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volume, chapter or section number, it is inserted between the date and page number, 
e.g. Burckhardt (2014), vol.4, p.85. The full reference for all non-Nietzsche works 
is provided in the footnotes on the first occasion that any such work is cited. These 
works are then listed in full in the bibliography at the end of this thesis. 
 
 
NIETZSCHE’S WRITINGS  
 
Emphases in Nietzsche’s writings: normal emphases (= “Kampf” in KSA) are 
rendered as underlined. Further emphases (“Krieg” in KSA) are double underlined. 
Interventions / omissions: any interventions in citations by the author, including 
insertions of original German words, are indicated by square brackets: []. Any 
omissions by the author are also inserted in square brackets […] in order to 
distinguish them from Nietzsche’s own ellipses. 
References to Nietzsche’s published / titled texts: these follow the standard 
abbreviations given in Nietzsche-Studien under ‘Siglen’, and are listed below. 
I have used German abbreviations, followed by the section / aphorism number (e.g. 
JGB 12; GM I 13). For sections / chapters that are not numbered but named, 
abbreviations have been devised for easy identification, e.g.: 
Götzen-Dämmerung, “Das Problem des Sokrates”, Section 3 = GD Sokrates 3. 
Also sprach Zarathustra, zweiter Theil, “Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung” = Z II 
Ueberwindung. 
Page references, where given, are to the relevant passage in the KSA. The format is 
as follows: 
 8 
EH klug 9 6.294f. (Ecce homo. Wie man wird, was man ist, “Warum ich so klug 
bin”, Aphorism 9, KSA Volume 6, page 294f.). 
References to the Nachlass (NL) in KSA follow the notation in KSA followed by 
volume and page, e.g. NL 2[15] 12.78f. = Nachlass note 2[15] in KSA Volume 12, 
page 78f. 
References to the Nachlass in KGW give the volume, part, note and page,  
e.g. KGW I/4 62[7], p.551 = Nachlass note 62[7] in KGW Volume 1, Part 4, page 
551. 
References to Nietzsche’s letters include the volume, part, and page number in the 
KGB, 
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Z II Gesindel  “Vom Gesindel” 
Z II Taranteln  “Von den Taranteln” 
Z II Weisen  “Von den berühmten Weisen” 
Z II Nachtlied  “Das Nachtlied” 
Z II Tanzlied  “Das Tanzlied” 
Z II Grablied  “Das Grablied” 
Z II Selbst-Ueberwindung  “Von der Selbst-Ueberwindung” 
Z II Erhabenen  “Von den Erhabenen” 
Z II Bildung  “Vom Lande der Bildung” 
Z II Erkenntniss  “Von der unbefleckten Erkenntniss” 
Z II Gelehrten  “Von den Gelehrten” 
Z II Dichtern  “Von den Dichtern” 
Z II Ereignissen  “Von grossen Ereignissen” 
Z II Wahrsager  “Der Wahrsager” 
Z II Erlösung  “Von der Erlösung” 
Z II Menschen-Klugheit  “Von der Menschen-Klugheit” 
Z II Stunde  “Die stillste Stunde” 
 
Z III [Dritter Theil] 
Z III Wanderer  “Der Wanderer” 
Z III Räthsel  “Vom Gesicht und Räthsel” 
Z III Seligkeit  “Von der Seligkeit wider Willen” 
Z III Sonnen-Aufgang  “Vor Sonnen-Aufgang” 
Z III Tugend  “Von der verkleinernden Tugend” 
Z III Oelberge  “Auf dem Oelberge” 
Z III Vorübergehen  “Vom Vorübergehen” 
Z III Abtrünnigen  “Von den Abtrünnigen” 
Z III Heimkehr  “Die Heimkehr” 
Z III Bösen  “Von den drei Bösen” 
Z III Schwere  “Vom Geist der Schwere” 
 13 
Z III Tafeln  “Von alten und neuen Tafeln” 
Z III Genesende  “Der Genesende” 
Z III Sehnsucht  “Von der grossen Sehnsucht” 
Z III Tanzlied  “Das andere Tanzlied” 
Z III Siegel  “Die sieben Siegel (Oder: das Ja- und 
Amen-Lied)” 
 
Z IV [Vierter und letzter Theil] 
 
Z IV Honig-Opfer  “Das Honig-Opfer” 
Z IV Nothschrei  “Der Nothschrei” 
Z IV Königen  “Gespräch mit den Königen” 
Z IV Blutegel  “Der Blutegel” 
Z IV Zauberer  “Der Zauberer” 
Z IV Dienst  “Ausser Dienst” 
Z IV Mensch  “Der hässlichste Mensch” 
Z IV Bettler  “Der freiwillige Bettler” 
Z IV Schatten  “Der Schatten” 
Z IV Mittags  “Mittags” 
Z IV Begrüssung  “Die Begrüssung” 
Z IV Abendmahl  “Das Abendmahl” 
Z IV Menschen  “Vom höheren Menschen” 
Z IV Schwermuth  “Das Lied der Schwermuth” 
Z IV Wissenschaft  “Von der Wissenschaft” 
Z IV Wüste Unter  “Töchtern der Wüste” 
Z IV Erweckung  “Die Erweckung” 
Z IV Eselsfest  “Das Eselsfest” 
Z IV Nachtwandler-Lied  “Das Nachtwandler-Lied” 
Z IV Zeichen  “Das Zeichen” 
 












WORKS BY OTHER AUTHORS 
 
BP:  Rolph, Wilhelm, Biologische Probleme zugleich als Versuch zur 
Entwicklung einer rationellen Ethik (Leipzig: Verlag von Wilhelm 
Engelmann, 1881). 
 
DWB:  Grimm, Jacob and Grimm, Wilhelm, Deutsches Wörterbuch, 25 vols 
(München: DTV, 1854ff.). 
 
KdU:   Kant, Emmanuel, Kritik der Urteilskraft, in Königlich Preussische 
Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Kant's gesammelte Schriften, 
“Akademieausgabe”, 29 vols (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1922), vol.5. 
 
KTO: Roux, Wilhelm, Kampf der Theile im Organismus: Ein Beitrag zur 
Vervollständigung der mechanischen Zweckmässigkeitslehre (Leipzig: 
Wilhem Engelmann Verlag, 1881). 
 
WWV: Schopenhauer, Arthur, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 2 vols 








Ai! let strife and rancour 
perish from the lives of gods and men… 
(Homer, Iliad, XVIII, l.107)1 
 
One must realize that war is shared and 
Conflict is Justice, 
and that all things come to pass […] 
in accordance with conflict. 
(Heraclitus, fragment LXXXII)2 
 
The disagreement between Heraclitus and Homer’s Achilles depicted in our 
epigraph clearly reveals the ancient origins of the philosophical theme with which 
this thesis will be concerned – namely, conflict. The prevalence of this theme 
throughout the subsequent history of philosophy further indicates that our desire to 
understand the nature of conflict is deeply rooted in our nature as thinking beings; 
indeed, it represents a leitmotif running through the works of Hobbes, Rousseau, 
Kant, Hegel and Heidegger, to name but a few. At some level, most of us are 
undoubtedly inclined to agree with Achilles insofar as we take war to be harmful 
and strive to resolve the various personal conflicts that arise in our lives in the sincere 
belief that we will be better off for doing so. Nonetheless, we can also no doubt 
appreciate Heraclitus’ argument in favour of conflict insofar as it is hard to deny that 
struggle represents an essential part of the natural world and that our most valued 
achievements are usually wrought of contention either with others or ourselves. But 
                                                      
1 Homer, Iliad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
2 Charles Kahn, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), p.67. 
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does this make Achilles naïve for yearning to bring an end to the kind of strife 
depicted in the Iliad? 
As the OED tells us, the term “conflict” is a Latinate term, “the participial 
stem of conflīgĕre to strike together, clash, conflict, contend, fight […], < con- 
together + flīgĕre to strike”. Under this broad notion of “striking together”, we also 
have the general definition of conflict as a “prolonged struggle”; then a more 
specific, physical definition of it as “fighting, contending with arms, martial strife”; 
a psychological definition that describes it as a “mental or spiritual struggle within 
a man”; and an epistemological or ideological definition of it as the “clashing or 
variance of opposed principles, statements, arguments, etc.”; finally, we find a non-
anthropomorphic definition of conflict as the “[d]ashing together, collision, or 
violent mutual impact of physical bodies”, or “the strife of natural forces”.3 It thus 
becomes quickly apparent that Heraclitus’ quarrel with Homer presents us with a 
false dichotomy – conflict is neither simply “good” nor “bad” per se. It is rather a 
complex concept used to index a wide range of relations, each of which may be said 
to have good or bad effects depending on the circumstances in which they occur and 
the standpoint of the individual making the relevant value judgement.4 
Before we approach the first task of assessing the value of conflict and the 
ways in which we might go about cultivating “good” conflict and suppressing “bad” 
conflict, we thus need to designate as clearly as possible what we mean by conflict. 
Insofar as this demands drawing a clear conceptual map of the notion of conflict, 
and critically assessing the justifications for why we might value particular forms of 
conflict over others, our endeavour is an unambiguously philosophical one. In the 
following thesis, I will be arguing not just that Nietzsche should be considered 
among the wealth of philosophers to have engaged with these problems, but that he 
has contributed a great deal more to resolving them than has hitherto been 
                                                      
3 OED, “conflict, n.” and “conflict, v.” 
4 And indeed, a closer examination of the opposition of Heraclitus and Homer’s Achilles 
reveals that they are largely talking about different forms of conflict, though an investigation 
of this is not our current purpose. 
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acknowledged. This said, fully appreciating Nietzsche’s contribution demands 
extensive interpretive work. In this introduction, I will briefly make the case for why 
this interpretive work is so exigent before giving an outline of the overall structure 
of the thesis. 
1. DETERMINING THE MEANING OF CONFLICT 
In his “Jasagen zu Gegensatz und Krieg” (EH GT 3 6.313), Nietzsche proclaimed 
himself to be carrying the torch for Heraclitus, “in dessen Nähe überhaupt [ihm] 
wärmer, [ihm] wohler zu Muthe wird als irgendwo sonst” (EH GT 3 6.312-3). Thus, 
he celebrates the fact that life (“Leben”) “Kampf sein muss” (Z II Selbst-
Ueberwindung 4.148), and more specifically, a Kampf for the “Überwältigung des 
Fremden und Schwächeren, […] Einverleibung und mindestens, mildestens, 
Ausbeutung” (JGB 259); moreover, he entreats his readers to cherish peace only “als 
Mittel zu neuen Kriegen” (Z I Kriegsvolk 4.58);5 in GT he urges us to engage in a 
“Kampf mit der Ausscheidung” of the redundant aspects of ourselves and society  
(GT 23 1.149); he advocates “kriegführen mit sich” (JGB 200); he writes that 
without Kampf, “wird alles schwach, Mensch und Gesellschaft” (NL 11[193] 9.517); 
and finally, he famously praises the ancient Greek love of “Wettkampf” or “agon” 
as the basis of their cultural prowess, asserting that “ihre ganze Kunst ist nicht ohne 
Wettkampf zu denken” (MA 170).   
However, foregoing any prejudices we might have about Nietzsche, the 
object of these exaltations is prima facie unclear. Dictionaries of (the history of) 
German reveal that the noun “Kampf” rivals its English analogue “conflict” in its 
ambiguity, signifying not only a “physiches (bewaffnetes) Ringen um den Sieg”, but 
also “‘Wettkampf’ [vor allem] im Sport” and “ideolog[isches] [beziehungsweise] 
geistiges Ringen”.6 Perhaps we might think that Krieg has a more univocally martial 
                                                      
5 See also Z IV Koenige 2 4.307. 
6 Hermann Paul, Deutsches Wörterbuch (Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, 1992), pp.446-7. 
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connotation. Indeed, Herman Paul’s dictionary describes how it came to replace the 
late-Medieval German term urliuge (which could be used to refer to any armed form 
of conflict); yet Paul also indicates that, historically speaking, Krieg had the far more 
general signification of “jede Art von Feindseligkeit” or “Streit (auch mit Worten)”.7 
What should further deter us from jumping to hasty conclusions regarding 
the referent of Nietzsche’s celebrations of conflict is that the plurivocality described 
by Paul and DWB is reproduced in Nietzsche’s own use of the terms in question. 
This semantic ambiguity is perhaps most obtrusive when it comes to interpreting his 
social philosophy. Is his affirmation of Krieg an affirmation of murderous, martial 
struggle? Or is he affirming a non-violent, non-destructive form of conflict 
analogous to sporting contest or debate? Otherwise put, does Nietzsche 
controversially propose that we engage in modes of contest that involve the struggle 
to negate our opponents in an unrestrained, unmeasured manner, or in a restrained, 
measured manner? Or is the matter simply unclear and therefore indeterminable? 
Some, such as Nietzsche’s fascistic readers, have taken his discussions of social 
conflict as unproblematically referring to belligerent conflict; conversely, others 
have taken the opposite hermeneutic approach, maintaining that even where 
Nietzsche appears to be most overtly talking about martial conflict, this is not in fact 
the case – thus, Walter Kaufmann, who staunchly defends this position, asserts that 
“one may generalize that in most of [Nietzsche’s] notorious remarks about ‘war’ 
[…] the word is used metaphorically”, that is, to symbolise a spiritual war.8 In the 
context of the notion of Wettkampf, some have then argued that Nietzsche’s 
conception of agonal contest includes violent forms of conflict, where others have 
read it as a definitively non-violent mode of struggle. And we can bring forth textual 
evidence to support both of these opposed interpretations.9 Likewise, there are texts 
in which Nietzsche conceives of the exploitative struggle that he thinks constitutes 
                                                      
7 Ibid., p.490. 
8 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974), p.386. This issue is examined in ch.1 of this dissertation. 
9 This is outlined in greater depth in ch.2. 
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life as a naked, amoral and unmeasured form of conflict; yet there are also texts in 
which he characterises this struggle as intrinsically restrained and in some sense 
substituting for eliminative modes of opposition. And as we will see, interpreters 
have tended to emphasise one or the other side of this definition of vital exploitative 
Kampf.10  Finally, if we scrutinise the “Kampf mit der Ausscheidung” valorised by 
Nietzsche, we see that he sometimes describes this as a non-destructive act of 
excretion, which, while exclusive in an unmeasured fashion, is nonetheless 
conceived as an act of Freigiebigkeit that bestows fertilising dung on others (see e.g. 
NL 11[134] 9.492); yet at other times, he approximates Ausscheidung to a process 
of eradicating entities that have become harmful (see e.g. NL 23[1] 13.600).11 
 In the first place, then, our task is descriptive. As far as possible, we need to 
draw a clear conceptual map of the philosophical terrain upon which Nietzsche is 
manoeuvring. This involves identifying the key forms of conflict with which he is 
concerned and then enumerating the qualities that he most consistently predicates to 
each of these. Throughout this thesis, I will be defending the idea that, albeit with a 
certain degree of interpretive violence, we can usefully divide the principal forms of 
human conflict advocated by Nietzsche into four groups (though it is important to 
note that not all of these are mutually exclusive):  
 
1. Vernichtungskämpfe: violently unmeasured struggles to the death, in which 
adversaries vie to physically destroy one another. 
2. Wettkämpfe: measured, non-violent, non-exploitative struggles between 
approximately equal individuals or social groups. I will also be referring to 
these as instances of agonal conflict. 
3. Kämpfe um Einverleibung: measured struggles of individuals or social 
groups striving to exploit weaker entities without destroying them. 
                                                      
10 This is outlined in ch.3. 
11 See ch.3 and ch.4. 
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4. Unmeasured struggles for exclusion that necessarily accompany the 
struggle for Einverleibung – i.e. the repression (Unterdrückung), repulsion 
(Zurückstoßen), excretion (Ausscheidung) or destruction (Vernichtung, 
Zerstörung) of entities within one’s self, social group, or society that have 
become redundant or harmful. 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I will be concerned with conceptually clarifying (1) and (2), 
both discretely and in their relation to one another; I will then analyse the interrelated 
forms of conflict described under (3) and (4) in Chapters 3 and 4.  
This is of course not an exhaustive typology of the forms of conflict dealt 
with by Nietzsche (for example, we may also think of anarchic conflict as another 
category of interest). Indeed, throughout this study, I will be drawing on many of the 
subsidiary forms of struggle that I have had to sideline in making the above 
taxonomy; however, I believe that it is through an analysis of the aforementioned 
quartet of categories that we will be able to obtain the best understanding of 
Nietzsche’s positive normative stance towards conflict.  
2. DETERMINING THE VALUE OF CONFLICT 
In addition to the task of conceptually demarcating these different (though in many 
ways interrelated and overlapping) forms of conflict, we are faced with the further 
challenge of determining Nietzsche’s normative stance towards each of them. Close 
inspection of the writings in which he is specific in his use of the concept of conflict 
reveals that, somewhat confusingly, he can be found to both valorise and denigrate 
each of these forms of conflict. Thus, in his notorious essay CV 3, where he is 
indubitably speaking of martial conflict, he confesses to singing a “Päan auf den 
Krieg” insofar as he declares such conflict to be not only an irreducible aspect of 
human existence, but one that is fundamental to any healthy culture (CV 3 1.774). 
On the other hand, in CV 5, he assents to the Greek disavowal of the “böse” Eris 
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goddess, who symbolises those impulses that provoke men “zum feindseligen 
Vernichtungskampfe [sic]” (CV 5 1.787). In this essay, Nietzsche favours a form of 
measured conflict he calls “Wettkampf” or, after the ancient Greeks, “Agon”; 
notwithstanding these affirmative remarks, he also warns that the competitive 
“agonal” spirit almost invariably led to destructive, socially harmful instances of 
stasis when sanctioned in the political domain (see e.g. WS 226). Moreover, within 
the artistic domain, Nietzsche claims that agonal conflict bred supradominant 
individuals – such as Homer, for example – who stifle the contest; hence, his 
conviction that “[d]as Agonale ist auch die Gefahr bei aller Entwicklung” (NL 
5[146] 8.78). We find a similar ambivalence with respect to his views on 
exploitation. For instance, though he often affirms exploitation as a vital life-process, 
he also speaks critically of the attempt made by the weak to parasitically unite with 
the strong and exploit them for purposes of shelter and protection (“unterschlüpfen” 
[NL 36[21] 11.560]). Finally, he also equivocates over the normative status of the 
struggle to excise (ausscheiden) problematic parts of the self and society. Thus, 
Nietzsche censures the Christian practice of endeavouring to amputate one’s 
troublesome subjective impulses and to eradicate one’s ideological enemies (GD 
Moral 1-3); but despite this negative appraisal, he nonetheless calls for us to 
“beschneiden” problematic instincts (GD Streifzüge 41 6.143), and he infamously 
endorses “die schonungslose Vernichtung alles Entartenden und Parasitischen” from 
society (EH GT 4 6.313).12 
This cursory survey should demonstrate the plurality of normative stances 
that Nietzsche takes towards each of the four main classes of struggle delineated in 
the previous section. Needless to say, this seeming oscillation represents a 
significant threat to the practical applicability of Nietzsche’s thoughts on conflict. 
After all, how are we to incorporate such ostensibly contradictory recommendations 
into our practical existence? As always with Nietzsche, we might be tempted to 
attribute this apparent inconsistency to his often flagrant disregard for the principle 
                                                      
12 See Chapters 3 and 4 for more references. 
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of non-contradiction, and his desire to impartially scrutinise an object from as many 
angles as possible – what is often called his “perspectivism”. Such a conclusion, 
however, would be premature, and should only be permitted as a last resort, after a 
detailed attempt to identify some systematicity in his thoughts on conflict. 
This is not virgin territory. A whole line of interpreters precedes me in my 
attempt to establish Nietzsche’s normative stance towards conflict. However, rather 
than striving to render his diverse thoughts on this topic coherent, they tend to latch 
onto either his celebration of measured forms of conflict or his advocacy of 
unmeasured conflict. It is worth making a brief and somewhat simplified 
reconstruction of these two veins of interpretation.  
First there are those who have branded Nietzsche a belligerent thinker who 
unreservedly exalts unmeasured struggle, and particularly war. These are the 
proponents of the so-called “hard” Nietzsche. The individual most responsible for 
inaugurating this reading was his own sister, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, who 
conscripted him as intellectual support for German aggression in the Great War.13 
Subsequently, in his book, Nietzsche der Philosoph und Politiker (1931), Alfred 
Bäumler paints Nietzsche as a fascistic thinker, for whom the alternative to European 
nihilism was a militaristic form of German imperialism. In many ways, Heidegger’s 
Nietzsche of the 1930s and early 1940s can also be placed in this line of 
interpretation.14 No doubt on account of Nietzsche’s association with the fascist 
movement, anti-fascist thinkers similarly tended to calumny Nietzsche as a 
diabolical warmonger.15 This is what I will refer to as the militaristic reading of 
Nietzsche. 
While there had often been voices supporting a softer reading of Nietzsche 
(particularly in France), this had been largely stifled in the Anglophone world of 
                                                      
13 For an overview of this influence, see Steven E. Ascheim, The Nietzsche Legacy in 
Germany 1890-1990 (California: University of California Press, 1994) (see esp. p.142). 
14 For a critical analysis of this aspect of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, see e.g. Julian 
Young, Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 
pp.140ff. 
15 See the introductory sections to ch.1 and ch.2. 
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Nietzsche scholarship until Walter Kaufmann’s game-changing Nietzsche: 
Philosopher, Psychologist and Antichrist (1974), which sanitized Nietzsche for 
those of liberal political persuasions. Kaufmann made two related moves that are 
pertinent to our current discussion. As already mentioned, he proposed that 
Nietzsche’s commendations of war should be read as metaphorically signifying the 
spiritual war that Nietzsche wanted us to wage against our passions. Continuing this 
line of interpretation, he then sought to depoliticise Nietzsche altogether, arguing 
that Nietzsche is first and foremost concerned with private self-cultivation, which is 
centred on the non-destructive sublimation of our impulses.16 His anti-political 
reading notwithstanding, Kaufmann also brought Nietzsche’s early unpublished 
essay CV 5, with its marked social dimension, to the attention of Anglophone 
scholars. This is the essay (to which I have already referred) in which Nietzsche 
favours limited modes of social competition over and against martial conflict. With 
this rediscovery, a new line of Nietzsche research was initiated – one that tended to 
use this essay as a heuristic tool for dissecting Nietzsche’s wider philosophical 
project. These readers, who generally occupy a liberal-democratic standpoint, 
sought to repoliticise Nietzsche’s thought. However, in contrast to the earlier 
militaristic readings, they tried (and are still trying) to discover a more 
democratically minded Nietzsche, contending that the notion of contest we find in 
CV 5 is in fact exemplified in democratic contest. Indeed, they tend to argue that he 
seeks a transformation of unmeasured conflict into measured conflict, namely 
through the establishment of certain democratic political institutions. In this 
hermeneutic cluster, we find, among others, Christa Davis Acampora, William 
Connolly, Lawrence Hatab, David Owen, Herman Siemens, Tracy Strong and Alan 
Schrift. This is what I will be referring to as the agonistic reading of Nietzsche. When 
grouped with others such as Stanley Cavell, James Conant and Paul Patton (among 
others), who strive to read a more democratic impetus (though not necessarily an 
agonistic one) into Nietzsche’s works, we might say that these interpreters represent 
                                                      
16 Kaufmann (1974), p.306. 
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what can be called the “soft” Nietzsche. Crucially, these readers often either gloss 
over the texts in which Nietzsche is most unambiguously bellicose and unmeasured 
in his prescriptions, or they wilfully ignore these moments by labelling them 
anomalous, hyperbolic outbursts that should not be included in any serious 
consideration of his thought. 
In response to this tendentious aspect of the soft reading, however, an 
adapted version of the hard Nietzsche emerged. The chief objective of these readers 
was to vitiate the growing number of democratic appropriations of Nietzsche’s 
thought. They contended that the sheer weight of anti-democratic sentiments running 
through his writings renders such appropriations untenable. They redirected our 
attention towards the texts in which Nietzsche glorifies war, and they further 
emphasised his valorisation of an immoral, and often murderous, struggle to exploit 
and exclude the weak. In this group, we find Bruce Detwiler, Mark Warren, 
Frederick Appel and Don Dombowsky.17 These readers tend not to wholly ignore 
Nietzsche’s more democratic inclinations, nor his interest in the ancient Greek agon; 
however, they argue that these thoughts are largely confined to the early and middle 
writings, and so cannot be taken as representative of his mature thought, which they 
hold to be distinctly pro-aristocratic, if not proto-fascist. I will refer to this reading 
as the radical aristocratic reading. 
Though not all of these commentators fit neatly into the camps to which I 
have assigned them, this should suffice to illustrate that the secondary literature 
merely reinstates the discord we originally found in Nietzsche’s texts themselves. 
They either characterise him as a hard thinker, recommending unmeasured conflict 
or as a soft thinker, endorsing measured conflict. This is the main aporia with which 
the following thesis will be concerned. I will be arguing that neither of these poles 
of interpretation is adequate to Nietzsche’s thought. Against these readings, my 
thesis will be that both the early and the later Nietzsche can be read as valorising 
both measured and unmeasured social conflict.  
                                                      
17 See ch.3. 
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The crux of my argument will be that the type of conflict Nietzsche 
prescribes depends on the given conditions. Since he does not positively value any 
mode of conflict in an unconditional or universal fashion, but rather in a way that is 
always context-specific, the variegated nature of his prescriptions will be seen to 
generate no serious contradiction. Identifying these conditions will reveal, 
particularly in the later period, a considered and cogent set of suggestions regarding 
how we ought to manage the various forms of conflict in our lives. While I will be 
focussing on the exegetical task of formulating, in as charitable a manner as possible, 
a coherent view of Nietzsche’s philosophy of conflict, the ultimate aim is that this 
will also give us a novel set of arguments with which we can critically engage and 
which we can bring to bear on contemporary debates in ethics and political theory. 
3. OUTLINE 
In order to defend my thesis that Nietzsche should be read as promoting both 
measured and unmeasured conflict, I employ two argumentative strategies. In the 
first two chapters, I focus on illuminating how Nietzsche consistently valorises both 
Vernichtungskampf and Wettkampf, in both the early and later works. Thus, neither 
the exclusively measured, agonistic reading, nor the unmeasured, militaristic reading 
will be found to be adequate descriptions of Nietzsche’s early or later thought. In 
contrast, in the final two chapters, I argue that both the early and the later Nietzsche 
recommend a combination of measured exploitative conflict (incorporation) and 
unmeasured exclusionary conflict as a means to overcoming society’s ills. This dual 
struggle for exploitation and exclusion is what I will broadly call organisational 
conflict. It should be added that in maintaining that there is a parallelism between 
the early and the later Nietzsche, however, I am by no means suggesting that there 
is a relation of identity between the two. On the contrary, I will be arguing that 
Nietzsche’s thoughts on conflict undergo a significant transformation between these 
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two phases due to the combined effect of his repudiation of Schopenhauerian 
metaphysics and his figuration of the world as will to power.  
 In Chapter 1, my focus is on Vernichtungskampf and, more specifically, war. 
Against his agonistic readers, I contend that Nietzsche gives various arguments, 
throughout the corpus, as to why we ought to esteem mortal forms of combat. 
However, my further contention will be that, particularly in the early period, many 
of these arguments are underpinned by an ontology of destructive conflict that is at 
odds with the logic of Nietzsche’s agonistic project. Whereas the agonists see 
Nietzsche as calling for the transformation of destructive conflict, I call attention to 
both early and late texts in which he holds destructive conflict to be the result of a 
cathartic release of an essentially destructive metaphysical force – an idea he largely 
inherits from Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the will. Nonetheless, I maintain that 
the agonists are correct to identify a strong critique of murderous conflict in 
Nietzsche and, moreover, a belief that this kind of conflict can be transformed into 
more productive forms of contest. Indeed, I argue that his readings in the natural 
sciences in the 1880s, and his concomitant development of the notion of the world 
as will to power, lead him to redescribe physically destructive conflict as the 
contingent expression of a polymorphous impetus to release pent-up energy and 
establish relations of exploitation. Even within his mature worldview, however, he 
still gives a number of arguments for why we ought to positively value 
Vernichtungskampf under very limited conditions. Though this chapter will have 
carved out a coherent ontological space for Nietzsche’s transformative project (since 
now the energy behind destructive impulses can be given alternative outlets), I 
nonetheless conclude that there remains a substantial portion of Nietzsche’s thought 
that cannot be explained in agonistic terms.  
 Having examined the concept of Vernichtungskampf in Nietzsche’s thought, 
I then consider its counterconcept in Chapter 2, namely, Wettkampf or agon. Against 
the militaristic and radical aristocratic readings, I justify the claim that Nietzsche 
consistently values agonal relations, understood as a measured form of non-
exploitative and non-destructive conflict that takes place between approximately 
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equal adversaries. Before doing so, however, I survey the striking lack of consensus 
among current interpretations of Nietzsche’s agonism. First, as has been intimated 
above, it is unclear what Nietzsche means by Wettkampf. Some claim that it is a 
wholly non-violent form of conflict, whereas others deem it to be inclusive of certain 
kinds of Vernichtungskampf. Furthermore, there is disagreement as to the social 
conditions under which he thinks agonal relations are possible and desirable. Some 
maintain that Nietzsche at least implicitly supports the idea that such relations can, 
and should, be democratically realised across the whole of society; contrariwise, 
others argue that according to Nietzsche, agonism should only be endorsed, and 
indeed is only truly possible, in the context of an elite minority of equals. Finally, 
commentators dispute the means by which this transformation can be effected and 
maintained. Some defend the idea that Nietzsche’s agonism is secured by a self-
initiated change of attitude towards one’s opponents, while others submit that agonal 
relations can only be realised by means of establishing a balance of powers, within 
which individuals or groups are too equally matched to overpower one another. I 
invoke Nietzsche’s contemporaries – namely, Jacob Burckhardt, Ernst Curtius and 
George Grote – in an effort to demonstrate that these various impasses can be 
overcome by means of a historically contextualised understanding of the agon. I 
conclude this chapter by affirming that both the early and the later Nietzsche can be 
said to valorise the agon and that therefore the wholly unmeasured reading (be it 
militaristic or radical aristocratic) does not bear scrutiny. 
By the end of Chapter 2, I will have discredited attempts to understand 
Nietzsche’s normative project exclusively in terms of either a violently unmeasured 
or an agonistically measured struggle, both of which Nietzsche only valorises under 
very specific and rarely occurring conditions. In Chapters 3 and 4, I turn to UB and 
the later writings (1884-8) respectively so as to demonstrate how Nietzsche 
describes a conceptually unique form of conflict – viz. organisational struggle – that 
fails to fit the Vernichtungskampf—Wettkampf dichotomy. I further maintain that he 
prescribes this in a far more general manner than either Vernichtungskampf or 
Wettkampf as a solution to the pathology he sees plaguing modernity. I open both 
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chapters by arguing that this pathology should be understood as a problem of 
disgregation between the parts of the organisation in question – i.e. the behavioural 
impulses that go to make up our self, or the citizens and social groups of which 
society is composed. In both chapters, I maintain that the principal remedy that 
Nietzsche recommends for this condition is a measured struggle for the exploitation 
or Einverleibung of that which is serviceable, and an unmeasured struggle for the 
exclusion of that which is harmful. Together, these two conflictual processes 
compose the struggle to order discordant elements of the self or society into a 
functional hierarchy. Against the radical aristocrats, who describe exploitation as an 
unmeasured mode of relation, my contention is that Nietzsche’s conception of 
healthy exploitation is consistently measured. To support this thesis, I underscore 
how he describes such exploitation as a symbiotic relation in which the exploiter 
aims to preserve the exploited. On the other hand, I contest the softer readers who 
see the measured struggle for exploitation as replacing unmeasured forms of 
struggle – a claim that is defended at the level of the self by the sublimational readers 
(e.g. Walter Kaufmann and Ken Gemes), and agonistic readers at the socio-political 
level. In opposition to these, I maintain that, though the struggle for Einverleibung 
and exploitation should be understood as measured, it must also be understood as 
preconditioned by unmeasured conflictual processes aimed at the exclusion of that 
which is harmful or superfluous. In substantiating this argument, I seek to fully 
analyse the dual logic (of incorporation and exclusion) that constitutes the total 
economy of organisational struggle.   
In Chapter 3, I examine how Nietzsche initially configures this dichotomous 
struggle for organisation in UB. I argue that he adopts a quasi-Schopenhauerian 
descriptive model of how healthy organisation arises, which presupposes the 
existence of metaphysical essences or Ideas teleologically organising the entities by 
means of selectively overpowering and assimilating the opposed entities that they 
need in order to fully realise themselves. My claim is that this is a measured process 
insofar as what is incorporated is preserved in a position of subservience to the Idea. 
I then argue that Nietzsche applies this abstract model to the concrete problems of 
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individual and social disintegration. To this end, I explicate his quasi-
Schopenhauerian belief that gaining insight into the Ideas that are striving to guide 
our individual and collective development is a precondition of our actively fostering 
this struggle for organisation. Yet, in contrast to Schopenhauer, we will also witness 
Nietzsche placing a far greater emphasis on the way in which this assimilation is 
necessarily married to a struggle for the exclusion and excretion of the superfluous 
or incompatible aspects of the self and culture. 
I conclude Chapter 3 by demonstrating how the metaphysical claims 
demanded by Nietzsche’s early synthetic project are rendered impossible by his 
rejection of metaphysics; thus, in Chapter 4, I examine how the later Nietzsche 
reconceives of the foundations of organisational struggle in light of this 
development. I reconstruct how he develops a descriptive model of healthy 
organisation that draws on the natural sciences and is purged of metaphysics – 
namely, in his account of the world as will to power. According to this model of 
healthy life, purposeful organisation is figured as the result of certain forces within 
the self or society contingently taking control of the aggregate in question and 
struggling to organise its parts in accordance with their higher aspirations. Again, 
however, this shaping will be seen to consist in a dual process of, on the one hand, a 
measured struggle to incorporate useful entities within a hierarchy and, on the other, 
an unmeasured struggle to excrete or exclude those that fail to fit within this 
ordering. Whereas in UB this process was said to be initiated by means of gaining 
metaphysical insight into our essential selves or the essence of society, I conclude 
Chapter 4 by arguing that Nietzsche shifts his position so that it is now a purely 
immanent insight into the world qua will to power that enables us to initiate the two-
sided struggle for organisation. 
By way of conclusion, I summarise how the majority of Nietzsche’s mature 
thoughts on conflict fit into a coherent whole; that is, how he can be said to prescribe 
agonistic, incorporative and destructive or exclusionary forms of conflict under quite 
separate, and compatible, sets of conditions. I then tally the various ways in which 
Nietzsche, and our study of his thought, warns that misconceiving of conflict can 
 30 
have a seriously detrimental impact on one’s practical existence. In tandem with this, 
I close by gesturing towards how we might positively reformulate our conception of 









In today's predominantly liberal climate, it comes very naturally to us to read 
Nietzsche as fundamentally opposed to murderous forms of conflict; and certainly, 
throughout his oeuvre, he repeatedly articulates a preference for measured, 
productive forms of struggle (what he calls “Wettkampf” or “Agon”) over and 
against those of a more destructive ilk. Texts expressing this idea, particularly CV 
5, have recently been placed centre stage not only within Nietzsche scholarship, but 
also beyond, in liberal-democratic appropriations of his thought in political theory.1 
As these readers often point out, Nietzsche’s antipathy towards destructive conflict 
manifests itself at both a physical and intellectual or spiritual level insofar as he 
censures both murderous struggle and the analogous silencing or exclusion of 
geistige adversaries (which we will be considering in Chapter 4). In this chapter, 
however, I will be specifically focussing on Nietzsche’s philosophical stance toward 
physically destructive, inter-human conflict (hereafter referred to as PDC). This 
encompasses any struggle that is driven by the desire to physically exterminate one’s 
opponent – what Nietzsche calls Vernichtungslust. Under this rubric, I will be 
                                                      
1 On this trend, see ch.2. 
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considering everything from individual cases of murder and attempted murder, up 
to and including large-scale military conflicts.2 
The tendency to read Nietzsche as a primarily agonistic philosopher, hostile 
to PDC, can be viewed as continuing the legacy left by Walter Kaufmann’s 
concerted attempt to render Nietzsche’s thought palatable to modern liberal readers. 
According to Kaufmann’s pioneering interpretation, Nietzsche maintained that  
the barbarian's desire to torture his foe can be sublimated into the desire 
to defeat one's rival, say, in the Olympic contests; it can even be 
sublimated into the rivalry of the tragedians who vie with each other 
for the highest prize, or into the efforts of a Plato to write more 
beautifully than the poets – and the entire Socratic dialectic could be 
construed as a sublimation of the same ancient striving to overwhelm 
one's foe.3 
 
As we saw in the Introduction, Kaufmann then makes the further claim that 
Nietzsche only promotes martial conflict “metaphorical[ly]”, that is, as a means to 
promoting spiritual struggle.4 The key idea running through Kaufmann’s exegesis is 
that Nietzsche sought a transfiguration of destructive conflict into measured 
intellectual modes of opposition. In the same vein, Lawrence Hatab has defended 
the general claim that Nietzsche does not espouse “eliminative destruction” but 
rather a “creative, agonistic” form of negation “that advances over something 
without annihilating it.”5 This is a prime example of the so-called “soft” reading of 
Nietzsche on conflict, which constitutes the main target of the current chapter.  
Christa Davis Acampora’s Nietzsche, though perhaps not as “soft” as Hatab’s, is 
                                                      
2 It is acknowledged that war may not always destroy the opponent absolutely insofar as it 
often aims at the submission rather than the obliteration of the opposed military force. 
Nonetheless, as an activity, it consists of a multitude of smaller scale murderous engagements 
(battles). Indeed, Nietzsche explicitly groups murder and war together under the heading of 
Vernichtungskampf. See e.g. CV 5 1.784-5. See also NL 1[34] 10.18: “Der Krieg als die 
erlaubte Form des Nachbar-Mordes.” 
3 Kaufmann (1974), p.220. 
4 Kaufmann (1974), p.386. 
5 Lawrence Hatab, Nietzsche’s Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence 
(New York: Routledge, 2005), p.63. 
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nonetheless a direct descendant of Kaufmann’s Nietzsche – namely, insofar as she 
emphasises the transformative impulse that informs Nietzsche’s stance on PDC: 
“From early in his career Nietzsche was interested in how human capacities for and 
tendencies toward aggression, struggle, and resistance could be channelled, 
sublimated, or redirected.”6 The objective of the following chapter is to test the 
robustness of this cluster of related claims. I will contend that the “soft” agonistic 
reading has at best limited validity, since in both the early and the later works a) we 
find an ontology of PDC that, in certain cases, contradicts the possibility of agonistic 
transformation – i.e. he describes some PDC as a necessary and therefore, to some 
extent, immutable feature of human existence; and b) he can, under certain 
conditions, be said to valorise PDC. In this way, I will be arguing that he both 
describes and values PDC in a way that is incompatible with the agonistic reading. 
This is by no means an unexplored theme. Nietzsche’s normative stance 
towards PDC has already been the subject of much interpretive dispute. First, the 
agonistic readings of Nietzsche put forward by Kaufmann and his inheritors can be 
understood as both a critical backlash against earlier interpretations of Nietzsche as 
a proto-fascistic warmonger, as well as a positive effort to bring him into the liberal 
democratic fold.7 Yet, in CV 3 – part of the same collection of unpublished essays 
                                                      
6 Christa Davis Acampora, Contesting Nietzsche (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013), 
p.4. 
7 See e.g. Lawrence Hatab, A Nietzschean Defence of Democracy: An Experiment in 
Postmodern Politics (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 1995). On the agonistic counter-argument to 
Fascist readings, see e.g. Keith Ansell-Pearson, who states that “The real problem with the 
labelling of Nietzsche as a Fascist, or worse, a Nazi, is that it ignores the fact that Nietzsche’s 
aristocratism seeks to revive an older conception of politics, one which he locates in the 
Greek agon”, see An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), pp.33-4. Examples of readings of Nietzsche as a bellicose thinker 
can be found among his critics and supporters alike, see e.g. Bertrand Russell, History of 
Western Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2004), p.693; or Alfred Bäumler, Nietzsche, der 
Philosoph und Politiker (Leipzig: Reclam, 1931), pp.63ff. and pp.172ff.; Ernst Nolte, Der 
Faschismus in seiner Epoche (Munich: Piper, 1963), see esp. pp.533-4. For an overview of 
the extent to which Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche was responsible for propagating this image 
of her brother, see Christian Niemeyer, entry for “Krieg”, in Christian Niemeyer (ed.), 
Nietzsche-Lexikon (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2009), pp.186–90 
(pp.188-9). 
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as CV 5 – Nietzsche presents us with a valorisation of war that would seem to lend 
at least some credibility to the interpretation of his thought as belligerently proto-
fascist; furthermore, in MA, he repeatedly avows the socially beneficial effects of 
war; and later, in GM, in his notorious portrayal of the violent, pillaging blond 
beasts, he again appears to unscrupulously affirm PDC.8 While some cite these texts 
to present Nietzsche’s normative project as one brutally advocating PDC,9 his 
agonistic readers tend to disregard, if not consciously suppress, them.10  
Drawing on these and other texts, I therefore propose to give a balanced 
reconstruction of Nietzsche’s affirmative thoughts on PDC. Aside from mediating 
between agonistic and militaristic (or radical aristocratic) interpretations, the 
original contribution of this chapter is its analysis of the different ontologies 
underpinning his multifarious stances towards PDC. It is worthwhile giving a brief 
précis of my critical exegesis. Thus, in Section 1, I focus on CV 3 in order to unpack 
Nietzsche’s early thoughts on PDC. I argue that he uses an amalgam of Aristotle’s 
notion of catharsis and Schopenhauerian metaphysics to generate an ontology of 
PDC according to which it is construed as the expression of an essentially destructive 
and unstoppably accreting drive or behavioural disposition. While we may be able 
to contain this impetus, it can neither be extinguished nor transformed – and if 
contained, it demands raw periodic release. On these grounds, I maintain that in this 
early text Nietzsche presents PDC as a metaphysical necessity.  
In Section 2, I make an inquiry into the non-metaphysical conceptions of 
PDC that he develops in the wake of his rejection of Schopenhauerian metaphysics. 
In doing so, I largely concentrate on Nietzsche’s middle period (though I also 
                                                      
8 GM I 11 5.275. 
9 See e.g. Fredrick Appel, Nietzsche contra Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1999). Appel, 
speaking of Nietzsche’s “sympathetic account of [the] unleashing of murderous destruction” 
in GM I 11, asserts that “although the ‘blond beast’ is gone forever, Nietzsche appears intent 
on encouraging something like a modern analogue to his beast of prey-like ‘innocent 
conscience’” (p.147). Don Dombowsky draws on CV 3 to defend a militaristic vision of 
Nietzsche in Nietzsche and Napoleon: The Dionysian Conspiracy (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 2014) (p.75), and Nietzsche’s Machiavellian Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004) (pp.89-96).  
10 See e.g. Acampora (2013), who does not once refer to either CV 3 or GM I 11. 
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consider CV 5). I begin by outlining his rejection of metaphysics before briefly 
considering the model of agonal transformation that he constructs in CV 5 and MA. 
My reading brings into relief precisely how this model presupposes an ontology of 
PDC that contradicts the ontology developed in CV 3.11 Despite this apparent shift 
to agonism, in latter half of this section, I argue that even in MA, Nietzsche 
vociferously praises war on account of the purely realist observation that it 
stimulates weary cultures.   
In Section 3, I then turn to Nietzsche’s later conception of PDC. I commence 
with an analysis of GM, which we will see betrays a brief reversion to the earlier 
cathartic model of PDC as a human necessity (though now purged of metaphysics). 
Nonetheless, I argue that we ought to treat this as an anomaly since, from 1881 
onwards, Nietzsche’s thought is rather dominated by a novel ontology of PDC. This 
ontology, which is informed by the scientific theory of Robert Mayer, will be seen 
to be perfectly compatible with Nietzsche’s agonism insofar as it posits PDC as 
wholly transformable. I nonetheless conclude that, although Nietzsche does endorse 
agonism, and formulate an ontology of PDC that is coherent with this endorsement, 
there is sufficient counterevidence to reject the overgeneralising claim of his 






                                                      
11 Unlike many of his interpreters, Nietzsche prefers the adjective “agonal” to that of 
“agonistic”, and so in the context of his thought I will employ the former. 
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1.2. THE EARLY NIETZSCHE ON 
VERNICHTUNGSKAMPF 
1.2.1. CATHARSIS, PURIFICATION AND DISCHARGE IN 
THE EARLY NIETZSCHE 
In order to get a bearing on how Nietzsche’s treatment of PDC can be understood in 
terms of catharsis, we should begin by outlining the various ways in which he 
conceptualises this process. The Greek noun “κάθαρσις”, from which the English 
“catharsis” originates, is standardly glossed as “purification” or “cleansing”12, or in 
German as “Reinigung”.13 As well as signifying the quotidian act of washing 
oneself, it can also take on the metaphorical sense of religious purification, or the 
act of washing away one’s sin.14 As we can see from Nietzsche’s own analysis of 
cathartic religious rituals in his 1875 lectures on “Der Gottesdienst der Griechen” 
(GDG), this metaphorical use exhibits varying degrees of symbolism. Thus, it can 
be used to signify the literal washing of the hands before dinner prayers, or the 
washing of a murderer with holy water so as to cleanse them of contaminating 
miasma [“µίασµα”]); but it can also refer to the act of cleansing a place of worship 
with holy smoke (“Weihgerauch”).15 
There is then the medical signification of catharsis. According to 
Hippocratic medicine, the body is composed of four humours or fluids that must be 
kept in harmonious balance if the individual is to remain healthy. Catharsis refers to 
the process of purgation that must be undertaken should one of these humours reach 
                                                      
12 See Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1961), entry for “κάθαρσις” (p.851). 
13 See Wilhelm Pape, Handwörterbuch der griechischen Sprache: Griechisch-deutsches 
Handwörterbuch (Braunschweig: Vieweg & Sohn, 1914), vol.1, p.1282. 
14 See Peter Thomas, “Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism: Catharsis”, Historical 
Materialism, 17 (2009), 259-264 (p.259). 
15 See GDG, KGW II/5, pp.504-11. See pp.504-14 for Nietzsche’s treatment of catharsis. 
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a pathological excess in a particular part, or the whole, of the body.16 We might 
compare this to the English verb “to let” (e.g. in the sense of “bloodletting”). An 
excess of black bile was held to be particularly problematic, though it was believed 
that this could be purged through either the ingestion of a drug or the performance 
of certain religious rites.17 
 Finally, there is the aesthetic meaning, which we first find in Aristotle’s 
Poetics, and which since then has been interpreted variously. Aristotle famously, yet 
ambiguously, theorised that one of the main functions of tragedy was to facilitate the 
catharsis of spectators’ feelings of fear and pity.18 Yet the brevity of Aristotle’s 
remarks, both in the Poetics and Politics, ignited a lengthy and on-going philological 
dispute. As it concerns us, this debate can be divided between the contrary 
interpretations of Lessing and Bernays. The former, in his Hamburger Dramaturgie, 
argues that tragic catharsis was a process by which passions undergo moral 
purification (“Reinigung”) and are thereby transformed into practical virtues.19 As 
an example, he draws on André Dacier’s hypothesis that going through the 
compassionate and fearful experience of watching a tragic character’s downfall 
renders the possibility of our being personally struck by similar misfortunes less 
fearsome: since we are acquainted with the possibility of such occurrences, their 
fear-inspiring element of surprise is undermined and we should be able to face them 
with greater fortitude should they actually come to pass. Thus, the outburst of 
                                                      
16 See also Liddell and Scott (1940) (p.851), who give a selection of references to the relevant 
places in Galen’s and Hippocrates’ works where this definition is evidently in play. See also 
Aristotle, Problems, 864b12-864b27, for evidence that Aristotle was well acquainted with 
this medical practice. 
17 See Adnan K. Abdulla, Catharsis in Literature (Indiana: Indiana UP, 1985), p.14. See the 
entire of ch.1 of Abdulla’s analysis for an excellent survey of the historical meanings of 
catharsis. 
18 See Aristotle, Poetics, 49b27; see also Aristotle, Politics, 1341b20-1341b32 for a slightly 
more complete and politically relevant treatment of catharsis. All references to Aristotle are 
taken from Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1991). 
19 Gotthold Lessing, Hamburgische Dramaturgie (Stuttgart, G. J. Göschen, 1890), 
pt.LXXVIII (January 29, 1768), p.262. 
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emotion evoked by tragedy has the power to transfigure the foible of fear into the 
noble virtue of courage.20  
Jacob Bernays, however, takes issue with both the vagueness and 
philological inaccuracy of Lessing’s exegesis. Through a close and historically 
contextualised reading of Aristotle, Bernays maintains that Aristotle’s use of the 
term “catharsis” should instead be understood in relation to term’s meaning within 
ancient Greek medicine.21 Bernays argues that when transferred from the medical 
into the psychological domain by Aristotle, the notion of catharsis nonetheless still 
implies the discharge (“Entladung”), but not transformation (“Verwandlung”) or 
further suppression (“Zurückdrängung”), of a pathological accretion; however, now 
it is a case of an accretion of affects as opposed to humours.22 While the originality 
of his medical interpretation may be questionable, it was certainly influential insofar 
as it inaugurated the now commonplace translation of “κάθαρσις” as “Entladung”.23 
 There is strong evidence to suggest that Nietzsche was aware of, and 
adopted, Bernays’ conception of catharsis. We find this in another lecture, namely, 
GGL, in which Nietzsche tells us that religious ceremonies could purge not just sin, 
but also overloaded affects. Through the performance of rhythmic music, the Greeks 
believed they could placate the gods by draining off their ferocity (“ferocia”); 
similarly, they were also of the conviction that art, by allowing a certain release, 
could be employed to regulate their own pathologically accreted affects (“krankhaft 
                                                      
20 Ibid., p.261. N.B. Lessing also criticises Dacier for believing that this one example 
exhausted the meaning of dramatic catharsis.  
21 Abdulla (1985) convincingly contests the originality of Bernays’ medical interpretation 
(p.17). 
22 Jacob Bernays, Grundzüge der verlorenen Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der 
Tragödie (Breslau: E. Trewendt, 1857), p.144. Here he describes Aristotelian catharsis as 
“eine von Körperlichem auf Gemüthliches übertragene Bezeichnung für solche Behandlung 
eines Beklommenen, welche das ihn bleklemmende Element nicht zu verwandlen oder 
zurückzudrängen sucht, sondern es aufregen, hervortreiben und dadurch Erleichterung des 
Beklommenen bewirken will.” 
23 On the issue of the originality of Bernays’ interpretation, see fn.21. On Bernays’ having 
established the standard translation of catharsis, see Glenn Most, “Nietzsche gegen 
Aristoteles mit Aristoteles”, in Martin Vöhler and Dirck Linck (eds.), Die Grenzen der 
Katharsis – Transformationen des aristotelischen Modells seit Bernays, Nietzsche und Freud 
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009), pp.51–62 (p.60). 
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gesteigerten Affekte”). In this way, tragedies, symposia and orgiastic cults would 
employ combinations of dramatic action, rhythmic music, or wine to induce a state 
of frenzy (“Taumel”) or excess (“Übermaaße”), which would in turn enable a 
discharge (“Entladung”) of these affects, thereby restoring inner harmony and 
equilibrium (“Gleichgewicht”).24 Thus, with his discussion of catharsis in terms of a 
raw or untransformed “Entladung”, and the lack of any mention of moral 
transformation, Nietzsche is ostensibly already operating with a Bernaysian 
conception of catharsis. The key features of this Bernaysian model of catharsis qua 
raw discharge can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. An initial pathological accretion of an affect; 
2. Stimulation or arousal of this affect to the point of excess; 
3. The subsequent unrefined, raw discharge of this affect; 
4. The final attainment of a healthy affective equilibrium. 
From GT, we can also see that Nietzsche was keenly aware of the dispute 
between Bernays and Lessing, speaking directly of “Jene pathologische Entladung, 
die Katharsis des Aristoteles, von der die Philologen nicht recht wissen, ob sie unter 
die medicinischen oder die moralischen Phänomene zu rechnen sei” (GT 22 1.142). 
However, in contrast to the aforementioned adoption of Bernays’ exegesis in his 
lectures, here Nietzsche rejects both theories as insufficient explanans of the effect 
of tragedy. In GT 22, he describes these interpretations of tragedy as evidently not 
those of aesthetically attuned individuals. The true function of tragedy is, according 
to Nietzsche, its ability to grant its audience an invigorating insight into the dark, but 
nonetheless joyful, Dionysian nature of reality – that is, the primal unity of the world 
                                                      
24 GGL, KGW II/5, pp.285-6: “Alle orgiastischen Culte haben den Sinn, die ferocia einer 
Gottheit auf Ein Mal zu entfesseln, damit sie uns nachher in Ruhe lasse [und] milde sei.” See 
also p.286: “Die kathart. Wirkung der Musik ist nun die, jene Entladung herbeizuführen, 
dadurch daß man die Seele schnell zu jenem trunkenen Übermaaße führt.” 
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underlying individuated appearances. In EH, Nietzsche again reiterates his earlier 
criticism of Bernays’ Aristotle, stating that people do not attend tragedies “um sich 
von einem gefährlichen Affekt durch dessen vehemente Entladung zu reinigen” but, 
rather, in order to be stimulated and to experience the pleasure of life even in the 
face of its strangest and most intractable problems (EH GT 3 6.312). 
 Notwithstanding these critical thoughts, the dynamic model of cathartic 
Entladung, as Glenn Most has demonstrated at length, recurs throughout GT.25 Thus, 
Nietzsche claims that in spectating tragedy we can be said to satisfy our need to 
“entladen” our “musikalische Erregungen”.26 And moreover, the musical satyr 
chorus of early Greek tragedy – representative of the “Ureine”, or noumenal world 
will underlying all appearance – is said to need to discharge (“entladen”) itself in 
Apollonian images; indeed, it was this choral discharging that gave rise to the 
dialogue and stage action of tragedy.27 As such, the full original title of GT, Die 
Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, is only explicated by Nietzsche with 
reference to a model of energetic economy that replicates the structure of the 
Bernaysian model of catharsis. What has hitherto not been observed, and we should 
therefore now examine, is the way in which the influence of this model extends 
beyond Nietzsche’s early reflections on aesthetics into his socio-political thought of 
the same period. 
                                                      
25 See Most (2009), pp.60-2. 
26 See GT 24 1.49-50: “Wir hatten unter den eigenthümlichen Kunstwirkungen der 
musikalischen Tragödie eine apollinische Täuschung hervorzuheben, durch die wir vor dem 
unmittelbaren Einssein mit der dionysischen Musik gerettet werden sollen, während unsre 
musikalische Erregung sich auf einem apollinischen Gebiete und an einer 
dazwischengeschobenen sichtbaren Mittelwelt entladen kann.” 
27 See GT 8 1.61-2: “Nach dieser Erkenntniss haben wir die griechische Tragödie als den 
dionysischen Chor zu verstehen, der sich immer von neuem wieder in einer apollinischen 
Bilderwelt entladet. Jene Chorpartien, mit denen die Tragödie durchflochten ist, sind also 
gewissermaassen der Mutterschooss des ganzen sogenannten Dialogs d.h. der gesammten 
Bühnenwelt, des eigentlichen Dramas. In mehreren auf einander folgenden Entladungen 
strahlt dieser Urgrund der Tragödie jene Vision des Dramas aus […]”. 
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1.2.2. SCHOPENHAUER, BERNAYS AND “DER 
GRIECHISCHE STAAT” 
One of the most explicitly political tracts from Nietzsche’s early period is CV 3. 
This unpublished essay was originally part of an early draft of GT (entitled 
“Ursprung und Ziel der Tragödie”), only to be subsequently removed.28 In CV 3, 
Nietzsche launches a thinly veiled attack on the early Wagner’s humanist conviction 
that higher culture requires the freedom of the ordinarily oppressed masses, which 
is in turn only secured through perennial social revolution.29 Another foil of CV 3 is 
Wagner’s later conviction that patriotic militarism is a blight for the state due to the 
fact that it threatens social stability.30 Remarking upon the violence, slavery and war 
inherent to the Greek state, Nietzsche seeks to counter the rosy, Christianised picture 
of the Greeks presented by Winkelmann and Schiller; what is more, he launches into 
a serious examination of whether such violence might in fact represent a 
precondition of higher culture. During this period, Nietzsche is profoundly 
concerned with identifying the grounds of a “wahre Kultur” – i.e., a noble, unified 
and artistically productive society. He takes ancient Greece as the prototype of just 
such a society; conversely, he views modern Germans as the epitome of a decadent 
                                                      
28 See KGW III/5, pp.142-55; compare NL 10[1] 7.333-49. Martin Ruehl has speculated that 
this was likely removed from the final draft of GT at the behest of Wagner. See Martin Ruehl, 
“‘Politeia’ 1871: Young Nietzsche on the Greek State”, in Paul Bishop (ed.), Nietzsche and 
Antiquity: His Reaction and Response to the Classical Tradition (Rochester: Camden House, 
2004), pp.79-97 (p.83). As Niemeyer (2009) has noted, however, there is nonetheless a 
distinctly Wagnerian vein of anti-Semitism running through the piece (p.187). However, 
Ruehl’s convincing analysis refutes Niemeyer’s later claim that CV 3 “darf allerdings, da er 
[CV 3] dem hier gesetzten Kontext (Wagner) unterworfen scheint, nicht pars pro toto 
genommen werden (und kann insoweit auch nicht erweitert werden dahingehend, N. sei 
hinreichend als ‘K[rieg]-Philosoph’ überführt)” (ibid.). 
29 See Richard Wagner, Die Kunst und Revolution (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1850), pp.40-5. 
For an insightful account of how Nietzsche’s rejection of Wagner and his defection to 
Burckhardt played a key role in the composition of CV 3, see Ruehl (2004). 
30 See “Über Staat und Religion”, in Hans von Wolzogen and Richard Sternfeld (eds.), 
Sämtliche Schriften und Dichtungen, 16 vols (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1911), vol.8, 
pp.3-29 (p.12). 
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pseudo-culture.31 In his endeavour to discover the roots of cultural health, Nietzsche 
rebels against Socialist and Communist visions of the ideal social condition as one 
of peaceful, substantive equality. For Nietzsche, this amounts to the forfeiting of 
culture altogether. Indeed, in his eyes, the state (Staat), along with the forms of 
higher culture enabled by the state, are predicated on slavery, and it is through war 
that such slaves are procured. Culture is thus the child of violence32; and as such, 
Nietzsche gorily likens “herrliche Kultur” to a “bluttriefenden Sieger […], der bei 
seinem Triumphzuge die an seinen Wagen gefesselten Besiegten als Sklaven 
mitschleppt”.33 
But how does slavery enable higher culture for Nietzsche? The answer to 
this is that, in many respects echoing Aristotle, Nietzsche thinks that the artistic 
genius is only afforded the leisure time he needs to produce his grand works of art 
by living off the surplus produced by a base of slave-labour.34 But this is not all bad 
for the labouring masses according to Nietzsche; now resonating with Wagner, he 
views the artist as dignifying, and even giving meaning to, their toilsome existence.35  
Once this pyramidal state, with its inegalitarian division of labour, has been 
formed by means of war, Nietzsche maintains that it then shields the genius from 
violent conflict for extended periods of time, allowing their works to attain fruition 
– constant war would constitute an impediment to cultural success. Thus, so far, his 
affirmation of war is limited to its role as a matrix for higher culture, though we 
should observe that cultural fecundity is clearly figured as the normative ground 
upon which Nietzsche’s praise of war is based. 
In probing the question as to how culture and violence might in reality be 
complementary rather than antagonistic, Nietzsche continues the realist legacy of 
                                                      
31 See CV 3 1.764. For more on this, see ch.3, §1 of this thesis. 
32 CV 3 1.767; compare GM II 17 5.324. 
33 CV 3 1.771; see also NL 1[10] 7.343. 
34 In Aristotle, we find the idea that freedom and higher modes of cultural praxis (particularly 
political praxis) are predicated on slavery. For an overview of this, see Terence Irwin, 
Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp.411ff. 
35 CV 3 1.776; compare Wagner (2015), p.26. 
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Jacob Burckhardt (and, before him, Machiavelli36). In the first part of Die Kultur der 
Renaissance in Italien (entitled “der Staat als Kunstwerk”), Burckhardt traces the 
way in which Renaissance states were forged through calculated and violent 
despotism. Drawing a causal relation between PDC and artistic excellence, he 
hypothesises that the violence committed by the Baglione family in fifteenth-century 
Perugia, where the twelve-year-old Raphael was growing up, was probably the 
inspiration for the painter’s masterful depictions of St. George and St. Michael.37 In 
Griechische Kulturgeschichte, Burckhardt is also at pains to highlight just how 
integral both slavery and wars of eradication were to the fabric of ancient Greek 
life.38  
As CV 3 continues, Nietzsche’s line of thought concerning war begins to 
evince distinct parallels with Bernays’ account of catharsis. At the same time, we 
witness Nietzsche developing a Schopenhauerian metaphysic to ground his belief in 
the inevitability of war (a belief that he in fact shared with Burckhardt and 
Schopenhauer alike). For reasons that will become clear, in order to fully appreciate 
the cathartic dynamic at play in CV 3, we need to begin by making an excursus on 
how Schopenhauer’s philosophy is covertly operating in the text.  
                                                      
36 See Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. by Harvey Mansfield (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), ch.14 (p.59): “[the Prince] should never lift his thoughts from the 
exercise of war, and in peace he should exercise it more than in war.” 
37 Jacob Burckhardt, Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien (Wien: Phaidon, 1934), p.18; see 
also “Der Krieg als Kunstwerk” (pp.58-60), where Burckhardt also draws a strong 
connection between art and war, showing how prevalent war was as an artistic theme among 
the renaissance Italians. On a similar note, in Griechische Kulturgeschichte, Burckhardt 
describes Delphi as “das große monumentale Museum des Hasses von Griechen gegen 
Griechen, mit höchster künstlerischer Verewigung des gegenseitig angetanen Herzeleids”. 
See Jacob Burckhardt. Griechische Kulturgeschichte: Alle vier Bände in Einem Buch (Berlin: 
Hofenberg, 2014) (vol.1, p.285). 
38 On slavery, see Burckhardt (2014), esp. vol.1, pp.141-58: “Es fällt uns einigermaßen 
schwer, ein Griechenland zu denken, das neben vier bis fünf Millionen Freier zwölf 
Millionen Sklaven, fast lauter ungriechischer Herkunft beherbergt hätte” (vol.1, p.146); and 
see also vol.4, p.258: where Burckhardt describes how, in fifth-century (B.C.) Greece, 
“Ausmorden, Verkauf in die Sklaverei, Verwüsten aller Pflanzungen, Ödelegen und 
Zerstören ist an der Tagesordnung.” 
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The early Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer and Hobbes in positing the 
natural state of humans to be one of bellum omnium contra omnes.39  But what are 
Schopenhauer’s reasons for making this claim? In WWV, the world is said to have 
two aspects: that of “Wille” (or “will”, in English), signifying the noumenal world 
in itself; and that of “Vorstellung” (or “representation”, in English), signifying the 
phenomenal world of objects and appearance. The world as will exists as an 
atemporal unity, which underlies all plurality at the level of representation, and can 
be described as a pathos of desire occasioned by a corresponding sense of lack – it 
is what Schopenhauer calls a “blinder Drang” (WWV I §34, p.246). At the most 
abstract level of the world as representation, there is then the atemporal plurality of 
Platonic Ideas. These are what Schopenhauer calls the “Stufe der Objectivation des 
Willens”, and they constitute the ideal form of every possible species of 
representable phenomenon (WWV I §25, p.187). But diverging from Plato, 
Schopenhauer describes these phenomena as striving against one another in an effort 
to realise their inner Idea at the level of appearances: 
Beständig muß die beharrende Materie die Form wechseln, indem am 
Leitfaden der Kausalität, mechanische physische chemische organische 
Erscheinungen, sich gierig zum Hervortreten drängen, einander die 
Materie entreißend, da jede ihre Idee offenbaren will. Durch die 
gesammte Natur läßt sich dieser Streit verfolgen, ja sie besteht eben 
wieder nur durch ihn. (WWV I §27, p.208)40 
The phenomena in which Ideas are embodied are therefore caught in a relentless 
struggle according to Schopenhauer. With respect to living organisms, this is best 
understood as the struggle over the resources that are requisite for survival and full 
development. This makes destructive conflict a metaphysically necessary 
characteristic of existence in a number of different ways. First, the situation is one 
also described by Malthus and Darwin, though now given a metaphysical basis: there 
is a superabundance of competitors in a situation of conflict over limited resources, 
                                                      
39 See WWV I §61, where Schopenhauer explicitly employs Hobbes’ phraseology (p.432). 
40 This text is cited in PHG 5 1.826 as evidence corroborating Heraclitus’ worldview.  
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which renders destructive contest an ineluctable fact of existence.41 The second 
reason is that these phenomena must also consume one another (as is evinced by any 
food chain).42 Indeed, with existence painted as a maelstrom of destructive struggle 
driven by an aching sense of lack, it comes as little surprise that Schopenhauer 
pessimistically interprets the world as marked by endless suffering. 
The underlying, unitary will of Schopenhauer therefore divides itself across the 
plurality of its phenomenal forms, and as these consume one another, so the will 
consumes itself. The will is thus said to be divided against itself (“selbstentzweit”),43 
caught in a state of restless hunger, lack and striving.44 As such, for Schopenhauer, 
the essence of the will is self-consumption45 and  -laceration 
(“Selbstzerfleischung”).46 This generates a third argument in Schopenhauer for the 
metaphysical necessity of destructive conflict: since every appearing form is an 
embodiment of the will, and must therefore reproduce its inner nature, “will Jeder 
Alles für sich, will Alles besitzen, wenigstens beherrschen, und was sich ihm 
widersetzt, möchte er vernichten”.47 We can syllogistically summarise this argument 
as follows: 
 
                                                      
41 See WWV I §56, p.403: “überall die mannigfaltigen Naturkräfte und organischen Formen 
einander die Materie streitig machen, an der sie hervortreten wollen, indem Jedes nur besitzt 
was es dem Andern entrissen hat, und so ein steter Kampf um Leben und Tod unterhalten 
wird”. See also Thomas Malthus, An Essay on The Principle of Population (London: J. 
Johnson, 1798), ch.3 and ch.8 (p.44); and Charles Darwin’s wedge metaphor in the first 
edition of The Origin of Species (London: John Murray, 1859), ch.3 (p.67): “In looking at 
Nature, it is most necessary […] never to forget that every single organic being around us 
may be said to be striving to the utmost to increase in numbers; that each lives by a struggle 
at some period of its life; that heavy destruction inevitably falls either on the young or old, 
during each generation or at recurrent intervals. […] The face of Nature may be compared to 
a yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp wedges packed close together and driven inwards 
by incessant blows, sometimes one wedge being struck, and then another with greater force.” 
42 See WWV I §27, p.208. 
43 See WWV I §27, p.208 and §56, p.403. 
44 See WWV I §56, p.403: “Eben ein solches rastloses, nimmer befriedigtes Streben ist das 
Daseyn der Pflanze, ein unaufhörliches Treiben.” 
45 WWV I §28, p.217: “[D]er Wille an sich selber zehren muß, weil außer ihm nichts da ist 
und er ein hungriger Wille ist. Daher die Jagd, die Angst und das Leiden.” 
46 See e.g. WWV I §51, p.335. 
47 WWV I §61, p.431. 
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The Metaphysical Reflection Argument 
1. The will is characterised by destructively conflictual activity; 
2. Every existing individual is an instantiation of the will; 
3. Therefore, every existing (human) individual is necessarily characterised 
by destructively conflictual activity. 
 
Despite the necessity with which individuals reflect the characteristics of the 
metaphysical ground, rule of law and state institutions can, says Schopenhauer, be 
used to supress such Eris (strife) within the sphere of human society. This is 
achieved by threatening, and imposing, deterrent punishment; however, says 
Schopenhauer,  
endlich wendet sich die aus dem Innern glücklich vertriebene Eris 
zuletzt nach außen: als Streit der Individuen durch die Staatseinrichtung 
verbannt, kommt sie von außen als Krieg der Völker wieder, und 
fordert nun im Großen und mit einem Male, als aufgehäufte Schuld, die 
blutigen Opfer ein […]. 48 
                                                      
48 WWV I §62, p.454. Compare Burckhardt’s argument that war is practically unavoidable 
(“unvermeidlich”): “Es gehört mit zur Jämmerlichkeit alles Irdischen, daß schon der 
Einzelne zum vollen Gefühl seines Wertes nur zu gelangen glaubt, wenn er sich mit anderen 
vergleicht und es diesen je nach Umständen tatsächlich zu fühlen gibt. Staat, Gesetz, Religion 
und Sitte haben alle Hände voll zu tun, um diesen Hang des Einzelnen zu bändigen, d. h. ins 
Innere des Menschen zurückzudrängen. Für den Einzelnen gilt es dann als lächerlich, 
unerträglich, abgeschmackt, gefährlich, verbrecherisch, sich ihm offen hinzugeben. 
Im großen aber, von Volk zu Volk, gilt es als zeitweise erlaubt und unvermeidlich, aus 
irgend welchen Vorwänden übereinander herzufallen. 
[…]Ein Volk lernt wirklich seine volle Nationalkraft nur im Kriege, im vergleichenden 
Kampf gegen andere Völker kennen, weil sie nur dann vorhanden ist; auf diesem Punkt wird 
es dann suchen müssen, sie festzuhalten; eine allgemeine Vergrößerung des Maßstabes ist 
eingetreten. (Jacob Burckhardt, Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen [Berlin: W. Spemann, 
1905], pp.162-3.) 
For Burckhardt, the necessity of war is based on an empirical-psychological, rather than 
metaphysical, claim: it is the desire to test one’s strength against another that leads so 
ineluctably to war. War is thereby conceived as a kind of measure or Maßstab. This 
compulsion for comparison (in many ways recalling Rousseau’s notion of amour propre) is 
posited by Burckhardt as an essential quality of man, and since the only way in which it is 
satisfied at an international scale is through war, he avers that it is almost inevitable that 
communities engage in military conflict with one another. As with Schopenhauer, even if 
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With this tendency towards Eris necessarily cumulating like a piled-up debt 
(“aufgehäufte Schuld”) within collective human existence, we can already begin to 
see an affinity between the dynamic described by Schopenhauer at a metaphysical-
social level and that described by Bernays’ Aristotle at the aesthetic-psychological 
level. We should now return to CV 3 in order to examine how Nietzsche brings about 
a more complete rapprochement of the dynamics respectively described by Bernays 
and Schopenhauer. 
One of the notable differences between (the early) Nietzsche’s and 
Schopenhauer’s will-based metaphysics is the recurrent reference to discharge 
(“Entladung”) that is so striking in the former, though largely absent from latter. This 
is particularly the case in CV 3. For Nietzsche, as for Schopenhauer, the will’s 
essence as inner contradiction (and self-consumption) must be reflected at the level 
of appearances;49 however, in CV 3, what the will ultimately strives to realise in 
appearance is genius, beauty and redemptive works of art. It is through these highest 
levels of objectification that the will can marvel at itself and attain temporary solace 
and redemption from its suffering.50  Yet Nietzsche, reprising an argument that can 
be traced back to Hartmann, holds that beauty and cultural development are 
foreclosed by the natural struggle for existence (that is, the “Kampf ums Dasein”).51 
These two originary tendencies by means of which the will manifests itself are, in 
the state of nature, incompatible – indeed, in this condition, the drive for art (“die 
zwingende Kraft des künstlerischen Triebes” [CV 3 1.766]) is fated to lose the battle 
against what Nietzsche calls the “Trieb des bellum omnium contra omnes”.  
                                                      
this compulsion must be granted periodic expression at an inter-community level, the state 
can nonetheless effectively force its suppression at an individual level. 
49 See NL 7[157] 7.199-200. 
50 CV 3 1.770-1. 
51 See Federico Gerratana, “Der Wahn jenseits des Menschen: Zur frühen E. v. Hartmann-
Rezeption Nietzsches (1869-1874)”, Nietzsche-Studien, 17 (1988), 391-433 (see esp. pp.418-
21). See also NL 7[24] 7.143-4. On the notion of the Kunsttrieb and its roots in Häckel and 
Schiller, see also Gregory Moore, Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp.89-96. Moore, however, misses the important Hartmann 
connection. Compare also WWV II §27. 
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For this reason, the state (Staat) is needed to impede or dam-up the Kampf 
ums Dasein for the sake of cultivating the will’s artistic impulse and, thereby, 
propagating culture. Echoing both Schopenhauer (and Burckhardt), though now 
using the vocabulary of “Entladung”, Nietzsche further suggests that the state cannot 
altogether inhibit the destructive structure of existence; rather, 
nach der allgemein eingetretenen Staatenbildung, concentrirt sich jener 
Trieb des bellum omnium contra omnes von Zeit zu Zeit zum 
schrecklichen Kriegsgewölk der Völker und entladet sich gleichsam in 
seltneren, aber um so stärkeren Schlägen und Wetterstrahlen. In den 
Zwischenpausen aber ist der Gesellschaft doch Zeit gelassen, unter der 
nach innen gewendeten zusammengedrängten Wirkung jenes bellum, 
allerorts zu keimen und zu grünen, um, sobald es einige wärmere Tage 
giebt, die leuchtenden Blüthen des Genius hervorsprießen zu lassen.52 
From this it is evident that, although the destructive “Trieb” for all-out war is 
depicted as irreducible, the political apparatus of the state is able to temporarily 
inhibit this proclivity, limiting it to short though severe outbursts of PDC. This 
ensures periods of peace and stability, during which the genius can work 
unhampered by the tumult of war; accordingly, this dynamic enables the flourishing 
of culture.53 While the general Kampf ums Dasein is negatively valued insofar as it 
constitutes an impediment to culture and genius, Nietzsche positively values 
belligerent explosions of PDC insofar as they facilitate the ends of culture.54  
In this depiction of a dynamic involving an energetic build-up followed by 
a qualitatively untransformed discharge, we bear witness to Nietzsche extending the 
Bernaysian model of catharsis to sociological phenomena.55 Further buttressing this 
reading, we find that Nietzsche expands upon this apology for war in such a way as 
                                                      
52 CV 3 1.772; see also NL 10[1] 7.344.  
53 See also NL 7[121] 7.169-70; cf. CV3 1.772-7. 
54 NL 1[10] 7.344: “Für diese Helena und ihre Kinder führte er jene Kriege: welcher Richter 
dürfte hier verurtheilen?” 
55 Though Nietzsche, unlike Bernays, employs this dynamic to explain the dynamic of certain 
“Triebe” rather than “Affekte”, the difference in this case appears to be minimal, as they both 
refer to particular behavioural tendencies, the latter merely placing emphasis on the 
emotional disposition underlying these tendencies. 
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to both bring more clearly into relief the influence of Bernays, and give the 
Schopenhauerian metaphysical speculation some empirical basis. Nietzsche 
specifically adds that the political drives (“Triebe”) were the means developed by 
the Greeks to supress the drive for all-out war, but these eventually became 
overdeveloped or overloaded (“überladen”). Such an excess of political activity had 
the adverse effect of hindering cultural development and fomenting violent political 
rivalries, culminating in revolution and war.56 Going beyond Aristotle (and 
Schopenhauer), Nietzsche therefore suggests that pathological accretion occurs in 
the very drives contrived to inhibit destructive conflict (i.e. the political drives). War 
ensues as a result, and the destructive energies accreted in the will are released or 
discharged in a quantitatively more condensed, but qualitatively untransformed, 
manner (in accordance with Bernays’, rather than Lessings’, account of catharsis). 
Nietzsche states that these violent releases illuminate how “der Wille von Zeit zu 
Zeit solche Selbstzerfleischungen als ein Ventil gebraucht, auch hierin seiner 
entsetzlichen Natur getreu.”57 Insofar as Nietzsche claims that these releases are 
required by the will in order for it to remain faithful (“getreu”) to its nature, it is clear 
that he is positing the “metaphysical reflection” argument as the necessary ground 
of this cathartic process. According to this ontology of PDC then, war is postulated 
as an obligatory lesser evil (the greater being a perpetual, pre-social form of total 
war). The argument advanced for the necessity of destructive conflict within this 






                                                      
56 CV 3 1.771. We may think of Burckhardt’s (2014) criticism of fifth-century (B.C.) Athens 
(vol.4, esp. pp.535-39). 
57 See e.g. NL 7 [121]7.170; 7[169] 7.205; 7[122] 7.175; 7[64] 7.153; see also GT 22 1.141; 
GT 4 1.39. 
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 The Bernaysian Catharsis Argument 
1. All humans are necessarily characterised by an irreducible drive for 
physically destructive conflict (as demonstrated by the metaphysical 
reflection argument); 
2. This drive can either be expressed continuously or in short concentrated 
bursts; 
3. Humans organised into a Staat impede destructive conflict; 
4. Therefore, humans organised into a Staat are necessarily characterised by 
an irreducible drive for physically destructive conflict that is expressed in 
short bursts. 
 
Nietzsche’s reasons for affirming PDC are now far more transparent: by discharging 
the drive for PDC in short outbursts of war, the now regulated (“reguliert”) – i.e. 
moderated and rehabilitated – political drives can be directed towards the generation 
of genius “mit neuer und überraschender Kraft”.58 Nietzsche therefore concludes that 
“in diesem Sinne ist das schreckliche Schauspiel der sich zerreißenden Parteien 
etwas Verehrungswürdiges.”  
In describing this dynamic as one that generates an end-state of healthy 
equilibrium (i.e. between the political, destructive and artistic drives) all four of the 
aforementioned criteria required to label a given energetic economy “cathartic” (in 
Bernays’ sense) have been fulfilled: there is an initial condition of pathological 
accretion, followed by a process of active stimulation and raw discharge, which 
culminates in the reattainment of a healthy state of equilibrium. Yet two questions 
now present themselves: what happens to Nietzsche’s position regarding destructive 
conflict when a) he definitively repudiates the quasi-Schopenhauerian metaphysical 
world-view upon which the Bernaysian catharsis argument is grounded?; and b) he 
embarks on a project calling for the transformation of destructive into productive 
                                                      
58 NL 7[121] 7.169-70: “Wenigstens pflegt der durch solche Ereignisse regulirte politische 
Trieb mit neuer und überraschender Kraft an der Vorbereitung der Geburt des Genius zu 
arbeiten.” 
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conflict? In the following two sections, I will endeavour to show how these two 
developments in Nietzsche’s thought problematize the cathartic model we have seen 
him formulate in CV 3. 
1.3. VERNICHTUNGSKAMPF AFTER 
METAPHYSICS 
As we have just seen, the Bernaysian catharsis argument is decisively grounded in 
the Schopenhauerian metaphysical reflection argument. But Nietzsche famously 
came to reject such metaphysical presuppositions; indeed, he had already 
adumbrated a damning critique of Schopenhauer in 1868, though this was shelved 
until the composition of MA. In this text, “Zu Schopenhauer”, Nietzsche states that 
“das eine Wort ‘Wille’ sammt seinen Prädikaten” is a “schwergemünztes, viel 
umschließendes Wort”.59 Although the world-will is supposed to exist in total 
isolation from the realm of objectivity, and therefore cannot even be conceived of as 
an object of knowledge, Nietzsche claims that, within Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, 
“die sämmtlichen Prädikate des Willens von der Erscheinungswelt geborgt sind.”60 
In terms of the published works, in the first part of MA, Nietzsche deepens his 
criticism of Schopenhauer’s Weltanschauung and commends the “strengere Logiker, 
nachdem sie den Begriff des Metaphysischen scharf als den des Unbedingten, 
folglich auch Unbedingenden festgestellt hatten, jeden Zusammenhang zwischen 
dem Unbedingten (der metaphysischen Welt) und der uns bekannten Welt in Abrede 
gestellt” (MA 16).61 
Nietzsche therefore reveals himself to be in favour of at least a return to the 
negative conception of the thing in itself as an “unfaßbares X”, à la Kant, if not the 
                                                      
59 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Zu Schopenhauer”, KGW I/4, pp.417-26 (§1, p.419).  
60 Ibid., §3 (p.424). 
61 See also MA 9, 13, 15, 17, 21. 
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complete abandonment of philosophical inquiry into the existence and essence of 
things in themselves (a position to which he would later wholeheartedly commit62). 
These lines of reasoning preclude the possibility that predicates such as “self-
consuming” and “self-lacerating” could be assigned to the world in itself (that is, to 
the will); indeed, it renders untenable the notion of there being any relation of 
reflection between the world in itself and the world of objectivity. With the failure 
of the metaphysical reflection argument, the Bernaysian catharsis argument of CV 3 
likewise falls – the reason for this being that the former is a foundational premise of 
the latter. By this logic, an unstoppably accumulating drive for PDC can no longer 
be metaphysically grounded. So, while Nietzsche does not directly take issue with 
the argument for the necessity of PDC that he presents in CV 3, we can see that with 
his apostasy from Schopenhauer (and metaphysics in general), it becomes simply 
unsustainable. It is perhaps unsurprising then that alongside his renunciation of 
Schopenhauerian metaphysics, Nietzsche begins to formulate alternative stances 
towards PDC, and it is to these that we should now turn our inquiry. 
1.3.1. THE PROJECT OF AGONAL TRANSFORMATION: A 
SKETCH 
One of the notable ways in which Nietzsche departs from the ideas of CV 3 is in his 
development of an agonal conception of PDC. Although I undertake a full analysis 
of Nietzsche’s conception of the agon in Chapter 3, it behoves us to briefly 
foreground the principal ways in which his agonism is at odds with the cathartic 
model of CV 3. It is in CV 5 that we discover the clearest delineation of this 
divergent conception of PDC, even though the essay was written in the same year as 
CV 3 (1872), and belongs to the same collection of unpublished essays. First off, in 
this text, Nietzsche is unequivocally critical of even short outbursts of PDC. Thus, 
he appears to concur with Hesiod’s indictment of the Eris goddess responsible for 
                                                      
62 See e.g. GD Fabel 6.80-1. 
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“Vernichtungskampf” (i.e. “den schlimmen Krieg und Hader”).63 Nietzsche 
censures PDC on account of its being antithetical to the productive, agonal conflict, 
symbolised by the “gute Eris”. It was this latter type of conflict that lay at the 
foundation of much of ancient Greek culture, and which characterised the contests 
fought among poets, politicians, musicians, athletes and dramatists (among many 
others). Nietzsche therefore implicitly calls for the transformation of 
Vernichtungskämpfe into these measured forms of contest; namely, insofar as he 
both tracks and exalts the way Greek (agonal) culture grew out of the condition of 
Vernichtungskampf that dominated Greece prior to Homer.64  
In CV 5, the figure of the genius (“Genius”) (particularly Homer) is 
portrayed as the instigator of this shift. He acknowledges the terrible impulse for war 
(the “so furchtbar vorhandenen Trieb”), and instead of falling into pessimistic 
resignation at the thought of its existence, asks: “was will ein Leben des Kampfes 
und des Sieges?” The answer to this, in CV 5 and MA at any rate, is that the drive 
(“Trieb”) achieving satisfaction in PDC is one fundamentally seeking contest and 
victory. Nietzsche no longer posits an essentially destructive “Trieb des bellum 
omnium contra omnes”. The drive at the root of PDC can, according to this account, 
be satisfied through an institution such as the agon, which grants people just such 
opportunities for contest and victory, though now through non-violent modes of 
conflict. By illuminating the potential for such transformation, the (poetic) genius 
can initiate the move away from PDC and towards agonal culture: “Der Dichter 
erzieht: die tigerartigen Zerfleischungstriebe der Griechen weiß er zu übertragen in 
                                                      
63 CV 5 1.786. 
64 See CV 5 1.785: “[W]ie sich in Wahrheit vom Morde und der Mordsühne aus der Begriff 
des griechischen Rechtes entwickelt hat, so nimmt auch die edlere Kultur ihren ersten 
Siegeskranz vom Altar der Mordsühne.” However, see also NL 16[26] 7.403, where 
Nietzsche still seems to be operating within a Schopenhauerian metaphysic: “1. Problem: 
wie wird der Wille, der furchtbare, gereinigt und geläutert, d. h. umgesetzt und in edlere 
Triebe verwandelt? Durch eine Veränderung der Vorstellungswelt, durch die große Ferne 
seines Zieles, so daß er sich im übermäßigen Ausspannen veredeln muß. Einfluß der Kunst 
auf die Reinigung des Willens. Der Wettkampf entsteht aus dem Kriege? Als ein 
künstlerisches Spiel und Nachahmung?” 
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die gute Eris. […] Die Gymnastik der idealisirte Krieg.” (NL 16[15] 7.398). In WS 
226, this picture is painted with greater clarity: 
Da das Siegen- und Hervorragenwollen ein unüberwindlicher Zug der 
Natur ist, älter und ursprünglicher, als alle Achtung und Freude der 
Gleichstellung, so hatte der griechische Staat den gymnastischen und 
musischen Wettkampf innerhalb der Gleichen sanctionirt, also einen 
Tummelplatz abgegränzt, wo jener Trieb sich entladen konnte, ohne die 
politische Ordnung in Gefahr zu bringen. Mit dem endlichen Verfalle 
des gymnastischen und musischen Wettkampfes gerieth der griechische 
Staat in innere Unruhe und Auflösung. 
It is the drive for victory (“Siegen”) and pre-eminence (“Hervorragen”), rather than 
all-out bellum, that is now figured as an immutable natural impetus 
(“unüberwindlicher Zug der Natur”). We can see from the vocabulary of Entladung 
that Nietzsche still conceives of this process in terms of cathartic discharge; and to 
be sure, during this period, he still views catharsis as fundamental to ancient Greek 
culture: “Die Nothwendigkeit der Entladung, der κάϑαρσις, ein Grundgesetz des 
griechischen Wesens. Ansammlung und Entladung in gewaltsamen, zeitlich 
getrennten Stössen” (NL 5[147] 8.79). In this note, we bear witness to the same 
dynamic of accumulation and discharge, yet, understood in the context of WS 226, 
we can assume that Nietzsche is not referring to the discharge of a drive toward PDC, 
but a drive for ascendancy. Of course, this drive can express itself destructively if it 
is not channelled into, and contained within, the correct social practices (such as the 
agon, for example). This also sheds light on VM 220, where Nietzsche attributes the 
cultural success of the Greeks to the fact that 
Sie leugnen den Naturtrieb, der in den schlimmen Eigenschaften sich 
ausdrückt, nicht ab, sondern ordnen ihn ein und beschränken ihn auf 
bestimmte Culte und Tage, nachdem sie genug Vorsichtsmaassregeln 
erfunden haben, um jenen wilden Gewässern einen möglichst 
unschädlichen Abfluss geben zu können.65 
                                                      
65 VM 220; See also NL 5[146-7] 8.77-9. 
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Reading this alongside WS 226, one way we might conceive of this Naturtrieb is as 
the aforementioned desire for ascendancy. Again, this drive demands expression, 
and so some form of cathartic model is certainly still at play (N.B. the hydraulic 
figurative language in the above quote); however, this drive is no longer conceived 
as intrinsically destructive or even harmful (i.e. schlimm) in nature – indeed, with 
the aid of the state, it can now be safely channelled away from its murderous 
behavioural component. 
CV 5 and the cited texts from the late 1870s all imply that PDC is neither 
metaphysically nor psychologically necessary (i.e. immutable); it is rather the 
expression of some polymorphous desire for combat, victory and overcoming (in 
many ways, as we shall see, prefiguring the notion of Wille zur Macht). Certainly, 
from CV 5 onwards, this idea of transfiguring destructive conflictual relations into 
those of a more productively conflictual character represents an enduring theme in 
Nietzsche’s writings.66 As should now be clear, however, this transformative model 
is contradicted by the cathartic account of PDC presented in CV 3. The reason for 
this is that these early and middle period texts are incompatible with the idea that 
destructive conflict is a metaphysically or psychologically necessary feature of 
human existence. From this perspective, the choice that CV 3 presented us with 
between perpetual and episodic war appears to be a false dichotomy. 
Before moving on, we should consider one objection to the incompatibility 
that I have purported exists between the cathartic and transformational models of 
PDC. Thus, one might counter that the situation is akin to that which Freud describes 
in his account of the psychological limitations of sexual sublimation: 
Ins Unbegrenzte fortzusetzen ist dieser Verschiebungsprozeß [d. h. 
Sublimation] aber sicherlich nicht, so wenig wie die Umsetzung der 
Wärme in mechanische Arbeit bei unseren Maschinen. Ein gewisses 
Maß direkter sexueller Befriedigung scheint für die allermeisten 
Organisationen unerläßlich, und die Versagung dieses individuell 
                                                      
66 This is also true of the later works, with respect to both physical and non-physical forms 
of destructive conflict. On physical conflict, see NL 7[161] 10.295; on non-physical conflict, 
see GD Moral 2-3 and EH Weise 7. 
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variablen Maßes straft sich durch Erscheinungen, die wir infolge ihrer 
Funktionsschädlichkeit und ihres subjektiven Unlustcharakters zum 
Kranksein rechnen müssen.67 
Perhaps PDC, like sexual energy in Freud’s picture of psychic economy, can be 
transformed up to a point, which always leaves an untransformable remainder 
resilient to sublimation. Maybe Nietzsche thinks that, rather than being wholly 
untransformable, our predilection for PDC is rather defined by a limit at which point 
individuals are compelled to engage in war insofar sublimational institutions such as 
the agon have become ineffective. However, the first problem with this attempt at a 
rapprochement of the cathartic and transformational models of PDC is that it lacks 
textual support. The only evidence for such an interpretation is in CV 3. In this text, 
we saw that “unter der nach innen gewendeten zusammengedrängten Wirkung jenes 
bellum”, the Gesellschaft is able “allerorts zu keimen und zu grünen”; however, this 
does not suggest a significant amount of transformation or canalisation of the 
accumulated destructive energies (if any). It merely implies, in a rather ambiguous 
manner, that they can be used while they are accumulating. But even if we assent to 
this charitable interpretive strategy, this is still not enough to rescue the agonistic 
reading of Nietzsche, since even this approach must still affirm the presence of an 
ever-mounting quantity of PDC, which is beyond our transformative efforts, and 
whose raw discharge must be sanctioned as a prerequisite of social health. The 
reading of Nietzsche as a general advocate agonism (à la Kaufmann, Hatab or 
Acampora), would nonetheless be vitiated. But CV 3 is not the only problem for 
agonistic readings. As I will now endeavour to show, in MA itself, we find that this 
line of interpretation is unable to account for further counterevidence. 
                                                      
67 Sigmund Freud, “Die kulturelle Sexualmoral und die moderne Nervosität”, in Gesammelte 
Werke, 17 vols ([London: Imago, 1940-1952] and [Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 
1966]), vol.7, pp.143-67. 
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1.3.2. NIETZSCHE’S REALISM: WAR AS A CULTURAL 
STIMULANT  
Even in MA, Nietzsche is not wholly committed to the project of agonal 
transformation. He also presents us with a realist account of the benefits of PDC – 
one that is purged of the metaphysical underpinnings of CV 3. But these realist 
reflections diverge from CV 3 in another important way. PDC is now praised insofar 
as it energises a community – that is, not insofar as it enables the discharge of 
energy, as in CV 3. This idea is clearly prefigured in Burckhardt’s 
Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen. Indeed, it is worthwhile sketching Burckhardt’s 
position in this text since this will grant us a richer understanding of Nietzsche’s own 
argumentation. Burckhardt quotes Lasaulx’s claim that for an old culture, which 
“nicht mehr eine gewisse Masse unverbrauchter Naturkräfte in sich trägt, aus denen 
es sich erfrischen und verjüngen kann”, being invaded by a younger, “kulturfähig” 
people can, in the long term, have a rejuvenating effect. As an example, Burckhardt 
cites the Teutonic invasion of the exhausted late Roman Empire. He nevertheless 
stipulates that, unqualified, this is a naively optimistic claim, and that suffering 
colonisation is by no means a guaranteed cultural boon; for example, the Mongols, 
argues Burckhardt, tended to have a merely detrimental effect on the cultures that 
they conquered.68 Notwithstanding, he maintains that suffering defeat in a war of 
colonisation represents a “notwendiges Moment höherer Entwickelung” for a 
people.  
Though passively suffering defeat in war is in this way praised by 
Burckhardt, he reserves his most laudatory words for the active pursuit of warfare – 
in particular on account of its enlivening, ordering, disciplining effects. On the one 
hand, according to Burckhardt, war has this beneficial effect due to the fact that it 
                                                      
68 Jacob Burckhardt (1905), p.161; See also Egon Flaig, “Kultur und Krieg. Antihumanismus 
bei Jacob Burckhardt und Friedrich Nietzsche”, in Richard Faber (ed.), Streit um den 
Humanismus (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2003), pp.137-56 (esp. pp.145-7). 
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both fosters the cultivation of heroic virtues and counteracts the cowardly foibles 
individuals develop during times of peace: 
[D]ie Kriege reinigten die Atmosphäre wie Gewitterstürme, stärkten 
die Nerven, erschütterten die Gemüter, stellten die heroischen 
Tugenden her, auf welche ursprünglich die Staaten gegründet gewesen, 
gegenüber Entnervung, Falschheit und Feigheit.69 
Compounding this, however, war also forces a society to order itself in what 
Burckhardt holds to be a vastly more economic manner: 
[D]er Krieg, welcher so viel wie Unterordnung alles Lebens und 
Besitzes unter einen momentanen Zweck ist, [hat] eine enorme sittliche 
Superiorität über den bloßen gewaltsamen Egoismus des Einzelnen; er 
entwickelt die Kräfte im Dienst eines Allgemeinen und zwar des 
höchsten Allgemeinen und innerhalb einer Disziplin, welche zugleich 
die höchste heroische Tugend sich entfalten läßt […]. 
Und da ferner nur wirkliche Macht einen längeren Frieden und 
Sicherheit garantieren kann, der Krieg aber die wirkliche Macht 
konstatiert, so liegt in einem solchen Krieg der künftige Friede.70 
Preparation for war unifies a social body by dint of the fact that individuals are forced 
to fight as one in order to overcome an external threat to their collective existence. 
In times of peace, Burckhardt argues, people become dissatisfied with structural 
social inequalities. The consequent demand for rights generates unrest and disunity, 
which in turn effects a general weakening of the social whole. By contrast, in times 
of war, all willingly submit to hierarchical organisation because all know this to be 
the most effective stratagem – it is in this way that Burckhardt thinks that egoism is 
overcome by the brute desire to prevail in the face of potential extermination.71 War 
mobilises a society, transforming it into a potently well-oiled war-machine.72  
                                                      
69 Burckhardt (1905), p.164. 
70 Ibid. 
71 However, as we shall see in the following chapter, in his Griechische Kulturgeschichte, 
Burckhardt is more sceptical regarding the cultural benefits of war (as compared with those 
of the agon).  
72 Compare FW 283. 
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Large-scale PDC is thus conceived by Burckhardt as an instance of cultural 
crisis. Recalling Kuhn’s depiction of scientific crises, which give rise to new 
scientific paradigms better able to structure a given discipline of knowledge, 
Burckhardt conceives of martial crises as the stimulant needed to reestablish social 
coherence. He adds, however, that modern wars do not qualify as crises on account 
of their being too small and temporary to touch upon the quotidian existence of 
European citizens; accordingly, such conflicts do not bless Europeans with the 
beneficial effects associated with “crisis” wars. Burckhardt presciently warns us that 
modern wars therefore merely postpone the coming “Hauptkrisis”. However, we 
should note that he also views it as perfectly possible for cultures to be simply 
eradicated by such crises without enjoying any of the aforementioned regenerative 
effects.73 
 But how does Nietzsche reprise and develop these themes? If we look at 
MA, we can see that he adopts Burckhardt’s commendation of war in almost all of 
its essentials. In MA 444, for example, he venerates war insofar as it “barbarisirt 
[…] und macht dadurch natürlicher; er ist für die Cultur Schlaf oder Winterszeit, der 
Mensch kommt kräftiger zum Guten und Bösen aus ihm heraus.” Like Burckhardt, 
Nietzsche thus maintains that even defeat can be beneficial insofar as it acts as a 
rejuvenating form of cultural hibernation. Taken on its own, this laconic affirmation 
of war is not particularly cogent. However, drawing on our analysis of Burckhardt, 
we can now infer the implicit rationale informing Nietzsche’s provocative 
assertions: suffering defeat in war can clear away the dross that encumbers a 
decadent culture, and though potentially devastating in the short term, can, in the 
long-term, reenergise that culture by fertilising it with new cultural influences. 
 But what about the advantages of actively engaging in war? While Nietzsche 
gestures towards these in MA 444, it is in MA 477 (entitled “der Krieg 
unentbehrlich”) that he properly elucidates his position. Moreover, in this aphorism 
we also witness him dramatically altering his stance with respect to the necessity of 
                                                      
73 Burckhardt (1905), p.164. 
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PDC (qua war).  Now such conflict is no longer conceived as releasing accrued 
energy, but rather creating or augmenting it. Thus, we know of no other means, he 
argues, 
wodurch mattwerdenden Völkern jene rauhe Energie des Feldlagers, 
jener tiefe unpersönliche Hass, jene Mörder-Kaltblütigkeit mit gutem 
Gewissen, jene gemeinsame organisirende Gluth in der Vernichtung 
des Feindes, […] ebenso stark und sicher mitgetheilt werden könnte, 
wie diess jeder grosse Krieg thut. 
Insofar as it goads individuals into action, war is extolled as a wellspring of socially 
beneficial energy. Like Burckhardt, Nietzsche maintains that by actively 
participating in war, a people can foster the amoral warrior virtues (such as a brave 
and brutal strain of sangfroid) upon which a vibrant culture is founded.74 Similarly, 
in MA 235, Nietzsche posits conditions of social violence as a prerequisite of 
cultivating genius – it gives them “ihr Feuer, ihre Wärme”. Peace, on the other hand, 
is conceived as the womb of cultural weakness and mediocrity; hence, asks 
Nietzsche, “[m]üsste man somit nicht wünschen, dass das Leben seinen 
gewaltsamen Charakter behalte und dass immer von Neuem wieder wilde Kräfte und 
Energien hervorgerufen werden?” Again, the criterion of evaluation underlying 
these aphorisms is that of cultural flourishing, and it is therefore unsurprising that 
war is described as particularly indispensable for later, more developed societies. 
Without war, such societies become weary (matt), as is evident in modern Europe, 
according to Nietzsche; echoing Burckhardt’s esteem of crisis, Nietzsche prescribes 
modern Europe “der grössten und furchtbarsten Kriege” (MA 477).75 Whether or not 
                                                      
74 MA 477: “Die Cultur kann die Leidenschaften, Laster und Bosheiten durchaus nicht 
entbehren.” See also Z I Kriegsmänner 4.59, where Nietzsche contrasts the warrior virtue of 
courage with the Christian virtue of neighbourly love: “Der Krieg und der Muth haben mehr 
grosse Dinge gethan, als die Nächstenliebe. Nicht euer Mitleiden, sondern eure Tapferkeit 
rettete bisher die Verunglückten.” See also MA 444. 
75 In the critical literature, this aspect of Nietzsche’s approach to PDC is perhaps best 
appreciated by the radically anti-foundationalist Georges Bataille, who is less interested in 
the underlying naturalistic or metaphysical grounds of violent conflict so much as its valuable 
iconoclastic effects. For Nietzsche, says Bataille, war energises a culture by exploding 
suffocating social and moral orders: “ces catastrophes lui semblèrent préférables à la 
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we assent to Nietzsche’s (or Burckhardt’s) suppositions, it can at least be stated that, 
now in Nietzsche’s middle period, we have once again denuded various justifications 
of PDC that are profoundly at odds with the agonistic reading. 
 Before moving on to Nietzsche later writings, it is worth noting that these 
ideas from the middle period are aligned with current empirical research, which 
tends to contest hydraulic drive theories of aggression. These theories – typified by 
Freud and Lorenz – represent inherently violent, destructive energies not only as 
intrinsic to human nature, but as psychologically accruing like mounting steam 
pressure in sealed vessel.76 According to this them, actively engaging in or watching 
violent activity ventilates this pressure and returns the individual to a healthy mean. 
The weight of psychological research, however, counters this thesis. Indeed, 
empirical studies indicate that neither watching nor participating in violent activity 
have a cathartic effect. On the contrary, to borrow Plato’s phraseology, the empirical 
evidence supports the idea that such activity “feeds and waters the passions”, rather 
                                                      
stagnation, au mensonge de la vie bourgeoise, de la béatitude des professeurs de morale 
reçue.” Georges Bataille, “Nietzsche et le national-socialisme” (1937), in Œuvres 
Complètes, 18 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), vol.6, pp.185-8 (p.185). What should also be 
remarked about Bataille’s reading of Nietzsche as pro-war is that it is not only at odds with 
agonistic interpretations, but is also distinctly opposed to readings of Nietzsche as promoting 
a murderous proto-fascistic aristocracy resembling that of the blond beasts. In Bataille’s 
words: “il est vain de lui [Nietzsche] prêter quelque intention mesurable en termes de 
politique électorale, en arguant qu’il parla de ‘maîtres du monde’. Il s’agit de sa part d’une 
évocation hasardée du possible. Cet homme souverain dont il désirait l’éclat, il l’imagina 
contradictoirement tantôt riche et tantôt plus pauvre qu’un ouvrier, tantôt puissant, tantôt 
traqué. Il exigea de lui la vertu de tout supporter comme il lui reconnut le droit de transgresser 
les normes. D’ailleurs, il le distinguait en principe de l’homme au pouvoir. Il ne limitait rien, 
se bornait à décrire aussi librement qu’íl pouvait un champ de possibilités” (ibid., p.186). In 
contrast to Appel, then, Bataille reads Nietzsche as presenting the “master race” as just one 
potential ideal in a field of contradictory future possibilities. According to Bataille, it is 
Nietzsche’s self-appointed task to keep this field of potentiality radically open. We must 
therefore acknowledge a significant third position in the debate over Nietzsche’s normative 
stance towards physically destructive conflict, one that cannot be reduced to the dichotomy 
between, on the one hand, agonistic and, on the other, murderous or militaristic, aristocratic 
readings. For more on Bataille’s anti-fascistic reading of Nietzsche, see “Nietzsche et les 
Fascistes” in Œuvres Complètes, 18 vols (Paris, Gallimard, 1973), vol.1 (esp. pp.452-3). 
76 See e.g. Sigmund Freud, “Das Unbehagen in der Kultur”, in Gesammelte Werke, 17 vols 
([London: Imago, 1940-1952] and [Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1966]), vol.14, 
pp.419-506. See also Konrad Lorenz, Das Sogenannten Böse: Zur Naturgeschichte der 
Aggression (München: Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998). 
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than giving vent to them.77 Engaging in, or watching, violent behaviour increases 
the chance of further violent behaviour rather than allaying violent inclinations.78 
Furthermore, while humans seem to have certain instincts that make them prone to 
aggressive modes of behaviour, the bulk of violence research suggests that homicidal 
behaviour is learnt, and therefore in no way compelled by a “natural”, let alone 
unstoppably accreting, drive.79   
Nietzsche’s position in MA 477 nevertheless goes beyond these theories in 
two important ways: first, for Nietzsche, engaging in violence does not just further 
stimulate propensities for such behaviour, but also stimulates the individual and 
society in a more general manner. Second, and directly following from this, unlike 
these contemporary critiques of catharsis theory, Nietzsche sees the stimulation 
resulting from certain forms of violent behaviour as a desideratum. Nevertheless, 
even in MA 477, Nietzsche is not entirely affirmative of the energising effects of 
war. He warns that the flood of energy that bursts forth with warfare can in fact 
devastate tender, under-developed cultures.80 As such, in MA, not only has 
Nietzsche evidently abandoned Schopenhauerian metaphysics in reconceptualising 
PDC, but his affirmative normative stance has also become generally more nuanced 
as compared with CV 3: war is no longer posited as a metaphysical necessity, but 
                                                      
77 See Plato, Republic, trans. by G. M. A. Grube and C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1992), 606c-e. Plato, it should be noted, is specifically referring to the effects of poetry. 
78 For a comprehensive survey of the current literature on cathartic theories of aggression, 
see R. Baumeister and B. Bushman, “Emotions and Aggressiveness”, in Wilhelm Heitmeyer 
and John Hagan (eds.), International Handbook of Violence Research (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic, 2007), pp.479-494 (esp. pp.485-7). 
79 J. Kivivuori, J. Savolainen and P. Danielsson, “Theory and Explanation in European 
Homicide Research”, in Marieke C. A. Liem and William Alex Pridemore (eds.), Handbook 
of European Homicide Research: Patterns, Explanations and Country Studies (New York: 
Springer, 2011), pp.95-110 (see esp. pp.105-9). 
80 See MA 477, where Nietzsche talks of the “hervorbrechenden Bächen und Strömen” 
caused by war, “welche freilich Steine und Unrath aller Art mit sich wälzen und die Wiesen 
zarter Culturen zu Grunde richten”. Indeed, we also uncover staunchly negative appraisals 
of PDC (especially war) before, during and after the middle period. For the early period see 
e.g. GT 15 1.100 or UB I 1.160; for the middle period, see e.g. MA 480, VM 320 and WS 
284; for the late period, see e.g. AC 48; NL 9[126] 12.410; 14[182] 13.369; 15[38] 13.438. 
For further references, see Niemeyer (2009). 
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rather as an instrumental requirement for social vitality, in some cases. Yet, if a 
culture is to survive in the long-run, recurrent military conflict is indispensable. 
There can be no Kantian “perpetual peace”, only a constant oscillation between the 
contented stability of peace and the rousing fervour of war. We should now ask 
whether the same can be said in the context of Nietzsche’s later writings. 
1.4. THE LATER NIETZSCHE ON 
VERNICHTUNGSKAMPF 
I will now argue that Nietzsche’s later thoughts on PDC can be divided into two 
distinct subsets. The first regresses to the cathartic model developed in CV 3, while 
the second explicitly develops the ontology presupposed by the agonal 
transformative project. I will now analyse these consecutively in an effort to show 
that while the later Nietzsche may open up an ontological space of possibility for 
agonal transformation, he nonetheless both conceptualises and valorises PDC in a 
manner that is incompatible with the agonistic reading.  
1.4.1. GM, “EIGENTLICHE AKTIVITÄT” AND THE 
RETURN TO CATHARSIS 
On the basis of GM I 11, Frederick Appel has asserted that an unrefined, raw 
discharge of physically destructive energy was considered imperative by the later 
Nietzsche.81 And certainly, there is a case to be made that the Bernaysian catharsis 
argument has made a resurgence in GM, particularly in the sketch Nietzsche makes 
of the noble “blonde Bestien”. Resonating with other aphorisms such as JGB 259, 
in GM I 11, Nietzsche paints an idealised picture of a community of aristocrats who 
                                                      
81 See fn.9. 
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live in a strict form of society based on mutual restraint. Despite this reciprocal 
moderation, however, these same nobles are said to struggle in an apparently 
unrestrained manner to exploit, dominate and incorporate those who live beyond the 
bounds of their rigorous social order. And to be sure, this lack of restraint often 
manifests itself as PDC. Thus, in their relation to outsiders, the blond beasts enjoy 
die Freiheit von allem socialen Zwang, sie halten sich in der Wildniss 
schadlos für die Spannung, welche eine lange Einschliessung und 
Einfriedigung in den Frieden der Gemeinschaft giebt, sie treten in die 
Unschuld des Raubthier-Gewissens zurück, als frohlockende 
Ungeheuer, welche vielleicht von einer scheusslichen Abfolge von 
Mord, Niederbrennung, Schändung, Folterung mit einem Übermuthe 
und seelischen Gleichgewichte davongehen […]. Auf dem Grunde aller 
dieser vornehmen Rassen ist das Raubthier, die prachtvolle nach Beute 
und Sieg lüstern schweifende blonde Bestie nicht zu verkennen; es 
bedarf für diesen verborgenen Grund von Zeit zu Zeit der Entladung, 
das Thier muss wieder heraus, muss wieder in die Wildniss zurück [...]. 
(GM I 11 5.275; my italics) 
We have, again echoing the Bernaysian catharsis argument, a potentially 
pathological build-up and a subsequent need for periodic, unrefined discharge, 
which takes the form of a physical Vernichtungskampf (against those considered 
foreign).82 What is also implied in this depiction is the idea that such outbursts 
reinstate a condition of healthy equilibrium. These immoderate eruptions are 
affirmed by Nietzsche as innocent, irrepressible expressions of strength. Indeed, 
only two sections later, he compares these violent discharges to the innocent 
necessity with which an eagle kills the lambs it needs to survive, or with which a 
lightning bolt flashes.83 Just as the lightning bolt simply is the flash, the nobles 
simply are these callous forms of activity, possessing no substantial self, let alone a 
libertarian free will, by dint of which they could be held morally accountable. The 
                                                      
82 On the potentially pathological consequences of over-accumulation, see GM II 11 5.312, 
where, in the case of the ascetic, this destructive impetus eventually releases internally due 
to a lack of external outlets. Compare also JGB 76. 
83 See GM I 13 5.278-9. 
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destructive urges of the nobles therefore cannot and should not be kept in a state of 
perpetual restraint (“das Thier muss wieder heraus”). 
But on what grounds is this necessity posited? In GM, what we see is that 
the essentially destructive metaphysical will, which necessitated PDC in CV 3, has 
been replaced by an immanent account of life (“Leben”) as necessarily destructive. 
Nietzsche asserts that life “nämlich in seinen Grundfunktionen verletzend, 
vergewaltigend, ausbeutend, vernichtend fungirt und gar nicht gedacht werden kann 
ohne diesen Charakter” (GM II 11 5.312; my italics). This can also be taken as one 
way in which Nietzsche conceives of life as “will to power” – namely, as a brutal, 
eruptive and destructive struggle for assimilation, growth and expansion. What 
motivates this peculiar description of life is Nietzsche’s desire to reveal how, 
although exploitation and destructive conflict may be locally inhibited (through the 
imposition of law e.g.), this is only ever as a means to forming greater unities of 
power (Macht-Einheiten), better able to brutally struggle against other opposed 
entities.84 As such, these fundamental biological processes (or Grundfunktionen) can 
only ever be displaced (but never wholly negated).85 To pursue their universal 
suppression, as Nietzsche believes Christianity is guilty of doing, is to pursue an 
actively hostile relation to life.86 Humans are therefore naturally (i.e. psychologically 
and physiologically) bound to engage in PDC since they cannot but embody these 
Grundfunktionen – expressing them as individuals, social groups or even ascetically 
against themselves.  
The Bernaysian catharsis model was found to be conditioned by the 
existence of some distinctly destructive energy that irrevocably accretes. In GM, 
                                                      
84 Compare AC 58 6.245-7.  
85 See GM II 12 5.312: “Rechtszustände immer nur Ausnahme-Zustände sein dürfen, als 
theilweise Restriktionen des eigentlichen Lebenswillens, der auf Macht aus ist, und sich 
dessen Gesammtzwecke als Einzelmittel unterordnend: nämlich als Mittel, grössere Macht-
Einheiten zu schaffen.” 
86 Although N.B. that insofar as both Christianity and its secular descendants rapaciously 
pursue mastery over their opponents and even life itself, they paradoxically embody the very 
characteristics of life as will to power against which they are ostensibly struggling. See e.g. 
GM III 11 5.362-3. 
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though the will to power is first and foremost described as a will to more power, it 
is at least in part conceived as just such a kind of energy. As we have seen, will to 
power is portrayed as having an ineradicably destructive component, which at the 
level of human existence demands periodic release in PDC. In GM, however, 
Nietzsche situates this energy immanently within life itself, rather than in the 
noumenal realm of the will. In this way, he can be said to have replaced the 
“metaphysical reflection” argument with a “naturalistic reflection” argument, which 
can be expressed as follows:  
 
 The Naturalistic Reflection Argument 
1. All living entities are necessarily characterised by will to power; 
2. Will to power is necessarily characterised by destructive conflictual 
relations; 
3. Humans are living entities; 
4. Therefore, humans are necessarily characterised by destructive 
conflictual relations. 
 
One would be hard put to deny that Nietzsche has to some extent reverted in GM to 
the (albeit now naturalised) Bernaysian catharsis argument. But should we take this 
as evidence of a substantive reprisal of the position he implicitly rejected in MA? 
And does this not problematize his transformative project in the same way CV 3 did 
– that is, insofar as it indicates that (at least after a certain point) we can only 
displace, but not transform, destructive tendencies? The ontological obstacle of 
immutability has once again reared its problematic head. My contention, however, 
is that this text should be treated as anomalous and therefore cannot be taken as 
evidence for Nietzsche having made a wholesale reversion to the Bernaysian 
catharsis argument. 
The first reason for treating these texts as anomalous is that in no other 
enumeration of the Grundfunktionen of life does Nietzsche mention destruction; 
rather, these consistently underscore the functions of overpowering, exploitation, 
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instrumentalisation and domination.87 It is these, I would argue, that best capture 
what the later Nietzsche holds to be the ultimately ineluctable aspects of life, nature 
and the world as will to power. Crucially, as I will claim in the following subsection, 
these do not necessarily have to be expressed in PDC. 
Second, in GM, as Marco Brusotti has noted, Nietzsche is principally 
opposing himself to Eugene Dühring’s theory that the concept of justice originated 
in the desire for revenge, which reactively follows our suffering of an injury.88 
Nietzsche saw Dühring (among others) as representative of a wider tendency within 
the human sciences to give explanatory priority to the reactive sentiments (e.g. 
“Hass, Neid, Missgunst, Argwohn, Rancune, Rache”). Further, Nietzsche argues 
that because these thinkers are caught in the spirit of Christian ressentiment, they 
tendentiously view the world through the lens of reactivity.89 In opposition to this, 
Nietzsche wants to introduce a new Grundbegriff to the sciences (biology and 
physiology in particular), namely, that of “eigentliche Aktivität”.90 He endeavours 
to illumine affects other than those based in reactivity – affects he holds to be of 
“höheren biologischen Werthe”: “die eigentlich aktiven Affekte, wie Herrschsucht, 
Habsucht und dergleichen”.91 Nietzsche strives to represent nobility and freedom as 
being distinguished by such “activity”. Unlike the weak and the slavish, they act 
with spontaneity and aggression, which Nietzsche defines as the essential 
characteristics of life itself, that is, of will to power. Nietzsche’s nobles are not prone 
to brooding and protracted periods of resentment that culminate in calculated acts of 
vengeance; they are an outpouring of aggressive, unrestrained, and as we have seen, 
at times necessarily destructive, force. If they do react, they do so immediately, 
                                                      
87 See NL 1[30] 12.17; NL 40[7] 11.631; JGB 259. 
88 See GM II 11 5.310-3; GM III 14 5.370. See also Marco Brusotti, “Reagieren, schwer 
reagieren, nicht reagieren. Zu Philosophie und Physiologie beim letzten Nietzsche”, 
Nietzsche-Studien, 41 (2012), 104-126 (see p.106 and p.126). 
89 See GM II 11 5.310: “Worauf ich allein aufmerksam mache, ist der Umstand, dass es der 
Geist des Ressentiment selbst ist, aus dem diese neue Nuance von wissenschaftlicher 
Billigkeit (zu Gunsten von Hass, Neid, Missgunst, Argwohn, Rancune, Rache) 
herauswächst.” 
90 See GM II 11 5.310 and 12 5.315-6. 
91 GM II 11 5.310. 
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without being poisoned by ressentiment.  When not immediate in this manner, 
reactivity becomes life-denial (since life just is spontaneous activity).  
As Brusotti remarks, it is largely in opposition to Dühring that Nietzsche 
sets up the active–reactive dichotomy from which thinkers such as Deleuze have 
gotten so much philosophical mileage.  Brusotti persuasively argues, however, that 
Nietzsche abandons this opposition after GM. Upon reading the works of the 
psychiatrist Charles Féré in 1888, Nietzsche came to realise that instantaneous 
reaction was symptomatic of the sick and neurotic.92 What characterises the strong 
is not the kind of unrestrained, automatic and spontaneous discharge we see the 
blond beasts destructively unleashing upon outsiders, but rather slow, deliberate 
reaction.93 Hence, Nietzsche is (ironically) reactively forced into making this 
extreme characterisation of will to power and freedom as immediate and aggressive 
“actual activity” due to his opposition to Dühring, which falls into the background 
after 1888. 
The third reason for treating Nietzsche’s description of PDC in GM as an 
exception becomes obvious once we probe the rhetorical status of the blond beast. 
Charitable readings have tried to argue that the figure is either a caricature of evil 
from the perspective of the slaves, or a mere symbol of unrestrained passion.94 While 
this human type is not easily reduced to a merely chimerical or symbolic status, there 
is textual evidence to support the idea that the blond beast functions as a rhetorical 
                                                      
92 See Brusotti (2012), pp.115-7; see also Marco Brusotti “Nachweis aus Charles Féré, 
Dégénérescence et Criminalité (1888), Nietzsche-Studien, 20 (2011) 342; see also Charles 
Samson Féré, Dégénérescence et Criminalité (Paris: Alcan, 1888). 
93 See NL 14[102] 13.279. 
94 Lawrence Hatab suggests that the depiction of the blond beast in GM is a caricature of the 
raiding barbarians as viewed from the perspective of the slaves. See Lawrence Hatab, 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp.48-
9. Walter Kaufmann (1974) on the other hand, claims that the blond beasts function as 
“ideograms for the conception of unsublimated animal passion” and asserts that “Nietzsche 
does not glorify […] them” (p.225). Along with these, we should also recall Bataille’s 
argument against literal readings of Nietzsche’s entreaties for an aristocratic master race. For 
Bataille, this figure merely represents one among many hypothetical future exemplars 
sketched by Nietzsche in his effort to describe “aussi librement qu’íl pouvait un champ de 
possibilités” (see fn.75). 
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device – i.e. as a polemical character (or caricature) akin to the men in the state of 
nature envisioned by Hobbes and Rousseau. 
In the relevant passages, Nietzsche complains that Europeans have lost their 
fear of man. Consequently, Nietzsche continues, they have also lost their love and 
admiration of man.95 We no longer have any sense of reverence for humans on 
account of the fact that we find ourselves surrounded by mediocre, sick individuals 
(“Missrathenen, Verkleinerten, Verkümmerten, Vergifteten”). Nietzsche’s disdain 
for this mediocre human type in many ways recalls his fear of a future dominated by 
the  figure of the “last human” (“der letzte Mensch”) – a form of herd-animal, the 
ideal utilitarian citizen, perfectly socialised and highly skilled at surviving, yet no 
longer able to develop and augment himself.96 In Z, Nietzsche contrasts his 
dystopian vision of the last human with his hope for a future ruled by the 
Übermensch.97 Analogously, in GM, the mediocre man of the present is contrasted 
with the blond beast. But can the Übermensch therefore be equated with the blond 
beast (as Detlef Brennecke has claimed, for example98). Should we think of a world 
governed by blond beasts as Nietzsche’s aspiration?  
There are good reasons against our making either of these assumptions. 
First, the only mention of the Übermensch in GM is in relation to Napoleon, but 
even he is not described as an Übermensch through and through. He is instead 
labelled a “Synthesis von Unmensch und Übermensch”, which strongly implies that 
his brutish and beastly (i.e. unmenschlich) traits are not part of his 
Übermenschlichkeit (GM I 16 5.288). Moreover, Nietzsche’s examples of blond 
beasts are mostly historical – for instance, the ancient Greeks and the Vikings (GM 
                                                      
95 See GM I 11 5.275f. 
96 See Z I Vorrede 5 4.19-20. 
97 On the opposition of the last human and the Übermensch, see NL 4[171] 10.162. See also 
Z IV Vom höheren Menschen 3 4.358, where Nietzsche warns that “diese kleinen Leute: die 
sind des Übermenschen grösste Gefahr!” 
98 See Detlef Brennecke, “Die Blonde Bestie. Vom Mißverständnis eines Schlagworts”, 
Nietzsche-Studien, 5 (1976), pp.113-145. See also Gerd Schank, “Nietzsche’s Blond Beast”, 
in Nietzsche’s Bestiary: Becoming Animal beyond Docile and Brutal, Christa Davis 
Acampora and Ralph R. Acampora (eds.) (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 
pp.140–55. 
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I 11 5.275) – whereas he explicitly states in Z that “Niemals noch gab es einen 
Übermenschen” (Z II Von den Priestern 4.119).99 Finally, when he does look to the 
past for exemplars, he certainly does not limit himself to blond beasts, often 
preferring to invoke artists such as Leonardo da Vinci, Homer and Goethe.100 It is 
therefore unjustifiable to reduce the Übermensch to the violent, murderous figure of 
the blond beast.101 Even in GM, Nietzsche qualifies his esteem for the behaviour of 
the blond beasts, warning that “Man mag im besten Rechte sein, wenn man vor der 
blonden Bestie auf dem Grunde aller vornehmen Rassen die Furcht nicht los wird 
und auf der Hut ist” (GM I 11 5.277). 
The blond beast’s function becomes plain when we take into consideration 
what Nietzsche was trying to achieve in these sections of GM: to give himself and 
his readers “Einen Blick nur auf etwas Vollkommenes, zu-Ende-Gerathenes, 
Glückliches, Mächtiges, Triumphirendes, an dem es noch Etwas zu fürchten giebt!” 
(GM I 12 5.278). He also endeavours to bring into relief how such terrifying, amoral 
behaviour is perfectly compatible with, and even forms the basis of, higher culture 
(hence his classifying the Athenians among the blond beasts). Nietzsche thereby 
rejects the myth that the purpose of culture is to transform man from the blond beast 
into “ein zahmes und civilisirtes Thier” (GM I 11 5.276). 
The blond beast therefore evidently functions as a rhetorical device 
principally conceived as a means to arousing an energising sense of awe. With this 
polemical character, he hopes to illuminate (by juxtaposition) not just the feebleness 
of modern Europeans, but also the contingency of our currently being in this 
lamentable condition. Nonetheless, in spite of Nietzsche’s valorising register, it is 
not an ideal for which he encourages us to strive.102 It is an image designed to enliven 
                                                      
99 Quoted in Paolo Stellino, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky: On the Verge of Nihilism (Bern: Peter 
Lang, 2015), p.196. 
100 See e.g. JGB 200 and NL 9[157] 12.428. 
101 See Stellino (2015), pp.196ff. Compare also Patrick Wotling, Nietzsche et le Problème de 
la Civilisation (Paris: PUF, 2009), p.291. 
102 A note that supports Appel and Brennecke, however, is NL 11[31] 13.18, though even 
here Nietzsche’s call appears to be for a temporary group of ruling barbarians who can act 
as a means to a more cultivated future ideal. 
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his readers and open their eyes to the possibility of constructing alternative ideals. 
We would also do well to avoid reading his description of their behaviour as an 
account of how will to power is necessarily or best expressed in human forms of life 
– that is, through inhibition, followed by necessarily destructive and unrestrained 
cathartic releases. In GM, as I have construed it, he only foregrounds the violence of 
the blond beasts in order to elicit the aforementioned galvanising fear and remind us 
of our brutal ancestry.103  
For these reasons, though there is undeniably some reversion to the 
Bernaysian catharsis argument employed in CV 3, I submit that we read this as an 
exceptional case. While we should therefore not associate the later Nietzsche with 
his earlier cathartic model of PDC, it is imperative that we remark that the notion of 
energetic discharge nonetheless plays a fundamental and widespread role in his later 
writings, albeit not in the way suggested by GM I 11; indeed, we should now 
examine Julius Robert Mayer’s influence on Nietzsche, since this will give us an 
insight into how Nietzsche’s broader conception of discharge actually underwent an 
important shift in the 1880s. 
1.4.2. GROUNDING THE TRANSFORMATIVE PROJECT:  
J. R. MAYER ON AUSLÖSUNG (1881-89) 
As of 1881, Mayer’s concept of “Auslösung” (i.e. “release” or “discharge”) comes 
to play a leading role within Nietzsche’s philosophy. The influence of Mayer’s 
conception of discharge can be traced back to when Peter Gast sent Nietzsche a copy 
of Mayer’s Über Auslösung (1876).104 In this text, Mayer posits two species of causal 
relation: the first describes cases in which a given cause is equal to its effect (in 
obvious accordance with the principle of the conservation of energy, also developed 
by Mayer). He hypothesises, however, that there is a species of causal relation that 
                                                      
103 Again, the same might be said for GD Alten 3 6.157. 
104 See letter to Heinrich Köselitz 16.04.1881 (KGB III/1, pp.84-5). 
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cannot be subsumed under this category; namely, that in which a cause triggers a 
chain reaction, or the (often sudden) release of a large quantity of stored up energy, 
as in an explosion. The energy invested in the action of pulling the trigger of a gun, 
for example, seems to be far outweighed by the energy thereby released in the firing 
of the bullet. While this is merely characteristic of “sehr viele” natural processes 
(“Naturprozesse”) according to Mayer, he deems the living, organic world to be “an 
einen ununterbrochenen Auslösungsprozeß geknupft”.105 In humans, for example, a 
nerve impulse represents a weak motor activity capable of triggering 
disproportionately great muscular movements. When measured and not 
overstepping precise boundaries (“gewisse Grenzen”), these internal Auslösungen 
produce a pleasurable sensation. This is evinced by the enjoyment we take in 
exercising our muscles through recreational sport, says Mayer. This pleasant 
sensation, Mayer continues, is closely connected to the feeling of health insofar as 
both index “einen ungestörten Auslösungsapparat”.106  
Mayer also claims that humans take similar pleasure in triggering external 
Auslösungen – in firing guns for example. Finally, he also points to “Auslösungen 
verbrecherischer Art”, speculating that  
wäre unserer Planet so beschaffen, das es jedem möglich wäre, 
denselben wie ein mit Dynamit gefülltes Gefäß 
auseinanderzusprengen, so würden sich sicher zu jeder Zeit Leute 
genug finden, bereit, mit Aufopferung ihres eigenen Lebens unsere 
schöne Erde in den Weltraum explodieren zu lassen […].107 
What should be observed, however, is that according to this argument, the urge 
humans feel to bring about destructive discharge is not due to a build-up of an 
intrinsically destructive drive or species of energy, nor is it motivated by any 
                                                      
105 Julius Robert Mayer, Über Auslösung, in Die Mechanik der Wärme. Gesammelten 
Schriften (Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, 1893), pp.440-6 (p.442). For a 
comprehensive review of Mayer’s influence on Nietzsche, see also Alwin Mittasch, 
Nietzsche als Naturphilosoph (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroner Verlag, 1952), pp.114ff.  
106 Mayer (1893), p.443. 
107 Ibid., p.446. 
 73 
anticipated pleasure in the destructive aspect of the act per se (Mayer’s project 
implies that we would have no interest in destroying the world if we had to do so 
with spades over the course of millennia); it is rather due to the anticipated pleasure 
in causing a disproportionate release of energy, which is only contingently 
associated with such explosively destructive actions. 
Though Nietzsche rejects the atomism he identifies in Mayer, this 
conception of Auslösung forms the cornerstone of his later conceptions of action, the 
affects, and the will to power.108 Indeed, Nietzsche now describes the fundamental 
natural process as that of Auslösung: “vor allem will etwas Lebendiges seine Kraft 
auslassen”.109 Of equal importance, though, is the accumulation of energy or force. 
For Nietzsche, geniuses and stronger human types are distinguished from weaker 
types insofar are they inherit or are able to store up greater quantities of force.110 He 
directly opposes this idea to Darwin’s notion of a drive for self-preservation, the 
logic of which, Nietzsche implies, cannot account for this ostensibly useless and 
even suicidal discharging of force (Mayer’s “Dr. Strangelove” example elegantly 
illustrates this incompatibility with the logic of self-preservation).111 As such, the 
will to power does not designate a process whereby entities merely accrue power in 
potentia, but includes the subsequent process of releasing or discharging such 
potential – that is, power in actu.112  
 While there is, as with the Bernaysian catharsis model, a certain demand for 
discharge according to this formulation of the will to power, engaging in PDC is 
neither metaphysically nor naturalistically necessitated. Even in 1883 (i.e. before his 
brief reversion to the Bernaysian catharsis argument), Nietzsche states that such 
                                                      
108 On Nietzsche rejection of Mayer’s atomism, see letter to Heinrich Köselitz 20.03.1882 
(KGB III/1, pp.182-3).  
109 NL 2[63] 12.89; see also NL 27[3] 11.275 and JGB 13. 
110 See GD Streifzüge 44 6.145-6 and NL 10[165] 12.553. 
111 NL 2[63] 12.89. 
112 See NL 11[114] 13.54, where it can be observed that both the inheriting and discharging 
of power are key to Nietzsche’s conception of strength; see also NL 15[78] 13.455 or JGB 
208 for Nietzsche’s application of this discharge model to the realm of human socio-political 
practice. 
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stores of energy can, as Mayer indicates, be ventilated through a gamut of different 
activities: 
[…] Ein und dieselbe Kraftgefühls-Menge kann sich auf tausend 
Weisen entladen: dies ist “Freiheit des Willens” — das Gefühl, daß im 
Verhältniß zu der nothwendigen Explosion hundert von Handlungen 
gleich gut dienen. Das Gefühl einer gewissen Beliebigkeit der 
Handlung in Betreff dieser Spannungs-Erleichterung. (NL 7[77] 
10.268) 
For Nietzsche, as for Mayer, there is always an array of behaviours through which 
this abstract, polymorphous force can obtain release. Thus, in one note from 1887, 
when he has more fully formulated his notion of the world as will to power, 
Nietzsche refers to the many “Ausdrucksweisen und Metamorphosen des Einen 
Willens […], der allem Geschehen inhärirt, der Wille zur Macht”, which he 
characterises as a “Stärker-werden-wollen” (NL 11[96] 13.44). At the level of 
human behaviour, the discharge of this will to power can take an infinitude of forms: 
for example, just as we have seen that it can discharge itself in PDC, or as we will 
witness in later chapters, socio-political oppression, it can equally obtain release in 
artistic expression.113 Within this account of Auslösung, we might say that physically 
destructive behaviour would be reduced to the status of a merely possible (though 
nonetheless probable) corollary of the release of power – just as was the case with 
the individuals Mayer theorised would detonate the earth if given the chance, the 
urge is one towards release, not PDC. While this opens up a logical space for 
agonism – since it allows for the apparently unlimited channelling of energy away 
from PDC – Nietzsche still acknowledges, albeit in an aphorism from 1881 (before 
he had conceptualised the will to power), that such accrued energy is, de facto, often 
released through impulsive, violent acts: 
 
                                                      
113 NL 7[3] 12.256: “Man muß den Künstler selbst nehmen: und dessen Psychologie (die 
Kritik des Spieltriebs, als Auslassen von Kraft, Lust am Wechsel, am Eindrücken der eigenen 
Seele, der absolute Egoismus des Künstlers usw.)” 
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Das Böse der Stärke. — Die Gewaltthätigkeit als Folge der 
Leidenschaft, zum Beispiel des Zornes, ist physiologisch als ein 
Versuch zu verstehen, einem drohenden Erstickungsanfall 
vorzubeugen. Zahllose Handlungen des Übermuths, der sich an 
anderen Personen auslässt, sind Ableitungen eines plötzlichen 
Blutandranges durch eine starke Muskel-Action gewesen: und 
vielleicht gehört das ganze “Böse der Stärke” unter diesen 
Gesichtspunct. 
(M 371)114 
Violence is explained and demoralised by Nietzsche insofar as he describes it as a 
means of attaining cathartic release. Such actions are not evil, he assures us, but 
merely the result of an immediate need to release (auslassen) pent-up energy in order 
to avert a condition analogous to suffocation. In a similar manner, Nietzsche seems 
to think that the de facto way in which nations often actually pursue power expansion 
is through wars of aggression: 
Es gehört zum Begriff des Lebendigen, daß es wachsen muß, — daß es 
seine Macht erweitert und folglich fremde Kräfte in sich hineinnehmen 
muß. […] Eine Gesellschaft, die endgültig und ihrem Instinkt nach den 
Krieg und die Eroberung abweist, ist im Niedergang (NL 14[192] 
13.378). 
This realist argument would appear to naturalise, explain, demoralise and even 
encourage PDC in a way that is largely at odds with the idea within the agonistic 
reading that Nietzsche was strongly opposed to such conflict. 
                                                      
114 M 371. See also See also GD Alten 3 6.157: “[…] Ich sah ihren [die alten Griechen] 
stärksten Instinkt, den Willen zur Macht, ich sah sie zittern vor der unbändigen Gewalt dieses 
Triebs, – ich sah alle ihre Institutionen wachsen aus Schutzmaassregeln, um sich vor einander 
gegen ihren inwendigen Explosivstoff sicher zu stellen. Die ungeheure Spannung im Innern 
entlud sich dann in furchtbarer und rücksichtsloser Feindschaft nach Aussen: die 
Stadtgemeinden zerfleischten sich unter einander, damit die Stadtbürger jeder einzelnen vor 
sich selber Ruhe fänden. […].” Though Nietzsche appears to be working with the Bernaysian 
catharsis model here, later in the same text he indicates that this energy could also be 
expressed through the agon. PDC was just one unrefined means the state used to release its 
excessively pent-up energy. Compare also GD Sokrates 8 and GD Streifzüge 23, where 
Nietzsche indicates that even within the agon itself, the striving for dominance could be 
transformed from physical contest into spiritual, philosophical contest. 
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Despite the fact that Nietzsche does not explicitly refer to Auslösung in the 
context of his post-1881 thoughts on war, there is nonetheless telling evidence that 
Mayer’s theory had a decisive impact on these thoughts. For example, in FW, where 
Nietzsche cautions us against accusing pacific cultures of laxity. Beneath this veneer 
of lassitude, he tells us, 
jene alte Volks-Energie und Volks-Leidenschaft, welche durch den 
Krieg und die Kampfspiele eine prachtvolle Sichtbarkeit bekam, jetzt 
sich in unzählige Privat-Leidenschaften umgesetzt hat und nur weniger 
sichtbar geworden ist; ja, wahrscheinlich ist in Zuständen der 
“Corruption” die Macht und Gewalt der jetzt verbrauchten Energie 
eines Volkes grösser, als je, und das Individuum giebt so 
verschwenderisch davon aus, wie es ehedem nicht konnte, — es war 
damals noch nicht reich genug dazu! (FW 23)  
This picture of once destructive, though now productively modulated, energies is at 
odds with the ontologies of PDC constructed in CV 3 and GM. But perhaps more 
interestingly, this aphorism also represents a change of tack from MA 477. In those 
cultures that have lost their taste for war, though they may prima facie appear weary 
or lax, closer scrutiny reveals that their combative energy, far from having 
disappeared, has rather been canalised into other pursuits – a process he 
unambiguously praises as a facilitator of knowledge. (It is this converted 
[“umgesetzt”] energy that enabled “die Flamme der Erkenntniss lichterloh zum 
Himmel [aufzuschlagen]” within these superficially languid cultures.) This 
aphorism therefore presents us with a dynamic that resembles a zero-sum struggle 
for energy fought between a nation’s martial and cultural undertakings.115  
This idea is also present in the writings from the end of Nietzsche’s working 
life. In one of his final notes from 1888/89, presciently entitled “Letzte Erwägung”, 
we can see that even at this late stage in his career, Nietzsche maintained a view of 
war far more compatible with Mayer’s notion of Auslösung than with the Bernaysian 
catharsis model: 
                                                      
115 An idea that is prefigured in UB I (see UB I 1 1.160f). 
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Könnten wir der Kriege entrathen, um so besser. Ich wüßte einen 
nützlicheren Gebrauch von den zwölf Milliarden zu machen, welche 
jährlich der bewaffnete Friede Europa kostet; es giebt noch andre 
Mittel, die Physiologie zu Ehren zu bringen, als durch Lazarethe…  
(NL 25[19] 13.646) 
Notwithstanding the subjunctive mood (“[k]önnten wir”), dispensing with war 
altogether remains a conceivable possibility for Nietzsche. Furthermore, eradicating 
war, and thereby freeing up millions of men usually engaged in standing armies, 
would allow their energy to be directed toward better ends – for example, as he 
mentions in a paraphrased version of this note, toward “die grandiose und hohe 
Arbeit des Lebens” (NL 25[14] 13.644). As such, the later Nietzsche can be said to 
promote the transformation of our collective behaviour from Krieg to cultural 
perfectionism in a manner that reverberates with the dynamic presaged in CV 5. The 
physically destructive relation of humans to one another is therefore possible (and 
even probable), but not necessary – humans can affirm and embody the 
Grundfunktionen of life without need of war and murder, and it generates no 
contradiction to conceive of human life as unburdened of these. 
1.5. CONCLUSION 
Despite the continued presence of an agonal impulse throughout Nietzsche’s 
writings, it should nonetheless now be evident that we must reject the claim that his 
attitude toward PDC is best described as denigratory and primarily concerned with 
its transformation. This position has been undermined on two fronts. The first 
regards the modal status of PDC in his philosophy – namely, that at two points he 
suggests that PDC is a necessary aspect of human existence. This necessity is 
expressed in two different ways, depending on the phase under examination: the 
early work CV 3 presenting PDC as metaphysically necessary; the later work GM 
presenting it as naturally necessary. We began by expounding the conception of 
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PDC underlying Nietzsche’s early affirmation of war in CV 3. Within this, such 
conflict was seen to be metaphysically necessitated by an immutably destructive and 
incessantly accreting drive demanding periodic release in war. This cathartic theory 
of violence was found to be grounded in an amalgam of Schopenhauerian 
metaphysics and the model of energetic economy found in Bernays’ reading of 
Aristotle. We then saw Nietzsche somewhat anomalously revive the same dynamic 
in GM; following his apostasy from Schopenhauerian metaphysics, however, we 
saw him reformulate this theory on naturalistic grounds. On account of the fact that 
CV 3 and GM posit the existence of a quantum of energy that must release itself as 
PDC and that will always be impervious to qualitative transformation, the 
ontological view underpinning these texts was seen to contradict the idea proposed 
by the agonistic readers that Nietzsche sought the complete transformation of PDC. 
The problem is trenchant: there are texts that actually entail the impossibility of the 
agonal project with respect to certain forms of destructive behaviour, which are 
posited as essential to thriving human life (i.e. episodic outbursts of PDC). Indeed, 
the normative cost of assenting to ontologies of destructive conflict resembling those 
we find in CV 3 or GM I 11 is that we (potentially inadvertently) sacrifice the idea 
of transformation as a coherent or even conceivable possibility. Due to their practical 
repercussions, it would therefore serve us well to be particularly chary of hypotheses 
postulating any intrinsically destructive tendencies as essential to either human 
psychology or the wider natural world. 
Nonetheless, I have tried to demonstrate how we can ring-fence these 
intractable texts (particularly CV 3 and GM I 11), and to argue that Nietzsche’s 
mature position is best (though not exhaustively) understood as the naturalist-realist 
account of PDC that he develops out of Burckhardt and Mayer. According to this, 
no essentially destructive drive is posited, and PDC is regarded as the contingent 
consequence of a polymorphous impetus toward power – an ontology of PDC that 
is perfectly congruent with his project of agonal transformation. However, even 
within this position, PDC is posited as a highly probable part of human existence.  
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 This brings us to the second major problem for the agonistic reading, which 
concerns the normative value that Nietzsche attributes to PDC. Whereas the 
agonistic readers suggest that Nietzsche is critical of PDC, and that this forms the 
basis of his calls for its transformation, it has now been demonstrated at length that 
he affirms PDC for an array of reasons. Despite the diversity exhibited by these 
justifications for PDC, they can roughly be split into two groups. The first group are 
founded on the presupposition that the energy associated with PDC is immutable, 
which suggest that compressing the expression of this energy into short term bursts 
is a precondition of social life and the forms of higher culture associated therewith. 
There is then the idea, also founded on this presupposition, that engaging in PDC 
represents a hale expression of power and freedom. The second group, however, is 
in no way premised on a notion of PDC qua discharge. Based on realist observations, 
which it appears he inherited from Burckhardt, Nietzsche suggests that PDC has a 
regenerative effect on culture – clearing away outdated cultural practices and 
fostering the cultivation of warrior virtues. 
Another finding that should be underscored is that MA 477 presented us 
with an account of PDC that contradicts both the Bernays and the Mayer inspired 
discharge ontologies. In this aphorism, PDC is figured as having an energising rather 
than a ventilating effect. Indeed, in his post-metaphysical phase, Nietzsche offers us 
perspectives from which PDC can be understood both as a source of energy as well 
as a locus for its discharge. 
It should be further added, that in this chapter I have by no means exhausted 
Nietzsche treatment of the sources and justifications for PDC. First, throughout his 
oeuvre, he attributes this species of conflict to a motley of other sources: in GT, for 
example, one cause of PDC is the unrestrained pursuit of egoistic ends;116 and in AC, 
he traces it back to God’s (and priests’) desire to keep man divided and distracted 
from science (“Wissenschaft”).117 Interestingly, though, we do not find competition 
                                                      
116 GT 15 1.100. 
117 AC 48 6.226-7. 
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over a scarcity of resources among these (except in Nietzsche’s citation of WWV in 
PHG), such as Schopenhauer, and many today, suggest is one of the prime 
motivating factors for PDC.118 Moreover, what readers may also find glaringly 
absent from my treatment is Nietzsche’s later calls for a “Vernichtung von Millionen 
Mißrathener” (NL 25[335] 11.98) – what has often been interpreted as a proto-Nazi 
advocacy of ethnic cleansing. The reason for this absence is that this theme will be 
explored in depth in Chapter 4.119 
It has minimally been demonstrated that both in the early works and 
thereafter, we bear witness to a multitude of unequivocal affirmations of PDC. In 
thinking through the preconditions of a strong and vibrant culture, Nietzsche posits 
war and violence as indispensable means. Nonetheless, he does not do so in an 
unqualified manner, remaining staunchly critical of forms of PDC that harm culture; 
thus, even in CV 3 he warns against unrelenting, universal states of war, and in MA 
477 he warns of the detrimental effects that wars can have for fledgling cultures. The 
evaluative criterion used to distinguish between better and worse forms of PDC is 
cultural health – that is, to what extent do the distinct forms of PDC enable a culture 
to become a productive whole? In our analysis of CV 5 and MA it was brought to 
light how Nietzsche employs this same evaluative metric to valorise the agonal 
transformation of PDC in an apparently generalised manner; notwithstanding, to 
frame this as representative of his wider thoughts on conflict risks whitewashing 
over the strong affirmative dimension to his thoughts on PDC. Therefore, although 
this study has supported the idea that Nietzsche cannot be straightforwardly branded 
a bellicose thinker, we should nonetheless guard against inversely distorting his 
thought in reaction to tendentious militaristic readings. 
 
 
                                                      
118 See e.g. Steven le Blanc, Constant Battles: Why We Fight (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 
2003). 
119 Bruce Detwiler notes this proto-fascistic interpretation in Nietzsche and the Politics of 








Surveying the various justifications of war that were enumerated in the 
previous chapter, one would perhaps not be blamed for thinking that 
Nietzsche’s thoughts concerning conflict should be understood, above all, as 
a general endorsement of destructive, unmeasured struggle. And indeed, there 
is no shortage of readers who take Nietzsche to valorise destructive conflict 
in a generalised manner. He was widely deemed to be at least partly 
responsible for both of the World Wars, namely insofar as he was taken to 
promulgate a ruthless strain of immoralism, and was read as actively 
promoting war as a remedy for modern Europe’s ills. Both his acolytes and 
detractors alike interpreted him as a proponent of war. Thus, we find 
Bernhardi, Bäumler and Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche (amongst many others) 
all reading his work as a literal call to arms. In concert with myriad other 
critics of Nietzsche, Bertrand Russell reiterated a commonly held lay 
prejudice when he claimed in his History of Western Philosophy that 
Nietzsche’s works are informed by a generally militaristic impulse, it being 
“obvious” that “in his day-dreams he is a warrior, not a professor; all of the 
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men he admires were military”.1 Similarly, Ernst Nolte (among others) reads 
Nietzsche as a philosopher of unbending intolerance, inciting his readers to 
both the physical and ideological extermination of the decadent elements of 
modern culture, be these moralities, philosophical worldviews, or human 
beings.2 
In the following chapter, I will refute the fallacious belief that 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of conflict is best read as generally endorsing 
unmeasured conflict and try to bring into relief the grounds upon which he 
endorses measured conflict. En passant, we have already witnessed the fact 
that Nietzsche advocates a non-destructive form of conflict – one that he 
maintains is exemplified in the ancient Greek practice of the agon. The agon 
(ἀγών) was typified in the athletic, equestrian and dramaturgical games that 
took place at Olympia and Delphi, but it also designated the more general 
cultural phenomenon of individuals competing to outdo one another in the 
pursuit of excellence. The key text for understanding Nietzsche’s early 
celebration of the agon is undoubtedly CV 5; however, we also find him 
explicitly dealing with the agon (or “Wettkampf” and “Wettstreit”, which I 
will hitherto read as synonyms for “agon”) in a sustained manner in MA, the 
Nachlass of 1883 and GD.3 Moreover, he is commonly taken to be implicitly 
referring to the agon in a number of aphorisms from JGB.4 Thus, whereas in 
                                                      
1 See Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2004), p.693. 
For an excellent review of the innumerable journalists and intellectuals who read Nietzsche 
as a warmonger, see Nicolas Martin “Nietzsche as Hate-Figure in Britain’s Great War”, in 
Fred Bridgeham (ed.), The First World War as a Clash of Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp.147-66; see also Ascheim (1994), esp. ch.5 and ch.8. As Martin 
(2006) points out, Bernhardi’s only explicit reference to Nietzsche in Deutschland und der 
nächste Krieg (Stuttgart und Berlin: J. G. Cotta, 1913) is a quote he takes from Z I Krieg 
(p.149). 
2 Nolte (1963), see esp. pp.533-4. 
3 See e.g. MA 158 and 170; NL 7[161] 10.295 and NL 15[21]10.485; GD Alten 3 6.157, GD 
Sokrates 8 6.71 and GD Streifzüge 23 6.126. 
4 Especially JGB 259 and 265. 
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the previous chapter I rebutted exclusively measured, agonal readings of 
Nietzsche by highlighting his valorisation of war, I will now rebut the 
exclusively unmeasured, militaristic interpretation of his thought by 
underscoring and elucidating his advocacy of agonal conflict.  
In the wake of influential liberal-democratic readings of Nietzsche, 
such as those of Kaufmann, Hatab and Connolly, the conception of the agon 
as measured and non-violent may appear self-evident and unproblematic; yet 
a broader reading of the literature on Nietzsche’s agonism suggests otherwise. 
Indeed, for my thesis to stand in any meaningful way, it must overcome three 
key problems reflected by three points of contention in the critical literature. 
The first, and most pressing, of these issues is that Nietzsche’s notion of 
agonal conflict has in fact been interpreted as inclusive of violent, 
unmeasured forms of conflict (such as war). This is what I will call the 
destructive reading, and (as we shall see) we find it propounded by Bäumler, 
Dombowsky and Martin Ruehl. In the first section of this chapter, however, 
I contend that for both the early and the later Nietzsche, the concept of agonal 
conflict is intrinsically non-destructive; indeed, one of the ways in which he 
commonly defines the agon is in its exclusive opposition to unmeasured 
forms of conflict. 
Having established that Nietzsche’s agonism describes a decidedly 
measured form of conflict, we then need to ascertain how this measure is 
characterised for Nietzsche. We thus arrive at our second obstacle. This 
regards the social scope within which Nietzsche thinks agonal measure is 
possible (a descriptive issue) and the scope within which he then endorses 
such measure (a normative issue). First off, there is the idea that agonally 
measured conflict is only deemed possible or desirable by Nietzsche within 
the very limited confines of an aristocratic minority struggling over political 
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power. This is what I will call the aristocratic reading, which can be found in 
both Appel’s and Dombowsky’s interpretations of Nietzsche’s agon. On the 
other hand, within what I will call democratic readings of Nietzsche’s 
agonism – such as that of Hatab, for example – the agon is depicted as 
globally realisable and desirable within the bounds of any given society. 
Caught between these two extreme readings, we are left with little clue as to 
the scope of Nietzsche’s agonal recommendations. I will argue, however, that 
in both the early and the later writings, Nietzsche maintains that individuals 
of every capacity and social standing are conceivably able to engage in agonal 
conflict, though only with individuals of approximately equal ability. 
Nonetheless, we also see that both the early and the later Nietzsche celebrate 
a more exclusive conception of the agon, only open to a minority of 
individuals – whether this is the elite artistic struggle for fame (Ruhm), as in 
the early works, or the equally elitist struggle for socio-political power 
(Macht), as in the later works. 
The third problem relates to Nietzsche’s observation that agonal 
conflict “entfesselt das Individuum” but also, simultaneously, “bändigt” him 
(NL 16[22] 7.402). It productively unleashes the individual insofar as it 
arouses their envy and egoistic ambition. Yet, beyond a certain point, these 
affects become socially and culturally detrimental, since they can lead 
individuals to strive for a form of permanent dominance that suppresses the 
contest of which they are a part; alternatively, Nietzsche thinks that such 
Maßlosigkeit, and the blind arrogance imbued in some by victory, can lead to 
violent acts of hubris, sedition or war – that is, back into the 
Vernichtungskampf from whence the agon originally emerged (a risk 
Nietzsche repeatedly flags up in CV 5, for example). How does agonal 
conflict restrain or bändigen the destabilising and potentially seditious affects 
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that it provokes and thereby avoid bringing about its own downfall? There 
are two contradictory answers to this question. According to the first 
interpretation (which I will call the respect reading), it is argued that the 
source of the agon’s measure is a shift in attitude on the part of the 
contestants. As we shall see, in their political appropriations of Nietzsche, 
William Connolly and Lawrence Hatab have contended that someone who 
affirms agonal political contest must respect the right of all individuals to 
participate in democratic struggle. The way in which this respect is 
engendered according to the respect reading, is that individuals come to 
appreciate a “Nietzschean” ontology of difference, whereby each 
acknowledges their adversaries as the constitutive ground of their existence. 
The contrary position maintains that within any agonal practice, the attitudes 
and goals of contestants are no different from those that drive more 
destructive forms of conflict – they still seek absolute domination. Measure 
is rather based in the fact that agonal contest is between roughly equal powers 
who mutually frustrate one another’s tyrannical aspirations. This reading, 
which I will call the counterbalancing reading, is proposed by Bonnie Honig 
and Herman Siemens. Both also posit the need for an institutional framework 
able to restore the state of mutual balance when counterbalancing fails, 
namely by forcibly removing violent or excessively dominant contestants (i.e. 
through the practice of ostracism). 
In the final section of this chapter, having unpacked the nature of this 
stand-off in more detail, I argue that neither of these readings is wholly 
adequate. Contrary to the counterbalancing reading, the self-limitation of 
contestants is imperative for both the early and the later Nietzsche. However, 
contrary to the respect reading, Nietzsche does not understand this self-
limitation as originating in one’s respect for the other as the ground of one’s 
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own existence. Rather, in the early work, self-limitation is motivated by a 
respect for the social whole and a religious piety. Then in the later work, 
Nietzsche replaces this with the Schmidt-inspired notion of Ehrfurcht – that 
is, a noble sense of reverence for opponents that who deems to be of equal 
worth, an affect that leads individuals to refrain from harming or exploiting 
one another. 
 Although there exist some common features to Nietzsche’s various 
overlapping configurations of agonal conflict, I will be trying to foreground 
the irreducible plurality and discord between these. It is little wonder that the 
concept is as nebulous as it is, since the Greeks themselves had no explicit 
theory of the agon.5 Furthermore, even among the historical sources with 
which Nietzsche would have been familiar, there is little consensus regarding 
the precise nature of the ancient Greek agon. The key historical conceptions 
of the agon with which Nietzsche would have been acquainted are to be found 
in Ernst Curtius’ “Der Wettkampf”,6 George Grote’s A History of Greece,7 
Burckhardt’s Griechische Kulturgeschichte8 and Leopold Schmidt’s Die 
                                                      
5 See Andreas Kalyvas, “The Democratic Narcissus: The Agonism of the Ancients Compared 
to that of the (Post)Moderns”, in Andrew Schaap (ed.), Law and Agonistic Politics (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2013), pp.15-41 (p.18). 
6 Ernst Curtius, “Der Wettkampf”, in Göttinger Festreden (Berlin: Wilhelm Herz, 1864), 
pp.1-22. James Porter has claimed that both Nietzsche and Burckhardt “adored” Curtius’ 
study (see James Porter, “Hellenism and Modernity”, in George Boys-Stones, Barbara 
Graziosi, Phiroze Vasunia (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Hellenism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). See also Curt Janz, Friedrich Nietzsche: Biographie, 3 vols 
(Munich: Hanser, 1978-9), vol.1, p.491. There is also evidence that Curtius influenced 
Burckhardt’s agonal interpretation of the Greeks (see Henning Ottmann, Philosophie und 
Politik bei Nietzsche [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999], p.49, fn.22). Moreover, the significant 
overlap in content between Curtius’ essay and CV 5 indicates that Nietzsche had independent 
knowledge of this text. 
7 George Grote, History of Greece, 2nd edn, 12 vols (London: John Murray, 1851). For 
evidence of Grote’s influence on Nietzsche, see NL 16[39] 7.407. 
8 We know that Burckhardt had discussed the content of his lectures at length with Nietzsche 
prior to presenting them. See letter to Erwin Rohde 21.12.1871 (KGB II/1, p.257), where 
Nietzsche indicates that, preceding the composition of CV 5, and while Burckhardt was 
composing Griechische Kulturgeschichte, “Mit Jakob Burkhardt [hat er] einige schöne Tage 
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Ethik der alten Griechen.9  And to be sure, we find a number of the 
contemporary readings of the agon at least partially anticipated by 
Nietzsche’s forerunners. Thus, in Ernst Curtius, we find a precursor of the 
destructive reading; in Burckhardt we uncover an early analogue of the 
aristocratic reading; finally, in Grote we find a democratic interpretation of 
the agon resembling the respect reading.  
Though I will be bringing to light the way in which these philological 
studies foreshadow many of the contemporary misinterpretations of 
Nietzsche’s agonism, it is not this that is of primary interest to us. Rather, by 
looking at where Nietzsche agrees and develops their idiosyncratic 
conceptions of the agon, we will see that each of them offers us a key to 
resolving the three interpretive disputes that are the central concern of this 
chapter. Thus, in Burckhardt we find a strong rejection of destructive readings 
of the agon – one that Nietzsche himself adopts (with modifications). 
Furthermore, in Burckhardt we also find a strong rejection of the idea that the 
agon is necessarily limited to an elite ruling caste – a stance that Nietzsche 
radicalises, rendering the agon even more inclusive. In opposition to the 
respect reading, the early Nietzsche follows Curtius and Grote in arguing that 
what gives rise to self-restraint is not respect for the other but patriotic love 
and religious fervour. Finally, against the counterbalancing reading, in his 
later work, Nietzsche directly draws upon Schmidt’s notion of Aidos, a noble 
form of self-restraint. Since a historical contextualisation of Nietzsche’s 
                                                      
erlebt, und unter [ihnen] wird viel über das Hellenische conferirt.” See Ruehl (2004) (p.91 
and p.96, n.44) for further references demonstrating this connection. This gainsays 
Acampora, who claims that the influence of Burckhardt on Nietzsche was negligible. See 
Acampora (2013), p.211 (n.7). 
9 Leopold Schmidt, Die Ethik der alten Griechen (Berlin: Wilhelm Herz Verlag, 1882). For 
evidence of his influence on Nietzsche, see e.g. NL 7[161] 10.295. For an excellent overview 
of this line of influence, see Andrea Orsucci, Orient—Okzident: Nietzsches Versuch einer 
Loslösung vom europaischen Weltbild (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996), pp.248-75. 
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conception of the agon has not yet been performed in a comprehensive 
manner, and moreover, since such work will help us make tractable the three 
aforementioned obstacles, filling this lacuna will constitute one of the main 
objectives of this chapter. Let us therefore begin with Curtius, Burckhardt 
and the destructive reading. 
2.2. DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT AND THE 
AGON 
The destructive reading of the agon is the most problematic with respect to the thesis 
being defended in this chapter – namely, that Nietzsche’s agonism attests to the fact 
that he advocates a measured form of conflict. This is because the destructive 
reading construes Nietzsche’s conception of the agon as co-extensive with, or at least 
inclusive of, unmeasured physical conflict (i.e. PDC). Bäumler, for example, puts 
forward a distinctly militaristic interpretation of Nietzsche’s agon. He reads CV 5 as 
stressing the need to affirm the “Lust des Sieges” and reads Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of Heraclitus’ metaphysics in terms of a naked (i.e. brutal and 
unlimited) struggle for political power.10 He then uses these readings to ground his 
claim that for Nietzsche the most effective remedy for the decline of modern 
Europeans is an affirmation of “Gefahr und Krieg”; indeed, he declares that 
Nietzsche “gehört in das Zeitalter des großen Krieges”.11 Bäumler arrives at the 
portentously fascist conclusion that the task of Germany is to be the “Führer 
Europas” – a mission requiring the national leadership of a single heroic individual.12 
The affirmation of victory in CV 5 is thus equated with an affirmation of martial 
                                                      
10 See Bäumler (1931), pp.63-4. 
11 Ibid., p.172 and p.183. 
12 Ibid., pp.181-2. 
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conquest. Similarly, Ruehl, Dombowsky and Enrico Müller have also interpreted 
Nietzsche’s agonism as inclusive of physically unmeasured conflict. Ruehl and 
Dombowsky do this by reading CV 5 as continuous with the militaristic sentiments 
of CV 3.13 To be sure, as we saw in Chapter 1, Nietzsche does positively value 
martial conflict in CV 3, provided it does not take the form of relentless all-out war. 
But can the same be said for CV 5?14  
At a more general level, to subsume physically destructive modes of conflict 
under the concept of “agon” is perfectly consistent with historical usage. In ancient 
Greek, “ἀγών”, though initially signifying any “gathering [or] assembly; […] 
especially met to see public games” or a “contest for a prize at the games”, can also 
refer to “contests in general”, or “generally, struggle” and even specifically 
“struggle[s] for life and death” or “battle[s]”.15 Then, in post-classical Latin, “agon” 
was used to signify (among other things) martyrdom.16 And surveying the history of 
German, one can see that “Wettkampf” has also been used to refer to measured and 
unmeasured conflict alike.17 Indeed, we might cite Curtius’ study as further evidence 
                                                      
13 See e.g. Dombowsky (2004), p.94: “In his early essays of 1871–72, the agonistic 
conception Nietzsche endorses does not exclude physical warfare, but wars of extermination 
(bellum internecinum).” And he continues “Nietzsche approvingly cites fragment 83 of 
Heraclitus, ‘War is the father of all good things’ (GS 92). Here it should be said, against the 
tenor of the radical liberal democratic interpretation that Nietzschean agonism is basically 
compatible […] with the commitment to perpetual war or permanent confrontation 
characteristic of fascist ideology…” (see also pp.43-4). See also Müller (2005) p.83. Müller 
considers Nietzsche to describe the Wettkampf as (among other things) “Kriegzustand 
zwischen den vereinzelten Poleis, als Stasis zwischen den verfeindeten Partein innerhalb der 
Poleis”. See also Ruehl (2004), p.91, where he argues that in CV 3, “Nietzsche describe[s], 
with obvious relish, the Greek agon as ‘the bloody jealousy of one town for another, one 
party for another, this murderous greed of those petty wars, the tiger-like triumph over the 
corpse of the slain enemy’.” 
14 Note that commentators such as Acampora (2013), who read CV 5 as an unequivocal 
promotion of non-destructive conflict, nevertheless refer to Nietzsche’s later “agonal 
practice” as including destructiveness (see e.g. p.189). 
15 See entry for “ἀγών”, in Liddel and Scott (1961), pp.18-9. 
16 See entry for “agon”, in Thesaurus Linguae Latinae (Lipsiae: B. G. Teubneri, 1900-), 
vol.1, p.1412. 
17 See entry for “Wettkampf, m.”, in DWB, vol.29, col.779). The first definition given of 
Wettkampf is: an “auseinandersetzung zweier oder mehrerer gegner”, the examples for 
which include military struggles – e.g. “das dänische Reich wird auch zum Ringplatz für eine 
Reihe jener Wettkämpfe politischer und militärischer Rivalität […].” 
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of such usage, since for him “Wettkampf” and “Krieg” are not mutually exclusive 
concepts (as we will see below). Finally, even in Nietzsche’s notebooks, we find at 
least one fragment in which he also uses the term “Wettkampf” to signify the violent 
“Kampf um’s Dasein”.18  
In the following section, I begin by arguing that if we take a closer look at 
Curtius’ “Der Wettkampf”, we can see that although he uses the term “Wettkampf” 
to refer to war and measured contest alike, he nonetheless distinguishes between two 
types of Wettkampf: one unmeasured, martial Wettkampf, and one measured, non-
violent Wettkampf, for which he shows an unequivocal preference. I then expound 
how Burckhardt rejects this subdivision of Wettkampf, preferring to strictly 
distinguish Wettkampf from war, though nonetheless acknowledging the often 
violent and even fatal consequences of agonal contest. Finally, in the remainder of 
the section, I argue that Nietzsche sides with Burckhardt’s approach, but supresses 
the violent elements of the Wettkampf remarked by his predecessor, thereby creating 
an idealised conceptual distinction between agonal conflict and PDC. Although I 
therefore defend the thesis that agon and war remain conceptually distinct for 
Nietzsche, I also explicate how he follows Burckhardt in underscoring the 
genealogical relation of agonal to destructive conflict. 
2.2.1. CURTIUS, BURCKHARDT AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A DISTINCTION 
For Curtius what distinguishes the Greeks from other cultures is what he calls their 
“wetteifender Thatenlust” – their joyful desire to engage in competitive activity and 
prove themselves preeminent. Thus, he proclaims, “Sollte ich Ihnen mit einem 
Worte ein Kennzeichen des hellenischen Lebens angeben, durch das es sich von dem 
aller anderen Völker unterscheidet – ich würde sagen es sei der Kranz”.19 For the 
                                                      
18 NL 21[15] 7.527. 
19 Curtius (1864), p.3. 
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Greeks, he continues, the meaning and value of life lay not in security and material 
comfort (as it does for modern individuals) but in “Ringen und Streben”,20 and he 
traces their cultural productivity back to the inordinately high value they placed on 
contest and victory. At the most general level, Curtius uses the term Wettkampf to 
signify any struggle for ascendancy in which the value of contest is placed above 
that of Arcadian contentment.   
Nothing in this vision of the Wettkampf is incompatible with military 
conflict, and indeed, Curtius maintains that the ancient Greek Wettkampf began as a 
military contest of tribes vying for ascendancy. What motivated such tribes to 
overcome one another, says Curtius, was their difference. He describes how they 
sought to establish the superiority of their “Eigenthumlichkeit” in “Verfassung, 
Kunst und Sitte” by destroying their rivals (though as Curtius points out, this would 
negate the very grounds of the victorious tribe’s Eigenthumlichkeit, since it was 
defined in its opposition to that of the eliminated tribe).21 Never in history, asserts 
Curtius, has any “Wetteifer der Kräfte so viel Energie entfaltet” as in ancient Greece 
in this all-out tribal (and later, inter-poleis) contention.22 Further equating Krieg and 
Wettkampf, though now between Greeks and non-Greeks, Curtius also compares the 
first Persian war to a Wettkampf.23  
Nonetheless, Curtius goes on to recount how later the Greeks conscripted 
religion as a means to developing a more stable, institutionalised form of agon, such 
as took place at Delphi or Olympia – what he calls the “regelmäßig[e] Wettkampf”. 
                                                      
20 Ibid., p.4. 
21 See ibid.: “Ein Wettkampf – zunächst der Stämme. Zwar sehen wir auch in der 
orientalischen Geschichte die verschiedensten Stämme mit einander ringen; ein Volk erhebt 
sich über das andere und drängt es aus seiner Stelle; aber hier gilt es nur einen bestimmten 
Besitz. Ist dieser gewonnen, so folgt das Leben wieder den alten Gleisen; mit Erreichung des 
Ziels hört das Streben auf, und der Stämme Eigentümlichkeit verschwindet.” He additionally 
discusses the “Wettkampf” of Athens, Sparta and Ionia, apparently also referring to their 
military struggle (ibid., p.5). 
22 Ibid., pp.5-6. 
23 Ibid., p.7: “Ja als zum großartigsten Wettkampfe die Persernot alle Kräfte des 
Griechenvolks aufrief, da hat Athen in der Schule der schwersten Drangsale, mit 
unglaublicher Anstrengung und Opferfreudigkeit den Ehrenkranz gewonnen”. 
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It is this regulated mode of contest that Curtius wishes to cultivate in German 
educational institutions in the form of a “geistig[e] Wettkampf”. His hope is that 
encouraging individuals to compete for ascendancy within the wissenschaftliche 
domain will act as a tonic for academic progress.24 Although Curtius unequivocally 
favours this limited species of Wettkampf, his wider use of the concept nevertheless 
encompasses all forms of struggle driven by a love of contest and ascendancy.  
Conversely, Burckhardt eschews this use of the term, opting instead to 
completely dissociate the notion of the agon from martial conflict. According to him, 
the Greek agon emerges only with the passing of “das heroische Zeitalter” of 
warfare. Only then is a form of victory other than that realised through the 
destruction of the other established, namely, “der Agonalsieg, d.h. der edle Sieg ohne 
Feindschaft […], den friedlichen Sieg einer Individualität”.25 Burckhardt traces the 
birth of the agon back to a burgeoning of the aristocracy, who, thanks to their slaves, 
had the time and wealth to engage in this new form of contest: 
Die durch die Geburt gegebenen Individuen der herrschenden Klasse 
sind nicht mehr, wie vorher, in beschränkter Anzahl vorhanden, 
sondern es herrscht eine große, wesentlich von Grundrenten lebende 
städtische Aristokratie, deren Lebenszweck und Ideal wiederum der 
Kampf, aber weniger der Krieg als der Wettkampf unter Gleichen ist. 
Die ganze Nation ist überzeugt, daß dies das Höchste auf Erden sei.26 
Like Curtius, Burckhardt underscores how the brilliance of Greek culture can be 
traced back to the enlivening effects of the Greeks’ agonally competitive spirit, as 
well as the inclusion of the arts within the institution of the agon.27 From the above 
quote, we can already see that Burckhardt understands agon as conceptually distinct 
from Krieg insofar as they refer to mutually exclusive states of conflictual affairs 
                                                      
24 See pp.19ff. 
25 Burckhardt (2014), vol.4, p.88. 
26 See ibid., p.117 (my italics). 
27 See ibid., p.83. Burckhardt refers to the agon as “das allgemeine Gärungselement, welches 
jegliches Wollen und Können, sobald die nötige Freiheit da ist, in Fermentation bringt”.  
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(even though both are similarly motivated by a desire for victory).28 To fully 
articulate this division, Burckhardt invokes Hesiod’s distinction of the two Eris 
goddesses, or goddesses of strife, each of whom symbolised a unique species of 
discord: 
Bei [Hesiod] finden wir denn auch die Kunde vom Agon, wie er sich 
im ländlichen und bürgerlichen Leben offenbart, d.h. der Konkurrenz, 
welche nur eine Parallele zum vornehmen und idealen Agon ist, und 
zwar kommt hier seine Lehre von der bösen und der guten Eris in 
Betracht, die wir am Anfang der Werke und Tage […] lesen. Letztere 
ist die früher geborene (wonach die böse etwa nur eine Ausartung ins 
Große, zu Krieg und Streit wäre), und zwar scheint Hesiod sie nicht nur 
im Menschenleben zu finden, sondern auch in der elementaren Natur; 
denn der Kronide hat sie schon in die Wurzeln der Erde gelegt. Sie ist 
es, welche auch den Trägen und Unbehilflichen zur Arbeit aufweckt; 
indem er einen andern sieht, welcher reich ist, müht dann auch er sich, 
zu pflügen und zu pflanzen und das Haus zu ordnen, und Nachbar eifert 
mit Nachbar im Streben nach Reichtum.29 
Burckhardt appears to assent to Hesiod’s parsing of war and Wettkampf, each of 
which are symbolised by distinct Eris deities. The good (“gute”) Eris symbolises 
Konkurrenz and agon, which manifest themselves in productive activity (i.e. 
“pflügen”, “pflanzen” and “das Haus … ordnen”), while the evil (“böse”) Eris is 
manifested in the destructive activity of war and strife (“Krieg und Streit”).  
In his analysis, however, Burckhardt does not create an absolutely clear-cut 
dichotomy between Wettkampf and destructive conflict; namely, insofar as he also 
accents the often-fatal consequences of the official agon, particularly the pankration 
– a no holds barred contest that combined boxing and wrestling, unrestrained by 
rules except those forbidding eye-gouging and biting. In such contests, people lost 
teeth, fingers were broken, and “[d]urch das Würgen, die entsetzlichen Stöße in den 
                                                      
28 Though he only distinguishes “Wettkampf unter Gleichen” from “Krieg”, we find that, 
unlike Curtius, Burckhardt generally refrains from using the term “Wettkampf” (or “Agon”) 
to refer to martial conflict. 
29 Ibid., p.88. 
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Unterleib usw. kamen aber auch nicht selten Tötungen vor”.30 Thus, although 
intentionally killing the other was supposed to be proscribed, fatalities were 
undoubtedly tolerated. 31  
It should also be observed that in Burckhardt’s citation of Hesiod, while the 
twin godheads are depicted as mutually exclusive in conceptual terms, the two 
species of conflict that they represent are figured as standing in genetic relation to 
one another. However, Burckhardt formulates this relation in a manner quite 
different from that of Curtius, who conceived of war as originary, and the 
“regelmäßig[e] Wettkampf” as only emerging later by means of human artifice (i.e. 
through the institution of religion). Contrastingly, for Burckhardt’s Hesiod, this 
relation is inverted, and it is the good Eris whom is conceived as the “früher 
geborene”; the evil Eris (i.e. “Krieg und Streit”) only arises as the result of human 
corruption or degeneration: “die böse etwa nur eine Ausartung ins Große […] wäre”, 
says Burckhardt. Therefore, although Burckhardt construes the Greek agonal age as 
historically posterior to the belligerently unmeasured heroic age, his interpretation 
of Hesiod indicates that the agonal impulse is ultimately genetically prior to the 
impulse for war. We should now determine where Nietzsche sits in this debate. 
                                                      
30 Ibid., pp.97-8. Burckhardt also maintains that artistic contests could be equally violent 
insofar as they often descended into a chaos of frenzied partisanship, which often eventuated 
in the spectators murdering one or more of the contestants. Indeed, the outcome of artistic 
contests were treated as a matter of life or death, claims Burckhardt, since contestants could 
be “scourged” (“blutig gegeißeln“) and expelled in the event of unfavourable judgement (see 
ibid., p.112 and fn.208). 
31 Indeed, whereas the grecophilic Curtius postulated that the Greeks took some inherent 
relish in the activity of struggle, Burckhardt stresses that “Es war nichts positiv Glückliches, 
wenn das ganze Leben auf einen Augenblick der furchtbarsten Spannung eingerichtet war; 
in der Zwischenzeit muß Abspannung oder tiefe Sorge um die Zukunft die Betreffenden 
ergriffen haben” (ibid., p.102.). Burckhardt also shows how envy, animosity and the shame 
of defeat were crippling and even drove competitors to suicide (see ibid., pp.102-3.). 
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2.2.2. THE EARLY NIETZSCHE ON THE RELATION OF 
WETTKAMPF AND VERNICHTUNGSKAMPF (1869-80) 
As already stated, Nietzsche himself can be found to use the term “Wettkampf” to 
refer to unmeasured conflict – namely, the unmeasured struggle pervading nature, 
as described by Darwin, Hobbes and Schopenhauer (and expounded in Chapter 1). 
For example, in an early Nachlass note, he describes the Schopenhauerian will 
(“Wille”), in terms of Wettkampf: “Der Wille tödtend (in der Natur im Wettkampfe 
des Schwächeren und des Stärkeren)” (NL 21[15] 7.527).32 There are then further 
texts that appear to support the idea that Nietzsche’s agonism is compatible with 
warmongery. For instance, in the opening paragraphs of CV 5, he marvels at the how 
the Greeks – widely considered “die humansten Menschen der alten Zeit” – could 
have been so violent and cruel, and taken such pleasure in the horrors depicted in 
the Iliad. Indeed, he censures our “weichlichen Begriff der modernen Humanität”, 
and our corresponding inability to conceive of this aspect of Greek culture as 
anything but an aberration. It is in contrast to these failings, therefore, that in CV 5 
Nietzsche endeavours to recuperate a vision of humanity able to incorporate such 
ostensibly savage tendencies.33  
This desire to acknowledge PDC as an intrinsic part of our humanity 
certainly recalls Nietzsche’s affirmation of war and its representation in CV 3, where 
he maintains that the warmongery of the Greeks, as depicted in the Iliad, was 
                                                      
32 Like Burckhardt, he also states in lecture notes from 1874-5 that the artistic “Wettkampf” 
was a “Kampf” in which a contestant’s life or death (“Leben oder Tod”) was often at stake 
(GGL III, KGW II/5, p.290). 
33 See CV 5 1.783: “So haben die Griechen, die humansten Menschen der alten Zeit, einen 
Zug von Grausamkeit, von tigerartiger Vernichtungslust an sich: ein Zug, der [...]  in ihrer 
Mythologie uns, die wir mit dem weichlichen Begriff der modernen Humanität ihnen 
entgegenkommen, in Angst versetzen muß. [...] Warum mußte der griechische Bildhauer 
immer wieder Krieg und Kämpfe in zahllosen Wiederholungen ausprägen, ausgereckte 
Menschenleiber, deren Sehnen vom Hasse gespannt sind oder vom Übermuthe des 
Triumphes, sich krümmende Verwundete, ausröchelnde Sterbende? Warum jauchzte die 
ganze griechische Welt bei den Kampfbildern der Ilias? Ich fürchte daß wir diese nicht 
‘griechisch’ genug verstehen, ja daß wir schaudern würden, wenn wir sie einmal griechisch 
verstünden.” 
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justified due to its forming the foundation of the Gesellschaft and its culture.34 
Indeed, Don Dombowsky argues that in justifying PDC, in CV 3 Nietzsche also 
affirms, “without utilizing the term, the Greek agon, or the agonal situation of 
competition and perpetual conflict between individuals and power-complexes.”35 
But can we read CV 3 and CV 5 together in this way? Or give Nietzsche’s agonism 
such a broad and inclusive definition? The previous chapter has already gestured 
towards the fact that we must answer both of these questions in the negative – 
however, it is worth our while giving a full explanation of why this must necessarily 
be the case. 
 We should begin by scrutinizing Nietzsche’s statements regarding violence 
at the beginning of CV 5. Casting his eye back to pre-Homeric Greece, he describes 
a savage world of unrelenting, violent strife – one in which “die Grausamkeit des 
Sieges ist die Spitze des Lebensjubels”. (N.B. that this roughly maps onto 
Burckhardt’s description of the “heroisch[e] Zeitalter”.) During this ferocious epoch, 
it was deemed just, “nach dem Rechte des Krieges”, to enslave or put to death the 
inhabitants of a conquered city as one saw fit. This ferocious world was one devoid 
                                                      
34 CV 3 1.771: “[B]lutige Eifersucht von Stadt auf Stadt, von Partei auf Partei, diese 
mörderische Gier jener kleinen Kriege, der tigerartige Triumph auf dem Leichnam des 
erlegten Feindes, kurz die unablässige Erneuerung jener trojanischen Kampf- und 
Greuelscenen, in deren Anblick Homer lustvoll versunken, als ächter Hellene, vor uns steht 
— wohin deutet diese naive Barbarei des griechischen Staates, woher nimmt er seine 
Entschuldigung vor dem Richterstuhle der ewigen Gerechtigkeit? Stolz und ruhig tritt der 
Staat vor ihn hin: und an der Hand führt er das herrlich blühende Weib, die griechische 
Gesellschaft.” 
35 See Dombowsky (2004), pp.43-4: “Nietzsche, writing in The Greek State, considers the 
Greeks as the ‘political men in themselves’. He defines their ‘political passion’, in opposition 
to the liberal optimistic view rooted in ‘the doctrines of French Rationalism and the French 
Revolution’, in terms of the unconditional subjection of all interests to the natural ‘State-
instinct’, by which he means, the artistic and passionate maintenance of a state of war, the 
‘bloody jealousy of city against city, of party against party . . . the incessant renewal of . . . 
Trojan scenes of struggle’. Thus, Nietzsche affirms here, without utilizing the term, the Greek 
agon, or the agonal situation of competition and perpetual conflict between individuals and 
power-complexes (also articulated by the conservative political forces of his generation).” 
See also Müller (2005), p.78. Müller states that, within the Homeric world depicted in CV 3 
and CV 5, “der Agon [sich] vornehmlich als heroischer Zweikampf um Leben und Tod, das 
Machtgefühl des Siegs wiederum als moralisch unreflektierter ‘Triumph auf dem Leichnam 
des erlegten Feindes’ […] darstellt.” 
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of measure, in which justice was equated with the will of the heroically mighty. 
Reinforcing his assertion in CV 3 (and GM II 17 5.324) that the state is born out of 
violence, Nietzsche seeks to illuminate the violent roots of Greek civilisation: “Und 
wie sich in Wahrheit vom Morde und der Mordsühne aus der Begriff des 
griechischen Rechtes entwickelt hat, so nimmt auch die edlere Kultur ihren ersten 
Siegeskranz vom Altar der Mordsühne” (CV 5 1.785). 
According to Nietzsche, the horror of any violent epoch has certain 
ramifications for the spiritual Weltanschauung of those enduring such times. 
Individuals subjected to unremittingly baleful conditions of this kind often come to 
equate life with suffering and punishment; hence, such an existence tends to generate 
a pessimistic worldview, what Nietzsche refer to as an “Ekel am Dasein” (CV 5 
1.785). This form of pessimism is exemplified, he claims, in both Eastern Buddhism 
and Greek Orphism (though we may also group the philosophies of Anaximander 
and Schopenhauer in this category). Yet this is not the only possible spiritual 
response to such a world. The Greek genius, Nietzsche tells us, formulates a quite 
contrary rejoinder to the question “was will ein Leben des Kampfes und des Sieges?” 
Rather than deeming life-denial the appropriate response to the horrific character of 
existence, “der griechische Genius den einmal so furchtbar vorhandenen Trieb 
gelten ließ und als berechtigt erachtet” (CV 5 1.785-6). The drive (Trieb) that the 
genius acknowledges is the drive for “Kampf und der Lust des Sieges”, what he calls 
in WS 226 “das Siegen- und Hervorragenwollen”. In Homer’s Iliad, this is expressed 
by Achilles as the desire “[e]ver to excel, to do better than others”.36 What is implied 
by Nietzsche is that, in evaluating the heroic world, the “Genius” places the accent 
on the supreme joy of victory, instead of on the dispiriting prevalence of crushing 
defeat, subjugation, slavery and murder.  
In speaking of the Greek “Genius”, Nietzsche is ostensibly referring to 
Homer, or at least some kind of archetypal Greek spirit epitomised in Homer. 
                                                      
36 Homer, Iliad, Book 6, l.208. 
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Certainly, Nietzsche thought that Homer ingeniously aestheticized brutal war in such 
a way as to make it tolerable if not affirmable.37 Thus, in Homer’s world, 
werden wir bereits durch die außerordentliche künstlerische 
Bestimmtheit, Ruhe und Reinheit der Linien über die rein stoffliche 
Verschmelzung hinweggehoben: ihre Farben erscheinen, durch eine 
künstlerische Täuschung, lichter, milder, wärmer, ihre Menschen, in 
dieser farbigen warmen Beleuchtung, besser und sympathischer […]. 
(CV 5 1.784) 
Nietzsche also describes this poetic act of idealisation as one that overcomes the 
brutal Kampf um’s Dasein (thereby contradicting the note cited above in which he 
categorises Darwinian struggle as a form of Wettkampf): “Der Dichter überwindet 
den Kampf um’s Dasein, indem er ihn zu einem freien Wettkampfe [sic] idealisirt” 
(NL 16[15] 7.398). Nevertheless, he is remarkably reticent when it comes to 
expounding how Homer concretely contributed to the advent of the Greek agonal 
age (after all, as Nietzsche would have undoubtedly been aware, agonal games are 
depicted in both the Iliad and the Odyssey, which indicates that the agon predated 
Homer38).  
If we read CV 5 in conjunction with GT, however, we get a better insight into 
how he might think Homer (and the communal “Genius” or “spirit” of the Greeks 
embodied in Homer) enabled the proliferation of non-destructive modes of contest. 
Thus, Nietzsche claims in GT 15 that a life of relentless violence generates a suicidal 
“practische[r] Pessimismus” – people simply cannot bear to go on living given the 
predominance of war. However, he adds, this defeatist sentiment only arose “wo 
                                                      
37 There are two reasons why Nietzsche might not have wanted to explicitly name the 
aestheticizing genius as Homer. First, Heraclitus also fits the description: viewing life as 
justified in conflict: “man muß wissen, daß der Krieg gemeinschaftlich ist und die Δίκη Streit 
ist u. daß alles gemäß dem Streite geschieht” (VPP, KGW II/4, p.273). Second, Nietzsche 
may have been referring to a more embracing notion of “Genius” – namely, as the “spirit” of 
the community (we find a similar use of “Genius” in FW 354, for example, entitled “Der 
Genius der Gattung”). See also Chapter 3, where this conception of genius is explored in 
greater depth. 
38 For example, the funeral games held in memory of Patroclus in Book 23 of the Iliad, and 
the games played by the Phaeacians (and in which Odysseus himself participates) in Book 8 
of the Odyssey.  
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nicht die Kunst in irgend welchen Formen […] zum Heilmittel und zur Abwehr jenes 
Pesthauchs erschienen ist” (GT 15 1.100). Homeric art offered solace, and acted as 
a prophylactic against despondency. By depicting the brutality and horror of the 
heroic age in such a beautiful fashion, Homer enabled the Greeks to affirm life and 
action.39 Christa Davis Acampora, though perhaps going beyond the texts 
themselves, has elaborated this line of interpretation, arguing that Nietzsche thought 
Homer enabled specifically agonal modes of action. In her rapprochement of CV 5 
and GT, she suggests that, with Homer, 
life becomes full of possibilities to seek and win, and the wisdom of 
Silenus is overcome, replaced with the worldview expressed in 
Homeric literature. Homer’s revaluation of human existence has it that 
what is best is to never die – to achieve some unforgettable victory. 
Second best is to not die too soon – that is, to live long enough to secure 
the meaning of one’s life through significant action.40  
Whether we accept this imaginative synthesis or not, what we can conclude from the 
above is that Nietzsche’s praise of the Iliad in CV 5 is not to be equated with a praise 
of its content (i.e. war and violence). Nietzsche is applauding the beautiful form 
Homer gives to this content – thus, he praises the Iliad as a “künstlerisches Spiel und 
Nachahmung” of the heroic world of war. Indeed, Nietzsche intimates that this 
ingeniously transfigured reflection is “Die Voraussetzung des Wettkampfes” (NL 
16[26] 7.404); but note well that it is at most merely a precondition 
(“Voraussetzung”) of the Wettkampf, and not the Wettkampf itself. Nietzsche’s 
celebration of the Iliad in CV 5 should therefore not be interpreted as an affirmation 
of war, as it is in CV 3.  
From this it should already be plain that the genius does not affirm and 
embrace conflict and the pleasure of victory tout court as the destructive reading 
would lead us to believe. On the contrary, Nietzsche praises how, in recognising this 
drive, the genius enables the Greeks to transfigure its destructive content, to forge 
                                                      
39 See also NL 11[20] 8.205-6 and NL 5[165] 8.86-7. 
40 Acampora (2013), p.51. 
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ways of engaging in struggle and the pursuit of victory without engaging in war and 
murder. As we saw in Chapter 1, this process of channelling energy away from 
socially pernicious forms of conflict is the essence of the Wettkampf, which 
functions as a non-destructive means of obtaining the key desideratum (i.e. triumph) 
that was previously sought in war.  
Like Burckhardt, Nietzsche also appeals to Hesiod’s partition of the Eris 
goddesses in order to illustrate the way in which he views Wettkampf as conceptually 
distinguished from, but genetically related to, murderous forms of conflict. Indeed, 
in the same note, Nietzsche also describes the role of the Greek poet as that of 
transposing destructive drives into the good Eris (i.e. Wettkampf): “die tigerartigen 
Zerfleischungstriebe der Griechen weiß er zu übertragen in die gute Eris”. Yet his 
representation of the good–evil Eris relation is not identical with that of Burckhardt. 
It is worth quoting Nietzsche’s citation of Hesiod at length so as to bring this 
divergence fully into relief: 
Die eine Eris möchte man, wenn man Verstand hat, ebenso loben als 
die andre tadeln; denn eine ganz getrennte Gemüthsart haben diese 
beiden Göttinnen. Denn die Eine fördert den schlimmen Krieg und 
Hader, die Grausame! Kein Sterblicher mag sie leiden, sondern unter 
dem Joch der Noth erweist man der schwerlastenden Eris Ehre, nach 
dem Rathschlusse der Unsterblichen. Diese gebar, als die ältere, die 
schwarze Nacht; die andre aber stellte Zeus der hochwaltende hin auf 
die Wurzeln der Erde und unter die Menschen, als eine viel bessere. Sie 
treibt auch den ungeschickten Mann zur Arbeit; und schaut einer, der 
des Besitzthums ermangelt, auf den Anderen, der reich ist, so eilt er 
sich in gleicher Weise zu säen und zu pflanzen und das Haus wohl zu 
bestellen; der Nachbar wetteifert mit dem Nachbarn, der zum 
Wohlstande hinstrebt. Gut ist diese Eris für die Menschen. Auch der 
Töpfer grollt dem Töpfer und der Zimmermann dem Zimmermann, es 
neidet der Bettler den Bettler und der Sänger den Sänger. (CV 5 
1.786)41 
                                                      
41 On Nietzsche’s use of the good–evil Eris distinction, see NL 16[19] 7.400, ST 1.545, M 
38, MA 170, WS 29. 
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Nietzsche therefore follows Burckhardt in drawing a sharp conceptual line between 
the species of conflict respectively demarcated by the good and evil Eris sisters. The 
latter is associated with “feindseligen Vernichtungskampfe [sic]” – that is, the 
“Morde”, “Krieg” “Streit” and “Wollüstige Grausamkeit” that characterises pre-
Homeric culture. By contrast, the good Eris, “als Eifersucht Groll Neid die 
Menschen zur That reizt, aber nicht zur That des Vernichtungskampfes, sondern zur 
That des Wettkampfes” (CV 5 1.787).42 In this way, Nietzsche unequivocally 
discriminates between PDC (falling under the banner of the “böse” Eris) and 
Wettkampf (falling under the banner of the “gute” Eris). 
But how does this terminological distinction cash out practically? And why 
does Nietzsche endorse the Wettkampf as “good”? In short, the good Eris inspires 
envy (“Neid”) and ambition (“Ehrgeiz”) in individuals, which propels them to 
engage in individually and socio-culturally constructive modes of praxis. Otherwise 
put, envy and ambition push people to pursue excellence to the point of outdoing 
their adversaries. But as Nietzsche notes, “der Kern der hellenischen Wettkampf-
Vorstellung” is not just the mutual stimulation of the contestants, but also the 
measure that they impose upon one another: “wie sie sich auch gegenseitig in der 
Grenze des Maaßes halten” (CV 5 1.789). This means that each individual’s 
ambition is kept within manageable bounds, and they are thereby prevented from 
becoming excessively dominant and stifling the contest (how this is achieved will 
be explored in further detail below). Evil (“böse”) Eris, contrariwise, is distinctly 
unmeasured (“grenzenlos”). It promotes detrimental modes of action such as murder 
and war, where one strives to win by eliminating one’s opponent.43 The Wettkampf 
is therefore presented as deeply productive in nature.  Individuals are driven by 
                                                      
42  See also NL 16[19] 7.400: “Die hesiodische Eris wird gewöhnlich falsch verstanden: was 
die Leute zum Krieg und Streit treibt, die böse: was sie zur ehrgeizigen That treibt, die gute.” 
43 See also WS 29, where Nietzsche distinguishes good and evil Eris in terms of the way in 
which individuals attempt to equal their opponents – that is, whether they try to do so by 
pulling their opponent down to their level (bad), or raising themselves up to the level of their 
opponents (good). While this aphorism sets the goal as equality and not victory (as in CV 5), 
it still sheds important light on the way in which Nietzsche conceives of the opposed 
dynamics of Wettkampf and Vernichtungskampf.  
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reciprocal stimulation to compete and prove themselves predominant at a given task, 
as opposed to through a direct clash of naked physical force. Nietzsche also 
underscores how this allows for the “mäßige Entladung” of a range of aggressive, 
though not necessarily destructive, human affects (such as envy, ambition, jealousy, 
hatred, and rage) that would otherwise have to be released in violent and even 
seditious activity.44 Thus, “der Grieche [erachtete] ein volles Ausströmenlassen 
seines Hasses als ernste Nothwendigkeit”, and it was the agon that granted this 
aggressive hatred a non-destructive outlet. Diverging from Burckhardt, then, agonal 
victory is not figured as “ohne Feindschaft” in Nietzsche’s analysis, but is rather 
saturated with a controlled form of animosity. Further distinguishing himself from 
Burckhardt, and in spite of his affirmation of agonal animosity, Nietzsche 
conspicuously suppresses the often-violent practical reality of agonal contest. Thus, 
as Herman Siemens has stressed, Nietzsche presents us with a highly stylised vision 
of the ancient Greek agon, one that, I would submit, cleaves an even more definite 
conceptual divide between agonal and physically destructive forms of conflict.45 
Insofar as the agon promotes (self-)cultivation, Nietzsche also sees it as one 
of the fundaments of ancient Greek education; thus, “[j]ede Begabung muss sich 
kämpfend entfalten, so gebietet die hellenische Volkspädagogik” (CV 5 1.787).46 In 
parallel with Curtius and Burckhardt, he also theorises that the Greek ethos of contest 
was the driving force behind their cultural flourishing. Spurred on by their envy and 
ambition, artists strove to outdo one another: “ihre ganze Kunst ist nicht ohne 
Wettkampf zu denken: die hesiodische gute Eris, der Ehrgeiz, gab ihrem Genius die 
                                                      
44 See NL 5[146] 8.79; see also NL 16[18] 7.399, where Nietzsche remarks “Wie die 
griechische Natur alle furchtbaren Eigenschaften zu benutzen weiß: die tigerartige 
Vernichtungswuth (der Stämme usw.) im Wettkampf”. 
45 See Herman Siemens, “Contesting Nietzsche’s Agon. On Christa Davis Acampora’s 
‘Contesting Nietzsche,’” Nietzsche-Studien, 44 (2015), 446-461 (p.452). 
46 On the educational function of the agon, see NL 16[4] 7.394: “Hesiod und — — — Die 
Jesuiten — ihre antike Erziehung — der Ehrgeiz und der Wettkampf in der Erziehung. / Das 
Problem des Wettkampfes. / 7. Künstler im Wettkampfe. (Bei uns aus Mangel an Größen 
selten: Schiller und Goethe.) […]”. See also NL 16[14] 7.397: “Die antiken Mittel der 
Erziehung: der Wettkampf und die Liebe.” 
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Flügel” (MA 170).47 Note that in trying to justify non-destructive, agonal contention, 
Nietzsche is now invoking the same cultural criterion that he used in CV 3 to justify 
PDC. 
If we simply focus on how Nietzsche parses Wettkampf and war, however, 
we risk glossing over what we have already identified as the primary purpose of CV 
5: to show how man’s “furchtbaren und als unmenschlich geltenden Befähigungen 
[…] vielleicht sogar der fruchtbare Boden [sind], aus dem allein alle Humanität, in 
Regungen Thaten und Werken hervorwachsen kann” (CV 5 1.783). We might 
reformulate this by saying that Nietzsche, like Burckhardt, strives to illuminate the 
genetic relation between Vernichtungskampf and Wettkampf. Though Nietzsche 
highlights the separate parentage of the two Eris goddesses (the evil Eris being born 
of “die schwarze Nacht”, and the good Eris being placed on earth by Zeus himself), 
he follows Burckhardt in suggesting that, in reality, one of the distinct forms of 
conflict that they represent is actually born out of the other. In Burckhardt’s account, 
as in the proem to Hesiod’s Work and Days, it is the good Eris that was born first, 
with the Vernichtungskampf emerging out of the corruption of the more originary 
Wettkampf.48 Nietzsche, on the other hand, inverts the order of derivation. Why, we 
should ask, would he decide to do such a thing? 
In the first place, Nietzsche’s motivation could be said to be purely 
philological. It appears from his lecture notes (GG), that he considered both the idea 
of the good Eris and the assertion of her genealogical priority, which are to be found 
                                                      
47 See also CV 5 1.790: “Mißtrauisch-eifersüchtig traten die großen musikalischen Meister, 
Pindar und Simonides, neben einander hin; wetteifernd begegnet der Sophist, der höhere 
Lehrer des Alterthums, dem anderen Sophisten; selbst die allgemeinste Art der Belehrung, 
durch das Drama, wurde dem Volke nur ertheilt unter der Form eines ungeheuren Ringens 
der großen musikalischen und dramatischen Künstler. Wie wunderbar! ‘Auch der Künstler 
grollt dem Künstler!’” 
48 See Hesiod, Work and Days, in Glen Most (ed. and trans.), Theogony, Work and Days, 
Testimonia (Cambridge, Massachusettes: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp.87-8, ll.11-26: 
“For the one [Eris] fosters evil war and conflict – cruel one, / no mortal loves that one, but it 
is by necessity that they honor / the oppressive Strife, by the plans of the immortals. But / 
the other one gloomy Night bore first; and Cronus' highthroned / son, who dwells in the 
aether, set it in the roots of / the earth, and it is much better for men.” 
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in the proem of Work and Days, to be the illegitimate additions “eines hesiodischen 
Rhapsoden”. According to Nietzsche, this rhapsodist invented the good Eris (along 
with her priority), then superimposed her onto Hesiod’s text in order to 
“rechtfertigen” “[d]er Wettstreit unter Dichtern [als] etwas erlaubtes.”49 For 
Nietzsche, however, the true tenor of Hesiod’s thought is best captured in Theogony, 
in which “die böse ist […] uralt”.50 
This said, Nietzsche’s motivation for inverting the order of birth given in 
the proem is likely more philosophical in kind. The second obvious reason that 
Nietzsche might have chosen this ordering, then, is on account of his interest in 
situating man’s origins in a horrific world devoid of measure. This would enable him 
to show how such brutal measurelessness is an inextricable part of our ancestry and 
inheritance. Cruelty and excess are not foibles of a wicked minority whose originally 
“good” natures have been contingently corrupted by society (as Burckhardt’s 
Hesiod, like Rousseau, might have it). Such a penchant for violence in fact lies at 
the very root of all that we vaunt as human. What lent the Greeks their potency and 
cultural competence was their ability to avail themselves of their natural urges for 
socially beneficial ends, what Nietzsche calls “[d]ie Verwendung des Schädlichen 
zum Nützlichen”. 51 Such transformative exploitation of our primitive nature, 
however, presupposes that we relocate these dark impulses within ourselves and 
acknowledge them as an intrinsic aspect of our humanity. No wonder, then, that 
Nietzsche considers modern man’s attempt to hew his “natural” animalistic impulses 
from his concept of “humanity” as having had such a debilitating effect. 
An expanded analysis of how Nietzsche thinks this transformation can be 
undertaken will form the subject matter of Section 3. For now we should merely note 
                                                      
49 See GDG, KGW II/5, pp.360-1. 
50  Ibid.: “[W]elche [Eris] wird als die ältere ἔρις u[nd] Kind d[er] Nacht bezeichnet? In 
Theog. die böse. […] Gerade die böse ist nach der Theog. uralt.” Indeed, in Nietzsche’s 
opinion, the “Theogony kennt die ἔρις nur als eine”, and therefore not as a dual godhead 
(ibid.). 
51 NL 16[18] 7.399. In the same note, Nietzsche also remarks “Wie die griechische Natur 
alle furchtbaren Eigenschaften zu benutzen weiß: die tigerartige Vernichtungswuth (der 
Stämme usw.) im Wettkampf”. See also VM 220 and NL 11[186] 9.514. 
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how this genetic relation shows that the Wettkampf and Vernichtungskampf share 
certain qualities: particularly the fact that they are both forms of conflict driven by 
the desire for victory and the range of aforementioned aggressive affects. 
Nonetheless, the early Nietzsche holds agonal and destructive conflict to be 
distinguished both in terms of their socio-cultural utility and in terms of the modes 
of action to which they lead. Vernichtungskampf (i.e. war and murder) is an 
unmeasured species of conflict in which adversaries strive for victory in a socially 
injurious fashion – namely, insofar as they each seek the annihilation of their 
counterpart; Wettkampf, by contrast, is measured and promotes self-improvement. 
Naturally, this self-perfectionist impulse is of high socio-cultural value on account 
of the fact that it motivates individuals to prove themselves by undertaking great 
deeds and producing great cultural artefacts, both of which serve to enrich the 
commonweal.  
2.2.3. THE LATER NIETZSCHE ON THE RELATION OF 
WETTKAMPF AND VERNICHTUNGSKAMPF (1881-89) 
As we enter the 1880s, what I will refer to as the later phase of Nietzsche’s thought, 
explicit discussion of agonal conflict or Wettkampf wanes almost to the point of 
disappearance. Yet as I will now argue, Nietzsche can be said to uphold his earlier 
conception of the relation of Wettkampf and PDC. In a note from 1881, for instance, 
Nietzsche tells us that 
Die griechischen Gesetzgeber haben den agon so gefördert, um den 
Wettkampfgedanken vom Staate abzulenken und die politische Ruhe 
zu gewinnen […] Das Nachdenken über den Staat sollte durch agonale 
Erhitzung abgelenkt werden — ja turnen und dichten sollte man — dies 
hatte den Nebenerfolg, die Bürger stark schön und fein zu machen. (NL 
11[186] 9.514)52 
                                                      
52 See also WS 226. 
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Here the agon is equated with “turnen und dichten” and “politische Ruhe”, and, 
furthermore, it is unambiguously opposed to civil war. However, it is once again 
depicted as drawing on the same energies as destructive conflict, offering a way of 
channelling potentially detrimental impulses into socially beneficial practices (i.e. it 
makes the citizens “schön und fein”). 
In 1883 (around the time he was reading Schmidt), Nietzsche describes the 
agonal feeling (“[d]as agonale Gefühl”) as that which “vor einem Publikum siegen 
will und diesem Publikum verständlich sein muß” (NL 8[15] 10.339). This shows 
that Nietzsche’s understanding of the agon is closely related to the poetic or 
dramaturgical Greek contest, for it is only in such contests that one must make 
oneself “verständlich” before an audience (“Publikum”). We need only examine a 
note such as the following to remark that, even after the emergence of the notion of 
the will to power, Nietzsche still sees the Wettkampf as conceptually distinct from 
PDC: 
Die Freien, Mässigen erfanden den Wettkampf als die immer 
wachsende Verfeinerung jenes Macht-Äußerungsbedürfnisses: durch 
den Wettkampf wurde der Hybris vorgebeugt: welche durch lange 
Unbefriedig<ung> des Machtgelüstes entsteht. (NL 7[161] 10.295) 
The Wettkampf represents a refinement (“Verfeinerung”) of individuals’ expression 
of power.53 It is defined, he indicates earlier in the same note, by Aidos – that is, 
“[e]ine Art Ekel vor der Verletzung des Ehrwürdigen.” It is measure that 
distinguishes agonal conflict from struggles in which one seeks the harm one’s 
opponent, which Nietzsche associates with “Übermaß, in dem freudigen I<nstinkt 
der> Hybris” (ibid.). In 1888, after a long hiatus, we then witness Nietzsche 
returning to the theme of the agon in his published work. Now, in GD, he is interested 
in how the form of philosophical debate engendered by Socrates and Plato 
constituted “eine neue Art agon” (GD Sokrates 8 6.71), that is, “eine Fortbildung 
und Verinnerlichung der alten agonalen Gymnastik” (GD Streifzüge 23 6.126). 
                                                      
53 See also FW 13. 
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Although Nietzsche in many ways construes this type of spiritualised agon as a 
decadent form of the practice, it is nonetheless even further removed from PDC than 
its physical counterparts in wrestling and gymnastics.  
In GD Alten 3, Nietzsche rebukes the disempowering and sanitising effect 
of the ancient Greek philosophers on their surrounding culture; but what should be 
observed is that in making this critique, he maintains a clear conceptual distinction 
between agonal practices and violent conflict, while nonetheless accenting their 
genetic relation: 
Ich sah ihren stärksten Instinkt, den Willen zur Macht, ich sah sie zittern 
vor der unbändigen Gewalt dieses Triebs, — ich sah alle ihre 
Institutionen wachsen aus Schutzmaassregeln, um sich vor einander 
gegen ihren inwendigen Explosivstoff sicher zu stellen. […] Und mit 
Festen und Künsten wollte man auch nichts Andres als sich obenauf 
fühlen, sich obenauf zeigen: es sind Mittel, sich selber zu verherrlichen, 
unter Umständen vor sich Furcht zu machen… […] Die Philosophen 
sind ja die décadents des Griechenthums, die Gegenbewegung gegen 
den alten, den vornehmen Geschmack (— gegen den agonalen Instinkt, 
gegen die Polis, gegen den Werth der Rasse, gegen die Autorität des 
Herkommens) […]. (GD Alten 3 6.157) 
Nietzsche implies that agonal practices or institutions arise out of the need to effect 
a Bändigung of the destructively explosive “[unbändige] Gewalt” of the will to 
power. This is achieved by creating moderated, institutional spaces in which this will 
can at least partially discharge itself in non-destructive activity. Thus, once again 
Nietzsche conceptually distinguishes measured agonal conflict – which he equates 
with the “Festen und Künsten” enjoyed by citizen’s living in a state of peace (i.e. 
who “vor sich selber Ruhe fänden”) – from the unrestrained bellicose mode of 
conflict occurring when “Stadtgemeinden zerfleischten sich unter einander” (ibid.).  
Notwithstanding this act of division, Nietzsche is highlighting a strong 
connection between the two modes of conflict. They are both expressions of the one 
will to power, and measured, agonal conflict is developed as a response to the often-
deleterious effects of this impetus. Again, as in GM, Nietzsche is trying to show how 
the cultural strength of the Greeks – particularly their art and (agonal) institutions – 
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grew out of a need to restrain and moderate the “[unbändige] Gewalt” of the will to 
power, to transform the “agonale Trieb” for discharge and overcoming into agonal 
conflict proper; thus, he says “ich sah alle ihre Institutionen wachsen aus 
Schutzmaassregeln”. Those things that we find laudatory in Hellenic culture are, for 
Nietzsche, a result of the Greeks’ ability to harness the productive potential of the 
will to power. As we saw in Chapter 1, however, this agonal drive is highly volatile 
and often releases itself with destructively explosive force.54  
The conditions under which this transformation occurs will be expounded 
over the subsequent sections. For now the objective has been to show that, unlike 
Curtius, Nietzsche persistently conceptualises agonal struggle in opposition to PDC 
– that is, the two types of conflict stand in a conceptual relation of exclusive 
disjunction towards one another. Indeed, Nietzsche draws an even clearer conceptual 
distinction than Burckhardt. Nonetheless, both the early and later Nietzsche also 
consistently underscore the genealogical relation of Wettkampf and 
Vernichtungskampf. In reading Nietzsche’s agon as a promotion of murderous 
conflict, his destructive readers therefore commit a genetic fallacy insofar they 
confound the agon with its origins (in violent strife). 
2.3. THE SCOPE OF THE AGON 
Now that we have established that Nietzsche’s endorsement of the agon does indeed 
refer to a measured form of conflict – insofar as it is not physically destructive – we 
need to establish the scope of this endorsement of measured conflict. The point in 
contention is the degree of social inclusivity exhibited by Nietzsche’s ideal agon. 
Whereas democratic appropriations of his thought tend to interpret his agonism as 
profoundly open and inclusive, aristocratic readings emphasise its exclusivity and 
                                                      
54 What he describes as an unmeasured, Dionysian species of “Rausch” in GD Streifzüge 8 
6.116. 
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confinement to a ruling minority. A survey of the internally divided critical literature 
therefore gives us no clear idea as to the scope of Nietzsche’s agonism; and indeed, 
without a coherent answer to this question of scope, Nietzsche’s conception of the 
agon is left with little, if any, practical applicability.  
On the democratic side, Hatab, for example, argues that although the 
Nietzschean agon “eschews equal results and even equal capacity”, it demands 
equality in the sense of equal opportunity. In political terms, this “agonistic 
openness” can be taken as the “open fair opportunity for all citizens to participate in 
political contention”.55 Thus, for Hatab, the ideal Nietzschean agon is democratic in 
its openness, and only aristocratic “in apportioning appropriate judgments of 
superiority and inferiority.”56 Crucially, this openness is conceived as the equal 
opportunity of citizens to compete for political power, where “losers must yield to, 
and live under, the policies of the winner”.57 The logic behind this notion of 
“agonistic openness” is that excluding individuals from the contest betrays “a flight 
from competition, a will to eliminate challenges” and is therefore “a weakness in a 
Nietzschean sense”. On this reading, then, agonism implies a radical state of 
receptivity to the challenges of others, regardless of social standing or capacity.  
In the other camp, we then find Appel and Conway. Conway argues that, 
according to Nietzsche, the agon is limited to a select “community of agonistic 
                                                      
55 See Hatab (1995), p.120. See also p.100, p.220 and pp.120-2. 
56 See Lawrence Hatab, “Prospects for a Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be 
Nietzscheans”, JNS, 24 (2002), 132-147 (p.140; see also p.142). David Owen also suggests 
that the Nietzschean democratic agon is similarly aristocratic insofar as it is a contest to 
establish a ranking of values – i.e. to establish what counts as excellence. See David Owen, 
Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity (London: Sage, 1995), pp.144-6.  
57 He states, therefore, that we can identify “specific configurations of power, of domination 
and submission in democratic politics” (Hatab [1995], p.63). See also David Owen, 
“Equality, Democracy, and Self-Respect: Reflections on Nietzsche’s Agonal Perfectionism”, 
JNS, 24 (2002), 113-131. Following Conant, Owen argues that the inequality affirmed by 
Nietzsche should be conceived as interior to the parts of the self, not as an external, social 
form of inequality. See also Owen (1995) (esp. p.163); and for a comparable reading of 
Nietzsche’s notion of the “Pathos der Distanz”, see Thomas Fossen, “Nietzsche's 
Aristocratism Revisited”, in H. W. Siemens and V. Roodt (eds.), Nietzsche, Power and 
Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), 
pp.299-318. This issue will be taken up again in ch.4. 
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‘friends’ founded by the Übermensch”.58 On a similar note, Appel thinks that to read 
Nietzsche as a proponent of democratic openness is contrived and demands an 
excessively violent appropriation of his thought for liberal-democratic ends.59 He 
contends that Nietzsche is a thoroughgoing aristocrat. But what does aristocracy 
mean in this context? For Appel, on the one hand, this minority is selected solely on 
the basis of their superior capacity, not according to birth-right or wealth.60 On the 
other hand, Appel attributes a more conventional notion of aristocratism to Nietzsche 
insofar as he reads him as campaigning for the oppressive rule of a few higher 
individuals over an enslaved majority. The same goes for Nietzsche’s understanding 
of the agon, which, echoing Conway, he describes in remarkably elitist terms as “the 
open clash of competing wills to power in the aristocratic inner circle”.61  
Appel also reads a line of continuity between CV 5 and Nietzsche’s later 
aristocratic agon. He maintains that both present “a constructive outlet for the 
potentially destructive wills of competitors, thereby preserving Greek community 
life and fostering its high culture.” Appel continues, asserting that, “[c]asting his 
eyes to the future, Nietzsche wishes to foster a space of contest and rivalry with a 
similar function. ‘Who can command, who can obey—that is experimented here!’”62 
Thus, like Hatab, he construes the struggle as one in which political power over 
one’s adversaries is the main stake. Yet, according to Appel, beyond this aristocratic 
inner circle, Nietzsche proposes that the majority of individuals ought to be confined 
to a politically excluded and murderously repressed slave-body.63 
                                                      
58 Daniel Conway, Nietzsche and the Political (New York: Routledge, 1997), p.31: “The 
aristocratic regimes [Nietzsche] favors would shelter a pyramidal hierarchy of ethical 
communities, each equipped with a distinctive morality that reflects its unique needs and 
strengths. At the pinnacle of this pyramidal structure would stand the community of agonistic 
‘friends’ founded by the Übermensch.” See also p.54: “Nietzsche depicts friendship as a 
mutually empowering agon, in which select individuals undergo moral development through 
their voluntary engagement in contest and conflict.” 
59 See Appel (1999), pp.2-5. 
60 Ibid., p.140. 
61 Ibid., p.141. 
62 Ibid., p.140 (quoting Z III Tafeln 25 4.265). 
63 Ibid., p.147. 
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This hermeneutic dichotomy regarding Nietzsche’s agonism reflects a more 
general division running through the secondary literature. Namely, that which exists 
between aristocratic and democratic appropriations of Nietzsche’s wider philosophy. 
In the former camp, commentators such as John Rawls and Thomas Hurka have 
claimed that Nietzsche’s perfectionist project is delimited to an aristocratic 
minority.64 Conversely, readers such as Stanley Cavell and James Conant have 
argued that Nietzsche’s perfectionism is open to all, perfectly compatible with 
democracy, and in no way confined to a particular social group.65 
 In the following section, then, the problem can be stated as follows: what is 
the social scope of Nietzsche’s agonism? Must every instance of genuinely agonal 
conflict exhibit the openness of which Hatab speaks; or is Nietzsche’s agon restricted 
to an aristocratic minority, excluding all others from participation? This can be 
divided into two sub-questions. First, does Nietzsche think that it is possible for 
anyone to participate in agonal conflict? Second, does he think it is desirable that 
anyone and everyone participate in agonal conflict, or are his positive valuations of 
such conflict specific to particular social groups? We should not take it for granted 
that Nietzsche’s descriptive and normative conceptions of the agon have the same 
extension.  
In trying to get an insight into the aristocratic aspect of Nietzsche’s agon, 
one place we might want to begin by looking is in Burckhardt’s Griechische 
Kulturgeschichte, where the agon is represented as closely bound up with the noble 
social class. Indeed, Martin Ruehl has even claimed that, “[l]ike Burckhardt, 
Nietzsche regarded the agon as an essentially aristocratic notion that belonged to a 
                                                      
64 See e.g. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1971), pp.285ff.; Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); 
see also Bruce Detwiler (1990).  
65 See Stanley Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of 
Emersonian Perfectionism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp.49-53; see 
also James Conant, “Nietzsche’s Perfectionism: A Reading of Schopenhauer as Educator”, 
in Richard Schacht (ed.), Nietzsche’s Postmoralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), pp.181–256. 
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pre-democratic age.”66 However, I will show that we find cogent criticisms in 
Burckhardt, not just of the democratic, but indeed, also of the strictly aristocratic 
conception of the agon. Moreover, Burckhardt rejects the idea of the agon as a direct 
struggle for political power. In Burckhardt we find both a socially inclusive and a 
socially exclusive or elitist conception of the agon, side by side, as it were.  
In the second subsection, I then examine Nietzsche’s conception of the agon 
prior to 1881, where he appears to appropriate much of Burckhardt’s account. Thus, 
he will be seen to propound a generalised notion of the agon, according to which any 
roughly equal individuals – though now this equality is conceived in terms of 
capacity rather than heredity – can agonally compete in local struggles for 
excellence. However, like Burckhardt, Nietzsche more emphatically endorses 
another more obviously aristocratic species of the struggle for excellence. We will 
also see that Nietzsche’s ideal agon, again paralleling Burckhardt’s, is an apolitical 
contest for fame and glory, and so cannot be conceived as a struggle for instrumental 
power fought among aristocrats. Indeed, while both Burckhardt and Nietzsche hold 
political agonism to be possible, they are both averse to it due to the fact that it can 
very easily deteriorate into socially detrimental forms of contest.  
In the third subsection, I turn to the scope of Nietzsche’s agonism after 1881. 
I contend that a major shift occurs at this point insofar as power (rather than fame or 
glory) is now figured as the principal stake sought in agonal contest; however, I 
nonetheless stress that this is not to be understood as instrumental or political power 
over one’s adversary. Drawing on JGB 259 and 262, which Appel uses to defend his 
aristocratic reading, I show that agonal conflict arises precisely where the struggle 
for instrumental or exploitative power cannot take place – namely, between any 
roughly equal will to power organisations. Though Nietzsche is particularly 
interested in how this is true of aristocratic social groups, and so undeniably 
                                                      
66 Martin Ruehl, “Politeia 1871 – Nietzsche contra Wagner”, in Ingo Gildenhard and Martin 
Ruehl (eds.), Out of Arcadia: Classics and Politics in Germany in the Age of Burckhardt, 
Nietzsche and Wilamowitz (London: Institute of Classical Studies, University of London, 
2003), p.78. 
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foregrounds this, I contend that he holds it to be possible for all relations of 
approximate equals.  
2.3.1. BURCKHARDT  
For Jacob Burckhardt, the ancient Greek agon was driven by the aristocratic ideal of 
kalokagathia, “der Einheit von Adel, Reichtum und Trefflichkeit”.67 According to 
his account, the agon initially emerges as a cultural practice of the noble class. The 
freedom to engage in the ostensibly useless practice of athletic and equestrian contest 
was founded on the surplus labour produced by the banausoi. These were the 
members of the working-classes, who performed almost all the manual labour in the 
ancient Greek polis.68 Hence, initially at least, the practice of the agon emerged by 
virtue of the socio-economic conditions of aristocracy. As such, Burckhardt does not 
think that agonal culture was possible within tyrannous societies (such a Sparta), 
which tend to be organised around purely utilitarian goals, and therefore proscribe 
such apparently extravagant behaviour in favour of work and military training.69 
Despite this emphasis on aristocracy, Burckhardt understands social 
inclusivity as a vital precondition of the agon. Thus, he glosses the agon as that which 
“bei den Griechen jeder geborene Grieche mitmachen durfte”, adding that such 
widespread participation would not have been possible within caste-based societies 
such as ancient Egypt. In such stratified societies, higher-caste individuals would 
not have wanted to compete before those belonging to lower social strata; thus, their 
contests tended to be fought before the king, where what was at stake was his 
                                                      
67 Burckhardt (2014), vol.4, p.81. 
68 Ibid. 
69 See ibid.: “Eine Feindin des Agonalen ist bei ihrem utilitarischen Charakter zwar die 
Tyrannis, und auch Sparta mit seinem kargen Dorismus, wo sich das Agonale auf seine 
besondere Weise fixiert, steht auf der Seite; denn hier findet sich nicht eine wahre 
Gesellschaft, sondern ein hart herrschendes Eroberervolk, dessen gymnastisches und 
sonstiges Tun wesentlich den praktischen Zweck hat, die Herrschaft zu behaupten”. 
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political favour.70 Only in ancient Greece, that is, “[n]ur in freien und kleinen 
Aristokratien konnte dieser Wille der Auszeichnung unter seinesgleichen vor 
gewählten oder sonst objektiv gegebenen Richtern zur Blüte kommen”.71 However, 
the aristocracy envisioned by Burckhardt is far from an exclusively hereditary 
nobility. As he points out, there was a great deal of social mobility during this period 
of Greek history; thus, for example, lower standing Greeks could become aristocrats 
by simply migrating to the colonies.72  
Burckhardt then describes how the agonal spirit spread beyond the confines 
of the aristocratic sphere, becoming a widespread feature of Greek social existence; 
indeed, “wenn überhaupt viele Griechen zusammenkamen, sich Agone ganz von 
selbst ergaben”:73 
So wird nach dem Ausgang des heroischen Königtums alles höhere 
Leben der Griechen, das äußere wie das geistige, zum Agon. Dieser ist 
es, welcher die Trefflichkeit (ἀρετή) und die Rasse manifestiert, und der 
Agonalsieg, d.h. der edle Sieg ohne Feindschaft erscheint uns in dieser 
Zeit als der altertümliche Ausdruck für den friedlichen Sieg einer 
Individualität. Von dieser Form des Wetteifers (φιλοτιµία) kam man auf 
den verschiedensten Gebieten nicht mehr ab. Sie zeigt sich im 
Symposion bei den Gesprächen und wechselnden Skolien der Gäste, 
auf dem Gebiete der Philosophie und der Rechtshändel […].74 
In a general sense, then, the agon was a peaceful form of contest, in which opponents 
sought to demonstrate their excellence at specific tasks. Any free individual could 
participate in this form of contest. However, note that for Burckhardt, this 
widespread agon “im ländlichen und bürgerlichen Leben” is “zum vornehmen und 
idealen Agon nur eine Parallele”.75 Though Burckhardt therefore reserves his highest 
praise for the noble agon, he nonetheless commends the culturally stimulating effect 
                                                      
70 Ibid., p.84; my italics. 
71 Ibid.; my italics. 
72 Ibid., p.81: “Emporstrebende Massen läßt man nach den Kolonien abziehen, wo sie dann 
ihrerseits Aristokraten werden.” 
73 Ibid., p.87. 
74 Ibid., p.85. 
75 Ibid., pp.87-8, my italics. 
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of this pervasive culture of agonal contest, calling it “das allgemeine 
Gärungselement, welches jegliches Wollen und Können, sobald die nötige Freiheit 
da ist, in Fermentation bringt”.76  Even with respect to the official agonal games 
(such as were held at Delphi), de jure, anyone could participate according to 
Burckhardt, provided they had enough money to cover their travel, bed and board 
expenses, and could pay for the necessary religious offerings.77 However, due to 
these costs, the de facto rule was that the agonal games remained a privilege of 
wealthy aristocratic families, which excluded women, slaves and the metics.78  
 But what did Burckhardt think was the end sought by those engaging in 
agonal contest? Above all, he informs us, the goal was that of excellence, and every 
aspect of ancient Greek spiritual and physical life was thus defined by the struggle 
of individuals to excel their peers. They sought to measure the degree of excellence 
that they had attained by placing themselves in comparison with others.79 Whereas 
in the Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen, Burckhardt saw military struggle as the 
primary means by which a polis measures itself against its counterparts (as we saw 
in Chapter 1), we now find that it is the practice of the agon which is conceived as 
the principal means of obtaining such measurement, both an individual and 
collective level.80 Burckhardt also argues that the goal of the Wettkampf was simply 
being victorious over others – that is, to achieve “der Sieg an sich”, disconnected 
                                                      
76 Ibid., p.83. 
77 Ibid., p.94. 
78 See ibid., p.94, where Burckhardt speaks of the “Zusammentreffen des Agonalen und der 
Aristokratie”. On the exclusion of the slaves and metics from the agon, see ibid, p.83: “[…] 
[A]ls mit der Zeit die völlige Demokratie eintrat, war man noch immer tatsächlich eine 
Aristokratie und Minderzahl gegenüber von Metöken und Sklaven.” See also ibid., p.105: 
“Beiläufig mag hier noch erwähnt sein, daß das olympische Fest (wie wohl alle wichtigen 
Agone) ausschließlich eine Sache von Mannsleuten war, und daß man die Weiber davon 
drakonisch fernhielt.” Burckhardt does however, note that women were, in some instances, 
allowed to compete in the agon (ibid., p.140). 
79 See ibid., p.89: “Überall, schon in den engsten Kreisen, stellte sich der Wettstreit ein; die 
volle Entwicklung des Individuums war davon abhängig, daß man sich unaufhörlich 
untereinander maß und verglich und zwar durch Übungen, bei denen es auf einen direkten 
praktischen Nutzen nicht abgesehen war.” 
80 Compare ch.1, p.36, fn.48. 
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from practical goals.81 It is important to recall that even in the official games, the 
prizes were in themselves worthless. Hence, Burckhardt is in agreement with 
Curtius’ statement that these prizes, “[d]er Kranz von Blättern, der Laubzweig, die 
wollene Binde haben ja keinen andern Wert, als daß sie Symbole des Sieges sind”.82 
On the other hand, Burckhardt states that immortal glory was the goal; hence, victory 
at Olympia “gilt als das Höchste auf Erden, indem er [der Sieg] dem Sieger verbürgt, 
was im Grunde das Ziel jedes Griechen ist, daß er im Leben angestaunt und im Tode 
hochgepriesen werden muß.” Therefore, although Burckhardt acknowledges that 
contestants often sought victory in the various organised games as a means to 
obtaining public influence, political power was not a primary motivating factor in 
his conception of the ideal agon, nor is it implied that the aristocratic agon 
established relations of command and obedience between the victors and the 
vanquished.83 After all one might win such honours by defeating an adversary from 
another polis.  
Andreas Kalyvas has argued (following others) that what distinguishes the 
classical from the archaic age of ancient Greece is the democratisation of the agon 
– that is, “the encounter of the democratic logic of equality with the aristocratic spirit 
of excellence”. To be sure, Burckhardt would at least partially assent to Kalyvas’ 
claim that, within the classical polis, “the aristocratic spirit became increasingly 
detached from its social and material bases, as additional social groups were 
gradually forming and participating in their own multiple agonistic spheres”. 84 In 
this way, we might label the agon aristocratic, not by dint of the social standing of 
its participants, but rather on account of the ethos or set of values held by those 
participants, an ethos which has its roots in the aristocratic classes. However, for 
                                                      
81 Ibid., p.99. 
82 Curtius (1864), p.14. 
83 See ibid., p.202. Here Burckhardt laments the fact that, with the coming of the democratic 
age, “Alle Siege in Olympia usw. garantierten eben nicht mehr den mindesten Einfluß in der 
Polis, wonach doch jetzt alle strebten” (my italics). He thereby implies that political Einfluß 
was the desideratum sought in true agonal contest. 
84 See Kalyvas (2013), pp.15-41, p.24. 
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Burckhardt, the survival of the agon depends on it maintaining these roots in the 
aristocratic social caste. Indeed, Burckhardt is severely critical of the over-
democratisation of the agon on account of the fact that he thinks this degrades the 
practice by extirpating it from its aristocratic ground.  
Burckhardt theorises that it was with the emergence of the artistic contest 
that this process of extirpation really got under way; indeed, this relatively novel 
type of contest heralded the demise of the ideal agon. The aesthetic agon did not 
require the purchasing of equipment, or even participation in official games, and 
thus anyone could participate given the talent. As soon as the agon proliferated 
beyond the domains of athletics and horseracing, however, it became an entirely 
public affair. Even shepherds could now participate in singing competitions, for 
example.85 In particular, Burckhardt emphasises the way in which artistic contest 
enflamed the cult of celebrity (“Zelebrität”), drawing attention away from the victors 
of the mostly aristocratic physical agons.86 Unlike Curtius (or Nietzsche for that 
matter), he gives this form of competition – the “Musisch-Agonale” – very little 
attention, most of which is disparaging, and he shows an unmistakeable preference 
for the physical, sporting agon (e.g. gymnastics, horse-racing and athletics). 
Following the advent of the Musisch-Agonale, philosophical dialogues and 
judicial trials start to take on a markedly contestatory character.87 For Burckhardt, 
this ushered in the end of the true agon: as the practice of oral contest became more 
widespread, the now vocal and contentious democratic polis demanded its leaders 
subordinate themselves to the whim of the demos. Exacerbating this decline, during 
the same period, Socrates also worked to undermine the notion of kalokagathia in 
his philosophical agons – namely, by redefining it as a concern with the betterment 
of all individuals and even the human race; thus, he sullied the goal of excellence by 
                                                      
85 Burckhardt (2014), vol.4, p.113. Burckhardt also remarks upon the low social standing of 
many competing artists (ibid., p.128). 
86 Ibid., p.149. 
87 Ibid., p.114. 
 118 
bifurcating it from its elitist, aristocratic element.88 On account of both of these 
occurrences, the goal of personal excellence and predominance fell into serious 
disrepute and the agon descended into a base oral contest over who could most 
effectively fawn to the caprices of the public: “ja die ganze Praxis der Demokratie 
wird mit der Zeit ein unechter Agon, wobei die scheußliche Übelrede, die 
Sykophantie usw. sich in den Vordergrund drängen.”89  
As popularity came to replace the goal of noble excellence 
(Edeltrefflichkeit), the contest lost its right to be called authentically agonal 
according to Burckhardt; instead, he calls this type of contest a pseudo-agon (“ein 
unechter Agon”). This is the age of demagogues and conceited personalities. Within 
this new pseudo-agon, the element of measure or restraint is lost: “Die Macht der 
Persönlichkeit zeigt sich also jetzt in den großen Beispielen nicht mehr agonal, d.h. 
im Siege über einen oder einige Ähnliche, sondern absolut”.90  Modesty no longer 
found a place in Greek society, and individuals ceased to compete for transitory, 
agonal victory over those of a similar capacity to themselves. Instead, they began to 
pursue absolute victory – that is, to establish themselves as tyrants. Needless to say, 
this had injurious repercussions for the old aristocratic agon. Burckhardt sees the 
case of Alcibiades as symptomatic of the destructive way in which the celebrities 
produced by the democratic agon eroded the noble sporting agon. Thus, Alcibiades 
stifled the gymnastic agon due to his scorn for participating with people of lower 
social standing, and in the equestrian agon, his inordinate wealth gave him such an 
overwhelming advantage that no one else saw any point in participating.91 In this 
way, he tyrannised over the games, and in his effort to obtain a complete victory, he 
                                                      
88 Ibid., p.205. “War die Kalokagathie ein Sein gewesen, so tritt nun an ihre Stelle ein Wirken 
auf andere, nämlich das ‘die Menschen besser machen’ […][.] [D]ies wird nunmehr der 
Maßstab, der an Menschen und Einrichtungen gelegt wird; Sokrates aber, und wer sonst noch 
so redete, sprach damit ein neues Ideal aus, mochte es mit der Wirklichkeit aussehen, wie es 
wollte. Und schon hatte man dabei nicht mehr den Edelfreien, sondern den Bürger überhaupt, 
ja bald den Menschen überhaupt im Auge.” 
89 Ibid.; my italics. See also pp.182ff. 
90 Ibid., p.203. 
91 Ibid., p.204.  
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effectively brought the aristocratic agon to an end.  Recall that Burckhardt maintains 
that the foundation of Greek superiority was their ability to measure themselves 
against others, and exercise their “Wille der Auszeichnung”, non-violently, through 
the practice of the agon.92 Indeed, Burckhardt remarks upon the rarity of inter-Greek 
war during the agonal age.93 However, coupled with the arrogance and ambition of 
the celebrity statesmen (which was inflated by victory in the first Persian War), it is 
no wonder that Burckhardt thought that with the corrosion of the agon – qua means 
for satisfying the desire for distinction – the seeds of the Peloponnesian war were 
sown and the fate of the agonal age was sealed.94  
Burckhardt’s affirmation of the aristocratic nature of the agon is therefore 
not to be construed as a restriction of the agon to the social strata of the landed, 
hereditary aristocracy. Rather, he suggests that the sine qua non of agonal conflict is 
the pursuit of the aristocratic value of excellence among one’s equals 
(“seinesgleichen”). Indeed, Burckhardt praises this inclusive notion of the agon as 
the actual foundation of Greek predominance – so long as it did not spill into oral, 
and especially political, contests for celebrity. Nonetheless, he thinks that the value 
of excellence is ultimately parasitic on the continued dominance of a noble social 
class, and he praises the sporting agons, which de facto excluded non-nobles, as the 
sustaining well-spring of the wider agonal culture of the Hellenes. Burckhardt’s agon 
should therefore be conceived as dependent upon, but not limited to, aristocratic 
social organisation. In Burckhardt, then, there are two Greek agons – one 
democratically inclusive agon, which is general to Greek society, and one that is 
aristocratically exclusive, which is reserved for the nobility – neither of which are 
directly political in nature. Moreover, Burckhardt conceives of the agon as possible 
                                                      
92 See ibid., p.89: “die volle Entwicklung des Individuums war davon abhängig, daß man 
sich unaufhörlich untereinander maß und verglich und zwar durch Übungen, bei denen es 
auf einen direkten praktischen Nutzen nicht abgesehen war.” 
93 See ibid., p.158: “Das schönste Distinguens der Zeit aber ist die Wenigkeit der Kriege 
zwischen Hellenen.” 
94 Ibid., p.258: “Ehrgeiz und Eitelkeit finden nicht mehr ihr Genüge im Proklamieren und 
Bejubeln von Agonalsiegern; man muß sich nach außen regen, d.h. gegen andere Poleis, 
andere höchst empfindliche, in letzter Instanz nur durch Zernichtung unschädlich”. 
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across the entire of society and all its domains, though he certainly does not advocate 
it within the sphere of the political. I will now argue that Nietzsche makes 
comparable divisions and limitations in conceptualising the agon, and that these 
undercut the opposition we find between Hatab and Appel. 
2.3.2. THE INCLUSIVITY OF NIETZSCHE’S EARLY 
AGONISM  
Among the preparatory Nachlass notes for CV 5, we find a fragment that prima facie 
supports a strong aristocratic reading of his agonism: “Der Wettkampf! Und das 
Aristokratische, Geburtsmäßige, Edle bei den Griechen!” (NL 16[9] 7.396). Here 
the implication is that the agon is directly associated with hereditary (geburtsmäßig) 
aristocracy. However, I will now argue that in this note, Nietzsche is only referring 
to the origins of the agon, and not to the limits of its social extension. Nietzsche’s 
use of Hesiod’s commercial, agrarian and generally banausic conception of the 
Wettkampf in CV 5 indicates that, like Burckhardt, he assents to a socially inclusive 
model of the agon. Yet Ottmann has claimed that, although Nietzsche cites Hesiod 
and may think that the agon is possible in a wider socially inclusive sense, we should 
not conclude that he equates agonal conflict with economic competition:  
Hesiod läßt für Nietzsche gerade vermissen, was für die aristokratische 
Verachtung des Banausischen typische war. […] [Nietzsche’s] Ziel war 
der Ruhm der Stadt, die Bildung, die Kultur. […] Das Ethos, das 
Nietzsche sucht, war das von Helden, nicht Arbeitern oder Bürgern.95 
Certainly, during this period we find numerous texts in which Nietzsche explicitly 
rebukes the pursuit of material gain (Geldgewinn) as a boorish and philistine 
endeavour, adverse to the improvement of culture.96 But is Ottmann’s heroic 
                                                      
95 Ottmann (1999), p.50. 
96 See NL 10[1] 7.346; CV 3 1.774; BA 1 1.667; UB III 5 1.379. See also Ritchie Robertson, 
“Competition and Democracy in Burckhardt and Nietzsche”, in Herman Siemens and James 
Pearson (eds.), Nietzsche on Conflict (forthcoming, 2017). 
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interpretation of Nietzsche’s agon justified? After all, we have already discerned the 
sharp distinction Burckhardt draws between the heroic and agonal ages. 
In CV 5, Nietzsche does not frame agonal contest as a struggle for 
Wohlstand, which signifies prosperity, health and well-being (Wohlfahrt or 
Wohlergehen), but not necessarily fiscal or material wealth.97 Nietzsche appears to 
be comfortable, like Burckhardt, representing this struggle for “Wohlstand” as a 
manifestation of the general impetus to improve and empower oneself, rather than 
as a base struggle for monetary gain.98 Indeed, he is at ease ascribing this to the 
category of conflict he endorses as Wettkampf (without even making the 
qualification, which we find in Burckhardt, that this is only a “Parallel” of the noble 
Wettkampf).99 As Enrico Müller has observed, CV 5 sets up a contest between the 
Homeric and the Hesiodic depictions of the pursuit of pre-eminence (aristeuein):  
Gegenüber dem Elitendiskurs, dem Homer durchgehend verpflichtet 
bleibt, war Hesiod ausgehend von seiner bäuerlichen Lebenswelt 
bemüht, ein Gerechtigkeitskonzept als Korrektiv gegen die hybriden 
Tendenzen des ungezügelten aristeuein zu errichten. Seine eigene 
Lebenserspektive hat es ihm ermöglicht, die Agonalitätsideologie einer 
bestimmten sozialen Gruppe in den Gedanken einer agonalen Sozialität 
als solcher zu verwandeln.100 
So is the agon necessarily limited to “das Aristokratische, Geburtsmäßige, [und] 
Edle” for Nietzsche? Turning to CV 5 itself, one cannot help but notice that the 
                                                      
97 See entry for “Wohlstand”, in DWB, vol.30, cols.1181-1184. 
98 CV 5 1.786: “[D]er Nachbar wetteifert mit dem Nachbarn, der zum Wohlstande hinstrebt.” 
99 For an example of Nietzsche seemingly endorsing the agon of the banausoi, see NL 16[8] 
7.396. See also Tracy Strong, Politics of Transfiguratation: Expanded Edition (California: 
University of California Press, 1988), p.151: “In Nietzsche’s reading, Hesiod retains the 
agonal principle as the basis of culture, and, in his contest with Homer, manages to establish 
an agon that is purely human and no longer tied to the immortal gods. By emphasising the 
human nature of the agon, Hesiod opens the contest up to potentially much richer variations.” 
As Müller (2005) has noted, for Strong, Nietzsche’s Hesiodic vision is generally opposed to 
the “aristokratisch kriegerischen Ausprägung des Agongedankens in den Homerischen 
Epen” (see p.80, fn.215).  
100 Enrico Müller, “Kompetetives Ethos und kulturelle Dynamik. Das Prinzip der Agonalität 
bei Jacob Burckhardt und Friedrich Nietzsche”, in Herman Siemens and James Pearson 
(eds.), Nietzsche on Conflict (forthcoming, 2017). 
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nominalised adjectives “Aristokratisch” and “Geburtsmäßig” have been suppressed. 
It is only “Edel” that remains. Thus, Nietzsche opens his essay on the Wettkampf 
indicating that he will be scrutinising the human “in seinen höchsten und edelsten 
Kräften” (CV 5 1.783), then closes the piece describing the Wettkampf as the 
“edelsten hellenischen Grundgedanken” (CV 5 1.792).  As has been observed in the 
Nietzsche-Wörterbuch entry for “edel”, although the term is closely bound up with 
the noble social class, “(hohe) Geburt [ist] keine conditio sine qua non” governing 
Nietzsche’s use of the adjective. The term is rather used to signify participation in a 
set of values that are typically associated with nobility, such as strength (“Stärke”), 
measure (“Maß”), and self-determination (“selbst-Beherrschung”). Further evidence 
for this thesis is that Nietzsche refers to other individuals, not necessarily of 
aristocratic lineage, as “edel” (e.g. the “heroische Mensch” and the “Mensch der 
tragischen Gesinnung”). Later, the Wörterbuch entry continues, around JGB, 
Nietzsche shows a preference for the terms “aristokratisch” and “noblesse”, and with 
this “der ‘höhere Rangklasse’ […] wird sogar noch starker herausgehoben”.101 His 
decision to use the term “edel”, instead of “aristokratisch” or “geburtsmäßig”, 
strongly implies that he sought to connect the Wettkampf to certain values originating 
in the ancient Greek aristocracy, but without necessarily limiting participation in the 
Wettkampf to the noble social classes.102  
 Further contradicting the idea of caste pedigree as a precondition of 
participating in agonal relations, is the fact that, echoing Burckhardt, Nietzsche 
stresses the condition of equality between contestants, without any mention of their 
social standing. Already in ST, he argues that as soon as two “gleichberechtigt 
Hauptspieler sich gegenüber standen, so erhob sich, einem tief hellenischen Triebe 
gemäß, der Wettkampf” (1.545). Even in the citation from Hesiod, there is a 
                                                      
101 Entry for “edel”, in Paul van Tongeren, Gerd Schank and Herman Siemens (eds.), 
Nietzsche-Wörterbuch (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004), p.698. See also entry for “Adel”: “der Adel 
wird [...] auch durch sein soziale Stelle, wie durch psychologische Züge und Gewohnheiten 
charakterisiert” (p.42).  
102 See also Müller (2005), p.80 (esp. fn.214), who also looks at how, according to 
Nietzsche’s account, aristocratic values became detached from the aristocratic social class. 
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symmetry to the agonal adversaries (“der Töpfer grollt dem Töpfer und der 
Zimmermann dem Zimmermann, es neidet der Bettler den Bettler und der Sänger 
den Sänger”); and if we look forward to the representation of Eris in WS 29, this 
condition of equality is unsurprisingly emphasised: “Wo die Gleichheit wirklich 
durchgedrungen und dauernd begründet ist, entsteht jener, im Ganzen als 
unmoralisch geltende Hang, der im Naturzustande kaum begreiflich wäre: der Neid.” 
 In these texts, perceived equality of ability is a prerequisite of the impulse 
to agonal contest – namely, because such a perception is necessary to arouse the 
feeling of envy (as de Tocqueville also famously remarked). The perception of 
approximate equality acts as a stimulant, or fillip to Wettkampf. Just like Burckhardt, 
Nietzsche emphasises how this was also reflected in the institutionally official forms 
of agon; thus, he states in WS 226 that “der griechische Staat [hatte] den 
gymnastischen und musischen Wettkampf innerhalb der Gleichen sanctionirt”. 
 These texts indicate that Wettkampf can take place between any individuals 
of roughly equal ability, not merely the equals of the aristocratic social classes. 
However, as Hannah Arendt has underscored, equality had a far more restricted 
meaning in antiquity,  
[…] and notably in the Greek city states. To belong to the few “equals” 
(homoioi) meant to be permitted to live among one's peers; but the 
public realm itself, the polis, was permeated by a fiercely agonal spirit, 
where everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all others, 
to show through unique deeds or achievements that he was the best of 
all (aim aristeuein).103 
On this reading, it is only a minority of individuals that enjoy the status of “equals” 
in the Greek polis, and who can therefore participate in the struggle for victory and 
predominance. Perhaps, then, the agonal equality of which Nietzsche speaks is 
therefore only applicable to the highest strata of Greek society – namely, citizens, 
who are able to participate in the public space of action? 
                                                      
103 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958), p.41. 
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 In order to demonstrate that Nietzsche does not share Arendt’s limited 
conception of agonal equality, we might look at GGL, where Nietzsche implies that 
agonal conflict (here referred to as “Wetteifer”) is a relation reserved for equals of 
any caste: 
Die Griechen verkehren mit ihren Göttern wie eine niedere Kaste mit 
einer höheren mächtigeren edleren, mit der man sich aber von gleicher 
Abstammung weiß. Man lebt mit ihr zusammen [und] thut alles, um 
dies Zusammenleben für sich wohlthätig zu gestalten: das allgem. 
Mittel ist, zu lieben, was jene liebt, zu hassen, was jene haßt, aber nicht 
im Wetteifer mit ihr [...]. (GGL III, KGW II/5, p.519; my italics) 
Yet, Nietzsche held that, among themselves, the Gods enjoyed agonal relations, 
remarking in another note that the Trojan War was “ein Wettspiel der hellenischen 
Götter” (NL 2[6] 7.46).104 Moreover, he states elsewhere that although the Greeks 
saw the Gods as a separate, higher caste (“Kaste”), that did not render the Greeks 
themselves ignoble; rather “[e]s ist ein Verhältniss, wie von niederem zu höherem 
Adel” (NL 5[150] 8.81). Having an aristocratic nature was not binary for Nietzsche’s 
Greeks, but a matter of degree. This implies that for Nietzsche belonging to the 
aristocratic classes is by no means a precondition of engaging in nobly measured, 
agonal conflict. Both humans and the pantheon of gods could agonally struggle 
within the bounds of their distinct groups. All of this would contradict Dombowsky’s 
thesis that for Nietzsche “agonism implies [social] inequality, class struggle and 
class war”.105  
But this emphasis on caste would appear to distinguish Nietzsche from 
Burckhardt, since the latter expressly stated that the agon rested on a partial 
effacement of the boundaries between social strata (excluding slaves, of course). 
However, as we turn away from the relation of the Greeks to their gods, and towards 
the specifically human agon, it becomes doubtful whether Nietzsche held equality 
                                                      
104 However, he also indicates that the gods engaged in destructive relations resembling the 
evil Eris: “Die Götter in Fehde. Die Titanenkämpfe wissen noch nichts vom Wettkampf” 
(NL 16[22] 7.402). 
105 Dombowsky (2004), p.45. 
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of social class to be a prerequisite of individuals entering into Wettkampf with one 
another. Like Burckhardt, he distinguishes the Greeks from the caste-based societies 
of the “Orientals”; moreover, he viewed the (agonal) educational institutions as 
concerned with individuals as opposed to castes: “Orientalische Völker haben 
Kasten. Die Institute wie Schulen, διαδοχαί, dienen nicht dem Stande, sondern dem 
Individuum” (NL 16[26] 7.404). Furthermore, the fact that Nietzsche considers the 
political tête-à-tête of Themistocles (of low-birth) and Aristides (of aristocratic 
lineage), to be a Wettkampf indicates that he was perfectly at ease considering 
individuals of different castes in wettkämpferische relations (see NL 16[35] 7.406). 
On the basis of this, it is likely that the kind of equality Nietzsche has in mind is an 
approximate equality of ability, and that his discussion of castes is a metaphor for 
the different “leagues” of contenders that constitute any domain of competitive 
practice. Indeed, Nietzsche often describes the agon as taking place between people 
of the same professional expertise – for example, the “Bettler”, “Sänger”, “Töpfer” 
and “Zimmermänner” already mentioned above, in addition to which he also 
explicitly mentions poets and philosophers.106 
2.3.3. THE ARISTOCRATIC VALUES OF NIETZSCHE’S 
EARLY AGONISM 
An overview of Nietzsche’s early conception of agonal contest reveals that it is 
motivated by the pursuit of three aristocratic values: ascendancy (i.e. excellence – 
ἀριστεύειν), fame (Ruhm), and education (Erziehung and Bildung). We have already 
seen that the agonal impulse for ascendancy is socially generalizable. In this 
subsection, I now want to consider the values that might render Nietzsche’s agon 
socially exclusive. I will begin by arguing that the agon is not a struggle for political 
                                                      
106 See CV 5 1.788: “Je größer und erhabener aber ein griechischer Mensch ist, um so heller 
bricht aus ihm die ehrgeizige Flamme heraus, jeden verzehrend, der mit ihm auf gleicher 
Bahn läuft”.  
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power – in either an aristocratic or a democratic sense – and so cannot be considered 
aristocratic insofar as it apportions such power (as both Hatab and Appel both claim, 
in different ways). However, Nietzsche’s notion of the agon, understood as a 
struggle for Ruhm and Erziehung, is nonetheless inextricably tied to stratified, 
aristocratic social order.   
As we saw in the introduction to this chapter, numerous readers aside from 
Appel and Hatab interpret Nietzsche’s Wettkampf as a struggle for political power. 
There are two ways that we might figure the relation of agonal conflict and political 
power: first, as both Hatab and Appel imply, as a direct struggle for power within 
explicitly political fora; and second, as Burckhardt (and Curtius) suggest, as an 
indirect struggle for political power within the non-political, official agonal games, 
success in which then brings the victor certain political honours and influence.107 
There is of course some indication that Nietzsche saw direct political contention as 
an instance of Wettkampf; for example, where he describes the “Ringen der 
politischen Parteien und der Städte mit einander” as an instance of “der 
Wettkampfgedanke des einzelnen Griechen und des griechischen Staates” (PHG 5 
1.825); or in CV 5 itself, he refers to Themistocles’ “langen Wetteifer mit Aristides” 
and “jener einzig merkwürdigen rein instinktiven Genialität seines politischen 
Handelns”. Finally, in his early lectures, he further recounts how poets were often 
motivated by the desire for “der persönl[liche] Vortheil, theils der Ehre, theils des 
Gewinns, theils zur Durchführung der eignen (politisch.) Pläne” (GGL III, KGW 
II/5, p.292). Yet, except for these few oblique references to political Wettkämpfe, in 
CV 5 and the early published works, the idea of the agon as a struggle for political 
power (be this direct or indirect) is notably suppressed. Indeed, even in CV 5, his 
reference to the political figure of Themistocles is used to illustrate the fact that 
ancient Greeks (though particularly artists and philosophers) were driven by the 
                                                      
107 See Curtius (1864), p.9: “auch der einzelne Staat war eine Palästra bürgerlicher 
Tüchtigkeit, wo dem Bestbewährten als Preis Macht und Ehre erteilt wurde”. 
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desire to supplant the existing preeminent figure in their competitive field and 
thereby inherit his fame (i.e. his “Ruhm zu erben” [CV 5 1.788]).  
Later in the 1870s, though, Nietzsche breaks his relative silence regarding 
the political agon, revealing himself to be actively hostile towards such an idea. In 
WS 226, for example, he censures political contest in no uncertain terms: 
Klugheit der Griechen. — Da das Siegen- und Hervorragenwollen ein 
unüberwindlicher Zug der Natur ist, älter und ursprünglicher, als alle 
Achtung und Freude der Gleichstellung, so hatte der griechische Staat 
den gymnastischen und musischen Wettkampf innerhalb der Gleichen 
sanctionirt, also einen Tummelplatz abgegränzt, wo jener Trieb sich 
entladen konnte, ohne die politische Ordnung in Gefahr zu bringen. Mit 
dem endlichen Verfalle des gymnastischen und musischen 
Wettkampfes gerieth der griechische Staat in innere Unruhe und 
Auflösung. 
The Wettkampf is only promoted as a means of diverting the desire for victory and 
ascendancy (“Siegen- und Hervorragenwollen”) away from the political sphere. 
Though here it is implied that it is the state that encourages this, Nietzsche at other 
times proposes that the state is actively hostile to the agon.108 The institutional agon 
circumscribes a space for the apolitical discharge of the drive for victory and 
ascendancy. The idea, echoing Burckhardt, is that a political agon jeopardises the 
state insofar as it so easily descends into unmeasured, violent sedition (stasis). 
Political conflict simply loses the measure necessary for it to be considered 
agonal.109 Though Nietzsche suggests that political agonism is conceptually 
                                                      
108 See NL 5[179] 8.91: “Die geistige Cultur Griechenlands eine Aberration des ungeheuren 
politischen Triebes nach ἀριστεύειν. — Die πόλις höchst ablehnend gegen neue Bildung. 
Trotzdem existirte die Cultur.” See also MA 474, where Nietzsche suggests that “Die 
griechische Polis war, wie jede organisirende politische Macht, ausschliessend und 
misstrauisch gegen das Wachsthum der Bildung” since it preferred a statically perfect state. 
109 This idea of the agon as a means of channelling potentially seditious, disgregative energies 
into culturally productive modes of activity is one that Nietzsche returns to on a number of 
occasions. See e.g. NL 5[146] 8.79: “Die Weisheit ihrer [die Griechen] Institutionen liegt in 
dem Mangel einer Scheidung zwischen gut und böse, schwarz und weiss. Die Natur, wie sie 
sich zeigt, wird nicht weggeleugnet, sondern nur eingeordnet, auf bestimmte Culte und Tage 
beschränkt. Dies ist die Wurzel aller Freisinnigkeit des Alterthums; man suchte für die 
Naturkräfte eine mässige Entladung, nicht eine Vernichtung und Verneinung. — Das ganze 
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possible, it is too unstable and high-risk to be profitable for the community. Agonism 
was a means of sustaining political order and organisation (and, as Nietzsche 
explains elsewhere in MA, the higher culture grounded upon that political order110). 
The criterion Nietzsche is using to distinguish between good and bad modes of 
agonism is the extent to which a form of agon promotes a cohesive culture. Pace 
Appel and Hatab, then, this very strongly suggests that Nietzsche’s ideal agon is not 
embodied in either democratic or aristocratic struggles for political supremacy.  
Mirroring Burckhardt, Nietzsche is therefore disinclined towards political 
agon of any kind. Hence, we can reject Ottmann’s thesis that what distinguishes 
Nietzsche from Burckhardt is that he “will die agonale Kultur, und er will sie ohne 
Abstriche”.111 Yet, whereas Burckhardt pays special attention to the sporting agon – 
neglecting (and even maligning) artistic contest – the early Nietzsche is far more 
interested in the social contribution of the geistig agon.112  (Though this is not to say 
                                                      
System von neuer Ordnung ist dann der Staat.” See also NL 11[186] 9.514-5: “Die 
griechischen Gesetzgeber haben den agon so gefördert, um den Wettkampfgedanken vom 
Staate abzulenken und die politische Ruhe zu gewinnen. (Jetzt denkt man an die Concurrenz 
des Handels) Das Nachdenken über den Staat sollte durch agonale Erhitzung abgelenkt 
werden — ja turnen und dichten sollte man — dies hatte den Nebenerfolg, die Bürger stark 
schön und fein zu machen. — Ebenso förderten sie die Knabenliebe, einmal um der 
Übervölkerung vorzubeugen (welche unruhige verarmte Kreise erzeugt, auch innerhalb des 
Adels) sodann als Erziehungsmittel zum agon: die Jungen und die Älteren sollten bei 
einander bleiben, sich nicht trennen und das Interesse der Jungen festhalten — sonst hätte 
sich der Ehrgeiz der abgesonderten Älteren auf den Staat geworfen, aber mit Knaben konnte 
man nicht vom Staate sprechen. So benutzte vielleicht Richelieu die Galanterie der Männer, 
um die ehrgeizigen Triebe abzulenken und andere Gespräche als über den Staat in Curs zu 
bringen.” 
110 For a helpful overview of this, see Ansell-Pearson (1994), pp.90ff. 
111 See Ottmann (1999), p.50. 
112 See e.g. Nietzsche’s “Einführung in das Studium der platonischen Dialoge” (KGW II/4, 
p.122). We also find reference to the Wettkampf of ancient Greek painters (see NL 1[19] 
7.16.); and Nietzsche takes a special interest in the contest of Homer and Hesiod, who were 
of course contemporaries (see e.g. NL 1[112] 7.44; NL 3[84] 7.134; NL 6[15] 7.134; NL 
16[4] 7.394. See also Nietzsche’s early philological analysis of their contest in “Der 
Florentische Tractat über Homer und Hesiod, ihr Geschlecht und ihren Wettkampf” (KGW 
II/1, pp.272–337). Likewise, in his lectures on rhetoric, he analyses the way in which the 
culture of public agonism shaped the formal development of ancient Greek rhetoric in 
philosophy, poetry, drama and historical tracts (See e.g. “Darstellung der antiken Rhetorik” 
[KGW II/4, p.434] and “Geschichte der griechischen Beredsamkeit” [KGW II/4, p.393]). 
Finally, echoing Curtius, Nietzsche describes the way in which the ancient musician 
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that he consistently celebrates the artistic agon.113) In ST, now inverting 
Burckhardt’s position, Nietzsche also argues that it was in fact the political-juridical 
agon that corrupted the artistic agon (and not the other way round) – namely, by 
imposing the criteria of rationality onto the artistic domain, which thrives on 
instinct.114 
Nietzsche was also interested in how the aesthetic agon was able to generate 
value. But what is of particular relevance is that in his writings on this matter we 
find the strongest evidence that Nietzsche thought of power or influence – i.e. 
guiding the behaviour of others, particularly one’s opponents – as the goal of agonal 
contest. Yet this power is the power to establish artistic norms over others, rather 
than instrumental political power, and it manifests itself as a pressure exerted upon 
others to conform through imitation insofar as “Das Vorbild des Grossen reizt die 
eitleren Naturen zum äusserlichen Nachmachen” (MA 158). As he phrases it in 
GGL: “Es gehörte Macht der Persönlichkeit dazu, um solche Neuerungen 
durchzusetzen; siegte man nicht, so wurde man bestraft; siegte man, so ward das 
Neue Regel” (KGW II/2, p.405).115 At some level then, the agon represents a contest 
of norms, with individuals inventing new styles and striving to institute these as 
norms (of what counts as a good performance). Viewed from this standpoint, cultural 
contest is therefore not just a struggle to prevail according to a pre-given measure, 
but is the further struggle to prevail by means of establishing one’s own standard as 
                                                      
Terpander, by initiating a musical agon, brought about a great flourishing of talent, as people 
felt themselves enticed by the competition he presented (“Vorlesung über die griechischen 
Lyriker” [KGW II/2, p.402]). 
113 As Siemens (2015) notes: “For a sharp dose of realism, we can do no better than to turn 
to his Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur […] lectures, where we read of the prevalence 
of degeneration in Greek art; of the stifling of talent at the hands of publics utterly incapable 
of sound aesthetic judgement (GGL III, KGW II/5, pp.322ff.); of the fear of innovation in 
art and the resistance to it through harsh repressive laws (GGL III, KGW II/5, p.298); and 
how the agon repressed the emergence of individuals for a long time” (p.452). See also GGL 
III, KGW II/5, p.290, where Nietzsche argues that the pursuit of public praise could cause 
the agon to degenerate into mere posturing and pretense. 
114 See ST 1.545. 
115 See Acampora (2013), who also emphasises the ability of the agon to generate values: 
“He [Nietzsche] relishes the agon because of its potential for what he later describes as the 
‘revaluation of values’” (p.25).  
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a rule.116 Indeed, Nietzsche states that “[n]ur im Wetteifer lernt man das Gute 
kennen” (NL 23[132] 8.450).117  
Needless to say, he does not think that anyone and everyone can participate 
in such struggle for cultural influence; indeed, his valorisation of the geistig agon 
has an undeniably elitist streak. In his depiction of this higher cultural struggle, he 
not only emphasises the motivational force of the desire for ascendancy, but, along 
with Burckhardt, he further accents the force of the desire for glory (Ruhm); thus, 
Nietzsche tells us of the jealous desire with which Plato and the ancient Greek poets 
sought to overthrow Homer and “an die Stelle des gestürzten Dichters zu treten und 
dessen Ruhm zu erben” (CV 5 1.789).  This is variously expressed as the desire for 
honour (Ehre118), praise (Lob) or posthumous fame (Nachruhm): 
 
Der Dichter überwindet den Kampf um’s Dasein, indem er ihn zu 
einem freien Wettkampfe idealisirt. Hier ist das Dasein, um das noch 
gekämpft wird, das Dasein im Lobe, im Nachruhm.  
(NL 16[15] 7.397) 
 
This note gestures towards the fact that, for Nietzsche, the quest for Ruhm is 
incompatible with the struggle for existence (the “Kampf um’s Dasein”), and 
furthermore, that his conception of the agon might also be incompatible with the 
banausic struggle to achieve predominance through the accumulation of 
                                                      
116 See MA 170. See also NL 16[21]7.401, where Nietzsche asks, “Was ist das aesthetische 
Urtheil? Das Richterthum in der Tragödie. / Der Wettkampf unter Künstlern setzt das rechte 
Publikum voraus. Fehlt dies Publikum, dann ist er im Exil (Philoktet).” See also NL 16[6] 
7.395: “Der Künstler und der Nichtkünstler. Was ist Kunsturtheil? Dies das allgemeine 
Problem. / Der Dichter nur möglich unter einem Publikum von Dichtern. […] / Die 
Entscheidung im ἀγών ist nur das Geständniß: der und der macht uns mehr zum Dichter: dem 
folgen wir, da schaffen wir die Bilder schneller. Also ein künstlerisches Urtheil, aus einer 
Erregung der künstlerischen Fähigkeit gewonnen. Nicht aus Begriffen.” On the topic of 
aesthetic judgement in Nietzsche, see Herman Siemens, “Reassessing Radical Democratic 
Theory in Light of Nietzsche’s Ontology of Conflict”, in Keith Ansell Pearson (ed.), 
Nietzsche and Poltical Thought (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp.83-106 (p.86). 
117 Quoted in Paul van Tongeren, “Nietzsche’s Greek Measure”, JNS, 24 (2002), 5-24 (p.7). 
118 See MA 170 and 474. 
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“Besitzthum”, “Reichthum” and “Wohlstand”.119 And to be sure, we find ample 
evidence to substantiate the idea that Nietzsche held the concern with “Ruhm” to be 
limited to an elite, non-banausic minority. In CV 1, for example, he states that 
“Ruhm” “ist doch an die seltensten Menschen, als Begierde, angeknüpft und 
wiederum an die seltensten Momente derselben.” Indeed, the struggle for immortal 
fame is reserved for a superior minority of individuals, whom “Das Gewöhnte, das 
Kleine, das Gemein” only obstruct. The majority, according to Nietzsche, merely 
“wollen leben, etwas leben — um jeden Preis. Wer möchte unter ihnen jenen 
schwierigen Fackelwettlauf vermuthen, durch den das Große allein weiterlebt?” (CV 
1 1.756). 
Evidently, the banausic struggle to excel one’s neighbour by accumulating 
more material wealth than them does not qualify as an instance of this higher form 
of Wettkampf. However, according to Nietzsche, it is not artists and poets that are 
the exemplary seekers of glory; rather “[d]ie verwegensten Ritter unter diesen 
Ruhmsüchtigen, die daran glauben ihr Wappen an einem Sternbild hängend zu 
finden, muß man bei den Philosophen suchen” (CV 1 1.757).120 In this quote, he 
associates Ruhm with a chivalrous vision of a noble minority of knightly (ritterlich) 
individuals engaged in a quest for fame and glory; yet at the same time, he also 
illuminates how the pursuit of Ruhm has now been transferred into the realm of the 
cultural elite (i.e. of philosophers). 
What further distinguishes the Nietzschean agon from the banausic contest 
for material wealth is Nietzsche’s association of the Wettkampf with the value of 
cultivation (Erziehung). This value is defined by the pursuit of excellence 
understood not simply as “being first” but as the cultivation of one’s highest 
capacities (what Nietzsche elsewhere calls “antike Tugend” and what Burckhardt 
                                                      
119 Nietzsche also describes the “Ruhm und Glück” enjoyed by victorious contestants, which 
was in some cases so completely overwhelming that they were led to commit heinous or 
sacreligious acts (CV 5 1.791). 
120 See also NL 19[170] 7.471: “Die Philosophen sind die vornehmste Klasse der Großen des 
Geistes. Sie haben kein Publikum, sie brauchen den Ruhm.” 
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refers to as Edeltrefflichtkeit or arête121). He highlights how the ancient Greek agon 
was interwoven with their pursuit of cultivation, observing how the agonal Greeks 
demanded that “Jede Begabung muß sich kämpfend entfalten” (CV 5 1.789), and 
again, how it was ambitious envy of the excellence or virtue (“Tugend”) of others 
that spurred individuals to cultivate themselves (“an jeder großen Tugend entzündet 
sich eine neue Größe” [CV 5 1.788]).122 But it was not just students that unfolded 
their virtuosity in a field of contest – Nietzsche tells us that their teachers were 
correspondingly in contention with one another.123 He therefore envisions the agon 
as inseparable from the Hellenic valuation of cultivation over and against the values 
of Arcadian happiness or wealth.124 Unfortunately, however, says Nietzsche, the 
Socratic-Christian inheritance of modernity has led us to denigrate and devalue 
ambition, struggle and genuine cultivation in favour of modesty, peace and 
bourgeois contentment. Indeed, modern educators “[haben] vor Nichts eine so große 
Scheu [.] als vor der Entfesselung des sogenannten Ehrgeizes”, and “der moderne 
Mensch fürchtet nichts so sehr an einem Künstler als die persönliche Kampfregung” 
(CV 5 1.789-90).  
                                                      
121 See M 195 and UB III 1.345. 
122 In enumerating some of the empowering attributes of the Greeks, Nietzsche also 
underscores both good education (“gute Erziehung”) and “Eifersucht im ἀριστεύειν” – that 
is, the covetous desire to be the best (the fundamental value driving the agon) (NL 5[40] 
8.51). 
123 See CV 5 1.790: “Wie aber die zu erziehenden Jünglinge mit einander wettkämpfend 
erzogen wurden, so waren wiederum ihre Erzieher unter sich im Wetteifer”. On the 
connection of Wettkampf and Erziehung, see also NL 8[77] 7.251; NL 8[80] 7.252; NL 16[4] 
7.394: “Die Jesuiten — ihre antike Erziehung — der Ehrgeiz und der Wettkampf in der 
Erziehung.”; NL 16[14] 7.397: “Die antiken Mittel der Erziehung: der Wettkampf und die 
Liebe.”  
124 See e.g. NL 6[31] 8.110, where Nietzsche, quoting Schopenhauer states: “‘[V]orzügliche 
und edle Menschen werden jener Erziehung des Schicksals bald inne und fügen sich bildsam 
und dankbar in dieselbe; sie sehn ein, dass in der Welt wohl Belehrung, aber nicht Glück zu 
finden sei […]’ — Parerga I 439. Damit vergleiche man die Socratiker und die Jagd nach 
Glück!” Compare, however, NL 4[301] 9.174 and M 199, where Nietzsche suggests that the 
Greeks sought to become tyrants in the belief that this constituted the highest form of 
happiness (though it is of course most likely that Nietzsche is working with different 
conceptions of happiness across these texts). 
 133 
In an analogous manner, Nietzsche avers that proper cultivation (Bildung) 
is incompatible with the modern liberal-capitalistic state, which is predominantly 
geared towards promoting the economic strength of the nation and propagating the 
(bourgeois) happiness of its citizens.125 Given these beliefs, it is understandable why 
Nietzsche would suggest in MA 439 that artistic development depends on the state 
being divided into a leisure class, on the one hand, and a working- or even slave-
class, on the other: 
Cultur und Kaste. — Eine höhere Cultur kann allein dort entstehen, wo 
es zwei unterschiedene Kasten der Gesellschaft giebt: die der 
Arbeitenden und die der Müssigen, zu wahrer Musse Befähigten; oder 
mit stärkerem Ausdruck: die Kaste der Zwangs-Arbeit und die Kaste 
der Frei-Arbeit. Der Gesichtspunct der Vertheilung des Glücks ist nicht 
wesentlich, wenn es sich um die Erzeugung einer höheren Cultur 
handelt [...].126 
Converging with Burckhardt, Nietzsche makes the practical observation that 
pursuing non-utilitarian values (what he refers to in CV 3 as a “neue Welt des 
Bedürfnisses”) such as Bildung (or Erziehung or Ruhm, for that matter), upon which 
the higher cultural agon depends, is enabled by, yet also foreclosed to, the banausic 
                                                      
125 See UB III 6 1.388: “Jede Bildung ist hier verhasst, die einsam macht, die über Geld und 
Erwerb hinaus Ziele steckt, die viel Zeit verbraucht; man pflegt wohl solche ernstere Arten 
der Bildung als ‘feineren Egoismus’, als ‘unsittlichen Bildungs-Epikureismus’ zu 
verunglimpfen. […] Dem Menschen wird nur soviel Kultur gestattet, als im Interesse des 
allgemeinen Erwerbs und des Weltverkehrs ist, aber soviel wird auch von ihm gefordert. 
Kurz: ‘der Mensch hat einen nothwendigen Anspruch auf Erdenglück, darum ist die Bildung 
nothwendig, aber auch nur darum!’” See also BA IV 1.715: “Jede Erziehung aber, welche 
an das Ende ihrer Laufbahn ein Amt oder einen Brodgewinn in Aussicht stellt, ist keine 
Erziehung zur Bildung, wie wir sie verstehen, sondern nur eine Anweisung, auf welchem 
Wege man im Kampfe um das Dasein sein Subjekt rette und schütze.” 
126 Even in this aphorism, however, Nietzsche accepts class mobility as a fact of social 
existence. 
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working-classes.127 As Aristotle observed long before Nietzsche or Burckhardt, the 
pursuit of excellence requires leisure.128  
So, does Nietzsche think that the values that he extols are necessarily 
confined to the landed aristocracy (as Nietzsche frames Theogonis as having argued 
when he made “good” and “noble” synonyms)?129 Generally speaking, it has already 
been established that Nietzsche, like Burckhardt before him, thinks that agonal 
conflict can arise between any equal parties, so long as they seek to win by excelling 
rather than harming their adversaries. Thus, though Nietzsche maintains that the 
value of excellence originated in the nobility, it is not inextricably bound to this 
group or domain. Nonetheless, again recalling Burckhardt’s position, Nietzsche also 
identifies a higher agon that is intimately bound-up with the values of education and 
Ruhm, both of which are portrayed as incompatible with the struggle for material 
wealth.130 The pursuit of these higher cultural values does therefore seem to be 
parasitic on social stratification and the division of labour. For Nietzsche, although 
the agon that takes place as individuals vie to achieve these values is only ever 
seriously pursued by a minority, this minority is not necessarily coextensive with the 
                                                      
127 See also CV 3 1.767: “Die Bildung, die vornehmlich wahrhaftes Kunstbedürfniß ist, ruht 
auf einem erschrecklichen Grunde […]. Damit es einen breiten tiefen und ergiebigen 
Erdboden für eine Kunstentwicklung gebe, muß die ungeheure Mehrzahl im Dienste einer 
Minderzahl, über das Maaß ihrer individuellen Bedürftigkeit hinaus, der Lebensnoth 
sklavisch unterworfen sein. Auf ihre Unkosten, durch ihre Mehrarbeit soll jene bevorzugte 
Klasse dem Existenzkampfe entrückt werden, um nun eine neue Welt des Bedürfnisses zu 
erzeugen und zu befriedigen”. 
128 See Aristotle, Politics, 1278a: “[U]nder some governments the mechanic and the labourer 
will be citizens, but not in others, as, for example, in so-called aristocracies, if there are any, 
in which honours are given according to excellence and merit; for no man can practise 
excellence who is living the life of a mechanic or labourer.” 
129 For an excellent overview of the relation of Nietzsche’s thoughts on the agon and ancient 
Greek aristocracy, see Anthony K. Jensen, “Anti-Politicality and Agon in Nietzsche’s 
Philology”, in Herman Siemens and Vasti Roodt (eds.), Nietzsche, Power and Politics: 
Rethinking Nietzsche’s Legacy for Political Thought (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), pp.319-46. 
Jensen questions the idea that Nietzsche was a committed aristocrat by illuminating his 
rejection of Theogonis’ attempts to segregate and purify an aristocratic race. He also argues 
that, for Nietzsche, “agon is not the exclusive right of either the old landed elite or the newly 
rich, and thus not the exlusive arena for either group’s values” (p.328). 
130 However, see MA 459, where Nietzsche describes how Diogenes was for a time a slave. 
We might also think of Epictetus as falling within this category. 
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ruling minority – i.e. the aristocracy; rather, participation is open to any individuals 
with the financial means and freedom to commit themselves to the contest for glory. 
We might therefore distance, though not fully dissociate, Nietzsche’s cultural 
aristocratism from an aristocratic political agenda.131  
Despite the many differences between Nietzsche and Burckhardt (in their 
attitudes towards artistic contest, for example), both offer a two-tier model of the 
agon, with one tier being characterised by social inclusivity, while the other is 
defined by its social exclusivity. However, this does not entail that both Hatab and 
Appel are therefore correct. On the contrary, since neither the elitist nor the 
generalizable agon are conceived as political struggles to establish instrumental 
power over one’s adversaries, we can reject both Hatab’s and Appel’s 
interpretations. The question we now need to ask is how Nietzsche’s position might 
have evolved as he became increasingly convinced that instrumental power is the 
true stake in all conflictual relations. 
2.3.4. THE INCLUSIVITY OF NIETZSCHE’S LATER 
AGONISM 
From 1881 onwards, Nietzsche almost completely drops Wettkampf and agon from 
his philosophical vocabulary. This should come as no surprise given the fact that 
two of the key features of Nietzsche’s earlier notion of the agon are problematized 
by the emergence of his conception of the world as will to power. According to 
Nietzsche, will to power organisations always act as a will to command or dominate 
                                                      
131 This gainsays Hatab’s argument (2002, p.141) that, when reading Nietzsche, “[w]e need 
a distinction between: 1) the aristocracy-democracy encounter in the cultural sphere 
pertaining to matters of creativity and normalcy, excellence and mediocrity; and 2) the 
aristocracy-democracy encounter in the political sphere pertaining to the formation of 
institutions, actual political practices, the justification of coercion, and the extent of 
sovereignty.” Hatab himself “maintain[s] that Nietzsche’s aristocraticism is defensible 
regarding the first encounter but not so regarding the second encounter.” 
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(Herrschen) understood as a will to direct weaker wills.132 This conception of life as 
will to power seems to undermine the idea of the agon as a non-exploitative relation 
of approximate equals – how is such a relation possible if the world is invariably 
characterised by the will to power?133  
Neither Nietzsche’s destructive nor his aristocratic readers raise this issue, 
however, viewing the agon as perfectly compatible, and even coextensive with the 
later Nietzsche’s more aggressive formulations of the will to power.134 Both 
Dombowsky and Appel take it as a given that in light of his desire to foster a form 
of human life that affirms the world as will to power, Nietzsche promotes a highly 
stratified type of society. Dombowsky interprets Nietzsche’s later conception of the 
agon as the violent struggle of an elite minority to oppress a subordinate slave-
class.135 Appel, drawing mostly on JGB 265, makes the slightly less extreme claim 
that the Nietzschean agon takes place among this minority as they non-violently 
struggle for command over one another, although in order to enjoy this agonal space, 
says Appel, this elite must engage in unmeasured conflict towards a slave-class.136 
We have already vitiated Dombowsky’s position in Section 1, where it was shown 
                                                      
132 NL 35[15] 11.514: “der Wille zur Macht sich spezialisirend als Wille zur Nahrung, nach 
Eigenthum, nach Werkzeugen, nach Dienern — Gehorchen und Herrschen: der Leib. — der 
stärkere Wille dirigirt den schwächeren.” 
133 NL 2[131] 12.132: “Der Wille zur Macht. […] Die Rangordnung als Machtordnung: 
Krieg und Gefahr die Voraussetzung, daß ein Rang seine Bedingungen festhält. Das 
grandiose Vorbild: der Mensch in der Natur, das Schwächste Klügste Wesen sich zum Herrn 
machend, die dümmeren Gewalten sich unterjochend” (quoted in Dombowsky [2004], p.93). 
See also e.g. NL 25[430] 11.126: “Die Rangordnung hat sich festgestellt durch den Sieg des 
Stärkeren und die Unentbehrlichkeit des Schwächeren für den Stärkeren und des Stärkeren 
für den Schwächeren — da entstehen getrennte Funktionen: denn Gehorchen ist ebenso eine 
Selbst-Erhaltungs-Funktion als, für das stärkere Wesen, Befehlen.” Z II Ueberwindung 
4.147: “Alles Lebendige ist ein Gehorchendes”. 
134 Dombowsky has simply argued that we reduce Nietzsche’s conception of agonal conflict 
to the aggressive notion of the will to power: “Nietzschean agonism is thought along with 
will to power, which says […] that life operates on the basis of exploitation, and with order 
of rank, which says that an order of rank is an order of power which presupposes ‘war and 
danger’” (p.93). 
135 See Dombowsky (2004), p.91: “The full benefit of freedom, in the Nietzschean sense, 
where freedom is the privilege of the few and not considered an inalienable right, can be 
appreciated only under agonal conditions where order of rank, war and inequality prevail.” 
136 See Appel (1999), pp.140-7. 
 137 
that the Nietzschean agon consistently signifies a non-destructive mode of conflict. 
It is therefore with Appel’s claim that we should now concern ourselves. 
The most extreme counter-position to Appel is that of Hatab, who takes a 
diametrically opposed line of interpretation. He attempts to read the will to power in 
terms of Nietzsche’s earlier conception of the agon, which is to say that he reads the 
will to power as an inherently measured form of conflict. Indeed, Hatab has proposed 
that the will to power is intrinsically agonal.137 In its most simple formulation, his 
position runs as follows: 
[T]he will to power expresses an agonistic force-field, wherein any 
achievement or production of meaning is constituted by an 
overcoming of some opposing force. Consequently, my Other is 
always implicated in my nature; the annulment of my Other would be 
the annulment of myself.138 
 
Hatab uses this notion of the will to power – understood as a theory asserting that 
the existence of all power organisations depends on the resistance offered by 
opposed organisations – to argue that affirming the world as will to power at the 
socio-political level “entails giving all beliefs a hearing” – that is, to affirm and invite 
the potential resistance that these beliefs might offer us.139  
In this subsection, I demonstrate that Nietzsche’s later agonism cannot be 
characterised in either of these ways. Both, in their own fashion, unjustifiably 
confound the will to power and Nietzsche’s early conception of the agon. This then 
translates into either a socially inclusive or exclusive vision of Nietzsche’s later will 
                                                      
137 See Hatab (2005), p.17: “The Greek agōn is a historical source of what Nietzsche later 
generalized into the dynamic, reciprocal structure of will to power. And it is important to 
recognize that such a structure undermines the idea that power could or should run 
unchecked, either in the sense of sheer domination or chaotic indeterminacy. Will to power 
implies a certain measure of oppositional limits, even though such a measure could not imply 
an overarching order or a stable principle of balance.” 
138 Hatab (1995) p.68. See also Hatab (2005) p.16: “Since power can only involve resistance, 
then one’s power to overcome is essentially related to a counterpower; if resistance were 
eliminated, if one’s counterpower were destroyed or even neutralized by sheer domination, 
one’s power would evaporate, it would no longer be power. Power is overcoming something, 
not annihilating it …” 
139 Hatab (1995) p.70. 
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to power-based-agonism. I will contend that though we do indeed now see the later 
Nietzsche interpreting agonally measured conflict as a struggle for power, this is a 
mode of struggle that can take place between individuals of any social standing so 
long as they are approximately equal in power. Notwithstanding, we witness 
Nietzsche emphatically (though not exclusively) endorsing the agon that takes place 
within the elite social sphere of the nobility. 
 In 1881, while his conception of the will to power was still very much 
inchoate, Nietzsche develops an abstract notion of Wettstreit, which is perhaps most 
lucidly articulated in NL 11[134] 9.491.140 In this text from 1881, Nietzsche’s not 
yet fully formulated conception of life as will to power – i.e. as a push for the 
incorporation and exploitation of weaker entities – is undeniably discernible; yet, 
within the depicted dynamic, there also seems to be a clear space for agonal relations. 
Thus, discussing “die Eigenschaften des niedersten belebten Wesens”, he states the 
following: 
Ein solches Wesen assimilirt sich das Nächste, verwandelt es in sein 
Eigenthum (Eigenthum ist zuerst Nahrung und Aufspeicherung von 
Nahrung), es sucht möglichst viel sich einzuverleiben, nicht nur den 
Verlust zu compensiren — es ist habsüchtig. So wächst es allein und 
endlich wird es so reproduktiv — es theilt sich in 2 Wesen. Dem 
unbegrenzten Aneignungstriebe folgt Wachsthum und Generation. — 
Dieser Trieb bringt es in die Ausnützung des Schwächeren, und in 
Wettstreit mit ähnlich Starken, er kämpft d.h. er haßt, fürchtet, verstellt 
sich. […] (NL 11[134] 9.491141). 
Nietzsche describes how plastidules greedily strive for nutrition and growth through 
the assimilation and exploitation of weaker entities (the “Ausnützung des 
Schwächeren”). However, this process of exploitative assimilation is distinctly 
unmeasured insofar as consumed entities are catabolised and then anabolised into 
                                                      
140 See KTO, p.107. See also DWB on “Wettkampf” as a synonym of “Wettstreit” (vol.29, 
col.780). 
141 Compare NL 7[3] 12.257: “Was gemeinsam ist: die herrschenden Triebe wollen auch als 
höchste Werth-Instanzen überhaupt, ja als schöpferische und regierende Gewalten betrachtet 
werden. Es versteht sich, daß diese Triebe sich gegenseitig entweder anfeinden oder 
unterwerfen (synthetisch auch wohl binden) oder in der Herrschaft wechseln.” 
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new, utilisable compounds. This is the activity of the “unbegrenzten 
Aneigungstrieb”. Nonetheless, Nietzsche indicates that situations of Begrenzung do 
arise in this environment of rapacious contention. These are situations of 
approximate equality, where the Aneignungstrieb cannot be immediately satisfied 
through the incorporation of the other. In such cases of struggle “mit ähnlich 
Starken”, a Wettstreit ensues. With respect to our current concerns, one of the most 
pertinent features of this Wettstreit is that it occurs under (it would seem) any 
condition of approximate equality or Gleichgewicht. However, during this period, 
Nietzsche also stresses that the conditions of such non-exploitative interrelation are 
extremely rare: “Ein labiles Gleichgewicht kommt in der Natur so wenig vor, wie 
zwei congruente Dreiecke” (NL 11[190] 9.516).142 Let us now examine how these 
ideas come into play later, when he returns to the ancient Greek conception of the 
agon, having more comprehensively formulated his notion of the world as will to 
power. 
2.3.4.1. NIETZSCHE’S APPROPRIATION OF SCHMIDT 
(1883) 
In Nietzsche’s writings from 1883, we bear witness to a resurgence of interest in the 
Wettkampf as he turns his gaze back towards the Greek conception of the agon. This 
shift is at least partially attributable to his reading of Schmidt’s Die Ethik der alten 
Griechen in the same year. In Schmidt’s philological treatment of the agon, the 
Greek practice is first and foremost conceived as a struggle for Geltung and Ehre as 
individuals strove to validate their high self-estimations.143 Indeed, in the second 
                                                      
142 See also NL 11[231] 9.530. 
143 Schmidt (1882), vol.1, pp.193-4: “So waren alle ernsten wie alle heitern Seiten des Lebens 
von einer Neigung durchzogen, welche unverständlich sein würde, wenn sie nicht mit einer 
Grundauffassung des Daseins im engsten Zusammenhange stände, nach welcher der Mann 
bestimmt ist sich hervorzuthun und seines Gleichen zu übertreffen. Aus ihr entspringt die 
Beliertheit einer bildlichen Ausdrucksweise, welche jede auf ein höheres Ziel gerichtete 
Anstrengung des Menschen als einen Agon, d. h. als einem um eines Preises willen 
unternommenen Wettkampf, bezeichnet.” 
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volume of Die Ethik der alten Griechen, Schmidt informs us of how the ancient 
Greeks rebuked a life of isolationism and solitude; the reason for this being that the 
duty to “know oneself” – and avoid falling into a state of vanity or undue modesty – 
could only be fulfilled by testing oneself against others.144 Accordingly, the desire 
for self-validation and honour (Ehrliebe or φιλότιµο) was praised by the Greeks so 
long as it did not exceed certain ethical boundaries by descending into wild self-
pursuit.145  
Schmidt also foregrounds how a strong understanding of honour also had an 
important limiting effect on this tendency for self-pursuit, namely, insofar as it 
discouraged individuals from harming the honour of others. This is what Schmidt 
variously calls Aidos, Ehrfurcht and Ehrgefühl (which we might translate as 
“reverence”): “das Streben Anderen, denen aus irgend einem Grunde Ehrerbietung 
gezollt wird, nicht wehe zu thun”.146 Schmidt distinguishes this noble affect of 
reverence from what the Greeks held to be the baser, though likewise limiting, affect 
of Aischyne (“shame” or “Schamgefühl”), “die Scheu sich selbst Tadel zuzuziehen”. 
Schmidt further discriminates between the two affects insofar as Aidos “wurzelt in 
der Reflexion auf das Fremde”, whereas Aischyne is rooted in reflection “auf das 
eigene Gefühl”, which is to say in self-concern.147 
In Schmidt’s conceptions of the agon and Aidos, we uncover a tension 
between social inclusivity and exclusivity that recalls Burckhardt and the early 
Nietzsche. On the one hand, Schmidt claims that the desire to prove oneself in 
Wettkampf permeated all social strata – that is, it “[durchdrang] das Bewusstsein 
                                                      
144 Ibid., vol.2, pp.394-8. 
145 Ibid., vol.2, p.394. 
146 Ibid., vol.1, p.168. However, Schmidt, like Burckhardt, Curtius, and Nietzsche in his early 
lectures, thought that success in the agon translated into political favours. Indeed, Schmidt 
quotes Thucydides’ Pericles as promising that the state would pay for the education of 
Miltiades’ children, “denn bei denen, bei welchen die grössten Preise für die Tugend 
ausgesetzt sind, sind auch die besten Männer im Staat thätig” (see ibid., vol.1, p.195). 
Schmidt also gives further evidence for the claim that individuals fought for posthumous 
fame (Ruhm) (see ibid., vol.1, p.197). 
147 Ibid., vol.1, p.168. 
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aller Schichten des griechischen Volkes”.148 His depiction of Aidos, however, is 
more equivocal. Unlike the feeling of shame, which is an affect that only arises in 
relation to figures of authority, Schmidt states that for the Greeks, Aidos “kann sich 
auch auf Gleichstehende richten, ja sie wendet sich gern auf Hülflose und 
Unglückliche […] und kann so selbst gleichbedeutend mit Mitleid werden”.149 The 
feeling of not wishing to harm the honour of another therefore arises, according to 
Schmidt, in relation not only to one’s superiors, but also in relation to one’s equals, 
and even subordinates. On the other hand, however, it is an exclusive affect, of which 
some individuals are not worthy: as he points out, in the Odyssey, Aidos is 
pronounced “nicht angemessen” for beggars.150 Thus, the fact that it is considered 
appropriate to feel Aidos towards the “Hülflose und Unglückliche” does not entail 
that it is proper to feel it towards those beyond one’s own caste. So far, I have 
sketched Schmidt’s thoughts on the agon, Aidos and Aischyne, but we should now 
examine how Nietzsche, in his appropriation of Schmidt, uniquely combines these 
ideas. As we will now see, tracking the way Nietzsche calls upon these philological 
theses is illuminating with respect to our current goal of ascertaining the social 
inclusivity of Nietzsche’s later agonism.  
Under the unmistakeable influence of Schmidt, in 1883 Nietzsche tries to 
appropriate features of the Greek Wettkampf for his project of cultivating a minority 
of superior, ruling Übermenschen.151 In a preparatory note for Book 3 of Z, we can 
identify the end to which Nietzsche is going to enlist Schmidt’s notion of the agon: 
[D]er Übergang vom Freigeist und Einsiedler zum Herrschen-Müssen: 
das Schenken verwandelt sich — aus dem Geben entstand der Wille, 
                                                      
148 Ibid., vol.1, p.190. Schmidt cites Work and Days and the Iliad to substantiate his claim 
that Wettkampf was present among both aristocratic and working class social strata. 
149 Ibid., vol.1, p.169.  
150 Ibid., vol.1, p.177. 
151 NL 35[72] 11.541: “Es muß viele Übermenschen geben: alle Güte entwickelt sich nur 
unter seines Gleichen. Ein Gott wäre immer ein Teufel! Eine herrschende Rasse. Zu ‘die 
Herrn der Erde.’” See also NL 35[73] 11.541: “Die Rangordnung durchgeführt in einem 
Systeme der Erdregierung: die Herrn der Erde zuletzt, eine neue herrschende Kaste.” Z III 
Tafeln 21 4.263: “[D]as Beste soll herrschen, das Beste will auch herrschen! Und wo die 
Lehre anders lautet, da fehlt es am Besten”. 
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Zwang-zum-Nehmen zu üben. Die Tyrannei des Künstlers zuerst als 
Selbst-Bezwingung und -Verhärtung! (NL 16[51] 10.516) 
 
Nietzsche is clearly seeking to overcome the Epicurean isolationism that dominates 
the free-spirit trilogy.152 His Übermenschen cannot simply close themselves off from 
society (as they might like). The future of humanity depends on their returning from 
hermitude and taking a commanding role in society. Indeed, dissatisfied with the 
isolationist tendencies of Zarathustra, he explicitly latches onto Schmidt’s 
conception of the agon, which framed the practice as both a locus of public action, 
and a means of self-validation. Nietzsche therefore calls the minority of isolated 
Freigeister to convene for the sake of engaging in a Wettkampf; however, 
Nietzsche’s ideal agon now has a markedly political dimension insofar as it is 
figured as a struggle of aspiring rulers for socio-political power – i.e. to command 
(“herrschen”) the people (“Volk”): 
Gerade jene zum Wettkampfe um Macht aufrufen, welche sich gerne 
verstecken und für sich leben möchten — auch die Weisen, Frommen, 
Stillen im Lande! Hohn über ihre genießende Einsamkeit! 
Alle schöpferischen Naturen ringen um Einfluß, auch wenn sie allein 
leben — ‘Nachruhm’ ist nur ein falscher Ausdruck für das, was sie 
wollen. 
Die ungeheure Aufgabe des Herrschenden, der sich selber erzieht — 
die Art Menschen und Volk, über welche er herrschen will, muß in ihm 
vorgebildet sein: da muß er erst Herr geworden sein! (NL 16[86] 
10.529)153 
                                                      
152 See e.g. FW 388: “Lebe im Verborgenen, damit du dir leben kannst! Lebe unwissend über 
Das, was deinem Zeitalter das Wichtigste dünkt! Lege zwischen dich und heute wenigstens 
die Haut von drei Jahrhunderten! Und das Geschrei von heute, der Lärm der Kriege und 
Revolutionen, soll dir ein Gemurmel sein!” 
153 See also NL 15[21] 10.485: “Problem! / Zum agon aufrufen! gerade die, welche sich gern 
verstecken möchten, die Stillen, Frommen, — Bewerbung um Herrschaft! / Einsamkeit nur 
Mittel der Erziehung! / gegen alle bloß Genießenden!” See also NL 8[15] 10.339: “Das 
agonale Gefühl, welches vor einem Publikum siegen will und diesem Publikum verständlich 
sein muß.” For an early example of Nietzsche emphasising this public dimension of the agon, 
see also “Darstellung der antiken Rhetorik” (KGW II/4, p.434): “[A]lles öffentliche 
Auftreten des Individuums ist ein Wettkampf”. 
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Needless to say, this appeal for a contemporary Wettkampf is not socially inclusive 
in nature; rather, it is specifically directed towards the scattering of higher 
individuals cached in self-imposed isolation, whom Nietzsche wishes to draw into 
the public domain. However, whereas in Schmidt the emphasis is still massively on 
Ehre and Ruhm, Nietzsche conceives of this public struggle as one fought over 
power (“Macht”). Indeed, Nietzsche now construes the quest for Ruhm as a 
masquerade for the pursuit of influence (“Einfluß”) over others. Whereas Einfluß 
was posited as a motivating goal of agonal contest in an exclusively aesthetic sense 
in his early agonism, the final three lines of the above note unmistakably evoke the 
idea of a struggle for influence qua political domination. At the very least, it mixes 
the political and the aesthetical in a manner reminiscent of his portrayal of “Künstler-
Tyrannen” (NL 16[51] 10.516; NL 2[57] 12.87). The supposition informing this plan 
for Z is that a society built upon the principle of contest will be a proficient, noble 
one akin to that of the ancient Greeks.154 
In these texts, we therefore find that Nietzsche’s endorsement of the agon is 
restricted to a minority of individuals whom he perceives as potentially worthy of 
ruling, and whom he seeks to bring into society and subject to selective pressure. 
However, in other texts we discover Nietzsche advocating a far more inclusive form 
of Wettkampf – for example, in a key Nachlass fragment in which he takes Schmidt’s 
notion of Aidos and brings it directly to bear on the concept of the agon:  
[…] Aidos ist die Regung und Scheu, nicht Götter, Menschen und 
ewige Gesetze zu verletzen: also der Instinkt der Ehrfurcht als habituell 
bei dem Guten. Eine Art Ekel vor der Verletzung des Ehrwürdigen. 
Die griechische Abneigung gegen das Übermaß, in dem freudigen 
I<nstinkt der> Hybris, <gegen> die Überschreitung seiner Grenzen, ist 
sehr vornehm — und altadelig! Es ist die Verletzung des Aidos ein 
schrecklicher Anblick für den, welcher an Aidos gewöhnt ist. […] Die 
Freien, Mässigen erfanden den Wettkampf als die immer wachsende 
                                                      
154 See also NL 16[50] 10.515: “Neuer Adel, durch Züchtung. Die Gründungs-Feste von 
Familien. / Der Tag neu eingetheilt; die körperlichen Übungen für alle Lebensalter.  Der 
Wettkampf als Princip. / Die Geschlechts-Liebe als Wettkampf um das Princip im 
Werdenden, Kommenden. — Das ‘Herrschen’ wird gelehrt, geübt, die Härte ebenso wie die 
Milde. Sobald ein Zustand meisterlich gekonnt wird, muß ein neuer erstrebt werden.” 
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Verfeinerung jenes Macht-Äußerungsbedürfnisses: durch den 
Wettkampf wurde der Hybris vorgebeugt: welche durch lange 
Unbefriedig<ung> des Machtgelüstes entsteht. (NL 7[161] 10.295) 
While Nietzsche is ostensibly merely describing Greek culture in this note, his 
account has a strong normative dimension; indeed, it is reasonable to infer that he is 
picking out the features of Greek agonal culture that should to some extent be 
reprised by modern society. Notably, in his account, it is prima facie only a select 
group who are able to limit themselves in a manner necessary for agonal conflict. 
These are the “Guten”, who are “an Aidos gewöhnt”. However, there is no evidence 
to suggest that this group is necessarily tied to the aristocratic social classes. Indeed, 
though Nietzsche underscores the aristocratic origins of Aidos and the Wettkampf – 
describing the former as “altadelig”, and claiming the latter to have been invented 
(“erfand”) by “[d]ie Freien, Mässigen” – he in no way claims that they are still 
confined to the nobility. As in his early writings, Nietzsche’s suggestion that this 
agonal virtue originated in the nobility should not be equated with the proposition 
that it did not, or could not, proliferate beyond this social caste. We should now 
examine how he develops these ideas in JGB, where his conception of the agon 
becomes even more inclusive. 
2.3.4.2. AIDOS AND AGONAL CONFLICT IN JGB 
While neither Wettkampf nor agon are explicitly mentioned in JGB, the species of 
conflict that they denote is conspicuously present in a number of aphorisms. Thus, 
the kinds of struggle depicted in JGB 259 and 265 fulfil many of the defining criteria 
of agonal conflict. Moreover, in JGB 259, Aidos is present in all but name as the 
noble ethos of “[s]ich gegenseitig der Verletzung, der Gewalt, der Ausbeutung 
enthalten”; again, in JGB 265, the disposition is present as “Feinheit und 
Selbstbeschränkung im Verkehre mit ihres Gleichen”. What is of further interest 
about these aphorisms is that both have been used by Appel to corroborate his 
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assertion that Nietzsche’s agonism is restricted to an aristocratic minority.155 But do 
they permit such a conclusion?  
The argument for a socially exclusive interpretation of these texts runs as 
follows. First, Nietzsche asserts that “Leben selbst ist wesentlich Aneignung, 
Verletzung, Überwältigung des Fremden und Schwächeren, Unterdrückung, Härte, 
Aufzwängung eigner Formen, Einverleibung und mindestens, mildestens, 
Ausbeutung” (JGB 259). If self-restraint, the treatment of others as one’s equals, and 
the renunciation of exploitation are to be life-enhancing, then, they cannot 
universally pertain, even within a society – in other words, they cannot form social 
“Grundprinzip[ien]” (as socialists, Christians and utilitarians would have it). For 
Nietzsche, this constitutes an attempt to suppress life’s essential characteristics – it 
is a case of the “Wille zur Verneinung des Lebens” – and so, such values represent 
“Auflösungs- und Verfalls-Princip[ien]”. Thriving life depends on struggle for 
Nietzsche; hence, such restrained behaviour must be radically limited: 
Auch jener Körper, innerhalb dessen, wie vorher angenommen wurde, 
die Einzelnen sich als gleich behandeln — es geschieht in jeder 
gesunden Aristokratie —, muss selber, falls er ein lebendiger und nicht 
ein absterbender Körper ist, alles Das gegen andre Körper thun, wessen 
sich die Einzelnen in ihm gegen einander enthalten: er wird der 
leibhafte Wille zur Macht sein müssen, er wird wachsen, um sich 
greifen, an sich ziehn, Übergewicht gewinnen wollen […]. (JGB 
259)156 
 
Of course, this is not to say that within such bodies of equals there is an absence of 
conflict. For Nietzsche (echoing Wilhelm Roux, as we will see in Chapter 4), the 
vitality of any body is conditioned by inner struggle. However, since between such 
mutually dependent equals this struggle can neither be destructive nor exploitative, 
I suggest that we think of it as an agonal mode of struggle – let us now look at some 
of the reasons for doing so. 
                                                      
155 See Appel (1999), p.141.  
156 See also GM II 11 5.312-3. 
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We have just recounted how Nietzsche figures Ehrfurcht as a relation 
exclusively reserved for nobly-minded, higher individuals.157 Moreover, during this 
phase of his thought, he maintains that these higher individuals are in the minority, 
“denn alles, was hervorragt, ist seinem Wesen nach, selten […]” (NL 7[70] 12.321). 
However, it would constitute a non-sequitur to conclude from these premises that 
Nietzsche thinks that the kind of Ehrfurcht undergirding agonal conflict is restricted 
to the aristocratic classes. The conditions stated for agonal limitation in JGB 259 are 
simply “thatsächliche Ähnlichkeit in Kraftmengen und Werthmaassen und ihre 
Zusammengehörigkeit innerhalb Eines Körpers”. It is incidental that this “geschieht 
in jeder gesunden Aristokratie” in an exemplary fashion. This is absolutely not to be 
confused with the claim that such limitation only occurs within healthy aristocracies. 
An aristocracy is just one example of such a body; indeed, a guild of tradesman 
would equally seem to qualify. So, though we still see Nietzsche taking an especial 
interest in the noble agon practiced by the aristocratic classes, he nevertheless 
endeavours to keep this radically open for all those willing to take on the task of 
cultivating noble virtues.  
Nietzsche pushes this line further in JGB 265. Having again stressed the 
necessity of exploitation, he also goes on to state that “[d]ie vornehme Seele” 
gesteht sich, unter Umständen, die sie anfangs zögern lassen, zu, dass 
es mit ihr Gleichberechtigte giebt; sobald sie über diese Frage des 
Rangs im Reinen ist, bewegt sie sich unter diesen Gleichen und 
Gleichberechtigten mit der gleichen Sicherheit in Scham und zarter 
Ehrfurcht, welche sie im Verkehre mit sich selbst hat, — gemäss einer 
eingebornen himmlischen Mechanik, auf welche sich alle Sterne 
verstehn. Es ist ein Stück ihres Egoismus mehr, diese Feinheit und 
Selbstbeschränkung im Verkehre mit ihres Gleichen — jeder Stern ist 
ein solcher Egoist —: sie ehrt sich in ihnen und in den Rechten, welche 
sie an dieselben abgiebt, sie zweifelt nicht, dass der Austausch von 
Ehren und Rechten als Wesen alles Verkehrs ebenfalls zum 
naturgemässen Zustand der Dinge gehört. (JGB 265) 
                                                      
157 Though N.B. that Nietzsche also refers to another form of Ehrfurcht for things that are 
superior. See e.g. JGB 263. 
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What is noble is the ability to exhibit self-restraint towards an equal out of complete 
egoism – that is, insofar as one merely views one’s relation to that individual as 
analogous to one’s own self-relation. While the vital limiting effect that Nietzsche 
attributes to Ehrfurcht within this dynamic is strongly reminiscent of Schmidt, he 
has nonetheless given the concept a notable modification: it is no longer primarily 
other-oriented in opposition to Schamgefühl, which, for Schmidt, was self-oriented; 
indeed, for Nietzsche, “Scham und zarter Ehrfurcht” are not represented as being 
defined by different relations to alterity – both are the result of overt egoism, and in 
no way to be confused with mercy or (we can assume) Mitleid.158 
Across these two aphorisms, in making the claim that Ehrfurcht is limited 
to equals, Nietzsche draws an analogy between three domains: the biological, the 
social and the physical. Agonal self-restraint inheres, according to Nietzsche, within 
a “lebendiger und nicht ein absterbender Körper”, between equal individuals, and 
between stars, in accordance with an “eingeborn himmlisch Mechanik”. The 
biological thesis draws on his reading of Roux, who proposed that an organism is a 
dynamic Gleichgewicht of struggling parts.159 The physical thesis appears to be a 
reconfiguration of his early Heraclitean worldview concerning the dynamic 
equilibrium of inanimate entities, now projected into the celestial realm.160 The 
social thesis then draws upon his early representation of the agon as a non-
exploitative, conflictual relation between equals. Nietzsche’s assertion that 
inanimate entities (such as stars) can act with reverence and shame towards one 
another may strike us as odd, if not as a patent example of the anthropomorphic 
fallacy.161 We will return to this problem in the final section. Let it suffice for now 
                                                      
158 As Paul van Tongeren has emphasised, one of the virtues that Nietzsche wants to foster 
is “Ehrfurcht vor sich”, a form of endogenous self-belief that does not rely on the judgement 
of others. See Die Moral von Nietzsche’s Moralkritik (Bonn: Bouvier, 1989), pp.228-31. 
159 See ch.4, §4.3. 
160 See PHG §§5-6 (1.822-30) and VPP §10 (KGW II/4, pp.261-82). 
161 Nietzsche seems to admit so much in NL 7[55] 10.259 when, speaking of the state, he 
asserts the following: “Wie kann der Staat Rache übernehmen! Erstens ist er kalt und handelt 
nicht im Affekt: was der Rache-Übende thut. Dann ist er keine Person, am wenigsten eine 
noble Person: kann also auch nicht im Maßhalten (im ‘Gleiches mit Gleichem’) seine 
noblesse und Selbstzucht beweisen.” 
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to note how, in drawing these analogies, Nietzsche is gesturing towards the fact that 
locally restraining the will to power need not entail a denial of nature insofar as such 
restraint is manifest in nature itself, and can indeed be seen to facilitate the exercise 
of power.  
How can agonal conflict be an expression of power, however, if it is non-
exploitative? How is this possible if command and instrumentalisation are essential 
to the activity of will to power? Looking back to Nietzsche’s Mayer-inspired 
conception of the will to power, which was explicated in Chapter 1, we can begin to 
formulate a response to these queries. Will to power does not just express itself as 
the accumulation and organisation of force, but also as the discharge of this force, 
which does not have to directly generate exploitative relations. There are three 
alternatives. First, power can be expressed purely for the sake of the sensation of 
relieving pent up force and experiencing how much command one has over oneself 
(and one’s “Auslösungsapparat”) – as can be the case in sport. We find this 
conception of agonal contest as an otherwise useless vent for force in a fragment 
where he affirms how the Greeks held “Die ‘unnütze’ Kraftvergeudung (im Agon 
jeder Art) als Ideal” (NL 8[15] 10.336).162 Second, discharge can be purely 
motivated by the desire to experience how much force one has accumulated relative 
to others – that is, a nominal dominance, without exercising any actual instrumental 
power over those dominated. As Nietzsche says of the Greek agon in GD Alten 3, 
                                                      
162 See also JGB 260: “Die Fähigkeit und Pflicht zu langer Dankbarkeit und langer Rache — 
beides nur innerhalb seines Gleichen —, die Feinheit in der Wiedervergeltung, das Begriffs-
Raffinement in der Freundschaft, eine gewisse Nothwendigkeit, Feinde zu haben (gleichsam 
als Abzugsgräben für die Affekte Neid Streitsucht Übermuth, — im Grunde, um gut freund 
sein zu können)”. It is crucial to observe that Nietzsche’s notion of enmity is by no means 
necessarily purely negative in kind. One’s enemy should ideally be an equal who gives us 
the opportunity to cleanse, exercise and improve ourselves. Indeed, although in JGB 260 
Nietzsche distinguishes the friend from the enemy (the enemy being the necessary condition 
for the friend), we find in Z I Freunde that friend and foe are not depicted as standing in a 
relation of exclusive disjunction towards one another: “In seinem Freunde soll man seinen 
besten Feind haben. Du sollst ihm am nächsten mit dem Herzen sein, wenn du ihm 
widerstrebst.” (4.72). See also Z I Krieg 4.59, where Nietzsche entreats us to rejoice in the 
successes of our enemies: “Ihr müsst stolz auf euern Feind sein: dann sind die Erfolge eures 
Feindes auch eure Erfolge.” 
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“mit Festen und Künsten wollte man auch nichts Andres als sich obenauf fühlen, 
sich obenauf zeigen: es sind Mittel, sich selber zu verherrlichen” (6.157). The accent 
is on feeling and showing oneself as “obenauf”, but not on exercising this dominance 
by controlling the behaviour of defeated adversaries. Finally, Nietzsche also 
conceives of agonal conflict as a means to strengthening and training oneself, or the 
community, for the exploitative struggle against others outside of the given agonal 
contest or community. As such, we might think of the form of restraint inherent to 
the agon in the same way Nietzsche thinks of law in GM II 11, namely, as a means 
(Mittel) in the exploitative, unmeasured “Kampf von Macht-Complexen” (5.313).  
As he also says in GD Alten 3, with agonal institutions, “[d]ie ungeheure Spannung 
im Innern entlud sich dann in furchtbarer und rücksichtsloser Feindschaft nach 
Aussen” (6.157). Such institutions did not replace exploitative or destructive 
conflict, but rather enabled it to be more effectively directed towards the outside. 
Thus, Nietzsche’s later conception of agonal conflict can be understood as cohering 
with his notion of the world as will to power, namely, insofar as such measured 
struggle represents a “Verfeinerung jenes Macht-Äußerungsbedürfnisses” (NL 
7[161] 10.295). 
The will to power can express itself variously in destructive conflict, 
exploitative conflict or agonal conflict. It is not necessarily agonal, and any agonal 
unity exhibited by a social group is always local and can never be extended across 
an entire community. Within the framework of Nietzsche’s argumentation, to 
conceive of the agon, as Hatab does, as embodied in the democratic principle of 
“open fair opportunity for all citizens to participate in political contention” is 
precisely to attempt to turn agonal equality into a “Grundprinzip der Gesellschaft”. 
This is because, for Nietzsche, agonal relations only subsist between approximate 
equals. The strong should not limit themselves agonally towards the weak. He does 
not advise the strong to exhibit Ehrfurcht towards the less fortunate and helpless, as 
Schmidt considers the Greeks to have done. Such behaviour would be a symptom of 
decline. Hatab suggests that the logic of the will to power demands not only that we 
show agonal moderation towards less capable individuals, but that we actively strive 
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to render them worthy opponents.163 However, Nietzsche’s later writings suggest 
that what takes place in nature and what must take place within any healthy society 
is that inferior individuals are excluded from agonal contest with their superiors, 
who should always opt to establish exploitative relations with those weaker than 
them. 
Nonetheless, pace Appel, this is once again perfectly compatible with 
Nietzsche’s conviction that any social subgroup of equals (i.e. equal in terms of 
capacity, rather than class) can engage in agonal conflict. However, the vibrancy of 
the agon is again conditioned by social stratification, since any social group of 
agonal equals can only sustain this equality on the basis of exploiting others within 
society (JGB 259). Thus, we see that Nietzsche’s later agonism, like his earlier 
agonism, is socially inclusive while at the same time demanding social stratification.  
Casting our mind back to Burckhardt, we can see the misleading nature of 
Martin Ruehl’s thesis that, “[l]ike Burckhardt, Nietzsche regarded the agon as an 
essentially aristocratic notion that belonged to a pre-democratic age.”164 The relation 
of agonal measure to aristocratic social order is complex and multifaceted for both 
Burckhardt and Nietzsche. Both appear to propound the idea that the values of the 
agon originate, and can be appreciated in their purest form, within an aristocratic 
social class, and that an agonal culture is best conceived as situated within a stratified 
society; however, both also bring into relief how agonal relations can proliferate 
beyond that class. 
                                                      
163 See Hatab (2005), p.142: “As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated 
competitor winds up being meaningless. So I should not only will the presence of others in 
an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and 
capacities to succeed in the contest.” 
164 See fn.67. 
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2.4. ON THE SOURCES OF AGONAL 
MEASURE  
We are left with the third and final obstacle to our having a clear picture of what 
agonal conflict practically signifies. This concerns the question as to how measure 
is imposed on evil Eris, which is to say the primal tendency to engage in unmeasured 
destructive conflict. As was established above, the agon draws upon, and harnesses, 
a range of the drives and affects that underpin the Vernichtungskampf: for example, 
the “so furchtbar vorhandenen Trieb” for “Kampf und die Lust des Sieges”, along 
with envy (Neid) and ambition (Ehrgeiz). Yet, even once these have been bridled 
and canalised into culturally productive Wettkampf, they are nonetheless constantly 
pushing towards excess (“Übermaß”). Indeed, Nietzsche recounts how the ancient 
Greek Wettkampf stimulated the ambition and envy of competitors to such an extent 
that, in their struggle to excel their adversaries, they were often tempted to resort to 
unmeasured means that were antithetical to the measured ethos of the Wettkampf 
itself.  
The first risk is that superdominant contestants will strive for the 
unmeasured goal of tyrannising over the contest and establishing a permanent 
victory, or what Nietzsche calls an Alleinherrschaft. Should an individual be 
sufficiently talented to dominate a given contest – that is, to become hors de 
concours, as Alcibiades does in Burckhardt’s account of the equestrian agon – the 
contest dries up due to the fact that others are no longer motivated to compete. As 
such, in the first place, measure is a precondition of agonal conflict insofar as 
approximate equality must be maintained in order to arouse the affects of envy and 
ambition, which represent the driving force of such contest.  The loss of constant 
measured tension, Nietzsche thought, led the Greeks back into the 
Vernichtungskampf, since 
ohne Neid Eifersucht und wettkämpfenden Ehrgeiz der hellenische 
Staat wie der hellenische Mensch entartet. Er wird böse und grausam, 
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er wird rachsüchtig und gottlos, kurz, er wird “vorhomerisch” — und 
dann bedarf es nur eines panischen Schreckens, um ihn zum Fall zu 
bringen und zu zerschmettern. (CV 5 1.792) 
Since the Greeks needed the Wettkampf as a means of releasing their competitive 
energies, it makes sense that with the loss of such measured non-violent means, they 
would revert to violent, unmeasured forms of contest. The second risk, however, is 
that individuals will directly resort to violent or murderous means in an attempt to 
secure victory. Thus, Nietzsche warns of the situation in which “einer der großen 
um die Wette kämpfenden Politiker und Parteihäupter [fühlt sich] zu schädlichen 
und zerstörenden Mitteln und zu bedenklichen Staatsstreichen, in der Hitze des 
Kampfes, […] gereizt […].” (CV 5 1.789).  
Nonetheless, Nietzsche maintains that “[d]er Wettkampf entfesselt das 
Individuum: und zugleich bändigt er dasselbe nach ewigen Gesetzen” (NL 16[22] 
7.402; my italics). How, then, does Nietzsche think that the two risks just outlined 
were staved off? How did the agon contain (bändigen) individuals at the same time 
as it released (entfesselt) them in provoking their personal ambitions? How was the 
ambition and envy of contestants curbed or begrenzt and the descent back into pre-
Homeric violence forestalled?  
In the critical literature, there is a deep disagreement regarding Nietzsche’s 
proposed solution to this problem. On the one hand, there are those who propound 
what I will call the respect reading; on the other, there are those who defend what I 
will call the counterbalancing reading. The former is put forward by Hatab and 
Connolly, while the latter is to be found in Herman Siemens, and to some extent, 
also Bonnie Honig. I will briefly reconstruct these readings before examining what 
Nietzsche’s historical sources on the ancient Greek agon (viz. Curtius, Burckhardt 
and Grote) say about agonal moderation. I will then argue that an appreciation of 
how Nietzsche develops their thoughts reveals an interesting, and more convincing, 
alternative to both the respect and counterbalancing readings.  
It should be emphatically stated at the outset that my intention is in no way 
to fully reconstruct, deflate or debunk the particular brands of democratic agonism 
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that the aforementioned political philosophers develop out of their interpretations of 
Nietzsche. Excepting Herman Siemens, they all proffer their readings as 
appropriations of Nietzsche’s thought, rather than strictly representative exegeses. 
I am not contending that their appropriations are in themselves without worth, but 
only that they take us farther than we might think from the tenor of Nietzsche’s 
thought, which in fact presents us with an as yet unremarked solution to the problem 
at hand. I will therefore be reconstructing their readings of Nietzsche only with a 
view to delineating two fallacious ways in which we might be tempted to read him 
on the question of agonal moderation. 
The foremost representatives of the respect reading are Hatab and Connolly. 
Both to some degree construe agonal measure as a subjectively imposed form of 
self-restraint that one exercises in relation to one’s adversaries. Nonetheless, each 
does so in their own way, and we should highlight some of the points of convergence 
and divergence in their Nietzschean (or arguably post-Nietzschean) visions. Thus, 
in Political Theory and Modernity (1988) and Identity and Difference (1991) 
Connolly marshals Nietzsche in his effort to sketch a democratic ethos of “respect” 
able to safeguard social pluralism – that is “agonistic care and self-limitation” 
towards one’s adversaries.165 Connolly refers to texts from throughout the corpus 
(though notably none in which the agon is explicitly discussed) in trying to 
illuminate Nietzsche’s affirmation of both the contingency and relationality of 
identity. In brief, the idea is that, though one might define oneself (or one’s 
community) as Christian, heterosexual, republican and non-violent, these features 
are contingent, which is to say that one could have been born elsewhere and could 
have developed a quite different identity.166 According to Connolly, this means that 
identity is always an artificial construction for Nietzsche, and not the expression of 
an essence. Connolly invokes NL 9[151] 12.424, which states that “Der Wille zur 
Macht kann sich nur an Widerständen äußern”, in an effort to demonstrate that the 
                                                      
165 William Connolly, Identity/Difference (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 
p.185. 
166 Ibid., p.174. 
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identity of the modern subject is, for Nietzsche, defined in opposition or resistance 
to the aspects of itself and its society that fail fit that identity. Hence, on this reading, 
the modern subject is conditioned by difference. We do not “contain an inner essence 
which draws us toward stasis and subjectivity”; rather, the modern subject is 
ineluctably “the locus of a struggle one strives to suppress”.167 
It is the modern subject’s “refus[al] to accept difference in itself and others”, 
and its desire to deny and escape this irreducible state of strife, that tempts it to assert 
its identity in a universalising, intolerant and even aggressive manner.168 This will to 
conquer, convert, exclude or eliminate otherness is what Connolly understands to be 
the basis of modern suffering, what he glosses as Nietzschean ressentiment. As an 
alternative to the gnawing resentment of pursuing this unachievable goal, Connolly 
recommends a Nietzschean ethic by which we “come to terms with difference and 
[…] seek ways to enable difference to be”.169 He maintains that this ethic can be 
cultivated by means of an “acceptance of [Nietzsche’s] ontology of resistance” – 
namely, insofar as this ontology “calls into question the project of perfecting mastery 
of the world” on the grounds that resistance is ineffaceable.170 This fosters what he 
calls an “agonistic respect for difference”: 
Recognition of these conditions of strife and interdependence, 
especially when such recognition contains an element of mutuality, can 
flow into an ethic in which adversaries are respected and maintained in 
a mode of agonistic mutuality, an ethic in which alter-identities foster 
agonistic respect for the differences that constitute them […].171 
Connolly reads Nietzsche as commending that each take a more “ironic” stance 
towards the norms and ideals that they endorse in order to avoid falling into a 
                                                      
167 William Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), p.156. For 
his invocation of NL 9[151] 12.424, see p.146. 
168 Ibid., p.158. Within the history of political philosophy, Connolly sees thinkers such as 
Hobbes, Hegel and Rousseau, who try to convert or excise those deviating from their ideal 
visions of society, as exemplary of such practices (see ibid., p.175). 
169 Hatab (1995), p.161. 
170 Ibid., p.161. 
171 Connolly (1991), p.166 
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disaffected state of ressentiment.172 As opposed to asserting one’s ideals 
dogmatically, one should a) acknowledge the aspects of oneself, and the members 
of one’s community, that fail to fit one’s ideals; and then b) engage in the necessary 
struggle with them in a measured manner – i.e. without seeking their eradication. In 
this way, Connolly appeals to us to “convert an antagonism of identity into an 
agonism of difference”.173 
While Connolly does not refer to Hesiod or CV 5, we can read the above as a 
summary of his Nietzsche-inspired account of how evil Eris can be stably 
transformed into good Eris. Thus, in order to prevent bloody forms of conflict, he 
tells us, 
Each must overcome its own fear and loathing to enter into equitable 
relations with others, and only an entity which has made progress in 
that respect is in a position to let others be what they are or must be.174 
Nonetheless, Connolly does not think that this shift in disposition towards the Other 
is wholly sufficient to ensure that social struggle remains non-violent. Sometimes 
violent behaviour will be too deeply ingrained in a person’s identity for her to be 
able to agonistically struggle with others. In such cases, the state must be capable of 
taking “the minimum legal action needed to protect others from the danger of 
violence”.175 We should note, then, Connolly’s ethical project therefore relies on the 
existence of an institutional safety-net (though some have argued that this is not 
sufficiently fleshed out by Connolly).176 
                                                      
172 Ibid., p.165; see also Connolly (1991), p.183. 
173 See ibid., p.178. 
174 Ibid., p.167. Connolly does not view this as the mere tolerance of subordinate minorities 
within hegemonic systems, but rather as the “relations between a variety of intersecting and 
interdependent constituencies, none of which sets the unquestioned matrix within which 
others are placed”. See William Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralisation (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p.92. 
175 Connolly (1991), p.180.  
176 Indeed, Mark Wenman has accused Connolly of excessively focussing on the ethical, 
subjective aspect of social problems, and neglecting the wider institutional sources of, and 
solutions to, these problems. See Mark Wenman, Agonistic Democracy: Constituent Power 
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Resonating with Connolly, Hatab argues that it is by means of 
acknowledging the will to power as that which “can manifest itself only against 
resistances” that we are able to cultivate a “civic attitude” of “agonistic respect” 
based on “equal regard”. This, he believes, can act as the foundation of an agonally 
organised democracy. However, alluding to Connolly, Hatab warns us that this 
attitude is not to be confused with a positive regard of compassion for one’s 
adversaries. It should rather be thought of as a minimal affirmation of the Other qua 
legitimate opponent, or in other words, as an acknowledgement of their equality of 
opportunity (to agonally compete with me). Indeed, Hatab rejects Connolly’s vision 
of a democracy founded upon an “ethics of letting-be” and “delight in difference” as 
a sanguine vision of a political community based upon just such a positive regard.  
Hatab accepts that “agonistic respect” can often be found wanting and that 
democratic institutional measures are required to counteract individuals’ or groups’ 
attempts to exclude their potential adversaries and thereby shut down the contest.177 
Moreover, Hatab also notes the need for non-procedural forms of political resistance, 
such as were deployed during the civil rights movement. However, he asserts that 
such protesters must “submit to the penalties of violating a law they think is 
unjust.”178 Thus, as in Connolly, we again find that he must take recourse to an 
institutional safety-net.  
Though both Hatab and Connolly therefore affirm the need for such 
institutional safeguards, both predominantly attribute agonal limitation to a 
dispositional shift on the part of democratic adversaries. As Herman Siemens has 
remarked, both “approach the question of limits from the position of the subject and 
the kind of ethos or attitude that must be adopted for political antagonism to remain 
this side of mutual destruction.”179 Furthermore, this ethos is conditioned by an 
                                                      
in the Era of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.116, p.120, 
p.123. 
177 Ibid., p.192. 
178 Ibid., p.92.  
179 Siemens (2013), p.90. See also Herman Siemens, “Nietzsche’s Political Philosophy: A 
Review of Recent Literature”, Nietzsche-Studien, 30 (2001b), 509-526 (esp. pp.521-2). 
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acknowledgement of the irreducible and constitutive function of resistance and 
struggle with respect to personal identity. 
On the other side, Herman Siemens, and, to some extent Bonnie Honig, 
present us with a picture of agonal measure that contrasts sharply with that of 
Connolly and Hatab. Both Honig and Siemens cite the same passage in CV 5 where 
Nietzsche states that the essence of the “hellenischen Wettkampf-Vorstellung” is 
that it “verabscheut die Alleinherrschaft und fürchtet ihre Gefahren, sie begehrt, als 
Schutzmittel gegen das Genie — ein zweites Genie” (CV 5 1.789).180 This is 
Nietzsche’s conception of reciprocally limiting forces. Within this vision of agonal 
measure, competing individuals invariably hold tyrannical aspirations, but so long 
as these individuals are roughly equal in strength, and are therefore able to keep one 
another’s ambitions in check, neither will be able to gain the upper-hand and tyranny 
will be (at least temporarily) foreclosed. Honig compares this to Machiavelli’s 
account of the mutual limitation of the people and the nobles in the Roman republic: 
[W]ere it not for their fear of being dominated by the nobles, the people 
would withdraw from politics […]. Were it not for the people’s active, 
political resistance to them, the nobles would put an end to all liberty, 
public and private, and impose a tyrannical rule on the republic. 
Because the nobles in a republic are always moved by their ambition to 
dominate the people, and the people moved always by their desire to 
secure their liberty, their struggle is perpetual. The perpetuity of their 
struggle, and the institutional obstacles to its resolution, prevent any 
one party from dominating and closing the public space of law, liberty 
and virtù.181 
Siemens similarly conceives of Nietzsche’s notion of agonal measure as “the result 
of a given equilibrium of forces” (i.e. as an instance of counterbalancing).182 He uses 
this conception of the agon to rebut Hatab’s and Connolly’s claim that agonal 
                                                      
180 See Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1993), p.71; see e.g. Herman Siemens, “Agonal Communities of Taste: 
Law and Community in Nietzsche's Philosophy of Transvaluation”, JNS, 24 (2002), 83-112 
(p.90 and p.104). 
181 Bonnie Honig (1993), pp.70-1. 
182 Siemens (2001b), p.521. 
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measure is above all a matter of the self-limitation of contestants. As evidence that 
Nietzsche did not think that agonal conflict involved the softening of contestants’ 
aspirations, Siemens cites NL 4[301] 9.175 (among other notes), in which Nietzsche 
explicitly states that “[d]ie Gleichheit der Bürger ist das Mittel zur Verhinderung der 
Tyrannis, ihre gegenseitige Bewachung und Niederhaltung.”183 We also find this 
belief in the uncompromising disposition of agonal contestants in Nietzsche’s 
description of the Wettkampfgedanke in PHG 5 1.825: “jeder Grieche kämpft als ob 
er allein im Recht sei, und ein unendlich sicheres Maaß des richterlichen Urtheils in 
jedem Augenblick bestimmt” (my italics).184 In this way, says Siemens, measure is 
imposed medially at the same time as both parties reciprocally stimulate one another: 
Equilibrium is, then, an “intersubjective” or relational phenomenon, a 
function of the relations between more-or-less equal forces, each 
striving for supremacy. So once again, the relational concept of 
equilibrium inserts a radical disjunction between the subject-position 
of the antagonists – their desires, intentions and claims – and the 
qualities of their resulting agonal interaction: each wants to be the best, 
yet an equilibrium is, or can be, achieved; each is tempted to excess and 
hubris, yet limits or measure can be achieved. The relational sense of 
the agon means that the measure or limit on action is determined not by 
the players’ goals, interests or disposition; rather it is the contingent 
result of dynamic relations that emerge between social forces 
competing for supremacy.185 
 
Like Hatab and Connolly, both Honig and Siemens also acknowledge the need for 
institutional safeguards. Indeed, both draw on the importance of the practice of 
ostracism within Nietzsche’s early account of the agon. As Nietzsche informs us in 
                                                      
183 Siemens (2002), p.105. To further substantiate his reading, Siemens also refers us to MA 
261, NL 5[146] 8.78-9; NL 23[1] 7.537; NL 6[7] 8.99: “In seinen geheimen Wünschen war 
jeder Grieche Tyrann”. 
184 We might also cite NL 16[18] 7.399, where Nietzsche observes “[w]ie die griechische 
Natur alle furchtbaren Eigenschaften zu benutzen weiß: die tigerartige Vernichtungswuth 
(der Stämme usw.) im Wettkampf”. Insofar as they exercised their “tigerartige 
Vernichtungswuth im Wettkampf”, it would appear that their affective disposition towards 
their opponents was not in the slightest restrained. 
185 Siemens (2013), p.91. 
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CV 5, ostracism was the practice whereby the ancient Greeks banished any 
individual who was deemed excessively predominant and who might therefore 
repress a given contest. As the Ephesians said upon exiling Hermador: “Unter uns 
soll Niemand der Beste sein; ist Jemand es aber, so sei er anderswo und bei Anderen” 
(CV 5 1.788). For Honig, a vital part of the agon’s measure is continually maintained 
by means of institutional checks and balances, as well as the oral institutional 
channels through which the agon is forced.186 For Siemens, however, the institution 
of ostracism is depicted as a last-resort or fall-back option, where pure mutual 
limitation is figured as the normal means of sustaining measure: “The function of 
ostracism was precisely to enforce limits where the emergence of absolute victors 
undid the mutual resistance offered by a Gegeneinander of more-or-less equal 
forces”.187  
 We have now delineated two quite commonsensical, though nonetheless 
fundamentally opposed, models of how agonal moderation might be achieved: one 
prioritising the role played by adversaries’ self-limitation, while the other 
emphasises the importance of their reciprocal limitation. What is more, their 
proponents claim that these models are either representative of Nietzsche’s thought, 
or at least inspired thereby. In the remaining two subsections, I will propose that a 
historically contextualised reading of Nietzsche’s early thought in fact presents us 
with a philosophically interesting third-way – one that can in many ways be said to 
combine aspects from both of the conflicting models, and indeed, even sublate their 
antagonism. 
2.4.1. NIETZSCHE’S CONTEMPORARIES 
The philological work of Nietzsche’s contemporaries again represents a fruitful 
point of entry with respect to our current task: that of resolving the aforementioned 
                                                      
186 See Honig (1993), ch.3. 
187 Siemens (2001b), p. 521. 
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dilemma and bringing Nietzsche’s synthetic alternative to the fore. The reason for 
this is that, as I will contend, we find his alternative model of moderation prefigured 
in their philological studies of the Wettkampf.  
In “Der Wettkampf”, Curtius observes how the agonal culture of the ancient 
Greeks, by overly stimulating individual ambition, would often descend into bloody 
sedition and civil war: “so ist die vom Wetteifer entfachte Flamme der Begeisterung 
ein Feuer geworden, das im Brande des Bürgerkriegs die Blüte der Staaten frühzeitig 
vernichtet hat.” Consequently, he continues, the Greeks were “weit entfernt, den 
Trieb, welchen der Wetteifer anregt, seiner natürlichen Beschaffenheit zu 
überlassen, in welcher er mehr zum Schlechten als zum Guten führt.”188  But how, 
we ought to ask, was this drive (“Trieb”) transformed?  
It was religion, according to Curtius, that restrained these socially harmful 
affects: “Sie [die Griechen] haben den wilden Trieb gezähmt, sie haben ihn gesittigt 
und veredelt, indem sie ihn der Religion dienstbar gemacht haben.”189 But how did 
religion enable this act of transfiguration? In short, according to Curtius, religion 
propagated a sense of subservience to the god-head of the polis, which in turn had 
the effect of counteracting the individualism normally concomitant with such 
struggle. This thereby rendered the Hellenic desire for contention serviceable to the 
polis. The reason organised agons were located at sites of religious significance (e.g. 
Delphi and Olympia), says Curtius, was that this encouraged contestants to view 
their performance as a tribute to the gods. In participating in the agon, the pious 
contestant sought to demonstrate the extent to which they had cultivated the mind 
and body bestowed upon them from above. Moreover, following the games, all 
prizes had to be bequeathed to the gods in their respective temples. Failure to do so 
would result in divine wrath, and the community would treat the offending 
individual as they would a temple robber.190 Hence, religion both spurred people to 
agonally cultivate themselves (so as to impress the gods), while simultaneously 
                                                      
188 Curtius (1864), p.9. 
189 Ibid., p.12. 
190 Ibid., p.14. 
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placing a cap on their dangerous egoism insofar as they were forced to dedicate their 
trophies to the gods out of fear of both social and divine retribution. Contestants had 
to willingly submit themselves to these religious norms; thus, as Curtius states, 
“keiner empfing den Siegerkranz, welcher sich nicht allen feierlich beschworen 
Normen des Kampfes willig unterworfen hatte.” This explains why, says Curtius, 
“alle regelmäßigen Wettkämpfe [sind] […] an Götterfeste geknüpft […] [und] ihre 
Schauplätze sind ursprünglich die Tempelhöfe, die eigentlichen Zuschauer die 
Götter.”191 
In contrast to Curtius, Burckhardt primarily attributes agonal measure to the 
rigorous style of education practiced by the Greeks during the agonal age (sixth-
century BC). On the one hand, Burckhardt informs us, gymnastic education had a 
cultivating effect, allowing military training to be substituted by the “vollendete 
Durchbildung des Leibes zur Schönheit”. But crucially, in order to achieve this, 
“[mußte] das Individuum sich so gut als für das Musische einer sehr methodischen 
Lehre unterziehen […] und [durfte] sich keine eigenwillige sogenannte Genialität 
erlauben”.192 The role of education, both in gymnastics and the arts, was therefore 
to simultaneously cultivate and curtail the individuality and ambition of individual 
contestants. The socially salubrious effects of this dual function were so marked that 
there was an “allgemeine Überzeugung vom Werte der Schulung (παίδευσις) […], 
die so stark war, daß der Staat (abgesehen davon, daß er die Gymnasien errichtete) 
seinerseits für die Sache nicht bemüht zu werden brauchte.”193  
Finally, whereas Curtius underlines the function of religion, and Burckhardt 
that of education, in limiting the ambitions of those competing in the agon, Grote 
underscores the importance of patriotic feeling, and communal subscription to a 
shared moral framework. Grote first describes the Corcyrean sedition – as recounted 
by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War – as an historical example 
of the complete loss of measure. Indeed, Nietzsche himself explicitly cites Grote’s 
                                                      
191 Ibid., p.13. 
192 Burckhardt (2014), vol.4, p.82; my italics. 
193 Ibid. 
 162 
account of this event in order to gloss his conception of Vernichtungskampf.194 Grote 
describes the pandemonium of butchery that erupted as two Corcyrean social groups 
vied for political power – namely, the oligarchs, who sought to ally Corcyra with 
Sparta and Corinth, and the demos, who wished to remain loyal to Athens.195 A 
violent and internecine revolution broke out, during which half of the main town was 
raised to the ground. Grote refers to the week of massacre as a “deplorable 
suspension of legal, as well as moral restraints”, which allowed the “fierce sentiment 
out of which [the slaughter] arose” to be “satiated”.196 Grote points out the fact that 
such states of frenzied stasis are a perennial feature of human history (he explicitly 
mentions the French revolution, for example). The Corcyrean revolution is, 
according to Grote, merely an archetype of this state of disarray.197 Grote describes 
some of the paradigmatic features of such chaotic upheavals as follows:  
[C]onstitutional maxims […] [cease] to carry authority either as 
restraint or as protection – the superior popularity of the man who is 
most forward with the sword, or runs down his enemies in the most 
unmeasured language, coupled with the disposition to treat both 
prudence in action and candour in speech as if it were nothing but 
treachery or cowardice – […] the loss of respect for legal authority 
[…], the unnatural predominance of the ambitious and contentious 
passions, overpowering in men’s minds all real public objects…198  
Since the propensity for destructive excess is “deeply seated in the human mind”, 
Grote warns us that “unless the bases of constitutional morality” are firmly and 
surely laid, we are condemned to continually fall back into the dissolute mayhem of 
the Vernichtungskampf.  
                                                      
194 See NL 16[39] 7.407: “Die korkyräische Revolution als Vernichtungskampf zweier 
Parteien. / In Athen dagegen eine Art Wettkampf. Grote, 3, p.536. [Vgl. George Grote, 
Geschichte Griechenlands. Dritter Band. Leipzig: Dyk, 1853:535-6.]” See also CV 5 1.784. 
195 For the original English version of Grote’s comparison of Corcyra and Athens (from 
which I shall be working), see Grote (1851), vol.6, pp.362-86. 
196 Ibid., p.377. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid., p.380 (my italics). 
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The contrary of this lamentable condition is, according to Grote, exemplified 
in Athenian democracy, which, though non-violent, is nonetheless conflictual; 
indeed, Nietzsche labels Grote’s description of Athens “eine Art Wettkampf” (NL 
16[39] 7.407). In classical Athens, says Grote, citizens were able to both exercise 
their combative instincts and express their political discontent by means of 
institutionalised debate, that is, in lieu of bloodshed.199 Thus, with ancient Athenian 
democracy, one bears witness to 
how much the habit of active participation in political and judicial 
affairs – of open, conflicting discussion, discharging the malignant 
passions by way of speech, and followed by appeal to the vote – of 
having constantly present, to the mind of every citizen […] the 
conditions of a pacific society, and the paramount authority of a 
constitutional majority – how much all these circumstances, brought 
home as they were at Athens more than in any other democracy to the 
feelings of individuals, contributed to soften the instincts of intestine 
violence and revenge, even under very great provocation.200 
Grote identifies how the Athenians granted their destructively aggressive instincts a 
controlled outlet in impassioned democratic debate. Victory was then decided not 
by direct brute force but indirectly, by appeal to a vote. As such, we can see how 
within this account, moderation is imposed both by virtue of a constitutional legal 
edifice as well as by means of individual self-restraint – that is, insofar as citizens 
exercise respect for legal norms. Furthermore, moderation is also founded on the 
fact that individuals appreciate the needs of the state and the conditions of “pacific 
                                                      
199 This cathartic vision of democracy bears a great deal of resemblance to Machiavelli’s 
conception of the Roman practice of accusation, which he describes as an outlet “by which 
to vent, in some mode against some citizen, those humors that grow up in cities; and when 
these humours do not have an outlet by which they may be vented ordinarily, they have 
recourse to extraordinary modes that bring a whole republic to ruin. So there is nothing that 
makes a republic so stable and steady as to order it in a mode so that those alternating humors 
that agitate it can be vented in a way ordered by laws.” See Niccolò Machiavelli, Discourses 
on Livy, trans. by Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1996), p.23 (see also ch.7 and ch.8). 
200 Grote (1851), vol.6, p.386 (emphasis added). 
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society” over and against their desire to give free reign to their instincts for violence 
and revenge. 
What recurs across the accounts of Curtius, Burckhardt and Grote, therefore, 
is an emphasis on the limiting (and enlivening) function of institutions such as 
religion, formal education and law. This reason for this is that each serve to check 
the egoistic excesses of agonal adversaries. However, what has also been brought 
into relief is that such institutions modify the disposition of opponents insofar as 
they promote the virtue of continence or self-restraint. For Curtius, religion 
contained the egoism of competitors, and they were only permitted to compete once 
they had voluntarily acquiesced to the constitutive (religious) norms of the agon. For 
Burckhardt, it was then regimented education that kept contestants’ pretensions of 
grandeur under control. And finally, for Grote, participation in political and juridical 
affairs helped instil a sense of patriotic concern for the commonweal. In none of 
these cases, however, does respect for one’s adversary come into the picture. Where 
we do find respect figuring prominently – i.e. with Curtius and Grote – it is 
conceived as respect for religious or juridical authority, or for the good of the polis. 
In the following subsection, I will illuminate how Nietzsche’s conception of agonal 
moderation is informed by analogous notions of respect and self-restraint. 
2.4.2. A NIETZSCHEAN MODEL OF AGONAL 
MODERATION 
As we have seen, some conception of equality is fundamental to both the 
counterbalancing and respect models of agonal moderation. However, it is 
conspicuously absent from the accounts of Curtius, Burckhardt and Grote. Thus, 
before taking a broader look at how Nietzsche conceives of agonal measure, it 
behoves us to answer the following question: what kind of role does equality play 
within Nietzsche’s conception of the agon?  
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2.4.2.1. EQUALITY AND THE AGON 
We should begin by cross-examining some of the evidence cited in support of the 
counterbalancing reading as presented by Herman Siemens (since his version of this 
reading is substantially more developed than that of Honig). Since the notion of 
equality is, unsurprisingly, foundational within the counterbalancing model, we 
should first try to ascertain the way in which this kind of relation is intrinsic to 
Nietzsche’s vision of the agon. 
One conception of equality that is often thought to be fundamental to 
Nietzsche’s conception of the agon is the notion of equilibrium (Gleichgewicht), 
particularly as this is articulated by Volker Gerhardt in his paper “Das ‘Princip des 
Gleichgewichts’”.201 In trying to shed light upon how agonally counterbalanced 
tyrants stand in a relation of equality to one another, Herman Siemens has drawn 
extensively on Gerhardt’s analysis: 
By “equality of power,” Nietzsche does not mean a quantitative 
measure of objective magnitudes, nor a judgement made from an 
external standpoint, but the expression of an estimated correspondence 
between powers, where each power judges itself (as equal) in relation 
to another power. Unlike the measure of equality, however, the concept 
of “equilibrium” can not be understood from the subject-position, the 
standpoint of the single antagonists or powers as their conscious goal. 
For the antagonists do not aim at equilibrium; rather, each strives for 
supremacy (Übermacht) – to be the best.202 
Here we have a lucid account of precisely what is being counterbalanced in 
Siemens’ model of agonal moderation. Yet, it is odd that the measure of the 
agon should at one and the same time be based in the judgement of each of 
the contestants, without this judgement in some way altering their subjective 
aims and dispositions. How does this judgement bring measure to the 
                                                      
201 Volker Gerhardt, “Das ‘Princip des Gleichgewichts”, Nietzsche-Studien, 12 (1983), 111-
133. For examples of the influence of this study on recent accounts of Nietzsche’s agonism, 
see e.g. Enrico Müller, (2005), p.87 (fn.230); and Acampora (2013), p.236.  
202 Siemens (2013), p.91. 
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conflictual state of affairs if not by affecting the intentional stance of those 
making the judgement? I might interpret my adversary as roughly equal to 
me, but if I do not give up the pursuit of tyranny, this judgement has no 
practical effect. Let us now turn to the key texts from MA and WS, as well as 
to Gerhardt’s analysis itself, in order to assess whether such Gleichgewicht 
accurately describes the kind of equality that undergirds Nietzsche’s 
agonism.  
In MA 92, Nietzsche presents us with a theory of justice that counters 
the idea of transcendent or natural rights. In an Aristotelian fashion, he tries 
to ground the idea of law in a notion of equality. The concept of justice 
(“Gerechtigkeit”, “Billigkeit”), he tells us, emerges when “ungefähr gleich 
Mächtigen” come face-to-face with one another in the state of nature (be these 
powers individuals or communities). Where each assesses the other to be of 
roughly equal power, and where, therefore, “es keine deutlich erkennbare 
Uebergewalt giebt und ein Kampf zum erfolglosen, gegenseitigen Schädigen 
würde, da entsteht der Gedanke sich zu verständigen und über die 
beiderseitigen Ansprüche zu verhandeln […]” (MA 92). What Volker 
Gerhardt brings into relief is the fact that the equality (Gleichheit) that is 
being discussed in these texts does not refer to an objective state of equality, 
“vom Standpunkt eines neutralen Beobachters festgestellt”; it is rather based 
on the mutual evaluation each party makes of their counterpart. We should 
remark that this is not a simple case of each measuring the other in terms of 
brute physical strength, but also in terms of the myriad other capacities that 
contribute to martial might; thus, for example, “[d]er physische Kraft des 
einen kann die größere List des anderen gegenüberstehen”.203  
                                                      
203 See Gerhardt (1983), p.117. 
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In such circumstances, each renounces the goal of physically overpowering 
the other in favour of self-preservation (“Selbsterhaltung”): “Gerechtigkeit geht 
natürlich auf den Gesichtspunct einer einsichtigen Selbsterhaltung zurück, also auf 
den Egoismus jener Ueberlegung: ‘wozu sollte ich mich nutzlos schädigen und mein 
Ziel vielleicht doch nicht erreichen?’” (MA 92; see also WS 22). Pace Siemens, it 
therefore turns out that Gleichgewicht does occasion the exercise of self-control. 
There is a decisive shift in the intentional disposition of each of the contestants 
insofar as they choose to renounce the goal of martially overpowering one another 
by means of physical destruction. In place of this, they decide to pursue the end of 
compromise. Justice is basically the terms of this compromise, which is to say that 
it represents a type of contract (Vertrag). Punishment then represents a form of 
exchange (Austausch) though which this Gleichgewicht is reestablished by forcing 
he who has broken this contract to resubmit to the law and exercise self-restraint.204 
In this case, then, the claim that “the measure or limit on action is determined not by 
the players’ goals, interests or disposition” is supported by neither Nietzsche’s 
writings on Gleichgewicht nor Volker Gerhardt’s analysis thereof. 
Reading these aphorisms together with CV 5, Volker Gerhardt interprets this 
as a pivotal moment in the movement from the state of nature (i.e. the quasi-
Darwinian Kampf ums Dasein) to a culture of Wettkampf. Gerhardt further asserts 
that equally opposed organisations (classes, states or individuals) still “streben nach 
Übermacht” once they have entered into this condition of justice; the difference is 
that now “Die Machtsteigerung wird auch im übertragenen Sinn in der 
Selbstherrschaft, im spielerischen Wettkampf und überhaupt in den Produktionen der 
                                                      
204 See MA 446; see also WS 22, where Nietzsche describes punishment as follows: “[S]ie 
[die Strafe] stellt gegen das Uebergewicht, das sich jeder Verbrecher zuspricht, ein viel 
grösseres Gegengewicht auf, gegen Gewaltthat den Kerkerzwang, gegen den Diebstahl den 
Wiederersatz und die Strafsumme. So wird der Frevler erinnert, dass er mit seiner Handlung 
aus der Gemeinde und deren Moral-Vortheilen ausschied: sie behandelt ihn wie einen 
Ungleichen, Schwachen, ausser ihr Stehenden; desshalb ist Strafe nicht nur 
Wiedervergeltung, sondern hat ein Mehr, ein Etwas von der Härte des Naturzustandes; an 
diesen will sie eben erinnern.” 
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Kultur und der Kunst gesucht.”205 So while the element of striving for supremacy is 
preserved in the shift to a social condition of justice, the key moment of limitation, 
which is the laying down of one’s arms, emerges from a definite change in the 
disposition and aims of the contending parties. 
In addition to this, Nietzsche also rejects the idea that adversaries invariably 
aim at supremacy, asserting that they do sometimes aim at equilibrium. However, 
contrary to the respect reading, the stronger party does not endeavour to “constitute 
adversaries worthy of agonistic respect”.206 Rather, a weaker power will sometimes 
pursue this goal vis-à-vis a stronger power:  
[Z]ieht die Gemeinde vor, ihre Macht zu Vertheidigung und Angriff 
genau auf die Höhe zu bringen, auf der die Macht des gefährlichen 
Nachbars ist, und ihm zu verstehen zu geben, dass in ihrer Wagschale 
jetzt gleichviel Erz liege: warum wolle man nicht gut Freund mit 
einander sein? (WS 22) 
Thus, a weaker party may pursue the more modest objective of establishing a relation 
of equilibrium and friendship, rather than trying to achieve physical Übermacht. 
This is because achieving Übermacht, or the destruction of the stronger power, is 
often not worth the effort. Nonetheless, one of Nietzsche’s wider aims is to show 
how this state of compromise and mutual self-control – which he describes as a 
condition in which there exists “rule of law” (a Rechtszustand) – does not obtain 
between unequal parties. Where inequality arises, according to Nietzsche, relations 
of subjugation (“Unterwerfung”) will be established since any compacts 
(“Verträge”) upon which law had been founded will become void: 
Dieser [der Rechtszustand] aber ist ebenso endgültig ein Ende gemacht, 
wenn der eine Theil entschieden schwächer, als der andere, geworden 
ist: dann tritt Unterwerfung ein und das Recht hört auf, aber der Erfolg 
ist der selbe wie der, welcher bisher durch das Recht erreicht wurde. 
(WS 26) 
                                                      
205 Gerhardt (1983), p.125 (my italics); see also p.124. 
206 See fn.165; see also Connolly (1991), p.165. 
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Though the weaker party may strive for equilibrium out of economic interest, the 
stronger does not stand to gain anything in bringing this about. Indeed, in the state 
of nature, there is no way of reestablishing Gleichgewicht should it be lost since 
there is no overarching institutional or juridical framework able to reimpose balance 
(for example, though practices such as ostracism). Should one party become 
stronger, there is nothing to stop this party monopolising all available power. This 
would seem to contradict the idea we found in the respect model, namely, that we 
should raise other weaker powers into a state of equality with us in order to agonally 
compete with them. Notwithstanding, what has been demonstrated is that if we want 
to think of the Nietzschean agon as based on some form of Gleichgewicht, we must 
concede that it does involve self-limitation, which is to say a renunciation of violent 
means of pursuing preponderance (Übergewicht), even if the goal of preponderance 
is itself is preserved.  
But what about the agonal conflict that takes place within the state of 
justice, where there is an overarching power, or where individuals exist 
within a community that has already renounced physical violence and are 
competing for dominance within a given pacific contest? What prevents these 
adversaries from erecting a tyrannical hegemony? To be sure, Nietzsche 
thinks that, in a “natural order of things”, counterbalancing serves just this 
purpose: 
[I]n einer natürlichen Ordnung der Dinge, [giebt] es immer mehrere 
Genies […], die sich gegenseitig zur That reizen, wie sie sich auch 
gegenseitig in der Grenze des Maaßes halten. Das ist der Kern der 
hellenischen Wettkampf-Vorstellung: sie verabscheut die 
Alleinherrschaft und fürchtet ihre Gefahren, sie begehrt, als 
Schutzmittel gegen das Genie — ein zweites Genie.    (CV 5 1.789) 
The ideal situation is one in which no single competitor is able to tyrannise over the 
contest due to the fact that their opponent is always strong enough to remain, on 
average, neck and neck with them. However, what is notable is that, contra Siemens’ 
account of the counterbalancing model, this is not a mutually perceived equality, but 
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a de facto form of equality: contestants striving maximally to achieve predominance 
within a given competitive practice are unable to conclusively prevail due to the 
approximately equal ability of their adversaries. Unlike the situation of 
Gleichgewicht, their perception of the equality of their counterpart does not have a 
limiting effect in this context. We might imagine a pair of wrestlers who, despite 
struggling to the utmost of their abilities, and each believing themselves to be 
superior in strength, are nonetheless unable to conclusively force their opponent into 
submission (without resorting to illegitimate means) due to their actual relative 
equality. 
This is not the only characterisation of the agon in Nietzsche’s writings that 
fails to fit Siemens’ counterbalancing reading. For another example, we might turn 
to MA 158: 
Verhängniss der Grösse. — Jeder grossen Erscheinung folgt die 
Entartung nach, namentlich im Bereiche der Kunst. Das Vorbild des 
Grossen reizt die eitleren Naturen zum äusserlichen Nachmachen oder 
zum Ueberbieten; dazu haben alle grossen Begabungen das 
Verhängnissvolle an sich, viele schwächere Kräfte und Keime zu 
erdrücken und um sich herum gleichsam die Natur zu veröden. Der 
glücklichste Fall in der Entwickelung einer Kunst ist der, dass mehrere 
Genie’s sich gegenseitig in Schranken halten; bei diesem Kampfe wird 
gewöhnlich den schwächeren und zarteren Naturen auch Luft und Licht 
gegönnt. 
This state of affairs contrasts sharply with that depicted in the aphorisms on 
Gleichgewicht. The task is no longer that of foreclosing violent or internecine 
struggle, but rather that of preventing the suffocation of burgeoning talents. In their 
pursuit of glory, the artist does not limit themselves; furthermore, they are already 
committed to a non-violent mode of contest; and finally, their acknowledgement of 
others of a similar ability is not going to cause them to abandon the goal of 
preponderance out of concerns for their self-preservation (as was the case with 
Gleichgewicht). Consequently, a Wettkampf in the arts is rare and difficult to actively 
sustain. It overexcites the desire to establish absolute ascendency and therefore 
constantly threatens to arrest cultural development; thus, in the arts at any rate, “[d]as 
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Agonale ist auch die Gefahr bei aller Entwicklung” (NL 5[146] 8.78).  Indeed, 
Nietzsche portrays the history of art as a concatenation of tyrants. Thus, with 
reference to Homer, and his suffocation of the ancient Greek aesthetic agon: 
Alles Gute stammt doch von ihm her: aber zugleich ist er die 
gewaltigste Schranke geblieben, die es gab. Er verflachte, und deshalb 
kämpften die Ernstern so gegen ihn, umsonst. Homer siegte immer. 
(NL 5[146] 8.78) 
In this transgenerational contest of artists, there is no mutual assessment and 
subsequent adjustment of goals such as is occasioned by the kind of Gleichgewicht 
that occasionally arises in the state of nature. There is at most a one-way assessment 
of equality as the new contender feels themselves worthy of assuming the mantle of 
their predecessor.207 And yet, Homer “always triumphed”, even in death. Indeed, no 
institutional mechanism, such as ostracism for example, is able to remove 
excessively dominant individuals if they are deceased. In such cases, it is a third 
party – namely, an audience – who must judge the adversaries as being equal. An 
agon arises in this context when a plurality of artists are actually incapable of 
monopolising critical acclaim (despite their best efforts). The equality implied here 
is an actual equality in the adversaries’ relative abilities to win the favour of their 
audience.208 Since there are no institutions to enforce this counterbalancing of great 
cultural figures, it is simply “[d]er glücklichste Fall” when “mehrere Genie’s sich 
gegenseitig in Schranken halten”. 
In CV 5, while Nietzsche does refer to the transgenerational contest of 
cultural figures, his focus on the practice of ostracism as a limiting mechanism shows 
that he primarily has the contention of living individuals in mind. We should observe 
that his conception of ostracism is quite different from that of Aristotle, for whom 
                                                      
207 See CV 5 1.787.  
208 Indeed, Nietzsche stresses the importance of third-party judgement in a number of notes. 
See e.g. NL 16[22] 7.402, where Nietzsche describes the Wettkampf as a “Kampf vor einem 
Tribunal.” See also NL 16[21] 7.401: “Was ist das aesthetische Urtheil? Das Richterthum in 
der Tragödie. / Der Wettkampf unter Künstlern setzt das rechte Publikum voraus.” See also 
PHG §6 1.826-7. 
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banishing “those who seemed to predominate too much through their wealth, or the 
number of their friends, or through any other political influence” fulfilled the 
function of levelling citizens so as to create harmonious proportion within the state. 
Moreover, according to Aristotle, ostracism secures the equality needed to sustain a 
legal order insofar as excessively preeminent individuals stand above, and are 
therefore unanswerable to, the laws of ordinary men.209 For Nietzsche, however, the 
Aristotelian conception of ostracism as a means to counteracting the rise of tyrants 
only emerged later in Greek history – namely, within the explicitly political context, 
when, as was already mentioned above, “die Gefahr offenkundig [war], daß einer 
der großen um die Wette kämpfenden Politiker und Parteihäupter zu schädlichen 
und zerstörenden Mitteln und zu bedenklichen Staatsstreichen, in der Hitze des 
Kampfes, sich gereizt fühlt” (CV 5 1.789). In this guise, then, ostracism is conceived 
as a prophylactic against violent Vernichtungskampf.  
In contrast to this levelling or stabilising construal of ostracism, by which 
the pursuit of excellence was curtailed, Nietzsche asserts that the original function 
of ostracism was not only to reestablish the de facto form of mutual moderation 
referred to above, but also to stimulate the pursuit of excellence. He claims that with 
the emergence of an overly dominant individual, “damit der Wettkampf versiegen 
würde und der ewige Lebensgrund des hellenischen Staates gefährdet wäre” (ibid.).  
The reason excessive dominance dries up agonal contest is that such contest is driven 
by envy, and envy only arises under conditions of approximately equality of 
ability.210 Adversaries must feel themselves capable of defeating their peers, and as 
equal to them in the sense of belonging to the same competitive league as them.211 
                                                      
209 See Aristotle, Politics, 1284a3-1284b3. 
210 This is strongly suggested by WS 29: “Wo die Gleichheit wirklich durchgedrungen und 
dauernd begründet ist, entsteht jener, im Ganzen als unmoralisch geltende Hang, der im 
Naturzustande kaum begreiflich wäre: der Neid. Der Neidische fühlt jedes Hervorragen des 
Anderen über das gemeinsame Maass und will ihn bis dahin herabdrücken — oder sich bis 
dorthin erheben [...].” 
211 We find a similar idea in Aristotle (and de Tocqueville, for that matter). See Rhetoric, 
1388a5f.: “It is clear also what kind of people we envy; that was included in what has been 
said already; we envy those who are near us in time, place, age, or reputation. […] Also our 
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Ostracism, in preventing any individual from setting up a permanent hegemony, 
thereby maintains the flow of contest; that is, it protects “das Wettspiel der Kräfte” 
(ibid.). What should be remarked, however, is that in this case, the equality that is 
safeguarded is the mutually perceived (i.e. envy eliciting) equality of the contestants. 
 What we can conclude from these observations, then, is that there are 
multiple conceptions of equality informing Nietzsche’s early conception of 
the Wettkampf: 
 
1. A form of equality that prevents violent struggle and thereby enables agonal 
contest; namely, Gleichgewicht: a mutually perceived equality of martial 
capacity, which causes opposed parties to renounce the goal of violently 
overpowering one another; 
2. A de facto equality established independently of third-party adjudicators. This 
is an equality of ability such that maximally striving opponents cannot 
conclusively defeat one another at a given non-violent competitive practice; 
3. A de facto equality in the eyes of third-party adjudicators, which concretely 
limits the opposed contestants’ claims to predominance (particularly in the 
context of aesthetic agonal struggle); 
4. A form of equality that provokes agonal struggle; namely, the mutually 
perceived equality of agonistic adversaries with respect to their proficiency at 
a particular non-violent task. This elicits contestants’ envy and, 
correspondingly, their desire to enter into contest with one another. 
We now have a clear insight into how, for Nietzsche, the mechanics of the agon rely 
on distinct, and equally indispensable, forms of equality. It should now be evident 
how Siemens’ counterbalancing model obfuscates the way in which a) self-restraint 
                                                      
fellow-competitors, […] [are not] those whom, in our opinion or that of others, we take to be 
far below us or far above us.” 
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is a necessary enabling condition of the agon insofar as it gets us out of the 
unmeasured state of nature; and, b) judgements of equality from a third-party 
standpoint are often a necessary component of agonal limitation. 
Nonetheless, from the analysis so far, it may appear as though ostracism and 
de facto equality (i.e. either [2] or [3]) are the only available sources of agonal 
moderation. Self-restraint has only been shown to be involved in getting parties out 
of the initial state of nature and preventing violence, but not necessarily in preventing 
individuals from tyrannising over a given agon while obeying the rules. Is self-
restraint, even within the norms of a given agonal practice, irrelevant for Nietzsche? 
By Gerhardt’s and Siemens’ interpretations, if contestants are not of roughly equal 
capacity, ostracism is the only available corrective, since the opposed parties will 
always strive maximally for supremacy over the competitive practice in question. 
However, as we will now see, there is abundant evidence that controverts this 
interpretation and which demonstrates the importance of self-restraint within 
Nietzsche’s understanding of agonal measure. 
2.4.2.2. AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF AGONAL 
RESPECT 
Nietzsche was undoubtedly aware of the role played by religion and myth within 
Greek agonal culture. Already in his 1875-6 lecture notes on “Der Gottesdienst der 
Griechen”, he reiterates Curtius’ observation that victors in the various official agons 
were obliged to bequeath their prizes to the gods.212 But as we look beyond the 
Philologica, we see that Nietzsche uses the term “mythisch” to refer to two quite 
distinct ideas within the context of the agon. First, he uses the term to denote the 
violently heroic world of Homeric myth, which Nietzsche, like Burckhardt, thought 
                                                      
212 See GDG, KGW II/5, pp.424-5: “Alle Siegespreise, die in den Agonen gewonnen wurden, 
mußten vom Sieger dem Gott wieder geweiht werden.” Nietzsche also notes how there were 
temples used solely for crowning the victors of the agonal games (see ibid., pp.418-9).  
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was antagonistic to the agonal world of pacifically competing individuals.213 On the 
other hand, he uses the term to refer to the ancient Greek institution of religion and 
religious belief. This latter form of the mythisch is figured as integral to agonal 
culture insofar as it functions as a brake on the affect of ambition: 
Gegensatz zu dem Wettkampf der mythische Zug: d.h. er verhindert die 
Selbstsucht des Individuums. Der Mensch kommt in Betracht als 
Resultat einer Vergangenheit: in ihm wird die Vergangenheit geehrt. 
 
Welches Mittel wendet der hellenische Wille an, um die nackte 
Selbstsucht in diesem Kampfe zu verhüten und sie in den Dienst des 
Ganzen zu stellen? Das Mythische. 
 
Beispiel: Aeschylus’ Oresteia und die politischen Ereignisse. […] 
 
Dieser mythische Geist erklärt es nun auch, wie die Künstler wetteifern 
durften: ihre Selbstsucht war gereinigt, insofern sie sich als Medium 
fühlten: wie der Priester ohne Eitelkeit war, wenn er als sein Gott 
auftrat. (NL 8[68] 7.248) 
From this rather fragmentary Nachlass note, we can extrapolate a number of 
different ways in which religious myth served to delimit Greek agonal ambition 
according to Nietzsche. First, religious myth reminds contestants of the importance 
of their ancestry or past (“Vergangenheit”) – that is, it reminds them that they 
compete not for their own glory, but for the glory of their ancestral line. Second, 
myth serves as a warning. In Aeschylus’ Orestian trilogy, the excessive political 
ambition of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus (who murder Agamemnon upon his return 
from Troy) is brutally punished, with Apollo ordering Orestes to murder the usurpers 
and Athena sanctioning the act of vengeance. Finally, religious sensibility purified 
artists’ personal ambition insofar as they felt that they were personally channelling 
                                                      
213 See e.g. NL 16[21] 7.401. “Kampf des Heroisch-Mythischen mit dem Individuum: Bevor 
das Individuum erwacht, erwacht die Heroenwelt als Welt von Individuen. Kampf des 
Heroisch-Repräsentativen und des agonalen Individuums: bei Pindar. Hesiods Eris und 
Homer selbst”. 
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the divinity in their artistic activity; on account of this, they did not hold their talent 
to be strictly attributable to themselves.214  
Note that all of the aforementioned restraining effects of religion take the 
form of a modification of contestants’ dispositions. In their consideration of myth, 
the tyrannous ambition of the individual is hindered (verhindert) in such a way as to 
corral it into the “Dienst des Ganzen”. This idea is already articulated in CV 5, and 
in far more lucid terms:  
Der Grieche ist neidisch und empfindet diese Eigenschaft nicht als 
Makel, sondern als Wirkung einer wohlthätigen Gottheit: welche Kluft 
des ethischen Urtheils zwischen uns und ihm! Weil er neidisch ist, fühlt 
er auch, bei jedem Übermaaß von Ehre Reichthum Glanz und Glück, 
das neidische Auge eines Gottes auf sich ruhen und er fürchtet diesen 
Neid; in diesem Falle mahnt er ihn an das Vergängliche jedes 
Menschenlooses, ihm graut vor seinem Glücke und das Beste davon 
opfernd beugt er sich vor dem göttlichen Neide. (CV 5 1.787)215 
In chorus with Curtius, Nietzsche portrays religious belief as having both a 
stimulating and restraining effect. For Nietzsche, the Greeks felt that their envy 
could be affirmed and acted upon on account of the fact that they thought it bestowed 
upon them by a “wohlthätige Gottheit”. Simultaneously though, the Greeks feared 
divine envy, which they felt would bring the scourge of nemesis upon them should 
they pursue their hubristic ambitions or achieve immoderate success. Myths such as 
those of Thamyris, Marsyas and Niobe, helped inculcate this fear into the mind of 
every Greek, and with it, some modicum of prudence and self-restraint (what we 
might call sōphrosýnē). We can deduce from these considerations that Nietzsche did 
not think that the Greeks pursued supremacy in an unrestrained fashion (only being 
limited by the tyrannical desires of others); rather, out of fear, they would willingly 
remove themselves from any competition in which they sensed their success was 
becoming disproportionate. 
                                                      
214 See also GGL III, KGW II/5, p.299: “[D]as siegreiche Individuum gilt as Incarnation des 
Gottes, tritt in den Gott zuruck.” 
215 On the envy of the gods, see also WS 30. 
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A similar dynamic of self-limitation can be identified in Nietzsche’s 
conception of patriotism. Already in an early Nachlass fragment, Nietzsche presents 
“der Heimatsinstinkt” as one of the most effective means in the struggle “gegen die 
maßlose Selbstsucht des Individuums” (NL 16[16] 7.398). Or as he expresses it in 
another note: “Was ist es, was die mächtigen Triebe in die Bahn der Wohlfahrt 
bringt? Im Allgemeinen die Liebe. Die Liebe zur Heimatstadt umschließt und 
bändigt den agonalen Trieb” (NL 21[14] 7.526). Again, this thought given a more 
comprehensive treatment in CV 5:  
Für die Alten aber war das Ziel der agonalen Erziehung die Wohlfahrt 
des Ganzen, der staatlichen Gesellschaft. Jeder Athener z.B. sollte sein 
Selbst im Wettkampfe soweit entwickeln, als es Athen vom höchsten 
Nutzen sei und am wenigsten Schaden bringe. Es war kein Ehrgeiz in’s 
Ungemessene und Unzumessende, wie meistens der moderne Ehrgeiz: 
an das Wohl seiner Mutterstadt dachte der Jüngling, wenn er um die 
Wette lief oder warf oder sang; ihren Ruhm wollte er in dem seinigen 
mehren; seinen Stadtgöttern weihte er die Kränze, die die Kampfrichter 
ehrend auf sein Haupt setzten. Jeder Grieche empfand in sich von 
Kindheit an den brennenden Wunsch, im Wettkampf der Städte ein 
Werkzeug zum Heile seiner Stadt zu sein: darin war seine Selbstsucht 
entflammt, darin war sie gezügelt und umschränkt. (CV 5 1.789-90) 
Nietzsche thus marries the at once stimulating (“entflammend”) and restraining 
(“zügelnd”) effects of both religion and patriotism in a manner strongly recalling 
Curtius. Agonal contestants are compelled to compete out of love for the 
commonweal (i.e. “die Wohlfahrt des Ganzen”) and their national godheads 
(“Stadtgötter”). Notwithstanding, these ideas (of the state and of the national 
godheads) also exert a restrictive force insofar as they impel the individual to check 
their agonal drives as soon as they threaten to come into conflict with the higher 
interests of the polis. Agonal education was therefore motivated by what Nietzsche 
calls a “burning wish” to serve the public good – one that must have ideally 
outweighed their egoistic aspirations. We can therefore infer from this that 
individuals would, of their own accord, rein in their personal ambitions were they to 
come into conflict with the ends of the state. Obviously, this requires the inculcation 
 178 
of, and widespread submission to, the moral authority of the state – just as Grote 
thought the democratic Wettkampf relied on there being “constantly present, to the 
mind of every citizen […] the conditions of a pacific society” and a thoroughgoing 
respect for “constitutional morality”. This does not necessarily vitiate the idea that 
every Greek also secretly yearned to tyrannise over the particular agons in which 
they participated, or even over society as a whole. The agonal Greeks may well have 
been characterised by a degree of cognitive dissonance as their egoistic and social 
concerns fought for psychological priority. However, the supposition of the above 
texts is that the latter would usually win out in the event of a serious clash of such 
interests. 
These findings, which illuminate the persistent importance of self-limitation 
within Nietzsche’s early agonism, decisively undermine the validity of the 
counterbalancing model; yet, it would be erroneous to conclude from this that our 
study stands in support of its opponent, the respect reading. While my exegesis has 
revealed a model in which subjects adjust their own aspirations, this does not occur 
in the way described by either Hatab’s or Connolly’s Nietzsche-inspired accounts of 
agonal moderation – that is, due to contestants acknowledging a particular ontology 
of difference and accordingly respecting their opponents’ right to participate. It is 
rather a mode of self-restraint that emerges as a result of social inculcation; 
moreover, though I would argue that we should conceive of this self-restraint as 
marked by the affect of respect, this is a respect for one’s community and the 







2.4.2.3. THE LATER NIETZSCHE ON EQUALITY AND 
SELF-RESTRAINT  
Given the critique of collective morality and law that Nietzsche develops during his 
middle period (and which is already thematised in UB III216), it should come as no 
surprise that, as we move into the mid-1880s, the need for a religious and patriotic 
moral framework is no longer posited as a precondition of agonal conflict.217 
However, the same cannot be said for self-restraint and equality, which are essential 
to his later notion of agonal struggle. 
 We should first consider how Nietzsche characterises the will to power in 
JGB 22, namely, as “gerade die tyrannisch-rücksichtenlose und unerbittliche 
Durchsetzung von Machtansprüchen”. According to this Weltanschauung, “[zieht] 
jede Macht in jedem Augenblicke ihre letzte Consequenz”. At first glance, there 
seems to be no ontological space for agonal self-restraint within this formulation of 
the will power. The only possible source of moderation would appear to be 
approximate de facto equality of power. Nonetheless, in JGB 265, Nietzsche 
indicates that where equal forces are opposed, they do in fact exhibit self-restraint. 
This is what we have already seen Nietzsche describe as the “eingebornen 
himmlischen Mechanik” according to which even stars (“Sterne”) act with “Feinheit 
und Selbstbeschränkung im Verkehre mit ihres Gleichen” (my italics). But how can 
there be what he refers to as an egoistic “Austausch von Ehren und Rechten als 
Wesen alles Verkehrs”, which “zum naturgemässen Zustand der Dinge gehört”? Is 
this not, as was indicated above, a manifest case of the anthropomorphic fallacy? 
Surely celestial bodies are not capable of granting rights to one another? Though this 
may partly be the case, I will now suggest that through a close reading of JGB 22 
and 265, we might be able to elucidate Nietzsche’s somewhat abstruse hypotheses. 
                                                      
216 See UB III 1.337. See also Herman Siemens, “(Self-)legislation, Life and Love in 
Nietzsche’s Philosophy”, in I. Wienand (ed.), Neue Beiträge zu Nietzsches Moral-, Politik- 
und Kulturphilosophie (Fribourg, CH: Academic Press Fribourg, 2009), pp.67-90 (pp.73ff). 
217 N.B., however, that Nietzsche speaks affirmatively of the need for religion in JGB 61. 
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In JGB 22, Nietzsche seeks to reconceptualise nature as an interaction of 
active forces. In doing so, he aims to contest the idea of natural law as conceived 
within the mechanistic worldview – that is, the idea that all natural events “obey” 
the dictates of nature in the sense of being merely the reactive response to exogenous 
causes in accordance with preordained natural laws.218 By contrast, Nietzsche’s 
active vision of nature conceives of natural events as being the result of a plurality 
of actively striving power organisations that obey no law, yet, in their maximally 
striving against one another, exhibit necessity (“Notwendigkeit”) and predictability 
(“Berechenbarkeit”). But if all activity is the result of an endogenously initiated, 
active striving, and not mere reactivity to external causes, then there must, Nietzsche 
tells us, be action at a distance. The reason for this is that, as will be further 
explicated in Chapter 4, a will to power organisation must be able to assess the 
relative power of that to which it is opposed before actively striving to overcome 
and assimilate it.219 Thus, Nietzsche claims that even “[i]n der chemischen Welt 
herrscht die schärfste Wahrnehmung der Kraftverschiedenheit” (NL 35[58] 11.537). 
What we can discern from JGB 265 is that a will to power organisation does 
not set out to overpower an opposed organisation that it perceives as roughly equal 
to its own strength – hence the apparent celestial order. Within Nietzsche’s account, 
the heavenly bodies actively restrain themselves. Moreover, their acknowledgement 
of the equal power of their counterparts should not be conceived as a concession 
made in the face of an insurmountable obstacle, but as a positive affect of reverence, 
whereby entities recognise and honour their own strength in the other: “sie ehrt sich 
in ihnen und in den Rechten, welche sie an dieselben abgiebt.” Rather than 
generating a relation free of tension, this leads to a mode of non-destructive and non-
exploitative contest – a “Wettstreit”, as Nietzsche describes it in NL 11[134] 9.491. 
                                                      
218 See also NL 40[42] 11.650: “[D]ie einzige Kraft, die es giebt, ist gleicher Art wie die des 
Willens: ein commandiren an andere Subjekte, welche sich daraufhin verändern.” 
219 See NL 12[27] 10.404-5: “Die Wirkung des Unorganischen auf einander ist zu studiren 
(sie ist immer eine Wirkung in die Ferne, also ein ‘Erkennen’ ist nothwendig allem Wirken 
vorher: das Ferne muß percipirt werden. Der Tast- und Muskelsinn muß sein Analogon 
haben:)”. 
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Thus, even at a cosmological-metaphysical level, what we might refer to as agonal 
conflict involves some form of self-imposed measure, which emerges from the 
perceived equality (Gleichgewicht) of an opposed entity. 
It should be pointed out that the experimental verifiability or falsifiability of 
this hypothesis is not what is of philosophical importance (indeed, it will be seen in 
Chapter 4 that the will to power is not a falsifiable theory). What matters is whether 
it can account for the same observable phenomena as effectively as, or even better 
than, the passive, mechanical model of nature. And needless to say, Nietzsche does 
indeed think that his hypothesis is better able to describe the “intelligible Charakter” 
of the world (JGB 36). Thus, if this is the case, and we are given a choice between 
the two, then Nietzsche thinks it worth our while choosing the active vision, since 
the reactive notion of mechanism supports a plethora of philosophical prejudices that 
negatively impact upon our practical life. Indeed, Nietzsche claims that the 
mechanical theoretical worldview betrays “ein artiger Hintergedanke, in dem noch 
einmal die pöbelmännische Feindschaft gegen alles Bevorrechtete und 
Selbstherrliche […] verkleidet liegt” – namely, the Christian-democratic notion of 
universal “Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz” (JGB 22).220  
By demoralising nature, and thereby de-essentialising the idea of universal 
equality, Nietzsche thinks we can open up a logical space of possibility for novel 
modes of social agency. Indeed, Nietzsche’s thoughts on social organisation can be 
viewed, at least in part, as an attempt to envisage modes of living together that affirm 
and embody the world as will to power to as great a degree as possible. An apposite 
place to begin our inquiry into how his theoretical conception of the will to power 
cashes out practically is with his polemical description of the society of the blond 
beasts. As was emphasised in Chapter 1, we should not read Nietzsche as advocating 
the murderous behaviour of the blond beasts; nonetheless, his portrayal of the 
                                                      
220 See also NL 7[54] 12.313: “Werden als Erfinden Wollen Selbstverneinen, Sich-selbst-
Überwinden: kein Subjekt, sondern ein Thun, Setzen, schöpferisch, keine ‘Ursachen und 
Wirkungen’. [...] Unbrauchbarkeit der mechanistischen Theorie — giebt den Eindruck der 
Sinnlosigkeit.” 
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sources of their social stability is illuminating and elaborates upon many of the 
themes he develops in MA and WS. Thus, he describes the community of blond 
beasts as being composed of individuals who are 
[…] so streng durch Sitte, Verehrung, Brauch, Dankbarkeit, noch mehr 
durch gegenseitige Bewachung, durch Eifersucht inter pares in 
Schranken gehalten […], die andrerseits im Verhalten zu einander so 
erfinderisch in Rücksicht, Selbstbeherrschung, Zartsinn, Treue, Stolz 
und Freundschaft sich beweisen (GM I 11 5.274). 
Toward those excluded from their community, of course, the blond beasts unleash 
their will without restraint. But what are the internal sources of measure that allow 
the blond beasts to socially cohere and displace their aggressive pathos onto 
foreigners? In this text, equality is clearly functioning as a fundamental source of 
measure. First, we can infer that a type of equality analogous to that of the 
Gleichgewicht described in MA is operating in this society: members mutually 
perceive, or recognise, one another as pares and accordingly exercise self-restraint 
towards their apparent equals (e.g. “Verehrung”). Yet Nietzsche also portrays these 
individuals as mutually restraining one another: it seems that despite the prevalence 
of self-limitation, they are nonetheless always pushing to overstep their bounds, but, 
due to their being roughly equal in their Eifersucht (i.e. there is “Eifersucht inter 
pares”), they are alert enough to identify and actively thwart one another’s attempts 
to attain predominance.  
In keeping with his description of the will to power, this idea of acting with 
a customary reverence (“Verehrung”) towards one’s equals is not understood by 
Nietzsche as a heteronomous act of subordination to the mores of one’s society; it is 
rather conceived as active and egoistic in kind. To exercise the “Sitte” of one’s 
society is not the same as “Sittlichtkeit”, the passive submission to the morality of 
one’s milieu.221 This is manifest in his characterisation of the sovereign individual 
                                                      
221 See also NL 9[145] 12.419, where Nietzsche directly associates Sittlichkeit with passivity 
and obedience: “Das Unvermögen zur Macht: seine Hypokrisie und Klugheit: als Gehorsam 
(Einordnung, Pflicht-Stolz, Sittlichkeit…) als Ergebung, Hingebung, Liebe”. 
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in GM II 2, whom he describes as “das autonome übersittliche Individuum”, adding 
that “‘autonom’ und ‘sittlich’ schliesst sich aus”: 
Der “freie” Mensch, der Inhaber eines langen unzerbrechlichen 
Willens, hat in diesem Besitz auch sein Werthmaass: von sich aus nach 
den Andern hinblickend, ehrt er oder verachtet er; und eben so 
nothwendig als er die ihm Gleichen, die Starken und Zuverlässigen (die 
welche versprechen dürfen) ehrt […]. (5.294) 
We might be tempted to equate this with the Kantian ideal of autonomy; however, 
there are critical differences. In the first place, there is the fact that Nietzschean 
sovereignty is not the result of rational reflection, as is conformity to the categorical 
imperative; it is rather the culmination of a lengthy pre-history of social 
conditioning, which fashions humans in such a way that they are left inclined to act 
customarily without need of external compulsion: “der Mensch wurde mit Hülfe der 
Sittlichkeit der Sitte und der socialen Zwangsjacke wirklich berechenbar gemacht”. 
Moreover, this freedom is embodied – i.e. “in allen Muskeln [zuckend]” – as 
opposed to being purely intellectual in kind. It furthermore does not result from 
counteracting the instincts; rather, “Verantwortlichkeit, […] dieser Macht über sich 
und das Geschick hat sich bei ihm bis in seine unterste Tiefe hinabgesenkt und ist 
zum Instinkt geworden, zum dominirenden Instinkt”. It is by means of custom, legal 
institutions and disciplinary practices that this tenacity of will has been bred into the 
human animal. Instead of being a mere slave to his momentary instincts, the fruit of 
this long labour of breeding – i.e. the sovereign individual – can now resist his 
desires, and his drives are organised firmly enough for him to be able to fulfil his 
promises, without being diverted by caprice. But whereas Nietzsche previously 
valorised the capacity to resist personal whim insofar as it enables individuals to 
better serve the higher goals of their community (as in CV 5), this aptitude is now 
exalted for enabling the sovereign individual to realise his own projects. He is in no 
way answerable to the moral authority of the community, but “[dürfen für] sich gut 
sagen […] und mit Stolz, also [dürfen] auch zu sich Ja sagen […]” (GM II 3 5.294-
5). 
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Nietzsche sees himself further diverging from the Kantian notion of moral 
autonomy insofar as he thinks Kantian morality demands that one treat everyone as 
equals.222 Conversely, the way in which Nietzsche’s sovereign individual acts 
towards others depends on his particular evaluation of the specific individual in 
question. Hence, he honours (“ehrt”) his equals while having contempt 
(“Verachtung”) for those beneath him. Furthermore, he honours his equals not out 
of fear of them, or from passive submission to an external moral authority, but out 
of his personal, active and affirmative assessment of such equals according to his 
own “Wertmaass”.  
Although it may appear as though mutually perceived equality is sufficient 
to induce agonal self-restraint according to Nietzsche’s later agonism, this is not the 
case. This self-restraint is based in a feeling of reverence or veneration 
(“Verehrung”) for one’s equals, and it is important to recall that a predilection for 
this kind of response to the perception of equality is impressed by means of custom 
(i.e. “Sitte” or “Brauch”) and institutional inculcation. The perception of such quality 
alone in no way entails self-restraint. On the contrary, perceived approximate 
equality can be the grounds for destructive conflict. Take duels, for example, of 
which Nietzsche says, “Gleichheit vor dem Feinde — erste Voraussetzung zu einem 
rechtschaffnen Duell. Wo man verachtet, kann man nicht Krieg führen; wo man 
befiehlt, wo man Etwas unter sich sieht, hat man nicht Krieg zu führen” (EH weise 
7 6.274).223   
This is where the cosmological notion of an “Austausch von Ehren und 
Rechten” departs most radically from his notion of society as a collective founded 
                                                      
222 See JGB 187 and 188: See also Tom Bailey, “Nietzsche the Kantian?”, in Ken Gemes and 
John Richardson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), pp.134-59 (p.151). 
223 Compare FW 13. See also NL 8[9] 10.331: “Voraussetzung der Blutrache ist zunächst, 
daß sie eine Familien-Angelegenheit ist: die Gaugenossenschaft oder der Staat mischt sich 
zunächst nicht ein. Aber sie setzt die höhere Organisation schon voraus: es ist Zweikampf 
zwischen Gleichgeordneten, Einem Ganzen Zugehörigen. Die Feindschaft gegen die Familie 
des Blutschuldigen ist grundverschieden von der Feindschaft gegen alles, was nicht zur 
höheren gemeinsamen Organisation gehört. Es fehlt die Verachtung, der Glaube an die 
tiefere Rasse des Feindes: in der Blutrache ist Ehre und Gleichberechtigung.” 
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on Verehrung and Ehrfucht: at the cosmological level, there is no need for the 
institutions and cultural mores that are demanded at the social level. Looking back 
to his thoughts on Schmidt, we can see that Nietzsche, like the Greeks in Schmidt’s 
analysis, considers the virtue of Ehrfurcht or Aidos as one that must be cultivated: 
“Zur Ehrfurcht erziehen, in diesem pöbelhaften Zeitalter, welches selber im 
Huldigen noch pöbelhaft ist, für gewöhnlich aber zudringlich und schamlos […]” 
(NL 26[244] 11.214).224 He also tellingly describes the Greek disdain for hubris as 
follows: “es ist die Verletzung des Aidos ein schrecklicher Anblick für den, welcher 
an Aidos gewöhnt ist” (NL 7[161] 10.295; my italics). Ehrfurcht is a matter of 
Erziehung and Gewöhnung.225  
Though ostracism has now dropped out of the picture, the interconnection 
of self-restraint, education and some form of conventional morality evidently have 
not – and in this sense, Nietzsche’s later thought still reverberates with that of 
Curtius, Burckhardt and Grote. This shows that even in the later works, Nietzsche 
still does not view agonal measure as grounded in a counterbalancing of aspiring 
tyrants (pace Siemens). It is rather by virtue of various educational practices that, 
when individuals identify those of equal standing, they agonally adjust their 
disposition towards their counterparts.226 In a manner echoing Burckhardt, therefore, 
education is the means by which the self-restraint of contestants’ ambitions is 
engendered. Again, this continence is not elicited by a sense of positive regard for 
the other; rather, in honouring their semblables, individuals egoistically honour 
themselves (“sie ehrt sich in ihnen” [JGB 265; my italics]). This, then, is the chief 
motivation for honouring one’s equals. Though Honig notes the need for institutions 
                                                      
224 See also Schmidt (1882), vol.1, p.173, where he recounts how Democritus “[behandelt] 
die Weckung und Befestigung der Aidos als das wesentlich Ziel der Knabenerziehung”. 
Schmidt also views the state and state institutions as indispensible foundations of social 
measure. By implication, therefore, he does not think that Aidos and Aischyne are on their 
own sufficient explans for the phenomenon of social measure (see ibid., pp.198ff.). 
225 See also JGB 259, where Nietzsche states that “Sich gegenseitig der Verletzung, der 
Gewalt, der Ausbeutung enthalten, seinen Willen dem des Andern gleich setzen” can become 
customary (“zur guten Sitte werden”). 
226 On the importance of religious education in the later Nietzsche’s thought, see also JGB 
61 and GM II 23 5.333ff. 
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in the later Nietzsche, she misconceives of these as sites for safely venting pent up 
aggression or removing superdominant contestants; what we have discovered, 
however, is that institutions primarily maintain social measure by dint of their 
capacity for instilling the related virtues of continence and tenacity (as components 
of Verantwortlichkeit) into individuals.227 
But how does this analysis bear upon the respect and counterbalancing 
readings? First, it demonstrates that, contrary to the respect reading, and consistent 
with his early thought, Nietzsche does not posit equal opportunity as a ground of 
agonal conflict. Rather, it is two other forms of equality that condition the agon; 
namely, perceived equality of power, which, contra the counterbalancing model, 
evokes agonal self-restraint, and approximate equality in the degree to which 
individuals are jealous (eifersüchtig) of one another, which underpins mutual 
restraint.228 The second point of disagreement between Nietzsche’s later agonism 
and the respect model is that the latter suggests that self-limitation is occasioned by 
the appreciation of a certain ontology of difference (and the fact that one’s own 
existence depends on the continued existence of one’s other). Yet our analysis has 
revealed that Nietzsche understands such restraint as based on the fulfilment of two 
quite different conditions: socio-cultural inculcation and the perception of equality. 
Lastly, we have witnessed that in continuity with his early thought, he does not 
believe that stronger individuals can treat those weaker than them with agonal 
respect without jeopardising the vitality of the social body to which they belong.  
There is nevertheless a striking problem with Nietzsche’s model. First, in 
JGB 259, he claims that self-restraint can only become customary (“zur guten Sitte 
                                                      
227 See also GD Streifzüge 39, where Nietzsche also traces Verantwortlichkeit back to social 
insitutions: “Der ganze Westen hat jene Instinkte nicht mehr, aus denen Institutionen 
wachsen, aus denen Zukunft wächst: seinem ‘modernen Geiste’ geht vielleicht Nichts so sehr 
wider den Strich. Man lebt für heute, man lebt sehr geschwind, — man lebt sehr 
unverantwortlich […]” (6.141). 
228 In this way, Nietzsche follows Aristotle’s notion of Megalopsychos, insofar as one is not 
meant to act towards one’s inferiors with a noble disposition, and there is a golden mean or 
measure dictating the degree to which it is proper to pursue honour. See Tongeren (1989), 
p.157.  
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warden”), “wenn die Bedingungen dazu gegeben sind (nämlich deren thatsächliche 
Ähnlichkeit in Kraftmengen und Werthmaassen und ihre Zusammengehörigkeit 
innerhalb Eines Körpers).” However, as the texts from MA highlighted, it seems that 
establishing social bonds and institutions (“Zusammengehörigkeit innerhalb Eines 
Körpers”) presupposes just such self-restraint from violence. We therefore find 
ourselves in a circle: self-restraint presupposes social institutions, yet social 
institutions presuppose self-restraint. Where there is both an absence of self-restraint 
and an absence of institutions able to instil such self-restraint – say in the wake of 
extended periods of Vernichtungskampf, or under the conditions of bellum omnium 
contra omnes – it remains to be seen how Nietzsche thinks this Ehrfurcht can be 
generated.  
2.5. CONCLUSION 
We have now rebutted the idea that Nietzsche should, in general, be thought of as a 
thinker who sanctions destructive, unmeasured conflict. It has been demonstrated at 
length that in both his early and later writings, Nietzsche endorses a measured 
species of conflict, which I have referred to as “agonal”. This type of conflict has 
been shown to be measured insofar as it excludes both PDC and tyrannical struggles 
of exploitation (though it was shown to emerge from, and frequently descend back 
into, these forms of conflict).  
However, there were three problems that we faced us in our endeavour to 
clarify Nietzsche’s conception of agonal conflict: first, it was unclear whether such 
conflict is intrinsically measured at all, or whether it is in fact inclusive of certain 
forms of PDC; second, if it is indeed a measured form of conflict, it was ambiguous 
what social scope this measure has – there was evidence for and against the idea that 
he was in favour of a socially inclusive form of agonal struggle; finally, exactly how 
agonal measure is concretely achieved was unclear: is it secured by dint of 
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counterbalancing tyrants against one another, or by virtue of some form of 
endogenous self-limitation on the part of contestants?  
In trying to overcome these three obstacles, the writings of Nietzsche’s 
contemporaries were found to be of indispensable value. Indeed, it should now be 
plain that his notion of agonal struggle does not emerge ex nihilo but rather stands 
in a relation of continuity with the historical conceptions of the Greek agon put 
forward by Curtius, Burckhardt, Grote and Schmidt. This said, in each instance he 
makes a highly selective appropriation. For example, he rejects Curtius’ expansive 
use of the term Wettkampf in favour of Burckhardt’s Hesiodic distinction of war and 
Wettkampf. However, the relation of dependency that Nietzsche identifies between 
aristocratic social order and the Wettkampf is looser than in Burckhardt, even though 
both similarly affirm a socially inclusive notion of the agon. Finally, Nietzsche 
reprises Curtius’ and Grote’s conviction that stable agonal conflict requires an 
authoritative and institutionalised moral order, be this juridical or religious in kind. 
Indeed, it has been taking these sources as a starting point that has enabled us to 
avoid many of the errors into which previous interpreters of Nietzsche’s conception 
of agonal conflict have fallen. Situating his writings on the agon within the context 
of nineteenth-century Wissenschaft is therefore vital if we are to soundly reconstruct 
his notion of Wettkampf from the scant texts that explicitly deal with the theme. But 
let us now briefly recap how we resolved the three aforementioned problems  
 In response to the first problem, it was demonstrated that in both the early 
and the later writings, Nietzsche defines agonal conflict in opposition to murderous 
forms of conflict. To be sure, though, it was found that these two concepts of conflict 
have certain qualities in common. For example, competitors’ in both are driven by a 
desire for predominance and a desire to give vent to their aggressive affects. 
Nonetheless, the two refer to mutually exclusive states of affairs. Whereas Nietzsche 
praises Wettkampf as a form of culturally productive conflict that spurs individuals 
to self-improvement and great deeds, he censures the Vernichtungskampf as a 
culturally harmful species of conflict that incites individuals to strive for the physical 
destruction of their adversary. Nonetheless, we should not lose sight of what was 
 189 
ascertained in Chapter 1; namely, that Nietzsche often conceives of PDC as an 
Urfaktum of human existence, and that under some circumstances it can even be 
culturally beneficial.  
Despite the conceptual disjunction that I establish between Nietzsche’s 
opposed notions of agonal and destructive conflict, we nonetheless identified a 
strong genetic relation between these two forms of struggle. Agonal conflict is born 
out of Vernichtungskampf insofar as it is constituted by means of bridling the affects 
that, in their uncontrolled originary state, drive the latter. Hence, there is no strict 
dichotomy or dualism between humanity’s higher capacities and its natural state. 
The relation is rather one of uncanny doubleness (the “unheimlich[.] 
Doppelcharakter” of the human being [CV 5 1.783]). Commentators have 
mistakenly held Nietzsche to confound Vernichtungskampf and Wettkampf on 
account of the fact that they fail to remark that in CV 5 he valorises the artistic 
affirmation of PDC as a means of transforming such conflict into agonal contest, 
and not because he himself celebrates such PDC (along with the agon). 
A serious point is at stake here. If we elide the distinction Nietzsche draws 
between Wettkampf and Vernichtungskampf, we lose sight of the difficult work we 
have to perform on destructive conflict in order to reap the cultural fruit of agonal 
contest. Fascist readings of Nietzsche’s agonism as a promotion of war (such as we 
find in Bäumler, Ruehl and Dombowsky) neutralise the transformative project 
before it has even got off the ground – this is because they confuse the starting point 
of the transformation depicted in CV 5 (i.e. Vernichtungskampf) with its goal (i.e. 
Wettkampf). In sharpening the conceptual disjunction and genetic relation of 
Vernichtungskampf and Wettkampf, I have tried to underscore the work that is 
demanded by Nietzsche’s analysis of agonism. 
 The second problem, regarding the scope, or aristocratism, of Nietzsche’s 
agonism was made tractable by paring Nietzsche’s notion of the agon in two. On the 
one hand, he views a socially inclusive form of agonism, understood as the pursuit 
of predominance through self-improvement, as both possible and socially expedient. 
In the second place, however, we uncovered a form of artistic agon that added the 
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goal of glory and eternal fame to the aim of preponderance. This struggle was found 
to be reserved for a minority of individuals characterised by their superior creative 
capacity. While this is a socially exclusive form of agon, it is by no means 
aristocratic in the sense of being restricted to individuals on account of their lineage, 
nor does Nietzsche envisage this as a struggle for political power – indeed, it was 
seen to be antithetical to political activity in a variety of different ways. Nonetheless, 
we also saw that this agon was parasitic on an oligarchical form of society (i.e. one 
in which the few rule) organised around a division of labour. This was for two 
reasons. First, the values of proper self-cultivation and glory are incompatible with 
the struggle for material wealth and the realm of necessity. Moreover, individuals 
must be free from the burdens of manual labour if they are to have the time to 
cultivate themselves. There is therefore an indirect, practical connection between 
this higher agon and traditional aristocratic social order. This is an important finding, 
since, in the advanced industrial, and even post-industrial, societies of today, in 
which a far greater number of individuals can be freed from the struggle for life’s 
necessities, there seems to be no reason why this higher type of agon cannot become 
correspondingly more inclusive and detached from aristocratic modes of 
governance. 
 We also established how, in his later writings, with the advent of the idea of 
the world as will to power, power becomes the main stake in the agon. However, 
Nietzsche still wishes to distinguish the agon from forms of conflict in which entities 
struggle to instrumentalise one another. Indeed, agonal conflict arises where the 
other cannot be overpowered, or where two opposed entities both believe the 
overpowering of the other to be unfeasible or unprofitable. The agon then becomes 
a means for opposed entities to discharge excess force and attain the feeling of power 
without instrumentalising (i.e. commanding) or physically harming their 
counterparts. In the later writings, agonal conflict also represents a means by which 
entities and individuals can strengthen themselves in their struggle to exploit other 
entities. The idea of the world as will to power is thus compatible with, but not 
reducible to, the idea of agonal conflict, which is just one form among many that the 
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will to power can take (including, for example, the struggle to eradicate or 
exploitatively command others). Although agonal struggle cannot be equated with 
the will to power, just as a species cannot be equated with its genus, such conflict 
also cannot be dissociated from exploitative or destructive forms of conflict in 
Nietzsche’s thought – agonal measure can only ever locally inhibit, and thereby 
displace, violent and exploitative modes of struggle. The upshot of this is that it is 
doubtful how much mileage democratic agonists can get out of the later Nietzsche’s 
conception of the agon understood as an alternative to unmeasured conflict. 
 With respect to the third problem, I demonstrated that there were two stages 
to the measure of the agon. The first stage enables the formation of (agonal) culture 
by freeing individuals and societies from the state of nature. This is based on 
mutually perceived approximate equality of martial capacity, which motivates the 
opposed parties to lay down their arms (realising they could not profitably defeat 
their counterpart in war); instead, they enter into a state of law. This allows the 
cultural agon to be established in which individuals compete to outdo one another in 
specific non-violent practices. The question then arose, however, as to how the 
emergence of excessively strong victors who stifle the competition can be averted. 
This is the second stage of measure. Within this stage we identified a range of 
different sources of moderation. There was an approximate de facto form of equality 
that did not rely on third-party judgement, and which engendered mutual-restraint 
(exemplified in an equally matched wrestling contest). There was then an 
approximate equality of ability according to the judgement of a third party 
(exemplified in aesthetic agons). Lastly, there was also ostracism, which could 
reestablish these forms of equality. However, it was also seen that measure was not 
only externally imposed on contestants – i.e. through ostracism or the restraint 
exerted upon them by their opponent – but was also endogenous insofar as agonal 
opponents can be said to exercise self-restraint. 
This should make it a little clearer just what is at stake if we approach the 
problem of agonal moderation exclusively from the standpoint of either the respect 
model or the counterbalancing model. In viewing agonal struggle as based on a 
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combination of ostracism and the balance of powers (à la the counterbalancing 
model), we risk overlooking the vital way in which self-limitation might contribute 
to sustaining the agon. Indeed, we also risk neglecting the need to develop 
educational institutions able cultivate this virtue. Those propounding the respect 
model, however, risk overlooking the possibility that agonal moderation might be 
cultivated by means of inculcating respect for one’s community – and this may 
represent a far simpler means of fostering agonal moderation than that of pushing 
for the acknowledgement of an ontology of difference and the corresponding respect 
of other individuals.  
It is also worth recapping what was uncovered concerning equality in the 
final section. In the early works, aside from enabling the agon, the principal effect 
of mutually perceived equality was figured as its ability to elicit envy; in the later 
works, by contrast, we saw that mutually perceived equality of power played a far 
greater limiting role insofar as it occasioned Ehrfurcht. In both cases, however, 
perceived equality of ability represents a sine qua non of agonal engagement. 
Against the respect reading, then, Nietzsche does not assert the equal opportunity of 
all to compete in any given agonal contest. He rather holds the realist position that 
without perceived equality of ability, the kind of conflict that emerges is one that 
naturally leans towards exploitative or destructive modes of opposition. This has 
severe implications for those that wish to formulate a left-wing Nietzschean politics 
based on the “agonist respect” of weaker minority groups (such as Connolly or Alan 
Schrift229). For Nietzsche, it is not possible for healthy individuals or social groups 
to agonistically relate to their inferiors since the conditions of perceived equality of 
ability simply do not obtain. This does not mean these minority groups are excluded 
from Nietzsche’s agonal recommendations, but that they must cultivate agonism 
amongst themselves and strive to raise themselves up to, or beyond, the level of their 
superiors.  
                                                      
229 See Alan D. Schrift, “Nietzsche’s Contest: Nietzsche and the Culture Wars”, in A. Schrift 
(ed.), Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, and Politics (Berkley: University 
of California Press, 2000), pp.184-201. 
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One issue that the fundamentality of equality raises for reading Nietzsche as 
a primarily agonal thinker, however, is the rarity that he increasingly attributes to 
equality as we move into the 1880s. As he claims in one note, “Ein labiles 
Gleichgewicht kommt in der Natur so wenig vor, wie zwei congruente Dreiecke” 
(NL 11[190] 9.516).230 Congruent with this, Nietzsche becomes increasingly 
interested in hierarchical organisation – that is, how functional, and particularly 
organismic, unities are formed through relations of command and obedience and the 
instrumentalisation of the weak by the strong.231 Correspondingly, within 
Nietzsche’s later view of the world as conflict, agonism can account for only a small 
portion of this conflict. At the same time, as we shall see in the following chapters, 
the conflict to form and maintain hierarchical organisations does not seem to fit into 
the category of destructive conflict – since it tends to preserve that which has been 
overpowered, albeit in a position of subjugation. Therefore, as it stands, our 
investigation into Nietzsche’s thoughts on conflict, which has so far inquired into 
the nature of destructive and agonal contention, leaves us with a significant gap. As 
such, the two questions with which we must now concern ourselves in the following 
two chapters are as follows: is Nietzsche’s thought characterised by another sui 
generis form of conflict? And, if so, what is the nature and value of this distinct form 
of conflict? 
                                                      
230 See also M 112: “Der ‘billige Mensch’ bedarf fortwährend des feinen Tactes einer Wage: 
für die Macht- und Rechtsgrade, welche, bei der vergänglichen Art der menschlichen Dinge, 
immer nur eine kurze Zeit im Gleichgewichte schweben werden, zumeist aber sinken oder 
steigen [...]”. See also NL 11[132] 9.490: “Verschiedenheit herrscht in den kleinsten Dingen 
[…] — die Gleichheit ist ein großer Wahn.” 
231 See e.g. NL 26[272] 11.221: “Selbst-Regulirung, also die Fähigkeit der Herrschaft über 
ein Gemeinwesen vorausgesetzt d.h. aber, die Fortentwicklung des Organischen ist nicht an 




THE EARLY NIETZSCHE ON THE 
STRUGGLE FOR ORGANISATION 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the previous two chapters, we have analysed Nietzsche’s thoughts concerning 
two conceptually distinct forms of conflict – namely, Vernichtungskampf and 
Wettkampf. However, this division of conflict into two discrete kinds implies a 
dichotomy that is at odds with Nietzsche’s rejection of binary oppositions (“[m]an 
darf […] zweifeln, […] ob es Gegensätze überhaupt giebt” [JGB 2]).1 As I will argue 
in the following two chapters, consistent with his suspicion of any dualism, closer 
scrutiny reveals that Nietzsche’s thoughts on conflict in fact cannot be divided into 
a neat dichotomy of measured and unmeasured struggle; rather, if we explore the 
lacuna left by the previous chapters, we uncover a third fundamental species of 
                                                      
1 See also JGB 24: “Mag nämlich auch die Sprache, hier wie anderwärts, nicht über ihre 
Plumpheit hinauskönnen und fortfahren, von Gegensätzen zu reden, wo es nur Grade und 
mancherlei Feinheit der Stufen giebt […].” NL 9[91] 12.384: “Es giebt keine Gegensätze: 
nur von denen der Logik her haben wir den Begriff des Gegensatzes – und von denen aus 
fälschlich in die Dinge übertragen.” In NL 9[121] 12.406, Nietzsche then indicates that it is 
imperative “[d]aß man die Gegensätze herausnimmt aus den Dingen, nachdem man begreift, 
daß wir sie hineingelegt haben.” See also FW 112, where, contesting the objective validity 
of the cause and effect opposition, Nietzsche argues that reality is a “continuum” and that 
“eine solche Zweiheit giebt es wahrscheinlich nie”. See also WS 67. See also Müller-Lauter, 
Nietzsche: His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of his Philosophy, trans. 
by David J. Parent (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), pp.10f. 
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struggle – one that cannot be subsumed under the heading of either Wettkampf or 
Vernichtungskampf. 
As should now be clear, for Nietzsche, agonal struggle presupposes the 
approximate equality of the relata at variance with one another; however, we have 
also remarked that he deems this kind equality an exceptional rarity. If for Nietzsche, 
as for Schopenhauer and Heraclitus, “alles Geschehen ist ein Kampf” (NL 1[92] 
12.33), we have to ask ourselves: what type(s) of conflict does Nietzsche think 
define(s) relations of in-equality? And what type(s) of conflict does he think should 
define such relations? In light of his wider criticisms of Vernichtungskampf, and the 
very limited conditions under which he endorses such conflict, it would be surprising 
if he recommended destructive relations. Such observations should further motivate 
us to probe the possible existence of categories of conflict that do not fit the 
Vernichtungskampf–Wettkampf dichotomy, which Nietzsche himself sets up in CV 
5. 
In a note written while reading Roux’s Kampf der Theile des Organismus, 
Nietzsche gives us an indication as to what types of conflict might define relations 
of inequality: namely, “Kampf mit Zerstörung oder Assimilation des Schwächeren” 
(NL 7[86] 10.272). And, to be sure, in 1886, he states that under conditions of 
inequality, “stoßen zwei zu verschiedene Macht-Quanten auf einander, so greift das 
stärkere über nach dem schwächeren zu dessen fortgesetzter Schwächung, bis 
endlich Unterwerfung, Anpassung, Einordnung, Einverleibung eintritt” (NL 5[82] 
12.221). Reading this in conjunction with JGB 259, it becomes evident that the type 
of conflict that takes place in lieu of the struggle for the “Zerstörung” of subordinate 
forces is one directed at their incorporation and exploitation: “Leben selbst ist 
wesentlich Aneignung, Verletzung, Überwältigung des Fremden und Schwächeren, 
Unterdrückung, Härte, Aufzwängung eigner Formen, Einverleibung und 
mindestens, mildestens, Ausbeutung”. The principal thesis that I defend over the 
following two chapters is that, in formulating alternatives to harmfully unmeasured 
 196 
conflict, Nietzsche also posits a measured species of struggle that does not fit under 
the rubric of agonal conflict – namely, what I will call incorporative conflict.2  
My secondary thesis, however, will be that although this species of conflict 
is measured, it is inextricably associated with, and even conditioned by, an 
unmeasured form of struggle that cannot be subsumed under the concept of 
Vernichtungskampf – namely, that directed towards the excretion or repulsion of that 
which is harmful. As mentioned in the introduction, we find this expressed in his 
calls for a “Kampf [zu ausscheiden] […] gewaltsam eingepflanzter fremder 
Elemente” (GT 23 1.149); or again later in his designating the “Trieb etwas 
zurückzustoßen” a fundamental drive of nature (NL 36[21] 11.560); or at the end of 
his working life, in his warning that a society, just like any organism, must 
“ausschneiden” its “entartenden Theilen” (NL 23[1] 13.600). Although I 
acknowledge the fact that these processes are of course not entirely co-extensive, I 
will be referring to them all under the umbrella term exclusionary conflict, since the 
verb “to exclude” can signify both the action of shutting external entities out, as well 
as that of expelling internal ones.3  
The combination of these two forms of struggle – i.e. incorporative 
(measured) and exclusionary (unmeasured) struggle – is what I will then refer to 
with the overarching term “organisational” struggle. I have termed it thus, since both 
of these conflictual processes are similarly directed at the expansion and 
strengthening of the internal hierarchy that Nietzsche views as essential to any vital 
organisation. Although the above quotes make clear that this form of conflict is 
perhaps most discernable in Nietzsche’s later writings, in this chapter, I will contend 
that it already plays a pivotal role in his early writings, particularly during the period 
of UB (1873-6). Subsequently, in Chapter 4, I will then inquire into how 
organisational conflict features in his later writings. 
                                                      
2 For “incorporation”, Nietzsche tends to use either Einverleibung or Assimilation. I will be 
treating both of these terms under the heading of incorporation. 
3 See entry for “exclude, v.”, OED. 
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In the first place, this chapter is a normative study aimed at expounding the 
grounds on which Nietzsche valorises organisational struggle. I maintain that in UB 
and the Nachlass from this period, he presents organisational conflict as a remedy 
for a destructive form of struggle he thinks threatens modern individuals, societies 
and cultures alike. In his own words, in modernity, “[wir] sehen […] alles feindselig 
gegen einander und alle edlen Kräfte in gegenseitigem aufreibendem 
Vernichtungskrieg” (NL 30[8] 7.734). However, his diagnosis remains obscure and 
difficult to pin down; indeed, during this period of his thought, his complaints about 
the problem of disgregation do not only concern social disgregation, but are 
multifaceted and split across a number of ontological domains. For example, as we 
shall see, we find Nietzsche describing such conflict at the axiological level of our 
ethical values, the subjective level of our behavioural inclinations, and at the cultural 
level of our aesthetic tastes, and so on. Thus, with a view to better understanding his 
remedy (i.e. organisational struggle), I begin by dissecting his complex diagnosis of 
this crisis (Section 1). 
Having delineated the problem identified by Nietzsche, I then turn to the 
solutions he proposes to this state of disgregation (Section 2). Insofar as he views 
modernity as a maelstrom of mutually neutralising forces, which we have just seen 
him describe as a Vernichtungskrieg, we might want to draw an analogy between 
this and the Vernichtungskampf he depicts in CV 5. Given this apparent analogy 
then, it would make sense to look toward the Wettkampf as the principal remedy or 
alternative to this widespread condition of measurelessness. Indeed, it has previously 
been claimed that Nietzsche conceives of his idealised vision of the Greek agon as a 
socio-culturally unifying principle of organisation.4 Moreover, as we saw in the 
                                                      
4 See Christa Davis Acampora, “Naturalism and Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology”, in Keith 
Ansell-Pearson (ed.), A Companion to Nietzsche (London: Blackwell, 2006), pp.314–34. In 
her treatment of the agon, Acampora emphasises how, for Nietzsche, “competitive relations 
serve as an organising force of culture by bringing together diverse elements [and] 
coordinating heterogeneous interests” (p.327). See also Müller (forthcoming, 2017), “Die 
Etablierung der Polis und die Institutionalisierung des Agonalwesens bilden einen 
wechselseitigen Zusammenhang” (p.14). Müller also states that “Nietzsches idealtypische 
Vorstellung einer agonalen Situation setzt eine Pluralität von Begabten und Ambitionierten 
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previous chapter, his agonistic democrat readers have claimed that he proposes a 
model of social organisation founded on the “agonistic” co-existence of discordant 
values – i.e. a society that, rather than being based on the domination or suppression 
of dissonant values, is characterised by an agonistic ethos of respectful and 
egalitarian engagement with those holding opposed values.5 Comparably, at the level 
of the subject, it has also been asserted that Nietzsche’s normative ideal is a self in 
which the various drives of the individual are said to be in a state of struggle 
analogous to his vision of the ancient Greek agon (indeed, this manner of talking 
about Nietzsche’s ideal self has become common currency in the critical literature).6 
And to be sure, UB itself has frequently been interpreted as an example of Nietzsche 
                                                      
voraus. Erst deren Gegeneinanderagieren erzeugt und variiert die dynamischen Verhältnisse 
der griechischen Lebenswelt. Die autonome Polis ist somit vor allem ein Produkt agonaler 
Selbstdisziplinierung” (p.18). Yunus Tuncel, in Agon in Nietzsche (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 2013) has also defended this position (see ch.6). 
5 See e.g. William Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed (Minnesota: Minnesota 
University Press, 2002) (p.171): “It is pertinent to underline again that this advocate of 
‘nobility of many kinds’ and ‘the spiritualization of enmity’ does not demand that every 
noble practice of artistry endorse the same fundamental interpretation of being he himself 
embraces. While he contests many who endorse, say, Christian love, Buddhist compassion, 
Judaic responsibility to a nameless divinity, or the Kantian presumption of pure practical 
reason, Nietzsche at his best […] seeks to establish noble relations of agonistic respect 
between the carriers of such alternative faiths, as participants in each come to terms with the 
contestability of their fundamental faith in an affirmative rather than resentful way.” See also 
David Owen (1995): “[F]or Nietzsche, tolerance for other views, a willingness to engage 
with them in an open and fair-minded way, is a condition of claiming to hold one’s own 
beliefs to be true. […] [T]his position commits citizens to a form of society which is 
characterised by the cultivation of the conditions of honest and just argument between free 
and equal citizens” (pp.161-2). 
6 Hatab, for example refers to Nietzsche’s “agonistic psychology”. See Lawrence Hatab, 
“Breaking the Contract Theory: The Individual and the Law in Nietzsche’s Genealogy”, in 
Herman Siemens and Vasti Roodt (eds.), Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking 
Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), pp.169-90 (p.173). 
Douglas Burnham, entry for “Agon”, in The Nietzsche Dictionary (London: Bloomsbury, 
2015): “[S]ince the individual self is comprised of a multiplicity of drives, an agonistic 
‘society’ is also found within the self” (p.16). Ken Gemes, “Freud and Nietzsche on 
Sublimation”, JNS, 38(1) (2009), 38-59: “Nietzsche often emphasizes the need for a kind of 
agonal struggle between the drives”. Gemes also states that he does “not believe that there is 
genuine conflict between the Nietzschean ideal of a unified self and the Nietzschean ideal of 
a self engaged in agonal struggle” (p.56, fn.21; see also pp.49-52, where Gemes repeatedly 
refers to Nietzsche’s vision of an “agonal struggle between drives”). See also Honig (1993), 
p.229. 
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agonally struggling against his times, or at least inciting his readers to do so.7 In this 
chapter, then, these agonal interpretations of Nietzsche’s early philosophy will 
constitute my primary polemical target. 
The real stumbling block for these unifying visions of Nietzsche’s agon is 
not merely the lack of textual evidence, but the fact that his portrayals of healthy 
unified cultures and individuals are dominated by a form of instrumentalisation that 
is incompatible with his conception of agonal conflict. Thus, in UB, he endeavours 
to persuade us of the need for a “Beherrschung” and “Unterordnung” of the historical 
influence of other cultures (i.e. their values and ideals).8 He then speaks of “die 
zwingende und herrschende Uebergewalt” required to shape the self into a 
“harmonisches System von Bewegungen” (UB III 2 1.342). In UB III, as 
commentators such as Rawls have noted, he apparently advocates an aristocratic 
strain of perfectionism, endorsing the oppression of the majority in the name of a 
cultural elite: “wie erhält dein, des Einzelnen Leben den höchsten Werth, die tiefste 
Bedeutung? […] Gewiss nur dadurch, dass du zum Vortheile der seltensten und 
werthvollsten Exemplare lebst […]” (UB III 6 1.384).9 Contrary to the agonistic 
reading of Nietzsche’s thought, I will therefore argue that he consistently 
                                                      
7 See e.g. Herman Siemens, “Agonal Configurations in the Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen”, 
Nietzsche-Studien, 30 (2001a), 80-106. Vanessa Lemm has argued that, contrary to the overly 
individualistic political philosophies of Rawls and Cavell, Nietzsche’s vision of freedom is 
inherently public and characterised by agonal struggle – that is, “a public struggle (agon) 
between the individual and society”. See Vanessa Lemm, “Is Nietzsche a Perfectionist? 
Rawls, Cavell, and the Politics of Culture in Nietzsche's ‘Schopenhauer as Educator,’” JNS, 
34 (2007), 5-27 (p.14). See also Nathalie Lachance “Nietzsche’s Ethics of Reading: 
Education in a Postmodern World”, in Horst Hutter and Eli Friedland (eds.), Nietzsche's 
Therapeutic Teaching: For Individuals and Culture (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp.31-46. 
Lachance states: “If there is an agon in Schopenhauer as Educator, it is […] between 
Nietzsche and the academic world” (p.35).  
8 See UB II 4 1.271: “[J]eder Mensch und jedes Volk braucht je nach seinen Zielen, Kräften 
und Nöthen eine gewisse Kenntniss der Vergangenheit, […] [aber] immer nur zum Zweck 
des Lebens und also auch unter der Herrschaft und obersten Führung dieses Zweckes.” See 
also UB II 1 1.257: “Die historische Bildung ist vielmehr nur im Gefolge einer mächtigen 
neuen Lebensströmung, einer werdenden Cultur zum Beispiel, etwas Heilsames und 
Zukunft-Verheissendes, also nur dann, wenn sie von einer höheren Kraft beherrscht und 
geführt wird und nicht selber herrscht und führt.” 
9 Quoted in Rawls (1971), p.325. 
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recommends an ongoing struggle to establish, sustain and renew instrumental 
hierarchies – that is, an un-agonistic, organisational form of conflict, which he 
thinks can remedy the problem of disintegration. Yet insofar as this is conceived as 
a struggle to preserve the overpowered entity in an exploited subordinate state, I 
propose that it should nonetheless be designated a measured form of conflict.  
However, as we try to ascertain more precisely what organisational conflict 
is, and hence what exactly Nietzsche is commending, the agonistic reading can be 
found to face yet another serious difficulty. The issue is that the measured struggle 
promoted by Nietzsche in UB is inseparable from his calls for a form of struggle that 
is distinctly unmeasured – i.e. exclusionary conflict. This is the unmeasured (though 
not necessarily destructive) struggle to be rid of all engagement with a given entity. 
Thus, in UB II he lauds the “kämpfenden, ausscheidenden, zertheilenden Macht” of 
the German youth of his day (UB II 10 1.331) as well as promoting the “vergessen” 
of superfluous cultural influences in such a way that they are “nicht mehr da, der 
Horizont ist geschlossen und ganz” (UB II 1 1.251).  He then advocates a similarly 
unmeasured species of conflict with respect to spiritual or psychological entities, 
such as desires, instincts and behavioural inclinations. In UB, for example, Nietzsche 
(albeit warily) affirms the necessity of critical history, and the (albeit difficult) 
“Vernichtung” of outdated traditions – by which he means the struggle to impose 
“eine neue Gewöhnung, einen neuen Instinct, eine zweite Natur an, so dass die erste 
Natur abdorrt” (UB II 3 1.270; my italics).  
This presents us with two questions, to which I will proffer solutions in the 
course of this chapter. First, what could Nietzsche mean by Ausscheidung and 
Vernichtung in the context of geistig entities such as values, behavioural 
dispositions, and aesthetic preferences? Second, how can we bring this promotion of 
unmeasured conflict into accord with his simultaneous promotion of measured, 
incorporative conflict? Is there not a contradiction here? With respect to the latter 
issue, I will demonstrate that which of these two approaches he recommends 
depends upon our evaluation of the entity in question; furthermore, by employing 
the model of organisational conflict, we will be able to make coherent sense of both 
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his calls to measured and unmeasured struggle as part of a single organisational 
impetus.  
Another obstacle that the descriptive aspect of our study needs to tackle, 
concerns the fact that, as we have seen in the previous chapters, Nietzsche’s 
conception of both PDC and agonism undergo a profound shift as he repudiates 
Schopenhauerian metaphysics and develops his conception of the world as will to 
power. Over the next two chapters, it will become evident that this is no less true of 
organisational conflict. Indeed, I will draw on UB in order to show that the model 
of organisational conflict prescribed by the early Nietzsche is fundamentally 
grounded in a quasi-Schopenhauerian Weltanschauung. The reason for this is that 
his prescription demands that we each gain an insight into a metaphysically essential 
aspect of our self (the “wahre Ursinn und Grundstoff [seines] Wesens” [UB III 1 
1.341]), and a realisation that man (particularly the genius qua the paragon of man) 
represents the final end towards which nature strives (“sie [Natur] sich zum 
Menschen hindrängt” [UB III 6 1.385]). For Nietzsche, conscious knowledge of 
these quasi-Schopenhauerian metaphysical truths serves as a fixed archimedean 
point from which we can engage in the struggle for organisation. In Section 2, we 
will see that Nietzsche posits such metaphysical bases as a precondition of 
incorporative conflict on account of the fact that he is operating with a largely 
Schopenhauerian model of how health is conditioned by a struggle for organisation.  
Yet what happens when he abandons his Schopenhauerian heritage? My 
contention in Section 3 is that Nietzsche’s repudiation of metaphysics undermines 
the model of organisational conflict he develops in UB to the point that it becomes 
wholly untenable. This will present us with the problematic to be resolved in the 
Chapter 4: can Nietzsche formulate a model of organisational conflict that does not 
rely on these dubious metaphysical foundations?   
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3.2. THE CRISIS OF CULTURAL 
DISINTEGRATION 
Nietzsche reproaches the Germans in UB I for having fallen into the delusion 
(“Wahn”) or error (“Irrthum”) that the defeat of the French in the Franco-Prussian 
War was as much cultural as it was martial. He deems the Germans deluded for 
believing themselves to have any real culture whatsoever. Indeed, he castigates them 
for being cultural philistines (“Bildungsphilister”) and barbarians (“Barbaren”), who 
are, in truth, fundamentally opposed to culture.10 The military victory over France 
bred, according to Nietzsche, an attitude of self-congratulatory complacency: 
“[J]edermann [ist] überzeugt […], dass es eines Kampfes […] gar nicht mehr 
bedürfe, dass vielmehr das Meiste so schön wie möglich geordnet […] sei” (UB I 1 
1.161).  
But to what kind of cultural Kampf is Nietzsche rallying his countrymen? 
What is it a struggle against? And what is it a struggle for? With respect to these 
queries, his oft-cited definition of culture, and its contrary, barbarism, is instructive: 
Kultur ist vor allem Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles in allen 
Lebensäusserungen eines Volkes. Vieles Wissen und Gelernthaben ist 
aber weder ein nothwendiges Mittel der Kultur, noch ein Zeichen 
derselben und verträgt sich nöthigenfalls auf das beste mit dem 
Gegensatze der Kultur, der Barbarei, das heisst: der Stillosigkeit oder 
dem chaotischen Durcheinander aller Stile. (UB I 1.163)11 
Evidently, he believes the Germans must fight for some kind of cultural unity 
(“Einheit”) and, contrariwise, against the incoherence (“chaotisch[es] 
                                                      
10 See UB I 2 1.166: “[D]ie systematische und zur Herrschaft gebrachte Philisterei [in 
Deutschland] ist deshalb, weil sie System hat, noch nicht Kultur und nicht einmal schlechte 
Kultur, sondern immer nur das Gegenstück derselben, nämlich dauerhaft begründete 
Barbarei.” 
11 See also UB II 4 1.274, where Nietzsche reiterates this definition of culture: “Die Cultur 
eines Volkes als der Gegensatz jener Barbarei ist einmal, wie ich meine, mit einigem Rechte, 
als Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles in allen Lebensäusserungen eines Volkes bezeichnet 
worden”. 
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Durcheinander”) of modern Germany’s bric-a-brac pastiche culture (what he calls 
“jene moderne Jahrmarkts-Buntheit [UB I 1 1.163]). Indeed, in the opening section 
of UB I, the essentials of Nietzsche’s rhetorical strategy are already fully discernible. 
He commences by creating an ideal normative vision of a true unified culture, then 
he indicates that the Germans do not possess this unity despite their beliefs to the 
contrary. It is an attempt to awaken his readers to the fact that unity is a task, not a 
given.12 He accordingly reprimands Germany’s pseudo-culture on account of its 
being “zerbröckelt” (UB II 10 1.329) and in a state of “atomistische Chaos” (UB III 
4 1.367). Needless to say, then, Nietzsche valorises cultural unity; but before we 
analyse the nature of this ideal unity, we should ask: what would its counterpart, “der 
Stillosigkeit oder dem chaotischen Durcheinander aller Stile”, actually look like? 
And why does he vilify this condition?  
As he repeatedly states throughout the early period, one of the root causes 
of modern fragmentation is an imprudent policy with respect to knowledge 
accumulation. This manifests itself as both the tendency of individuals to amass an 
excess of historical Wissenschaft and the superficiality of the German approach to 
                                                      
12 In this respect, Nietzsche follows thinkers such as Schiller and Wagner in pronouncing 
Germans and German culture to be pathologically lacking in cultural wholeness. See 
Friedrich Schiller, Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2010), 
Brief VI (p.22): “Die Kultur selbst war es, welche der neuern Menschheit diese Wunde 
schlug. Sobald auf der einen Seite die erweiterte Erfahrung und das bestimmtere Denken eine 
schärfere Scheidung der Wissenschaften, auf der andern das verwickeltere Uhrwerk der 
Staaten eine strengere Absonderung der Stände und Geschäfte nothwendig machte, so zerriß 
auch der innere Bund der menschlichen Natur, und ein verderblicher Streit entzweite ihre 
harmonischen Kräfte.” On the struggle of art and science, see also Brief IX, p.34. See also 
Richard Wagner, Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft (Leipzig: Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1850), 
where he claims that the German Volk has been divided by a pernicious egoism and the 
pursuit of luxury. He also claims that science has become divorced from life (§2). As a 
remedy to this, he states that “der Bruderkuß, der diesen Bund besiegelt, wird das 
gemeinsame Kunstwerk der Zukunft sein” (p.14). He further maintains that the various 
domains of art have become “splintered”, and that his tragic artwork of the future can reunite 
them. It should also be borne in mind, that Germany had been undergoing a long and arduous 
process of unification, and that it was at this time still a relatively inchoate nation-state, 
having only officially emerged from an assemblage of largely autonomous provinces in 
1871, after the Franco-Prussian War. 
 204 
education, or Bildung.13 Nietzsche indicts the Germans for esteeming the inordinate 
consumption of knowledge, with little thought as to the utility of this knowledge – 
that is, for believing that “nur dadurch, dass wir uns mit fremden Zeiten, Sitten, 
Künsten, Philosophien, Religionen, Erkenntnissen anfüllen und überfüllen, werden 
wir zu etwas Beachtungswerthem, nämlich zu wandelnden Encyclopädien” (UB II 
4 1.273-4).14 Such immoderate and indiscriminate accumulation of sundry 
knowledge is the essence of philistinism according to Nietzsche. However, amassing 
knowledge does not strike us as harmful or disintegrative per se. So why does he 
deem it a pathology? and how does it relate to fragmentation? 
Nietzsche’s chief grievance in UB I is that philistinism obstructs authentic 
agency, especially aesthetic and ethical agency. Let us begin with the former. 
Nietzsche asserts that, due to the study of multitudinous languages, literary 
expression has become a “seelenlosen Wörtermosaik” as writers clumsily employ a 
strange combination of French and Latin grammatical and rhetorical styles (UB I 11 
1.222). Potential artists lack a fixed set of rules and criteria of judgement according 
to which they could confidently create harmonious works of art: “Es fehlt hier an 
einem natürlichen Boden, an der künstlerischen Werthschätzung, Behandlung und 
Ausbildung der mündlichen Rede [um ein guter Schiftsteller zu werden]” (UB I 11 
1.220). In lieu of this, they merely imitate other cultures, though in an incoherent 
manner.15  Thus, he reprises Schopenhauer’s admiration of the ancients for having 
                                                      
13 See GT 13. Here Nietzsche traces this malady back to the Socratic or Alexandrian tendency 
that overwhelmed the Greeks and disrupted the dynamic and vital interrelation of the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian. Indeed, Nietzsche portrays Socrates as having instigated an 
“unerhörte Hochschätzung des Wissens”, and criticises him for being an individual “in dem 
die logische Natur durch eine Superfötation […] so excessiv entwickelt ist” (1.89-90). This 
“Superfötation” of the drive to logical knowledge came at the expense of the instinctive 
(aesthetic) wisdom (“instinctive Weisheit”) that enabled the creation of Attic tragedy. For 
more on this theme, see also ST (esp. 1.542). 
14 See also UB I 1 1.163: “Die Formen, Farben, Producte und Curiositäten aller Zeiten und 
aller Zonen häuft der Deutsche um sich auf und bringt dadurch jene moderne Jahrmarkts-
Buntheit hervor, die seine Gelehrten nun wiederum als das ‘Moderne an sich’ zu betrachten 
und zu formuliren haben”. We also find this diagnosis presaged in GT 23, where Nietzsche 
talks of the modern condition as a “fieberhaften Suchen, das sich allmählich in ein 
Pandämonium überallher zusammengehäufter Mythen und Superstitionen verlor” (1.148). 
15 On the problem of Nachahmung in UB, see Siemens (2008, pp.86ff).  
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“eine regelrecht fixirte Sprache mit durchweg festgestellter und treulich 
beobachteter Grammatik und Orthographie” (UB I 11 1.227).16 The problem is 
therefore the absence of a clear set of values and criteria able to guide artistic praxis.  
Nietzsche likewise avers that the inordinate accumulation of knowledge has 
thwarted ethical agency – one simply cannot implement all of the ethical models that 
one has ingested from past cultures due to their being at variance with one another. 
In UB III, Nietzsche characterises this as the “Hin und Her” generated in the 
individual on account of the conflict that arises between their antique and Christian 
ideals: 
In diesem Hin und Her zwischen Christlich und Antik, zwischen 
verschüchterter oder lügnerischer Christlichkeit der Sitte und ebenfalls 
muthlosem und befangenem Antikisiren lebt der moderne Mensch und 
befindet sich schlecht dabei; […] alles dies erzeugt eine Friedlosigkeit, 
eine Verworrenheit in der modernen Seele, welche sie verurtheilt 
unfruchtbar und freudelos zu sein. (UB III 2 1.345) 
This division paralyses the individual by presenting them with conflicting maxims 
and models for action.17 As he states in a preparatory Nachlass note for UB II: 
“Geschichte — schwächt das Handeln und macht blind gegen das Vorbildliche, 
durch Masse verwirrend” (NL 27[81] 7.611).18 The individual is caught in a state of 
vacillation, in which behavioural inclinations mutually frustrate one another, 
rendering the individual incapable of agency in a manner reminiscent of Buridan’s 
ass. As he stresses in UB II, the individual has, through this excess of reason, “seinen 
Instinct vernichtet und verloren”. As a consequence of this alienation from instinct, 
“das Individuum [wird] zaghaft und unsicher und darf sich nicht mehr glauben” (UB 
                                                      
16 See also NL 29[47] 7.645-6. Indeed, prior to Socrates’ arrival, Nietzsche describes the 
Greeks as having forged “das strenge ältere Gesetz der einheitlichen sprachlichen Form” 
(SGT 1 1.93). 
17 Nietzsche repeatedly refers to the paralyzing effects of the unrestrained pursuit of 
(historical) knowledge. See e.g. UB II 3 1.268, where antiquarian history is described as 
paralyzing the man of action (“[sie] lähmt […] den Handelnden”). 
18 Quoted in Jörg Salaquarda, “Studien zur zweiten unzeitgemässen Betrachtung”, Nietzsche-
Studien, 13 (1984), 1-45 (p.16).  
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II 5 1.280). Insofar as this discordance of ends, ideals and values incapacitates the 
individual, we can comprehend why Nietzsche would warn of the necessity “sie alle 
zu bezwingen und zu bewältigen, um nicht selbst an ihrem Kampfe zu Grunde zu 
gehen” (UB II 4 1.272).  
The second form of harmful disintegration indexed by Nietzsche concerns 
the disjunction he believes has arisen between the inner (i.e. private and intellectual) 
and outer (i.e. public and practical) aspects of modern German life. In UB II 4, he 
recounts how, as a consequence of the aforementioned inner havoc, modern man has 
simply abandoned the tiresome struggle of practically implementing his learning, 
and has instead turned inwards, disregarding the task of making an authentic choice 
as to how to intercourse with others and present themselves to the outside world.19 
Modern man thus “versinkt in sich selbst, ins Innerliche, das heisst hier nur: in den 
zusammengehäuften Wust des Erlernten, das nicht nach aussen wirkt, der 
Belehrung, die nicht Leben wird” (UB II 5 1.280; my italics).  
Nietzsche accuses the Germans of simply deferring to convention in an 
effort to circumvent the problem of practically applying this internal bedlam of 
models:  
Sieht man einmal auf’s Aeusserliche, so bemerkt man, wie die 
Austreibung der Instincte durch Historie die Menschen fast zu lauter 
abstractis und Schatten umgeschaffen hat: keiner wagt mehr seine 
Person daran, sondern maskirt sich als gebildeter Mann, als Gelehrter, 
als Dichter, als Politiker. (Ibid.) 
In unquestioningly adopting one of these bourgeois mantles, everyone comes to don 
the same “bürgerliche Universal-Rock” (ibid.) and, likewise, everyone equally 
comes to suffer from a “Schwäche der Persönlichkeit” insofar as they fail to 
                                                      
19 UB II 4 1.274: “Daraus entsteht eine Gewöhnung, die wirklichen Dinge nicht mehr ernst 
zu nehmen, daraus entsteht die ‘schwache Persönlichkeit,’ zufolge deren das Wirkliche, das 
Bestehende nur einen geringen Eindruck macht; man wird im Aeusserlichen zuletzt immer 
lässlicher und bequemer […].” 
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exteriorise their personal inner life.20 To the extent that everyone follows this policy, 
however, philistinism generates the illusion of cultural unity by generating 
uniformity (“Gleichförmigkeit”, “Uniformität”):  
[D]ie Verwechselung in jenem Wahne des Bildungsphilisters daher 
rühren, dass er überall das gleichförmige Gepräge seiner selbst 
wiederfindet und nun aus diesem gleichförmigen Gepräge aller 
“Gebildeten” auf eine Stileinheit der deutschen Bildung, kurz auf eine 
Kultur schliesst. (UB I 2 1.165) 
Modern Germans are therefore consistently philistine (even if they do play different 
philistine rôles within society). Indeed, in the uniformity of its fragmentariness, 
modern philistinism has a sufficient façade of holism to blind its sufferers to the very 
cultural sickness afflicting them. But, as Nietzsche emphasises, philistine uniformity 
and systematicity do not amount to true stylistic unity. This is because such pseudo-
unity is only achieved through the exclusion and negation of the creative forces that 
necessarily underpin any authentic style (“wahre Stil”).21 Indeed, Nietzsche charges 
modern Germans with preferring to apathetically mimic others over proactively 
constructing authentic, individual modes of acting in the world.22 Moreover, 
according to his diagnosis, the pressure of conformism is inimical to the emergence 
of true individuals: as he says at the beginning of UB III, people are often forced to 
suppress their individuality “[a]us Furcht vor dem Nachbar, welcher die Convention 
fordert” (UB III 1 1.337).23 This, then, is what Nietzsche is rebuking when he 
                                                      
20 UB II 5 1.281: “Das Individuum hat sich ins Innerliche zurückgezogen: aussen merkt man 
nichts mehr davon”. 
21 Nietzsche calls this the “Ausschliessen und Negiren aller künstlerisch produktiven Formen 
und Forderungen eines wahren Stils” (UB I 1 1.166). See also UB I 8 1.206, and his criticism 
of “[uniforme] Glauben”.  
22 See UB II 4 1.273: “[W]as wirklich Motiv ist und was als That sichtbar nach aussen tritt, 
bedeutet dann oft nicht viel mehr als eine gleichgültige Convention, eine klägliche 
Nachahmung”. 
23 See also UB III 3 1.353: “Wo es mächtige Gesellschaften, Regierungen, Religionen, 
öffentliche Meinungen gegeben hat, kurz wo je eine Tyrannei war, da hat sie den einsamen 
Philosophen gehasst”. Furthermore, see his criticism of artistic critique in philistine culture 
in UB II 5 1.285. 
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laments the “[Gegensatz] von Form und Inhalt, von Innerlichkeit und Convention” 
(UB II 4 1.278).  
The third and final way in which philistine culture has generated 
fragmentation according to Nietzsche, is that the sheer quantity of history ingested 
produces a disorienting sense that one exists in a state of pure flux or “becoming”, 
lacking any fixed points. This is the feeling “von der Flüssigkeit aller Begriffe, 
Typen und Arten, von dem Mangel aller cardinalen Verschiedenheit zwischen 
Mensch und Thier” (UB II 5 1.319). Such disorientation and the sense of a loss of 
higher purpose leads people to embrace a dangerous strain of cynical irony towards 
the world of action.24 This in turn breeds a socially divisive form of egoistic 
immoralism as individuals fall back on the one thing of which they are certain: their 
own personal life-needs. The rapacious and hostile pursuit of personal gain 
eventuates in a loss of community and the fragmentation of the Volk: “das Volk 
[geht] am egoistischen Kleinen und Elenden, an Verknöcherung und Selbstsucht zu 
Grunde […], zuerst nämlich auseinanderfällt und aufhört Volk zu sein” (ibid.).25 In 
this condition of purely pursuing our baser needs, Nietzsche views humans as being 
no better than animals.26 Consequently, at this point in his philosophical 
development, he is highly critical of the affirmation of becoming (in a manner 
recalling Schopenhauer’s critique of those who embrace the will to live); 
correspondingly, as will be illuminated, he sought some metaphysically fixed points 
as a remedy to this malaise. 
                                                      
24 See UB II 5 1.279: “[D]urch dieses Uebermaass [vom historischen Wissen] geräth eine 
Zeit in die gefährliche Stimmung der Ironie über sich selbst und aus ihr in die noch 
gefährlichere des Cynismus: in dieser aber reift sie immer mehr einer klugen egoistischen 
Praxis entgegen, durch welche die Lebenskräfte gelähmt und zuletzt zerstört werden”. See 
also NL 27[80] 7.611. 
25 This is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s characterization, in GT, of the buddhistic anti-socialism 
and even practical pessimism of those overly exposed to the Dionysian reality of existence. 
See GT 17 and 23. 
26 See UB III 5 7.819-20: “Solange jemand nach dem Leben wie nach einem Glücke verlangt, 
hat er den Blick noch nicht über den Horizont des Thieres hinausgehoben, nur dass er mit 
mehr Bewusstsein will, was das Thier im blinden Drange sucht — das heisst, wir verbringen 
Alle den grössten Theil unsres Daseins in der Thierheit, wir selbst sind die Thiere, welche 
sinnlos zu leiden scheinen.” 
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Naturally, this is not an exhaustive reconstruction of Nietzsche’s criticisms 
of modern society in UB. Nonetheless, it amply demonstrates that in UB Nietzsche 
is deeply preoccupied with the cultural pathology of disintegration on a number of 
fronts: 
 
a) The anarchic discordance of models guiding agency;  
b) The diremption of our interior, intellectual world from our external 
comportment, which has come to be governed by convention; 
c) The social division caused by egoism and the rapacious pursuit of base life-
needs.  
We should recall the ultimate evaluative standard that Nietzsche is employing at this 
time – namely, the extent to which a given phenomenon aids or obstructs a 
generative culture and the production of artistic genius: “eine werdende Cultur und 
die Erzeugung des Genius — das heisst das Ziel aller Cultur” (UB III 3 1.358).27 
Crucially, the various forms of disgregation mentioned above undercut the social 
and individual conditions of coordination and coherence that are necessary for 
genius to arise. Although there is some equivocation in Nietzsche’s use of the term 
genius (this will be clarified below), it is nonetheless with this end in mind that he 
thinks concerted social and individual agency, and a coherent basis for aesthetic 
praxis is exigent. He is therefore staunchly opposed to the Hegelian idea that modern 
Germans have already achieved a “Vollendung der Weltgeschichte” (UB II 8 1.308) 
or Hartmann’s Whiggish belief that progress is guaranteed by a rational and 
automatic “Weltprozess” (see e.g. UB II 9 1.311ff.). In contrast to the idealistic, self-
congratulatory and laissez-faire attitude that he believes such Hegelianism 
                                                      
27 See also UB III 3 1.363, where he describes the Genius as “die höchste Frucht des Lebens”. 
For more on what Nietzsche means by “Genius” in UB, see James Conant (2000), p.193 and 
pp.209ff. See also Lemm (2007), p.14. For a wider overview of Nietzsche’s concept genius 
(i.e. one that draws on all phases of his writing), see Herman Siemens (2002), pp.85-91. We 
will return to the question of genius below. 
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engenders, he wants to show us that the improvement of our situation is contingent 
on our actively fighting for it: “[N]icht erträumt werden kann jener ideale Zustand, 
er muss erkämpft und errungen werden […]” (UB II 9 1.317; my italics). We should 
examine how Nietzsche conceives of this “ideale Zustand”, and the means by which 
he thinks we can fight to attain it. 
3.3. THE PATHS TO EINHEIT 
How does Nietzsche propose we resolve these three types of disunity? In fact, he 
offers a number of interconnected solutions. One of the key ways in which they are 
interconnected, as will become clear, is in their paradigmatic appropriation of 
Schopenhauer’s conception of healthy organisation qua instrumental hierarchy – one 
that is secured through a struggle for assimilation that is distinctly unagonistic. Thus, 
I begin by arguing that Nietzsche cannot be said to present the Wettkampf as a 
solution to the problem of disunity. I then delineate Schopenhauer’s unagonistic 
account of the origins of functional organisation (Zweckmäßigkeit) and how 
Nietzsche employs this in responding to each of the three crises enumerated above. 
3.3.1. WETTKAMPF 
Given both the emphasis on the unifying quality of the Wettkampf in the writings of 
Nietzsche’s contemporaries and predecessors (e.g. Curtius, Burckhardt and 
Schiller28), as well as the fact that CV 5 was written in the same year that he was 
                                                      
28 For Curtius (1864), the dramaturgical agon had a powerful gathering quality, bringing 
together artists, musicians, actors, poets, architects (who would design the amphitheatres), 
and audience for the staging of the production: “Das ganze Volk wurde überall in die 
Interessen der Kunst hereingezogen” (p.11). Moreover, artists would gather before the Greek 
people (not just that of a single polis), which would then judge their work (alongside official 
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preparing the first Betrachtung (1872), we might reasonably expect Nietzsche’s 
positive portrayal of the Wettkampf to be proffered as a remedy to the crisis of 
disgregation. However, in reality, this only serves to make it all the more 
conspicuous that the unifying quality of the agon has been suppressed in CV 5. 
Nonetheless, Enrico Müller and Christa Davis Acampora (and to some 
extent also David Owen) have attributed a strong unifying function to Nietzsche’s 
early conception of the agon.29 The note that is usally cited in support of this position 
is NL 16[22] 7.402 (one of the preparatory notes for CV 5), in which Nietzsche 
minimally states: “Die panhellenischen Feste: Einheit der Griechen in den Normen 
des Wettkampfes”. In CV 5, the closest he then comes to attributing a unifying 
quality to the agon is in his stating that without the Wettkampf, the Greek polis “wird 
böse und grausam […] — und dann bedarf es nur eines panischen Schreckens, um 
ihn zum Fall zu bringen und zu zerschmettern.” (CV 5 1.518; my italics). Yet this 
does not give us any substantive notion of the cohesive effect of  agonistic conflict; 
it merely implies that the Greek state became weak and susceptible to Persian 
conquest once agonal practices began to decay. According to Nietzsche, the agon 
certainly had a strengthening function, one that gave Greek culture its peculiar 
                                                      
judges, of course) (pp.9-11). The agon (together with religion) thus generated a national 
identity amidst inter-poleis struggles (DW, p.19).  Curtius hoped that cultivating a similar 
agon within German academia would likewise further the project of German unification.  
Similarly, Burckhardt (2014) claims that the Panhellenic games (particularly at 
Olympia) played a key formative role in both foreclosing war and its divisive effects, and 
fostering a unitary Greek identity. Panhellenic contests facilitated this by offering a neutral 
locus for ordinarily hostile tribes to socially interact (vol.4, pp.92-3). 
 Finally, for Schiller, the Greek agon was an ideal example of what he calls the play 
drive (Spieltrieb). In the activity of non-violent play, Schiller thought that the Greeks 
managed to synthesise their physicality (associated with what he calls the Stofftrieb) and their 
love of law and form (the Formtrieb) (see Schiller [2010], Brief XV, pp.62-4). Without such 
a unifying practice, Schiller believed that one of these two tendencies – towards 
materiality/physicality/sensuality on the one hand, and towards abstraction/law/reason on the 
other – tend to tyrannise and make life either barbarically ordered or barbarically anarchic. 
29 See fn. 3. David Owen has also argued that the agon unifies communities insofar as it 
generates shared norms and standards of excellence. See David Owen, Maturity and 
Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason (London: Routledge, 
1994). Owen claims that “[t]he agon is constituted through the ongoing construction, 
destruction and reconstruction of ‘communities of judgement’” (p.77). 
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greatness; but this strengthening quality was indissociable from its centrefugal force. 
Indeed, Nietzsche is often concerned with the potentially disunifying effects of 
agonal struggle. As the previous chapter demonstrated, the primary way Nietzsche 
thought the agon could underwrite social unity was by acting as a flue hole for 
disunifying energies – i.e. by channelling agonistic conflict away from the political 
sphere.30 We also saw that his early conception of the agon relied on the 
superordinate forces of religion, law and education to counteract this centrefugal 
quality of the agon. Organisation can only be maintained, according to Nietzsche, so 
long as these overarching instititutions retain control of the agon.  
Perhaps the strongest evidence we have in favour of the idea that Nietzsche 
understood the agon as a unifying practice is in his lecture GMD, which is not (to 
the best of my knowledge) cited by any of those defending the idea of the 
Nietzschean agon as a socially binding force. In this lecture, Nietzsche endorses the 
“geistvolle” Anselm Feuerbach’s assertion that “Die olympischen Spiele führten die 
gesonderten Griechenstämme zur politisch religiösen Einheit zusammen” (GMD 
1.518). However, in this lecture, Nietzsche’s focus is not on how the form of conflict 
definitive of the agon united people, so much as how tragedy had a socially and 
aesthetically unifying effect.31 Hence, even here, it is not so much measured conflict 
that Nietzsche views as the ground of Greek unity, but communally creating and 
spectating tragedy, which only incidentally took take place in the context of the 
agonal games. For this reason, if we are to locate Nietzsche’s response to the crisis 
of modern distintegration, we need to look beyond the confines of his thoughts on 
the agon. 
                                                      
30 See NL 11[186] 9.514-5; compare also NL 30[7] 7.732-3. 
31 On tragedy’s socially unifying effect, Nietzsche (echoing Wagner) remarks that “Der 
Grieche flüchtete sich aus der ihm so gewohnten zerstreuenden Öffentlichkeit, aus dem 
Leben in Markt Straße und Gerichtshalle, in die ruhig stimmende, zur Sammlung einladende 
Feierlichkeit der Theaterhandlung” (GMD 1.520). 
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3.3.2. SCHOPENHAUER ON CONFLICTUAL 
ORGANISATION  
In trying to analyse Nietzsche’s conception of healthy unity in UB, the most fitting 
point of entry is through Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, and particularly his account 
of how Zweckmäßigkeit emerges through conflict as outlined in WWV. PHG clearly 
evinces that in 1873 Nietzsche was well acquainted with, and even assented to, the 
description of the world as struggle given in WWV I (esp. §27 and §28).32 Indeed, 
as I will demonstrate in the subsequent sections, this gives Nietzsche a basic 
conception of how functional unities emerge out of conflict – a notion he 
paradigmatically employs throughout UB, albeit with modifications. 
According to Schopenhauer, we have experiential access to the an-sich of 
one object – that is, how that object exists beyond all appearance. This object is our 
own body. On the one hand, we experience our body as a mere object or phenomenon 
amongst others. Yet we also know it “from the inside”, so to speak, as an indivisible 
striving, or willing. Schopenhauer argues by analogy that this gives us an insight 
into the interior or noumenal aspect of all objects; thus, for Schopenhauer, all things 
in themselves are defined by this very same indivisible striving.33 Space and time 
are then the conditions of plurality; and, in a typically Kantian fashion, as opposed 
to being properties of the world in itself, Schopenhauer conceives of them as a 
structural framework that we project onto the noumenal world as will, thereby 
transforming it into the world as representation. Hence, the world in itself, being 
outside of space and time “kennt demnach keine Vielheit, ist folglich einer” (WWV 
I, §25 p.185). He directly distinguishes this form of unity, which precedes all 
plurality, from the unity of a concept (which is constructed from a plurality of 
                                                      
32 See PHG §5 1.826, having given an exegesis of Heraclitus’ view of reality as struggle, 
Nietzsche tells us that “Jenen Kampf, der allem Werden eigenthümlich ist, jenen ewigen 
Wechsel des Sieges schildert wiederum Schopenhauer (Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I S 
175)”. Nietzsche then quotes a long section from WWV I §27 as evidence vindicating 
Heraclitus’ worldview. 
33 See WWV I §§19-21.  
 214 
instances, post hoc) or the unity of an individual (which exists in space and time). In 
distinction to these forms of unity, all things in themselves are numerically identical 
to one another and, furthermore, their unity is ontologically prior to their plurality.34  
A similar notion of unity can be ascribed to Schopenhauer’s construal of 
Platonic Ideas. Within Schopenhauer’s system, Ideas represent an intermediary 
between the absolute unity of the world as will and the plurality of the world as 
representation.35 Like Plato, Schopenhauer reasons that for all the individuals of a 
given species of phenomena (that is, for every natural kind), there exists an Idea – 
an essence, model or timeless prototype from which all the individual instantiations 
of that species are derived.36 Moreover, these Ideas are transcendent, existing outside 
of space and time, and, as such, are ontologically prior to all objectivity. Like the 
unity of the will, their unity is not the result of abstraction (from perceived objects) 
and they are therefore said to possess a “unitas ante rem” in contrast to the “unitas 
post rem” of concepts (WWV I §49, p.313).37  
As we saw in Chapter 1, these Ideas are described by Schopenhauer as 
engaged in a fierce and unrelenting struggle at the level of representation. First, they 
must vie with one another in a zero-sum game over matter, which they require in 
                                                      
34 Schopenhauer employs the simile of the magic lantern to illuminate the relation of plurality 
and unity in his notion of the world as will and representation: “Wie eine Zauberlaterne viele 
und mannigfaltige Bilder zeigt, es aber nur eine und die selbe Flamme ist, welche ihnen allen 
die Sichtbarkeit ertheilt; so ist in allen mannigfaltigen Erscheinungen, welche neben einander 
die Welt füllen, oder nach einander als Begebenheiten sich verdrängen, doch nur der eine 
Wille das Erscheinende, dessen Sichtbarkeit, Objektität das Alles ist […]” (WWV I §28, 
p.215). 
35 For a charitable reading of Schopenhauer’s theory of the Idea (or forms), see John E. 
Atwell, Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will (Berkley, 
University of California Press, 1995), pp.129-53. 
36 As Julian Young has argued, Schopenhauer’s understanding of Ideas cannot be equated 
with that of Plato insofar as Schopenhauer does not reify Ideas as does Plato. See Julian 
Young, Schopenhauer (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.129-33 (esp. p.132). Indeed, we may 
want to look at Schopenhauer’s forms as having more in common with Aristotelian essences, 
which inhere like formulae within objects, directing their development and activity. 
37 See WWV I §25, p.187: “Ich verstehe also unter Idee jede bestimmte und feste Stufe der 
Objektivation des Willens, sofern er Ding an sich und daher der Vielheit fremd ist, welche 
Stufen zu den einzelnen Dingen sich allerdings verhalten, wie ihre ewigen Formen, oder ihre 
Musterbilder.” 
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order to become manifest phenomena. The result of this is what Schopenhauer calls 
“allgemeine[r] Kampf” (WWV I §27, p.208). Among animals, this battle of the Ideas 
is most noticeably played out in the struggle for survival, though Schopenhauer also 
claims that it takes place in the inorganic domain, arguing that even forces are 
engaged in this struggle when acting on matter. While in Chapter 1 we found that 
this conflict is indelibly marked by unmeasured, destructive opposition, if we 
examine what he, after Kant, calls inner and outer Zweckmäßigkeit, we find that 
measured conflict is also integral to Schopenhauer’s Weltanschauung.  
Kant’s most lucid account of the philosophically problematic nature of 
Zweckmäßigkeit is in his Kritik der Urteilskraft, where he asks how we can explain 
the existence of functionally organised unities. How can we account for self-
organising beings (i.e. organisms), in which the parts seem to fit together to serve 
the interests of the whole (what Kant calls inner Zweckmäßigkeit)? And how is it 
that nature seems to fit together into a harmonious whole, with all the plants and 
animals supporting one another, with rational human culture standing at the pinnacle 
of this system (what Kant calls outer Zweckmäßigkeit)?38 Kant argues that we simply 
cannot conceive of how such harmonious wholes could arise in a purely mechanistic 
universe by sheer coincidence.39 How could the parts, which serve very specific 
functions with respect to the whole, and also depend on the other parts for their 
existence, have been created without a pre-existing idea of the whole in the mind of 
a creator? Kant’s solution is to suggest that, alongside the notion of mechanistic 
causality, we need to retain the concept of teleological causality as a principle of 
reflective judgement – that is to say, we must think “als ob” they were the product 
of intelligent design in accordance with final ends.40  
                                                      
38 See e.g. KdU, §63 and §67. See also §83, where Kant’s posits culture (“Cultur”) as the 
final end of nature. 
39 As he categorically states with respect to organisms in KdU §66: “Ein organisiertes 
Produkt der Natur ist das, in welchem alles Zweck und wechselseitig auch Mittel ist. Nichts 
in ihm ist umsonst, zwecklos, oder einem blinden Naturmechanism zuzuschreiben” (p.376). 
40 See KdU §70, where Kant maintains that the following maxim must be taken as a principle 
of reflective jusdgement: “Einige Produkte der materiellen Natur können nicht, als nach bloß 
mechanischen Gesetzen möglich, beurteilt warden (ihre Beurteilung erfordert ein ganz 
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Schopenhauer, however, arrives at a very different, arguably more dogmatic, 
conclusion – namely, that the unity of any entity has its ground in the metaphysical 
unity of its Platonic Idea. Universal struggle is, for Schopenhauer, the turbulent 
matrix out of which ever higher Ideas enter the world – a process culminating in 
man, which he calls the “deutlichste und vollkommenste Objektivation” of the will 
(WWV I §28, p.216). For the Idea of man to become manifest, however, it “mußte 
begleitet seyn von der Stufenfolge abwärts durch alle Gestaltungen der Thiere, durch 
das Pflanzenreich, bis zum Unorganischen”– the reason for this is that man needs a 
world into which he can be born, and the materials for his survival. As such, all the 
Ideas “ergänzen sich zur vollständigen Objektivation des Willens” (ibid.). 
Schopenhauer’s Ideas thus form a pyramidal hierarchy, with man standing at its 
apex. It is important to note that this outer Zweckmäßigkeit – understood as a form 
of unity arising from an antagonism internal to the system – emerges because 
phenomena must reflect or embody the unity of the will, which is itself defined by an 
inner antagonism.41 
Just as outer Zweckmäßigkeit, emerges from the conflict between 
individuals, so, for Schopenhauer, the inner Zweckmäßigkeit of organisms is 
grounded in the conflict within individuals. Every organism is a hierarchy of Ideas; 
indeed, higher Ideas, he tells us, are only able prevail in the struggle by pressing 
lower Ideas into the service of their higher purpose: 
[S]o geht aus diesem Streit die Erscheinung einer hohem Idee hervor, 
welche die vorhin dagewesenen unvollkommeneren alle überwältigt, 
jedoch so, daß sie das Wesen derselben auf eine untergeordnete Weise 
                                                      
anderes Gesetz der Kausalität, nämlich das der Endursachen)” (p.387). As he also states in 
§67, the conception of nature as a “System der Zwecke” “nicht ein Prinzip für die 
bestimmende, sondern nur für die reflektierende Urteilskraft sei, daß es regulativ und nicht 
konstitutiv sei, und wir dadurch nur einen Leitfaden bekommen, die Naturdinge in Beziehung 
auf einen Bestimmungsgrund, der schon gegeben ist, nach einer neuen gesetzlichen Ordnung 
zu betrachten, und die Naturkunde nach einem andern Prinzip, nämlich dem der 
Endursachen, doch unbeschadet dem des Mechanisms ihrer Kausalität, zu erweitern” 
(p.379). 
41 See WWV I §28, p.217. 
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bestehn läßt, indem sie ein Analogen davon in sich aufnimmt (WWV I 
§27, p.205). 
This exploitative, instrumentalising struggle to establish hierarchy is the constitutive 
ground of every phenomenon: “Kein Sieg ohne Kampf: indem die höhere Idee, oder 
Willensobjektivation, nur durch Ueberwältigung der niedrigeren hervortreten kann” 
(ibid., pp.206-7). In the case of an organism, Schopenhauer gives the example of the 
digestive organs competing against the rest of the body for energy, or the body 
digesting and exploiting organic matter. He defines the health of the organism as its 
ability to contain these various conflicts and keep lower Ideas subordinated to the 
higher purpose of the individual.42 The effectiveness with which these lower Ideas 
are subordinated – that is, the rigor with which the hierarchical organisation is upheld 
– directly correlates to the degree of health and perfection attained by the 
phenomenon in question (an idea that finds precedence in Goethe43).  
Like Kant, Schopenhauer rejects the idea that we are able to explain the unity 
of the organism with reference to mechanical laws; though, unlike Kant, he 
additionally makes the speculative metaphysical claim that this proves the existence 
of Ideas: 
Man [wird] zwar im Organismus die Spuren chemischer und physischer 
Wirkungsarten nachweisen, aber nie ihn aus diesen erklären können; 
weil er keineswegs ein durch das vereinigte Wirken solcher Kräfte, also 
zufällig hervorgebrachtes Phänomen ist, sondern eine höhere Idee, 
welche sich jene niedrigeren durch überwältigende Assimilation 
unterworfen hat. (WWV I §27, p.206) 
                                                      
42 WWV I §27, p.207: “[D]aher ist das behagliche Gefühl der Gesundheit, welches den Sieg 
der Idee des sich seiner bewußten Organismus über die physischen und chemischen Gesetze, 
welche ursprünglich die Säfte des Leibes beherrschen, ausdrückt […].” 
43 See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, “Zur Morphologie” (1817), in Goethes Werke. 
Hamburger Ausgabe, 14 vols (vol.13) (Hamburg: Wegner, 1948), pp.53-520: “Je 
unvollkommener das Geschöpf ist, desto mehr sind diese Teile einander gleich oder ähnlich, 
und desto mehr gleichen sie dem Ganzen. Je vollkommner das Geschöpf wird, desto 
unähnlicher werden die Teile einander. In jenem Falle ist das Ganze den Teilen mehr oder 
weniger gleich, in diesem das Ganze den Teilen unähnlich. Je ähnlicher die Teile einander 
sind, desto weniger sind sie einander subordiniert. Die Subordination der Teile deutet auf ein 
vollkommneres Geschöpf” (p.55). 
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Organismic unity can only be explained, according to Schopenhauer’s abductive 
reasoning, on the basis of an actively striving metaphysical entity – that is, an Idea. 
Moreover, this is a process of struggle aimed at subduing and exploiting other Ideas. 
Yet even when these subaltern Ideas have been pressed into a hierarchy, conflict is 
nonetheless pervasive within the organism. This is because Ideas are always 
struggling to break free of their fetters and reassert their independence. Despite the 
fact they have been forced into “Dienstbarkeit,” lower Ideas “immer noch streben, 
zur unabhängigen und vollständigen Aeußerung ihres Wesens zu gelangen.” (WWV 
I §27, p.207). Death therefore often results from the eventual victory of the lower 
Ideas in their rebellious struggle and the consequent disintegration of the hierarchy 
which constituted the organism; though it also arises (as mentioned above) as Ideas 
snatch matter from one another – for example, when organic entities consume one 
another in order to survive. Just as a victor in battle might sack and enslave a defeated 
city, the victorious Idea disbands the opposed organism and instrumentalises the 
Ideas previously organised therein.44  
It should now be obvious why Schopenhauer holds the view that “wir 
[sehen] in der Natur überall Streit, Kampf und Wechsel des Sieges” (ibid.). It is 
imperative to remark that this vision of reality as an unceasing struggle for 
assimilation forms the basis of Schopenhauer’s pessimistic worldview, as well as 
motivating his advocacy of an ethics of life-denial. As Nietzsche himself observes, 
Schopenhauer considered such universal strife “ein durchweg entsetzliches, 
keineswegs beglückendes Phänomen” (PHG 1.826). With respect to its purely 
descriptive features, however, we can attribute the following characteristics to 
assimilative struggle: 
 
                                                      
44 As Schopenhauer puts it: “Die deutlichste Sichtbarkeit erreicht dieser allgemeine Kampf 
in der Thierwelt, welche die Pflanzenwelt zu ihrer Nahrung hat, und in welcher selbst wieder 
jedes Thier die Beute und Nahrung eines andern wird, d.h. die Materie, in welcher seine Idee 
sich darstellte, zur Darstellung einer andern abtreten muß, indem jedes Thier sein Daseyn 
nur durch die beständige Aufhebung eines fremden erhalten kann” (WWV I §27 p.208). 
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1. Within it, opposed relata (Ideen) strive to subjugate their counterparts into a 
functional hierarchy; 
2. Its telos, instrumental hierarchy, is associated with health; 
3. It is inextricably associated with unmeasured conflict (qua the forced 
dissolution of existing unities as a means to commandeering their 
constituent Ideas); 
4. It continues within the instrumental hierarchies even once these have been 
established; 
5. It is driven by a species of metaphysically substantial entity (i.e. Ideen). 
Measured conflict can therefore be described as an essential aspect of the world as 
representation for Schopenhauer, since Ideas are first and foremost striving to 
preserve the Ideas they overcome, albeit in a condition of servitude. Despite this 
measure, however, this struggle of higher versus lower Ideas cannot be labelled 
agonistic due to its being characterised by inequality, instrumentalisation and, 
despite its measured aim of subjugation, often being conditioned by the destructive 
process of disbanding existing unities (i.e. instantiations of Ideas). In the following 
sections, I will elucidate how the various struggles for organisation proposed by 
Nietzsche in UB paradigmatically fulfil these criteria. 
3.3.3. PLASTISCHE KRAFT 
In UB I, as in CV 5, Nietzsche explictly rejects militarism as a path to true culture. 
Contrary to bellicose readings of his thought (such as those of Bäumler, Russel and 
Dombowsky), he unequivocally states that “[s]trenge Kriegszucht, natürliche 
Tapferkeit und Ausdauer, Ueberlegenheit der Führer, Einheit und Gehorsam unter 
den Geführten [sind] Elemente, die nichts mit der Kultur zu thun haben” (UB I 1 
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1.160; my italics). Yet despite this point of overlap, CV 5 and UB do not share a 
corresponding concern with the Wettkampf as a constructive social alternative. 
Indeed, Nietzsche does not even once mention either the Wettkampf or agon in UB, 
where he is overtly responding to the problem of disgregation. What makes it so 
surprising that CV 5 and the notion of the Wettkampf is the first port of call for 
commentators seeking to develop a Nietzschean theory of organisation is that we 
find him giving an explicit (and as we shall see, quite unagonistic) account of how 
we might unify ourselves socially and individually in UB. While it has been 
suggested only recently that Nietzsche abandoned Schopenhauer’s notion of 
Zweckmäßigkeit as of 1868, we will see that his proposed resolution profoundly 
resonates with Schopenhauer’s thoughts on organisation.45 In order to bring this into 
relief, we should first examine how he suggests we tackle the problem of 
philistinism. 
Despite Nietzsche’s critique of over-education, and in particular, the 
excessive accumulation of historical knowledge of other cultures, it should be 
highlighted that he does not think that we can do without historical knowledge; 
rather, as he himself emphatically remarks: “das Unhistorische und das Historische 
ist gleichermaassen für die Gesundheit eines Einzelnen, eines Volkes und einer 
Cultur nöthig” (UB II 1 1.252).  But how can historical learning concretely remedy 
the problem of disintegration to which its excess, or “hypertrophy”, gave rise in the 
first place? We can begin to tackle this question by expounding the three types of 
history Nietzsche identifies in UB II, and the ways in which he thinks they can be 
either advantageous or deleterious to life. 
                                                      
45 See Kevin Hill, Nietzsche’s Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of his Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford Univerity Press, 2003). Referring to Schopenhauer’s conception of Zweckmäßigkeit, 
Hill claims that, “When Nietzsche read Schopenhauer in 1865, he quickly embraced both the 
metaphysics of the will and the speculative account of teleology that flowed from it. But 
Nietzsche’s early enthusiasm for Schopenhauer’s metaphysics soon dimmed, and with it, his 
ability to make sense of teleology. In 1868, Nietzsche turned to Kant’s third Critique to make 
good this loss” (p.75). 
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First, Nietzsche describes monumental history, a mode of historical praxis 
that glorifies past individuals and thereby conscripts them as exemplars for future 
action. The great man of action, “der einen grossen Kampf kämpft, der Vorbilder, 
Lehrer, Tröster braucht und sie unter seinen Genossen und in der Gegenwart nicht 
zu finden vermag” (UB II 2 1.258). We might think of Schiller’s idealisation of the 
Greeks as epitomising this kind of history insofar as he mines the past to provide his 
present with exemplars for future action.46 By looking into the past, one can see the 
potential, and set a standard, for greatness in the future. Rather than being informed 
by a desire for preservation, this form of historical practice is driven by the wish for 
happiness (“Glück”), greatness (“Grosse”) and “den Begriff ‘Mensch’ weiter 
auszuspannen und schöner zu erfüllen” (UB II 2 1.259). In order to render the past 
serviceable to the present, however, monumental historians must always elide the 
parts of it that make an exemplar particular to their historical context – that is, they 
must always distort the past: 
Wie viel des Verschiedenen muss, wenn sie jene kräftigende Wirkung 
thun soll, dabei übersehen, wie gewaltsam muss die Individualität des 
Vergangenen in eine allgemeine Form hineingezwängt und an allen 
scharfen Ecken und Linien zu Gunsten der Uebereinstimmung 
zerbrochen werden! (UB II 2 1.261) 
Taken to excess, though, Nietzsche warns that this can lead to the distortion of the 
past for violent, seditious ends, and even lead to a form of atavism that harmfully 
impedes progress (“die Werdenden und Wollenden”) (UB II 2 1.263).  
Thankfully, antiquarian history, which is more concerned with the faithful 
documentation of the past, can act as an antidote for this distorting excess. The 
antiquarian serves life “[i]ndem er das von Alters her Bestehende mit behutsamer 
Hand pflegt, will er die Bedingungen, unter denen er entstanden ist, für solche 
bewahren, welche nach ihm entstehen sollen” (UB II 3 1.265). He describes this as 
a “Festschrauben” “an […] Gesellen und Umgebungen, an […] mühselige 
                                                      
46 For evidence that Nietzsche himself thought of Schiller in precisely this way, see NL 
29[117] 7.684: “Schiller gebrauchte die Historie im monumentalen Sinne”. 
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Gewohnheit” (UB II 3 1.266). However, the myopic and reverent study of one’s own 
past comes with its own attendant dangers: 
Der antiquarische Sinn eines Menschen, einer Stadtgemeinde, eines 
ganzen Volkes hat immer ein höchst beschränktes Gesichtsfeld; das 
Allermeiste nimmt er gar nicht wahr, und das Wenige, was er sieht, 
sieht er viel zu nahe und isolirt; er kann es nicht messen und nimmt 
deshalb alles als gleich wichtig und deshalb jedes Einzelne als zu 
wichtig. Dann giebt es für die Dinge der Vergangenheit keine 
Werthverschiedenheiten und Proportionen, die den Dingen unter 
einander wahrhaft gerecht Würden […]. (UB II 3 1.267) 
In stressing that everything is good within this narrow range of focus, antiquarian 
history itself ends up distorting the past by robbing it of its variability in value 
(“Werthverschiedenheit”) and thereby flattening it. As Catherine Zuckert has 
observed, “antiquarian preservation changes the very past it would retain”. 47 
Moreover, this fetishistic piety (“Pietät”) of a people towards its traditions and 
cultural roots eventually means that antiquarian history also constricts growth and 
progress: “sie versteht eben allein Leben zu bewahren, nicht zu zeugen; deshalb 
unterschätzt sie immer das Werdende” (UB II 3 1.268). Finally, when this mode of 
historical praxis extends beyond one’s own national roots, it can descend into “das 
widrige Schauspiel einer blinden Sammelwuth, eines rastlosen Zusammenscharrens 
alles einmal Dagewesenen” (ibid.) – at which point, it becomes the very quintessence 
of philistinism. 
The final mode of history described by Nietzsche is that of critical history, 
which he presents as an explosive corrective to the conservatism of antiquarian 
history: “[man] muss die Kraft haben und von Zeit zu Zeit anwenden, eine 
Vergangenheit zu zerbrechen und aufzulösen, um leben zu können” (UB II 3 1.269). 
                                                      
47 This is to say, antiquarian history “does not present historical truth” (despite its pretentions 
to the contrary). See Catherine Zuckert, “Nature, History and the Self: Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
Untimely Considerations”, Nietzsche-Studien, 5 (1976), 55-82 (pp.61-2). See also 
Salaquarda (1984), p.20. Indeed, according to Nietzsche, all history can be said to have a 
distorting effect insofar as “Alles Erinnern ist Vergleichen d.h. Gleichsetzen” (NL 29[29] 
7.636). 
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By denuding the unjust origins (e.g., in violence or weakness) of a particular 
moribund and constrictive social phenomenon (e.g. “eines Privilegiums, einer Kaste, 
einer Dynastie zum Beispiel”), critical history works to destroy such phenomena and 
thereby enable the creation of new social orders and traditions – that is, it allows us 
to supplant an embedded part of our “erste Natur” with a new “zweite Natur”.48 
Notwithstanding these remarks, Nietzsche is highly doubtful regarding the extent to 
which this destruction of the disagreeable aspects of our heritage is possible, or even 
advisable: 
[D]ie Thatsache [ist] nicht beseitigt, dass wir aus ihnen herstammen. 
Wir bringen es im besten Falle zu einem Widerstreite der ererbten, 
angestammten Natur und unserer Erkenntniss, auch wohl zu einem 
Kampfe einer neuen strengen Zucht gegen das von Alters her 
Angezogne und Angeborne, wir pflanzen eine neue Gewöhnung, einen 
neuen Instinct, eine zweite Natur an, so dass die erste Natur abdorrt. Es 
ist ein Versuch, sich gleichsam a posteriore eine Vergangenheit zu 
geben, aus der man stammen möchte, im Gegensatz zu der, aus der man 
stammt — immer ein gefährlicher Versuch, weil es so schwer ist eine 
Grenze im Verneinen des Vergangenen zu finden und weil die zweiten 
Naturen meistens schwächlicher als die ersten sind. (UB II 3 1.270)  
The critical approach, when indulged to excess, harmfully strives for the severance 
of one’s roots. Moreover, Nietzsche warns that it is hard to place a limit on this 
destructive activity (“es so schwer ist eine Grenze im Verneinen des Vergangenen 
zu finden”).49 For these reasons, “Menschen oder Zeiten, die auf diese Weise dem 
Leben dienen, dass sie eine Vergangenheit richten und vernichten, sind immer 
gefährliche und gefährdete Menschen und Zeiten” (ibid.). Yet, in spite of his 
                                                      
48 Nietzsche first describes critical history as the means by which “[d]er Mensch” fulfils his 
desire “von Noth sich befreien” (NL 29[115] 7.683). See Salaquarda (1984), p.28. Jörg 
Salaquarda has shown how Nietzsche was influenced by Franz Grillparzer in this respect. 
See Georg Salaquarda, “‘Er ist fast immer einer der Unserigen’: Nietzsche und Grillparzer”, 
in T. Borsche, F. Gerratana, A. Venturelli (eds.), “Centauren-Geburten”: Wissenschaft, 
Kunst und Philosophy beim jungen Nietzsche (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994), p.239 and p.245.  
49 This emphasis on the fact that we often “abstammen” from the parts of our culture that we 
wish to destroy can be seen as a step away from the position he defends in GT 23, where he 
suggests that Roman influences should be removed as a failed graft should be amputated 
from a tree.  
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reservations, Nietzsche can certainly be said to sanction this destructive act of radical 
critique, that is, the unmeasured struggle to empty a tradition of its cachet by means 
of divulging its ignominious origins. 
These are the potential uses of history for life, which is to say, for 
preservation (secured by antiquarian history) and flourishing (enabled by critical 
history and realised by monumental history). As we saw above, Nietzsche does not 
think man can survive without distorting and exploiting the past for his own 
purposes. He describes this process of pressing history into the service of one’s life-
needs as one of incorporation (“Einverleibung”):  
Je stärkere Wurzeln die innerste Natur eines Menschen hat, um so mehr 
wird er auch von der Vergangenheit sich aneignen oder anzwingen; und 
dächte man sich die mächtigste und ungeheuerste Natur, so wäre sie 
daran zu erkennen, dass es für sie gar keine Grenze des historischen 
Sinnes geben würde, an der er überwuchernd und schädlich zu wirken 
vermöchte; alles Vergangene, eigenes und fremdestes, würde sie an 
sich heran, in sich hineinziehen und gleichsam zu Blut umschaffen. 
(UB II 1 1.251) 
The ability to exploit history in order to repair and renew culture in the present – i.e., 
“Vergangenes und Fremdes umzubilden und einzuverleiben, Wunden auszuheilen, 
Verlorenes zu ersetzen, zerbrochene Formen aus sich nachzuformen” – is what 
Nietzsche refers to as “die plastische Kraft eines Menschen, eines Volkes, einer 
Cultur” (ibid.). What is striking about this early passage in UB is that it seems to be 
describing the ideal form of history as monumental history. The practice of drawing 
foreign influences into ourselves and then transforming them into our lifeblood 
(“hineinziehen und gleichsam zu Blut umschaffen”), of forcefully distorting them in 
the manner of the man of action forging models for himself out of the past, 
encapsulates his description of monumental history; conversely, it jars with his 
conception of the piety of antiquarian history, and the destructiveness of critical 
history. Nietzsche’s ideal thus seems to be best represented by monumental history, 
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kept within bounds by antiquarian and enabled by critical history.50 As Jörg 
Salaquarda has remarked, Nietzsche only added the critical mode of history at a 
relatively late stage of his preparations for UB II. To be sure, for the most part he 
planned the essay as an apology for monumental history over and against antiquarian 
history, which he largely equates with philistinism.51 In light of this prioritisation, 
we should now make a closer study of monumental history with two questions in 
mind: how does this process of instrumentalising the past resolve the problem of 
disgregation? And can this mode of engagement with history be considered agonal 
in kind?  
Nietzsche takes the pre-Socratic Greeks to have exemplified this ability to 
incorporate knowledge of past and foreign cultures in their appropriation of 
Egyptian, Lydian, Indian, Jewish, Oriental, Zoroastrian and Chinese cultural 
influences. According to Nietzsche, the Greeks aggregated and implemented their 
knowledge of foreign cultures in accordance with their real needs (“ihre ächten 
Bedürfnisse”). Among these needs, he specifies the demand to be “glücklich”, “weis 
und ruhig”,52 and to excel one’s neighbours (“[zu schwingen] sich hoch und höher 
als der Nachbar”).53 This attentiveness to their true needs gave them a standard 
according to which the fray of foreign influences could then be organised:   
                                                      
50 Indeed, Nietzsche sometimes even states that only the monumental (or as he also calls it, 
the “Klassisch”) form of history truly attends to a culture’s life-needs. See e.g. NL 29[29] 
7.636: “Das Lebensbedürfniss verlangt nach dem Klassischen, das Wahrheitsbedürfniss nach 
dem Antiquarischen. Das Erste behandelt das Vergangne mit Kunst und künstlerischer 
Verklärungskraft.” 
51 See Salaquarda (1984), p.18. On the emergence and insertion of the critical mode of history 
into the plan of UB II, see p.28. 
52 As he says in PHG 1 1.807: “[D]as, was sie [die Griechen] lernten, sogleich leben wollten.” 
See also UB IV 6 1.463: “So benutzen die jetzigen Gelehrten und Philosophen die Weisheit 
der Inder und Griechen nicht, um in sich weise und ruhig zu werden: ihre Arbeit soll blos 
dazu dienen, der Gegenwart einen täuschenden Ruf der Weisheit zu verschaffen.” See also 
NL 8[15] 10.335, where Nietzsche highlights the “Empfindung, mit der jeder Philosoph seine 
Gegner niederkämpfen wollte — durch den praktischen Beweis, daß er der Glücklichste sei.” 
53 PHG 1 1.806: “[S]ie [die Griechen] haben […] alle bei anderen Völkern lebende Bildung 
in sich eingesogen, sie kamen gerade deshalb so weit, weil sie es verstanden den Speer von 
dort weiter zu schleudern, wo ihn ein anderes Volk liegen ließ […] und so, wie sie, sollen 
wir von unsern Nachbarn lernen, zum Leben, nicht zum gelehrtenhaften Erkennen, alles 
Erlernte als Stütze benutzend, auf der man sich hoch und höher als der Nachbar schwingt.”  
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Die Griechen lernten allmählich das Chaos zu organisiren, dadurch dass 
sie sich, nach der delphischen Lehre, auf sich selbst, das heisst auf ihre 
ächten Bedürfnisse zurück besannen und die Schein-Bedürfnisse 
absterben liessen. So ergriffen sie wieder von sich Besitz; sie blieben 
nicht lange die überhäuften Erben und Epigonen des ganzen Orients; 
sie wurden selbst, nach beschwerlichem Kampfe mit sich selbst, durch 
die praktische Auslegung jenes Spruches, die glücklichsten Bereicherer 
und Mehrer des ererbten Schatzes und die Erstlinge und Vorbilder aller 
kommenden Culturvölker. (UB II 10 1.333; my italics) 
On the ancient Greek model, knowledge of the past is only retained if it can be 
implemented, if it can be given an instrumental value with respect to the present.54 
Exemplars from the past – i.e., models and standards for aesthetic and ethical action 
– are only preserved and taught to subsequent generations to the extent that they can 
be implemented as expedients in the face of current obstacles. For Nietzsche, this 
criterion of implementability applies not just to historical knowledge, but to 
knowledge more generally. Thus, he extolls “[jene] [einfache] Mannestreue, die 
einen Alten zwang, wo er auch war, was er auch trieb, sich als Stoiker zu gebärden, 
falls er der Stoa einmal Treue zugesagt hatte” (UB II 5 1.282). 
According to this account of the struggle for incorporation – the 
“beschwerliche[.] Kampfe mit sich selbst” – what cannot be applied must be 
forgotten: “Das was eine solche Natur nicht bezwingt, weiss sie [die Griechen] zu 
vergessen” (UB II 1 1.251). By this, Nietzsche seems to be saying that we should 
not revise such knowledge, nor should it form part of the curriculum of education; it 
should rather be left to recede into oblivion. This is what Nietzsche refers to as the 
“unhistorische” mode of existence.  
 At a stroke, this solves problem (a), the disgregation of influences on 
agency, and (b), the disjunction of our inner and outer existence. First, by seeking 
ways by which to implement knowledge, and by forgetting any knowledge that does 
                                                      
54 See his criticism of linguistics and the study of Indian philosophy in UB III 8 1.424: “Man 
treibt zum Beispiel die sprachlichen Studien eifriger als je, ohne dass man für sich selbst eine 
strenge Erziehung in Schrift und Rede für nöthig befände. Das indische Alterthum eröffnet 
seine Thore, und seine Kenner haben zu den unvergänglichsten Werken der Inder, zu ihren 
Philosophien kaum ein andres Verhältniss als ein Thier zur Lyra […].” 
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not have pragmatic value, a combination of influences is formed that is wholly suited 
to one’s true aesthetic and ethical needs. Second, in concretely applying knowledge, 
one reunifies one’s interior life (of knowledge and belief) with one’s exterior 
existence (in praxis). 
 But can this “beschwerliche[.] Kampfe mit sich selbst”, which one must 
undertake in order to synthesise foreign influences, justifiably be called agonal? 
Despite Nietzsche cursorily mentioning that this struggle is informed by an agonal 
desire to excel one’s neighbours, I would contend that the relation he encourages 
towards our historical influences is certainly not agonal in kind; rather, it is 
characterised by both instrumentalisation, and the unmeasured exclusion of certain 
data in a way that is incompatible with agonal struggle. If we invoke Nietzsche’s 
exposition of the kind of cultural organisation he is proposing, it becomes 
immediately apparent that the mode of Kampf being advocated has little in common 
with his conception of the agon: 
Soll nun das Leben über das Erkennen, über die Wissenschaft, soll das 
Erkennen über das Leben herrschen? Welche von beiden Gewalten ist 
die höhere und entscheidende? Niemand wird zweifeln: das Leben ist 
die höhere, die herrschende Gewalt, denn ein Erkennen, welches das 
Leben vernichtete, würde sich selbst mit vernichtet haben. (UB II 10 
1.331) 
The normative thesis that the needs of life ought to dominate (“herrschen”) the 
pursuit of knowledge is justified by the fact that any other arrangement would, 
according to Nietzsche, entail eventual death.55 He does not advocate an agon 
between our life-needs and our knowledge of other cultures, but a Kampf for a stable, 
functional (i.e. instrumentalising) hierarchy, within which, learning, and what we 
learn, is wholly subordinated to our instrumental needs. The accent on exploitative 
                                                      
55 See also UB II 1 1.257: “Denn bei einem gewissen Uebermaass derselben zerbröckelt und 
entartet das Leben und zuletzt auch wieder, durch diese Entartung, selbst die Historie”. In 
UB II 3 1.268, Nietzsche also censures the situation in which “die Historie [dient] dem 
vergangnen Leben so […], dass sie das Weiterleben und gerade das höhere Leben untergräbt, 
wenn der historische Sinn das Leben nicht mehr conservirt, sondern mumisirt […].” 
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relations makes it difficult to read an agonistic impetus into UB II. The struggle to 
incorporate influences within oneself is a process in which, as Vanessa Lemm has 
aptly phrased it, “the human being appropriates, dominates and rules over the past”.56 
As Herman Siemens has observed, this bears a striking resemblance to the 
process of “Übertragung” that is depicted in CV 5. This denotes the process by virtue 
of which the agonal Greeks managed to “einordnen” their aggressive and destructive 
natural drives into culturally productive activity.57 On the basis of this, Siemens 
maintains that “[t]he key to Nietzsche’s thought here is a notion of productive and 
inclusive conflict that he derives from the signature institution of pre-Socratic 
culture: the contest or agon (Wettkampf). It is through a transformative assimilation 
– or Übertragung – of natural, destructive drives that the agon was born.”58 
However, neither the fact that the agon emerges out of an analogous type of 
organisational struggle, nor the fact that the resultant organisation is productive, are 
sufficient conditions for considering such struggle agonistic. Indeed, the 
“Einordnung” of drives upon which the agon is grounded is one that aims at a 
functional hierarchy, within which destructive energies are enduringly subordinated 
to, and pressed into the service of, the social whole.59 To be sure, the struggle for 
Übertragung (or “Einordnung”60) is, like the agonal conflict to which it gives birth, 
a non-destructive (i.e. measured) and productive mode of relation. Notwithstanding, 
the agon, as I have construed it, is not motivated by the desire to instrumentally 
command (i.e. “einordnen”) one’s agonistic opponent, as is the case with this 
                                                      
56Vanessa Lemm, “Nietzsche, Einverleibung and the Politics of Immunity”, International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies, 21 (2013), 3-19 (p.6). 
57 See NL 16[15] 7.398: “Der Dichter erzieht: die tigerartigen Zerfleischungstriebe der 
Griechen weiß er zu übertragen in die gute Eris.” 
58 See Herman Siemens (2001a), p.101. 
59 NL 21[14] 7.526: “Was ist es, was die mächtigen Triebe in die Bahn der Wohlfahrt bringt? 
Im Allgemeinen die Liebe. Die Liebe zur Heimatstadt […]”; NL 16[18] 7.399: “Wie die 
griechische Natur alle furchtbaren Eigenschaften zu benutzen weiß: die tigerartige 
Vernichtungswuth (der Stämme usw.) im Wettkampf”. 
60 See also NL [146] 8.79: “Die Natur, wie sie sich zeigt, wird nicht weggeleugnet, sondern 
nur eingeordnet, auf bestimmte Culte und Tage beschränkt. […] [M]an suchte für die 
Naturkräfte eine mässige Entladung, nicht eine Vernichtung und Verneinung. — Das ganze 
System von neuer Ordnung ist dann der Staat.” 
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incorporative mode of conflict. The observation that the agon is preconditioned by 
a type of organisational struggle, does not justify the equation of these two distinct 
forms of conflict. 
Another way in which UB II resists agonistic readings is in its persistent 
valorisation of unmeasured conflict. It should now be plain that for Nietzsche there 
is the need to forget expendable knowledge and thus be rid of its harmful influence. 
Organisational struggle is therefore both the struggle to include useful knowledge 
within the horizon of one’s needs and to fully exclude knowledge that one has been 
identified as redundant. The drawing of any boundary is always an at once inclusive 
and exclusive act. We should further note that this is not an act of exclusion that 
maintains a conflictual relation with that which has been excluded. It is an instance 
of complete obfuscation – any excluded value (i.e. guide for action) from another 
culture is simply “nicht mehr da, der Horizont ist geschlossen und ganz” (UB II 1 
1.251).61 It is also worth adding that this process of exclusion is in no way analogous 
to ostracism, since the reasoning behind it is not the excessive predominance, or 
tyrannical effect of a given cultural influence, but simply because that influence fails 
to fit the needs of the social whole. 
Organisational struggle denotes precisely this dual activity of incorporation 
(measured) and exclusion (unmeasured). Indeed, Nietzsche further emphasises the 
way in which unmeasured conflict is a prerequisite of the incorporative processes he 
so values insofar as he exhorts his readers to an unambiguously unmeasured mode 
of struggle at the end of UB II. Here he appeals to the “Jugend, jenes ersten 
Geschlechtes von Kämpfern”, the “Schlangentödtern”, who will undertake the 
urgent and burdensome task that he has set forth in UB II. In naming them 
“Schlangentödtern”, and in defending their right to “Roheit und Unmässigkeit”, he 
makes it quite transparent that he is campaigning for anything but a measured, agonal 
mode of conflict:  
                                                      
61 Drawing on JGB 188, Müller-Lauter (1999) has referred to this as “the healthy tendency 
to eliminate what could disturb the ‘healthy closedness’ of the horizon […]” (p.31). 
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Ihre Mission aber ist es, die Begriffe, die jene Gegenwart von 
“Gesundheit” und “Bildung” hat, zu erschüttern und Hohn und Hass 
gegen so hybride Begriffs-Ungeheuer zu erzeugen; und das 
gewährleistende Anzeichen ihrer eignen kräftigeren Gesundheit soll 
gerade dies sein, dass sie diese Jugend nämlich, selbst keinen Begriff, 
kein Parteiwort aus den umlaufenden Wort- und Begriffsmünzen der 
Gegenwart zur Bezeichnung ihres Wesens gebrauchen kann, sondern 
nur von einer in ihr thätigen kämpfenden, ausscheidenden, 
zertheilenden Macht und von einem immer erhöhten Lebensgefühle in 
jeder guten Stunde überzeugt wird. (UB II 10 1.331) 
The language with which Nietzsche marshals the “Jugend” in this passage can hardly 
be read as a provocation to measured, agonal conflict. As he himself says earlier in 
the same section, one sets out on the path to realise true culture “Vor allem dadurch, 
dass er [der Jugend] einen Aberglauben zerstört, den Glauben an die Nothwendigkeit 
jener [philisterhaften] Erziehungs-Operation” (UB II 10 1.326). The false and 
counter-productive belief of antiquarian philistines that the indiscriminate 
accumulation of knowledge is the only means by which to cultivate the youth – and 
that such accumulation forms the basis of “Gesundheit” and “Bildung” – is an 
injurious superstition, which has arisen out of weakness (i.e. a temporary need for 
self-preservation rather than flourishing). Moreover, this prejudice only further 
exacerbates the problem of measurelessness (i.e. hypertrophy). On these grounds, 
then, this fallacious belief must be destroyed (“zerstört”). This is chiefly achieved 
by generating “Hohn und Hass” against the entrenched convictions that block the 
project of cultural Erneurung. As such, destruction is figured as a process of 
devaluation or radical critique. This accords with DWB, which gives the primary 
definition of vernichten as “für nichts achten, unwerth halten” (the secondary 
definition, “zu grunde richten”, then only applies in the case of “sinnliche dinge”).62 
As he indicates in his retrospective appraisal of UB I in 1888-9, the text represents 
an act of “schonungsloser Verachtung” (my italics): “Der erste Angriff 
[Betrachtung] (1873) galt der deutschen Bildung, auf die ich damals schon mit 
                                                      
62 See DWB, entry for “vernichten” (vol.25, col.922-5). 
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schonungsloser Verachtung hinabblickte. Ohne Sinn, ohne Substanz, ohne Ziel: eine 
blosse ‘öffentliche Meinung’” (EH UB 1 6.316). 
But what distinguishes the forms of unmeasured conflict that Nietzsche 
advocates from those that he condemns; for example, the struggle that he associates 
with Socrates and the destructive drive for knowledge in GT, or the ruinous historical 
sense, or even the evil Eris of CV 5? 63 In short, these degenerate forms of 
unmeasured conflict are criticised on account of their being hostile to life and 
culture.64 Indeed, the principal effect of excess knowledge is that, as we saw, man 
“hat seinen Instinct vernichtet und verloren” (UB II 5 1.280), thereby losing  his 
natural self-confidence in action, which leaves him stultified and severely hinders 
his ability to flourish.65 Then in Chapter 1, we established that in CV 5 Nietzsche 
rebukes the physical Vernichtungskampf on account of its culturally detrimental 
effects.  
Contrariwise, the destructive conflict promoted by Nietzsche consistently 
stimulates creativity and growth, thereby serving the end of promoting life and 
culture.66 This is a case akin to “justifiable homicide”, particularly murder on 
grounds of self-defence, where the killing (i.e. destruction) of one’s assailant is 
permitted on the grounds that he would likely have murdered one, had he not been 
killed. Thus, Schopenhauer is praised as the “Vernichter kulturfeindlicher Kräfte” 
                                                      
63 See UB II 7 1.295: “Der historische Sinn, wenn er ungebändigt waltet und alle seine 
Consequenzen zieht, entwurzelt die Zukunft, weil er die Illusionen zerstört und den 
bestehenden Dingen ihre Atmosphäre nimmt, in der sie allein leben können.” 
64 According to Nietzsche, Socrates (and Euripides), in their unlimited propagation of 
dialectics as a measure of value, strove for the destruction of myth, instinct and Greek 
tragedy, which were the grounds of Hellenic vitality. NL 1[43] 7.21: “Die griechische 
Tragödie fand in Sokrates ihre Vernichtung.”  See also SGT 1.541-2. 
65  See UB II 5 1.279: “[D]urch dieses Uebermaass werden die Instincte des Volkes gestört 
und der Einzelne nicht minder als das Ganze am Reifwerden verhindert”. UB II 5 1.280:  The 
rational man, says Nietzsche, “hat seinen Instinct vernichtet und verloren, er kann nun nicht 
mehr, dem ‘göttlichen Thiere’ vertrauend, die Zügel hängen lassen, wenn sein Verstand 
schwankt und sein Weg durch Wüsten führt.” 
66 See UB II 7 1.295-6. Nietzsche warns that, “[w]enn hinter dem historischen Triebe kein 
Bautrieb wirkt, wenn nicht zerstört und aufgeräumt wird, damit eine bereits in der Hoffnung 
lebendige Zukunft auf dem befreiten Boden ihr Haus baue, wenn die Gerechtigkeit allein 
waltet, dann wird der schaffende Instinct entkräftet und entmuthigt.” 
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(NL 28[6] 7.619) and Nietzsche states that the great productive spirit only aims to 
condemn (“verurtheilen”) “was für ihn den Lebenden und Lebenzeugenden 
Vernichtung und Entwürdigung ist […]” (UB II 4 1.278). On this account, the 
Zweckmäßigkeit of both culture and individuals must, as with Schopenhauer, be 
established through a combination of measured and unmeasured conflict.  
What we may doubt is whether Nietzsche’s attempt to harness destructive 
force for creative purposes is open to the scepticisms that he himself expresses 
regarding critical history: will the “Schlangentödtern” Nietzsche calls forth be able 
to set a limit (Grenze) on their own destructive activity? But moreover, can we 
moderns supplant the antiquarian model of education? Or is this too deep a part of 
our first nature, the removal of which would do us irreparable damage?67 Whether 
Nietzsche’s own project can circumvent these obstacles remains a moot point; 
nonetheless, these caveats should not leave us disaffected. The most dangerous 
course of action is that of inaction. Were we to let life remain dominated by 
knowledge, at least according to Nietzsche’s logic, we would be effectively 
condemning ourselves to death. 
Nietzsche’s endorsement of organisational struggle can be construed as an 
attempt to promote a form of conflict that clearly shares three key structural features 
with Schopenhauer’s notion of assimilative conflict. Thus, the following can be said 
of Nietzsche’s model of organisational struggle in UB: 
 
1. It is aimed at subjugation (Überwaltigung) (i.e. that of the three forms of 
history to the needs of life, and that of the various data of historical 
knowledge to a person’s or culture’s life-needs);  
                                                      
67 Nietzsche registers this problem in UB III 6 1.401-2: “[D]ie Schwierigkeit liegt für die 
Menschen darin, umzulernen und ein neues Ziel sich zu stecken; und es wird unsägliche 
Mühe kosten, die Grundgedanken unseres jetzigen Erziehungswesens, das seine Wurzeln im 
Mittelalter hat, und dem eigentlich der mittelalterliche Gelehrte als Ziel der vollendeten 
Bildung vorschwebt, mit einem neuen Grundgedanken zu vertauschen.” 
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2. It is directed towards establishing a top-down instrumental relation (e.g. to 
render knowledge ancillary to life), which is associated with cultural health 
(just as it is associated with organismic health for Schopenhauer and 
Goethe);  
3. It necessarily involves unmeasured conflict (i.e. the exclusion of redundant 
knowledge and beliefs). 
One important difference, of course, is that whereas Schopenhauer describes 
organisational conflict as a naturally occurring process, Nietzsche’s depiction of 
such conflict has a strong normative dimension. Thus, Nietzsche suggests that, 
within the domain of culture at least, organisational struggle is contingent upon 
human agents consciously striving for synthesis.    
We might also argue that Nietzsche’s early account of organisational 
conflict fulfils the fourth distinguishing criterion of Schopenhauer’s assimilative 
conflict – namely, insofar as struggle persists within the resultant hierarchies; thus, 
each mode of historical practice tends towards hypertrophy and constantly attempts 
to set itself up independently of the culture’s life-needs. Within the healthy culture, 
there must therefore be a continuous process of reigning the various types of history 
back into the service of life by deploying the relevant antidote form of history. Like 
the lower ideas in Schopenhauer’s model, historical learning is always pushing to 
gain independence from life, and must perpetually be brought back into a position 
of subservience.  
On all of the above grounds, I would contest the suggestion that UB II should 
be primarily be understood as a text which “draws on and extends the agonistic 
model he earlier describes [in CV 5]”.68 Nonetheless, in order to substantiate my 
                                                      
68 Acampora (2013), p.39. Acampora argues that the struggle of the different types of history 
with one another is agonistic in a manner recalling the struggle of the Apollinian and 
Dionysian in GT: “Just as Nietzsche thinks the Dionysian and the Apollinian must be 
combined such that their mutual resistance achieves creative results, he argues that the 
various practices of history must be combined in the interest of creating and serving an 
affirmative form of life” (p.40). However, though she highlights the moment of mutual 
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claim that the notion of organisational conflict developed by Nietzsche in UB 
follows the general structure of Schopenhauer’s conception of the struggle for 
Zweckmäßigkeit, it still remains to be seen how it is metaphysically grounded (5.). 
However, as we turn to the question of self-knowledge as it is worked out in the 
latter two Betrachtungen, these foundations will gradually be exposed to view. 
3.3.4. KNOWING THYSELF 
In my analysis of UB II, I bracketed out an important concept; namely, that of self-
knowledge. We can already extrapolate from the above that knowing oneself must 
be a condition of the organisational conflict outlined in UB II: one must have a clear 
conception of one’s true life-needs and one’s plastische Kraft in order to know what 
belongs within (and what should be excluded from) this horizon. Nietzsche thought 
the Greeks were able to organise themselves only to the extent that they obeyed the 
Delphic dictum to “know thyself”: “das heisst [sich] auf ihre ächten Bedürfnisse 
zurück besannen und die Schein-Bedürfnisse absterben liessen” (UB II 10 1.333). In 
this subsection, I propose that we turn to the final two Betrachtungen to get a better 
picture of why this is necessary, and how Nietzsche thinks it can be achieved. 
James Conant has claimed that “on the whole [Nietzsche] does not talk about 
[Schopenhauer] very much; and furthermore, the views put forward in [UB III] seem 
to contradict Schopenhauer’s own philosophical views.”69 However, we should be 
very careful not to mistake a lack of explicit mention of Schopenhauer in UB III for 
a lack of presence. Indeed, proper scrutiny reveals that Schopenhauer’s thought has 
a profound structuring influence on UB, in spite of there being some fundamental 
points of divergence. This goes for Nietzsche’s notion of self-knowledge in UB III 
(and UB IV) just as much as it does for his understanding of how the self is forged 
                                                      
resistance and limitation, Acampora does not pay sufficient attention to the general 
subordination of historical study to life. 
69 Conant (2001), p.202, also quoted in Lemm (2007), p.10. See also Stanley Cavell (1990): 
“Schopenhauer, as everyone notes, is scarcely present in the text” (p.53). 
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into a purposive unity, which draws heavily on Schopenhauer’s notion of 
Zweckmäßigkeit. Indeed, I will now defend the claim that Nietzsche’s conception of 
self-organisation is one that he largely adopts from Schopenhauer, and which 
correspondingly shares in the metaphysical presuppositions of his predecessor’s 
account of assimilative struggle. It is vital that we acknowledge this inheritance since 
it reveals just why the solutions Nietzsche presents to (a)-(d) become unsustainable 
in the later writings (i.e. because of their Schopenhauerian metaphysical 
presuppositions). To convincingly bring this legacy to light, we should begin by 
giving a summary of how Schopenhauer thinks that the self is formed into a 
purposive organisation.  
Again following Kant, Schopenhauer distinguishes between intelligible and 
empirical character.70 According to this distinction, the character of the individual 
has two sides: one that appears to us (our empirical character) and one that remains 
imperceptible (our intelligible character). In Kantian terms, we might refer to this as 
the difference between the phenomenal and noumenal aspects of the self: 
[D]er intelligible Charakter jedes Menschen [sei] als ein 
außerzeitlicher, daher untheilbarer und unveränderlicher Willensakt zu 
betrachten […], dessen in Zeit und Raum und allen Formen des Satzes 
vom Grunde entwickelte und auseinandergezogene Erscheinung der 
empirische Charakter ist, wie er sich in der ganzen Handlungsweise und 
im Lebenslaufe dieses Menschen erfahrungsmäßig darstellt. (WWV I 
§55, p.380) 
We each possess a unique character, or will – what Schopenhauer refers to as our 
peculiar “vollständige Persönlichkeit”.71 Like all objects, this character – as purely 
intelligible character – is undetermined (i.e. free) since it exists outside of space and 
                                                      
70 For an informative comparison of Kant’s, Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s views on 
intelligible character, see Gerhardt (1996), pp.117-24. 
71 See WWV I §26, p.188: “Auf den obern Stufen der Objektität des Willens sehn wir die 
Individualität bedeutend hervortreten, besonders beim Menschen, als die große 
Verschiedenheit individueller Charaktere, d.h. als vollständige Persönlichkeit, schon 
äußerlich ausgedrückt durch stark gezeichnete individuelle Physiognomie, welche die 
gesammte Korporisation mitbegreift.” 
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time and is therefore not subject to the laws of causality. This is what Schopenhauer 
also calls our “individuellen Willen[.]” (WWV I §55, p.382). However, our character 
appears – i.e. as our empirical character – when we make decisions and act, which 
is to say when it has to realise itself in the realm of space and time. Nonetheless, for 
Schopenhauer, each individual’s character is, in its essence, unchanging – indeed, 
just as there are Platonic ideas (“Ideen”) for each distinct natural kind, Schopenhauer 
states that there is a separate Platonic Idea for each person’s individual character; 
hence, at the moment of birth, a person’s “Wandel [ist schon] fest bestimmt […] und 
[bleibt] sich bis ans Ende im Wesentlichen gleich” (ibid., p.384).72 As such, when a 
person’s character is presented with a given conflict of motives, that person will only 
ever resolve upon one particular path and is completely determined according to the 
principle of sufficient reason which governs their empirical character. For example, 
one’s character determines how egoistic or altruistic one is. Schopenhauer explains 
that although people might appear to change, this is merely because they have new 
knowledge about how to better attain their goals. Thus, on this view, an egoistic man 
might appear to act more altruistically, but only because he has become convinced 
by the religious dogma that such behaviour will grant him an eternal afterlife of 
paradise. His altruistic behaviour is, according to Schopenhauer, therefore just as 
egoistically determined as before (ibid., p.295). 
This brings us to the third type of character identified by Schopenhauer – 
acquired character (“erworbener Charakter”). Schopenhauer claims that through 
successive acts we are able to glean a progressively more comprehensive picture of 
our unique empirical character. As such, we can be in states of relative knowledge 
or ignorance regarding our empirical character – in particular, regarding our unique 
strengths and weaknesses. Man finds in himself, says Schopenhauer, “zu allen, noch 
so verschiedenen menschlichen Anstrebungen und Kräften die Anlagen” (ibid., 
                                                      
72 See WWV I §45, p.300, where Schopenhauer states that “jeder Mensch gewissermaaßen 
eine ganz eigenthümliche Idee darstellt.” 
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p.396). In order to know which of these to pursue, it is essential that we achieve 
conscious knowledge of our peculiar character: 
Können wir uns dazu nicht entschließen, sondern greifen, wie Kinder 
auf dem Jahrmarkt, nach Allem was uns im Vorübergehn reizt; dann ist 
dies das verkehrte Bestreben, die Linie unsers Wegs in eine Fläche zu 
verwandeln: wir laufen sodann im Zickzack, irrlichterliren hin und her 
und gelangen zu nichts. […] Darum ist das bloße Wollen und auch 
Können an sich noch nicht zureichend, sondern ein Mensch muß auch 
wissen, was er will, und wissen, was er kann: erst so wird er Charakter 
zeigen, und erst dann kann er etwas Rechtes vollbringen. (Ibid., pp.396-
7) 
To fruitfully follow a certain path in life – that is, for our life to trace a directed line 
rather than dissipating into a “Fläche” of caprice and haphazard dilettantism – some 
impulses must “ganz unterdrückt werden” (ibid.). Through knowledge of our 
empirical character (particularly our personal strengths and weaknesses) we learn 
which of these must be suppressed. This enables us to follow the path dictated by 
our character with determination and efficacy. Prefiguring Nietzsche’s criticism of 
bourgeois imitation, Schopenhauer also reserves particular disdain for those who, in 
lieu of proper self-understanding, merely attempt to ape others (usually out of envy 
of their successes): “Nachahmung fremder Eigenschaften und Eigenthümlichkeiten 
ist viel schimpflicher, als das Tragen fremder Kleider: denn es ist das Urtheil der 
eigenen Werthlosigkeit von sich selbst ausgesprochen” (ibid., p.400). Not only is 
this inherently reprehensible, but it also frequently results in disappointment insofar 
as it lures individuals to undertake projects for which, in terms of their personality, 
they are ill-equipped (ibid., p.401).  
 What I wish to highlight in this summary of Schopenhauer is the fact that 
the process of attaining self-knowledge depends on an essentialist conception of the 
self as a unique and unchanging metaphysical essence – that is, as an Idea. It is only 
epistemological access to this self that enables us to avert the pitfalls of imitation 
and caprice; this is how one might, according to Schopenhauer, follow Pindar’s 
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command to “become who one is”. But how is this account operative in Nietzsche’s 
vision of how one ought to approach the problem of synthesising one’s self?  
On one level, Nietzsche is openly sceptical regarding the notion of acquired 
character, particularly since he opens UB III by casting doubt on the very possibility 
of self-knowledge: 
Aber wie finden wir uns selbst wieder? Wie kann sich der Mensch 
kennen? Er ist eine dunkle und verhüllte Sache; und wenn der Hase 
sieben Häute hat, so kann der Mensch sich sieben mal siebzig abziehen 
und wird doch nicht sagen können “das bist du nun wirklich, das ist 
nicht mehr Schaale.” (UB III 1 1.340) 
How can we ever be certain that we have obtained insight into our true needs and 
capacities and not merely those which appear so? Or that our own self-
understanding has not itself been infiltrated by convention – are we not convention 
through and through?73 What sense does it make to speak of a core, essential self if 
it can never be intuited? Do such doubts not throw the foundation of his entire 
organisational project into question?  
To be sure, Nietzsche also shows a marked desire to move away from a 
substantial, essentialist conception of the self. Though he maintains that each of us 
is a “Unicum”, we are not so in the sense of an Idea – i.e. a unitas ante rem. Rather, 
we are “ein so wunderlich buntes Mancherlei zusammenschüttelt zum Einerlei” (UB 
III 1 1.337). Moreover, even in 1865, Nietzsche criticises Schopenhauer’s notion of 
empirical character insofar as he thinks conceiving of character as something fixed 
and determined negates the possibility of a normative philosophy aimed at changing 
the individual.74  
                                                      
73 In his concern with convention in UB III, the influence of Emerson is striking. See Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, “On Self-Reliance”, in Joel Myerson (ed.), Transcendentalism: A Reader 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 318–39. On the relation of Nietzsche and 
Emerson, see Conant (2000, pp.31ff) and Cavell (1990). 
74 See KGW I/5, p.276: “Man wirft der Schopenhauerischen Ethik vor, daß sie keine 
imperative Form habe: Das Ding was die Philosophen Charakter nennen, ist eine unheilbare 
Krankheit. Eine imperative Ethik ist eine solche, welche mit den Krankheitssymptomen zu 
thun hat und indem sie gegen diese kämpft, den Glauben hat den einheitlichen Grundstock, 
das Urübel zu Beseitigen.” 
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However, despite his misgivings, in UB IV, Nietzsche signals that he at least 
in part assents to Schopenhauer’s notion of character; though he still makes 
significant additions to the theory: 
Es wäre sonderbar, wenn Das, was Jemand am besten kann und am 
liebsten thut, nicht auch in der gesammten Gestaltung seines Lebens 
wieder sichtbar würde; vielmehr muss bei Menschen von 
hervorragender Befähigung das Leben nicht nur, wie bei Jedermann, 
zum Abbild des Charakters, sondern vor Allem auch zum Abbild des 
Intellectes und seines eigensten Vermögens werden. (UB IV 2 1.435) 
Character is realised with absolute necessity and automaticity, for Nietzsche – there 
is no point in trying to change or shape it, our life is an ineluctable “Abbild” thereof. 
However, he appears to hold a notion of acquired character that depends on the 
discovery of something other than our character – that is, one’s intellect and 
“eigensten Vermögens”, of which one’s life can also be an “Abbild”, though it is not 
necessarily so. Whereas for Schopenhauer, acquired character is portrayed as 
something that certain people simply do attain while others do not, for Nietzsche, 
acquired character is a task, as will become more apparent as we continue. 
So far, confusingly, we have seen Nietzsche reject and then partially adopt 
with significant modifications, Schopenhauer’s essentialist notion of the self. 
However, this should not distract us from the strong vein of essentialist metaphysics 
running through UB. Let us recall his criticism, in UB I and II, of Weltanschauungen 
that affirm becoming on the grounds that they issue in a pernicious form of egoism. 
Indeed, Herman Siemens has remarked the “total repudiation of becoming in UB III 
4 […], and the advice ‘to destroy all that is becoming […].’”75 While we should 
certainly acknowledge the incipient reservations Nietzsche expresses towards the 
Schopenhauerian conception of subjectivity in UB, I now want to foreground the 
numerous moments in the text where he can be said to quite uncritically adopt just 
such an essentialist conception of the self. 
                                                      
75 Siemens (2009), p.92 (quoting UB III 4 1.375). 
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 Thus, in UB, we find that he valorises the struggle to gain insight into a 
metaphysically essential part of our character – one that lies beneath the 
“Mancherlei” of our self and that largely mirrors Schopenhauer’s notion of empirical 
character. Moreover, he retains a firm faith in the possibility of obtaining knowledge 
of this deeper self. Indeed, Nietzsche maintains that people such as Schopenhauer 
and Wagner have achieved just such self-knowledge. He further speaks praisingly 
of the way in which Schopenhauer was governed (“waltet”) by his “platonische 
Idee” (UB III 5 1.376), implying that this is a condition that we do not automatically 
enjoy. As the previous section (UB III 4) indicates, Schopenhauer’s character was 
defined by the tenacious pursuit of truth, and the willingness to consciously sacrifice 
happiness for this goal. Perhaps an even more Schopenhauerian moment in UB is to 
be found in Nietzsche’s description of Wagner in UB IV: 
[V]on dem Augenblicke an, wo die in ihm herrschende Leidenschaft 
ihrer selber bewusst wird und seine ganze Natur zusammenfasst: damit 
ist dann das Tastende, Schweifende, das Wuchern der 
Nebenschösslinge abgethan, und in den verschlungensten Wegen und 
Wandelungen, in dem oft abenteuerlichen Bogenwurfe seiner Pläne 
waltet eine einzige innere Gesetzlichkeit, ein Wille, aus dem sie 
erklärbar sind […]. (UB IV 2 1.435) 
Nietzsche adduces Schopenhauer and Wagner as evidence that the discovery of 
some deeper self (our Platonic Idee, inner Gesetzlichkeit or Wille) is a real 
possibility. It is precisely in their having grasped this core self that they educate us 
– they personally evince the possibility of accomplishing this task and, in setting a 
precedent, thereby inspire us to undertake the challenge ourselves: “Deine wahren 
Erzieher und Bildner verrathen dir, was der wahre Ursinn und Grundstoff deines 
Wesens ist, etwas durchaus Unerziehbares und Unbildbares, aber jedenfalls schwer 
Zugängliches, Gebundenes, Gelähmtes” (UB III 1 1.341; my italics). 
Not only does Nietzsche disclose that he holds self-knowledge to be possible 
in these texts, but he also reveals that the self accessed through such knowledge is 
comparable to Schopenhauer’s metaphysical notion of the empirical character: it is 
an unchanging essence. Throughout UB III and IV, he employs a panoply of terms 
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to refer to this inner essence: “innere Gesetzlichkeit”, “der Kern seines Wesens”, the 
“Wahres Wesen”, “persönlichen Willens”, “eigentliches Selbst”, and so on.76 But 
how can we concretely go about gaining epistemological access to this self? To be 
sure, Nietzsche gives his readers a very practicable account of just how they can set 
about achieving this: 
Die junge Seele sehe auf das Leben zurück mit der Frage: was hast du 
bis jetzt wahrhaft geliebt, was hat deine Seele hinangezogen, was hat 
sie beherrscht und zugleich beglückt? Stelle dir die Reihe dieser 
verehrten Gegenstände vor dir auf, und vielleicht ergeben sie dir, durch 
ihr Wesen und ihre Folge, ein Gesetz, das Grundgesetz deines 
eigentlichen Selbst. Vergleiche diese Gegenstände, sieh, wie einer den 
andern ergänzt, erweitert, überbietet, verklärt, wie sie eine Stufenleiter 
bilden, auf welcher du bis jetzt zu dir selbst hingeklettert bist; denn dein 
wahres Wesen liegt nicht tief verborgen in dir, sondern unermesslich 
hoch über dir oder wenigstens über dem, was du gewöhnlich als dein 
Ich nimmst. (UB III 1 1.340) 
Introspection enables us to identify our highest joys. By comparing these past 
delights, Nietzsche believes that we will come to see that they form a ladder, or what 
we might call a Rangordnung (again in contrast to the hypertrophied antiquarian 
who fails to differentiate in apportioning value to the past). Nietzsche’s thesis is that 
this reveals an inner law expressing the trajectory of our ideal self-development, 
which thus provides us with a conception of a higher self towards which we can 
consciously aim. Note that this inner law is a law directing our development or 
progress – it never describes ourselves as we are. We can think of this law as 
                                                      
76 Other commentators have also noted the fact that Nietzsche holds an essentialist 
conception of the self in UB. See e.g. Nuno Nabias, “The Individual and Individuality in 
Nietzsche”, in K. A. Pearson (ed.), A Companion to Nietzsche (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 
pp.76-94 (pp.78-80). Nabias underscores the anology between the Schopenhauerian notion 
of character and Nietzsche’s conception of the self in UB; however, he does not bring out 
how this underpins Nietzsche’s early organizational project. See also Robert Miner, 
“Nietzsche’s Fourfold Conception of the Self”, Inquiry, 54(4) (2011), 337-360 (pp.339ff.). 
Although Miner does not draw the Schopenhauerian comparison, he tries to argue that this 
essentialist notion of the self persists throughout Nietzsche’s writings. See also Frank 
Chouraqui, Ambiguity and the Absolute: Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty on the Question of 
Truth (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), who likewise notes the parallelism 
between Nietzsche’s notion of will and Schopenhauer’s notion of character (p.86). 
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analogous to an algebraic formula, which shows the pattern in an existing series, and 
thereby allows us to deduce how the series should continue for higher values, 
without actually having any content of its own. Certainly, in dynamising the notion 
of the essential self, Nietzsche has once again adapted the Schopenhauerian model; 
nonetheless – and this is what is imperative for my argument – he retains the idea of 
a metaphysically fixed kernel lying at the heart of the self, as well as the idea that 
we can gain epistemological access to this kernel.  
But why is this discovery of an inner trajectory of value to Nietzsche? Echoing 
the structure of UB II, this self-knowledge forms the basis for organising the wider 
self into a “harmonische Ganzheit” and “vielstimmigen Zusammenklang” (UB III 2 
1.342). The end result should be someone 
[…] in denen alles, Erkennen, Begehren, Lieben, Hassen, nach einem 
Mittelpunkte, einer Wurzelkraft hinstrebt und wo gerade durch die 
zwingende und herrschende Uebergewalt dieses lebendigen Centrums 
ein harmonisches System von Bewegungen hin und her, auf und nieder 
gebildet wird […]. (UB III 2 1.342) 
 
Once the ideal trajectory of our self has been deduced, it functions as a 
“Cardinalkraft” “Wurzelkraft”, or “Mittelpunkte” under which all our other 
capacities can be organised.77 As such, the discovery of our inner law gives us the 
fundament needed to synthesise our “Erkennen, Begehren, Lieben, Hassen” into a 
stable and coherent structure. Nietzsche depicts this central point or force, not merely 
as the cornerstone of self-organisation, but also as the organising force itself “die 
zwingende und herrschende Uebergewalt”. As an example of the antithesis 
(“Gegenbild”) of Wagner, Nietzsche describes Goethe (the poet, novelist, painter 
and courtier) as someone who “wie ein viel verzweigtes Stromnetz erscheint, 
welches aber seine ganze Kraft nicht zu Meere trägt, sondern mindestens ebensoviel 
                                                      
77 See also NL 30[9] 7.734: “[…] Harmonie [ist] da, wenn alles auf einen Mittelpunct, auf 
eine Cardinalkraft bezogen ist, nicht wenn zahlreiche schwache Kräfte zugleich spielen.” 
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auf seinen Wegen und Krümmungen verliert und verstreut, als es am Ausgange mit 
sich führt” (UB IV 3 1.442).  
This overpowering of one’s impulses, which is unequivocally advocated by 
Nietzsche in UB, cannot defensibly be called agonistic since it is characterised by 
the rather unagonistic process of exploitatively subordinating those impulses under 
a single force. The concept of such a “lebendige[s] Centrum” is profoundly at odds 
with the decentred pluralism of Nietzsche’s agonism, according to which the 
strongest exist in constellations defined by mutual limitation (das “Wettspiel der 
Kräfte”), and any single superordinate force is forcibly removed by means of 
ostracism.78  
Schopenhauer saw truth (“Wahrheit”) as his goal, and Nietzsche reveres the 
way in which his predecessor tenaciously devoted himself to the pursuit of this goal, 
especially given the fact that Schopenhauer did so in a fashion that was completely 
opposed to the scholars of his day, who only sought truth to the extent that it brought 
them academic honours.79 But, according to Nietzsche, in his irreverent pursuit of 
truth he was forced to deny and destroy conventional beliefs, prejudices and 
falsehoods. Once again resonating with the model of assimilation expounded in UB 
II, this process of overpowering is not merely a measured, inclusive process of 
coordinating our inclinations into an effective hierarchical structure; rather, in 
addition to this, it is a process of exclusion, a “Wegräumung alles Unkrauts, 
Schuttwerks, Gewürms, das die zarten Keime der Pflanzen antasten will” (UB III 1 
1.341). The target of this attack is the dross of prejudice, convention and the vulgar 
pressures of society. For this reason, “[darf] der Genius sich nicht fürchten, in den 
feindseligsten Widerspruch mit den bestehenden Formen und Ordnungen zu treten, 
wenn er die höhere Ordnung und Wahrheit, die in ihm lebt, an’s Licht herausheben 
will” (UB III 3 1.351). This is a hostile act of rejecting convention in favour of 
                                                      
78 Vanessa Lemm (against Cavell) has also argued that the relation of one’s exemplar or ideal 
self to the rest of one’s self is not one of equality. See Lemm (2007), p.21. 
79 UB III 7 1.411: “Es gehörte zu den herrlichen Bedingungen seiner Existenz, dass er 
wirklich einer solchen Aufgabe, gemäss seinem Wahlspruche vitam impendere vero, leben 
konnte und dass keine eigentliche Gemeinheit der Lebensnoth ihn niederzwang […]”. 
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“Wahrheit und Ehrlichkeit” (UB III 3 1.354). As we already witnessed above, 
convention prevents the potential genius from attaining fruition; thus, in struggling 
against this, “bekämpft er das, was ihn hindert, gross zu sein”: 
Daraus folgt, dass seine Feindschaft im Grunde gerade gegen das 
gerichtet ist, was zwar an ihm selbst, was aber nicht eigentlich er selbst 
ist, nämlich gegen das unreine Durch- und Nebeneinander von 
Unmischbarem und ewig Unvereinbarem […]. So strebte 
Schopenhauer, schon von früher Jugend an, jener falschen, eiteln und 
unwürdigen Mutter, der Zeit, entgegen, und indem er sie gleichsam aus 
sich auswies, reinigte und heilte er sein Wesen und fand sich selbst in 
seiner ihm zugehörigen Gesundheit und Reinheit wieder. (UB III 3 
1.362) 
The primary means by which Schopenhauer “zerstört” was, according to Nietzsche, 
radical critique – i.e. denial (“Verneinung”). To be sure, Nietzsche explicitly 
describes the “Vernichtung” performed by Schopenhauer in terms of an act of 
“Verneinung” of the doxa of his day (UB III 3 1.364 and 4 1.372). The false belief 
Nietzsche thinks Schopenhauer most effectively dispelled was the idea that 
happiness represents the goal for which we should strive. Schopenhauer revealed the 
pursuit of happiness to be a futile endeavour – one driven by ignorance of the fact 
that all such striving ever brings us is a cycle of painful desire, momentary 
satisfaction, and boredom followed by the re-emergence of painful yearning.80 He 
therefore devalued such beliefs by denuding their foundations in myopia and naïveté. 
Indeed, we might view Nietzsche’s Schopenhauer as launching a distinctly 
unmeasured struggle against the belief in, and impulse for, enduring happiness.81  
                                                      
80 See NL 35[12] 7.812, where Nietzsche speaks of “[d]er Philosoph als der wahre 
Widersacher der Verweltlichung, als der Zerstörer jedes scheinbaren und verführerischen 
Glücks und alles dessen, was ein solches Glück verspricht, der Staaten, Revolutionen, 
Reichthümer, Ehren, Wissenschaften, Kirchen unter den Menschen […].” As he quotes 
Schopenhauer as saying in UB III 4 1.373: “Ein glückliches Leben ist unmöglich: das 
Höchste, was der Mensch erlangen kann, ist ein heroischer Lebenslauf.” 
81 Indeed, Nietzsche talks of Schopenhauer as having destroyed his own “Erdenglück”. See 
UB III 4 1.372: “Gewiss, [Schopenhauer] vernichtet sein Erdenglück durch seine Tapferkeit, 
er muss selbst den Menschen, die er liebt, den Institutionen, aus deren Schoosse er 
hervorgegangen ist, feindlich sein […]”. 
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Again, this exclusive or destructive activity is to be distinguished from the 
forms of destructiveness disparaged by Nietzsche; namely, insofar as, in overcoming 
“das unreine Durch- und Nebeneinander von Unmischbarem”, it facilitates health 
(“Gesundheit”) and healing: “es giebt eine Art zu verneinen und zu zerstören, welche 
gerade der Ausfluss jener mächtigen Sehnsucht nach Heiligung und Errettung ist, 
als deren erster philosophischer Lehrer Schopenhauer unter uns entheiligte” (UB III 
4 1.372).82 
Nietzsche presents Schopenhauer as his educator because he is manifest 
evidence of someone who has been able to achieve the aforementioned integration 
of the various parts of his self. As such, he writes for himself and not for others, and 
cannot be said to imitate the French style: “Niemand an ihm das nachgemachte 
gleichsam übersilberte Scheinfranzosenthum […] entdecken wird” (UB III 2 1.347). 
There is an honesty (“Ehrlichkeit”) to his writing, a “Natürlichkeit, wie sie 
Menschen haben, die in sich zu Hause […] sind”. He is also a whole individual: 
“einmal ein ganzes, einstimmiges, in eignen Angeln hängendes und bewegtes, 
unbefangenes und ungehemmtes Naturwesen” (UB III 2 1.350). 
Like Schopenhauer, then, Nietzsche views the discovery of our inner self as 
a source of purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) and increased efficacy; however, 
whereas Schopenhauer merely emphasises the way in which this revelation gives us 
a basis for the Unterdrückung of distracting impulses, Nietzsche accents the way in 
which it can act as a fulcrum around which our forces can be synthesised and further 
cultivated (in the service of this higher goal). The ideal educator, says Nietzsche, 
should not merely create harmonious order under the dominant “Wurzelkraft”, but 
they should also “alle vorhandenen Kräfte heranziehe[n] [und] pflege[n]” (UB III 2 
1.342).  
                                                      
82 Hence, Nietzsche refers to Schopenhauer as the “befreiender Zerstörer” in a number of 
notes. See NL 34[36] 7.803; NL 34[43] 7.807. Indeed, Nietzsche approximates 
Schopenhauer to the critical form of history (whereas Rousseau stands for monumental 
history, and Goethe for antiquarian history) (see UB III 4 1.369ff.). See also Zuckert (1976), 
pp.71-6. 
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In this way, the ordering Nietzsche seeks to establish is not one that simply 
forces our inclinations into passive submission to our higher selves; rather, this order 
is the very means by which those forces can be stimulated and held in ever greater 
and more fecund degrees of tension. We only have to look to his characterisation of 
Wagner and Wagner’s music in UB IV to see how intrinsic continued tension is to 
the hierarchical order advocated by Nietzsche: 
Sturm und Feuer nehmen bei ihm [Wagner] die zwingende Gewalt 
eines persönlichen Willens an. Ueber allen den tönenden Individuen 
und dem Kampfe ihrer Leidenschaften, über dem ganzen Strudel von 
Gegensätzen, schwebt, mit höchster Besonnenheit, ein übermächtiger 
symphonischer Verstand, welcher aus dem Kriege fortwährend die 
Eintracht gebiert: Wagner’s Musik als Ganzes ist ein Abbild der Welt, 
sowie diese von dem grossen ephesischen Philosophen verstanden 
wurde, als eine Harmonie, welche der Streit aus sich zeugt […]. (UB 
IV 9 1.494) 
Thus, this dominating centre should not be construed as suppressing conflict 
between the forces that it harmonises, but as actually enabling, sustaining and 
maximising this conflict, while reasserting itself in a continuous manner, insofar as 
it prevents this struggle from becoming internecine. 
We can now see that all of the criteria defining Schopenhauer’s notion of 
assimilative conflict have been fulfilled by Nietzsche’s account of the organisational 
struggle for self-cultivation:  
 
1. The aim of the struggle is the subjugation (of diverting impulses) and the 
establishment of functional hierarchy;  
2. Instrumental hierarchy is associated with (psychological) health;  
3. The struggle is inseparable from an unmeasured mode of conflict (i.e. the 
radical critique of misguided beliefs);  
4. The struggle persists within the resultant hierarchies; 
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5. The process is driven by (or at least founded upon) a metaphysical entity 
(i.e. the self qua essence).  
Nonetheless, in relation to (5), it should be underscored that Nietzsche dynamises 
this subjective essence, reconceiving of it as a developmental law in opposition to 
Schopenhauer’s more static portrayal of empirical character (though it should also 
be added that this dynamism renders it no less metaphysical and unchanging at its 
core). 
With this, we have now unpacked how Nietzsche proposes we resolve 
disintegration at an individual level, and how this is rooted in a quasi-
Schopenhauerian Weltanschauung. What remains to be seen, however, is how 
Nietzsche suggests we resolve this problem at the level of the collective.  
3.3.5. COMMON PURPOSE  
In UB II, Nietzsche suggests that the solution to the problem of disgregative egoism, 
which was seen to be caused by an excess of historical learning, is what he calls “das 
Überhistorische”. Drawing on Schopenhauer, he argues that art and religion grant us 
metaphysical insight into the truth of reality, thereby giving us the existential 
foothold we require in order to avoid slipping into the stream of becoming and, with 
this, disillusioned egoism. Myth and art (which, of course, acts as a vehicle for myth) 
are therefore framed as the antidotes to the excesses of historical learning by virtue 
of the fact that they give “dem Dasein den Charakter des Ewigen und 
Gleichbedeutenden” (UB II 10 1.330).83 Nietzsche was certainly probing the 
                                                      
83 In this thought, Nietzsche is undoubtedly reprising Schopenhauer’s conception of “die 
metaphysische Bedürfniß”, a notion with which he was certainly familiar (see e.g. letter to 
Carl von Gersdorff, 07.04.1866 [KGB I/2, p.120]). Schopenhauer argues that, as consolation 
for their knowledge of death, “und neben diesem die Betrachtung des Leidens und der Noth 
des Lebens” (WWV II §17, p.186), humans require some form of metaphysical explanation 
and justification of the world. As a means to this, humans turn to metaphysics which, as 
either philosophy or religion, “über die Natur, oder die gegebene Erscheinung der Dinge, 
hinausgeht, um Aufschluß zu ertheilen über Das, wodurch jene, in einem oder dem andern 
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unifying qualities of religion and art during this period of his thought – stating at one 
point that “[z]um Organisiren des Chaotischen eignet sich Kunst und Religion” (NL 
29[192] 7.708).84 However, while they appear to counteract disenchantment with the 
world, and the socially divisive effects of such disenchantment, it is unclear in UB 
what active role they play in binding the community together.85  
Indeed, by UB III, Nietzsche seeks to found cultural coherence on quite 
different, though nonetheless metaphysical, bases. In this subsection, I will therefore 
focus on UB III in order to elucidate how the “Kampf für die Kultur” (UB III 6 
1.386) – i.e. the struggle to synthesise society into a cultural unity – to which 
Nietzsche rallies his readers, can be considered analogous to Schopenhauer’s notion 
of assimilative conflict. As will become evident, Nietzsche’s cultural Kampf is 
aimed at the hierarchical organisation of society around a higher, metaphysically 
                                                      
Sinne, bedingt wäre; oder, populär zu reden, über Das, was hinter der Natur steckt und sie 
möglich macht” (ibid., p.189). Like philosophical metaphysics, religions, says 
Schopenhauer, deal with an “Ordnung der Dinge an sich” (ibid., p.192). He states that 
religion is able to communicate the metaphysical truth of reality by means of allegory (sensu 
allegorico), where philosophy does so through deductive argumentation (sensus proprio). 
Different religions accomplish this to differing extents, according to Schopenhauer, and 
indeed, “Der Werth einer Religion wird demnach abhängen von dem größern oder geringern 
Gehalt an Wahrheit, den sie, unter dem Schleier der Allegorie” (WWV II §17, p.195). 
Ordinary people simply do not have time for philosophy, and so religious dogma leads them 
to the ethical and metaphysical conclusions to which philosophical reflection leads in a more 
thorough sense. Religion thereby functions as a consolation for life’s pain by granting 
ordinary people an insight into a higher world that transcends that of appearance. Thus, in 
this section of WWV II, he praises the verisimilitude of pessimistic religions such as 
Buddhism and Christianity, as well as the fact that they show their followers the need for 
redemption.   
84 Interestingly, in “Über Staat und Religion”, Wagner appropriates Schopenhauer’s notion 
of the metaphysical need and tries to show how religious belief can help the state achieve its 
Zweck, which Wagner describes as the generation of stability: “[S]o stellt das religiöse 
Dogma die andere, bisher unerkannte Welt dar, und zwar mit solch' unfehlbarer Sicherheit 
und Bestimmtheit, daß der Religiöse, dem sie aufgegangen ist, hierüber in die 
unerschütterlichste, tiefbeseligendste Ruhe geräth.”	See Richard Wagner (1911), p.22.  
85 My reading therefore opposes Julian Young’s communitarian interpretation of Nietzsche. 
Young emphasizes the overlap between Nietzsche’s and Wagner’s theories regarding how 
mythology (and the art that conveys that mythology) contribute to social unity. See Julian 
Young, Friedrich Nietzsche: A philosophical Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), pp.113-9; “Nietzsche: The Long View”, in Julian Young (ed.), Individual and 
Community in Nietzsche’s Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) pp.7-
30 (esp. pp.10-15). 
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grounded goal (Zweckmäßigkeit): the “Erzeugung der Genius”. Whereas 
commentators are in the habit of referring to the struggle against modern pseudo-
culture promoted in UB III as an agon, my contention is that it should first and 
foremost be categorised as an instance of organisational conflict.86 
Nietzsche is at pains to convince us that acknowledging our need to strive 
for our higher (integrated) self does not just impose solitary duties upon us, but also 
those of a distinctly social kind. Furthermore, as we can see from the following 
quote, he envisages the collective acknowledgement of these duties as having a 
socially binding effect: 
[J]ene neuen Pflichten sind nicht die Pflichten eines Vereinsamten, man 
gehört vielmehr mit ihnen in eine mächtige Gemeinsamkeit hinein, 
welche […] durch einen Grundgedanken zusammengehalten wird. Es 
ist dies der Grundgedanke der Kultur, in sofern diese jedem Einzelnen 
von uns nur Eine Aufgabe zu stellen weiss: die Erzeugung des 
Philosophen, des Künstlers und des Heiligen in uns und ausser uns zu 
fördern und dadurch an der Vollendung der Natur zu arbeiten.” (UB III 
5 1.381-2; my italics)  
It is our assenting to this Grundgedanken of generating genius that motivates our 
joining the “Kampf für die Kultur”. Nietzsche’s solution is no doubt based on 
Wagner’s belief that a “Volk” is defined by “der Inbegriff aller Derjenigen, welche 
eine gemeinschaftliche Noth empfinden.”87 For Wagner, the egoistic pursuit of 
luxury in modernity has resulted in an unhealthy strain of social incoherence, and it 
is only by reconnecting with our shared need for a culturally renewing form of art 
(“das Kunstwerk der Zukunft”) that we will be able to replace this mere 
“Zusammenhang” of individuals with true community. Recognition of this common 
need will, Wagner informs us, convert this aggregate of egoists into a “selige[.] 
Harmonie der Natur” – i.e. it is the path to our “Erlösung aus [unserer] egoistischen 
                                                      
86 See fn.7.   
87 Wagner (1850), p.8. See also ibid., pp.214-5, where Wagner refers to the “künstlerischen 
Genossenschaft, die zu keinem anderen Zwecke, als zu dem der Befriedigung 
gemeinschaftlichen Kunstdranges sich vereinigt”.  
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Verzauberung”.88 For Wagner, the panacea is the artwork of the future, the making 
of which demands bringing both artists and the community into free association with 
one another, and which hence represents the “Bruderkuß” simultaneously produced 
by, and uniting, the Volk.89  
Nietzsche, however, is not so easily equated with the socialist aspirations of 
the early Wagner (as we saw in our treatment of CV 3 in Chapter 1). Indeed, there 
is a deep equivocation in Nietzsche’s conception of this socially binding need – an 
equivocation that can be traced back to his slippage between two conflicting 
definitions of genius. On the one hand, he employs the Kantian idea of genius as a 
“Naturgabe” or “angeborne Gemütsanlage (ingenium), durch welche die Natur der 
Kunst die Regel gibt” – one which only a minority of gifted individuals possess 
(KdU §46, p.307) (a conception of genius that reaches fever pitch in the later 
Wagner). This definition roughly accords with contemporary usage in English. I will 
call this elite genius (since it is the inborn privilege of an elite minority). On the 
other hand, following Romantics such as Byron and Emerson, Nietzsche develops a 
more global, and evenly distributed conception of genius. According to this 
understanding of genius, the term denotes the capacity for originality, authenticity 
and receptivity to nature, which inheres in everyone, without exception. Thus, 
Emerson proclaims to all of his readers that “[g]enius is the power to labor better 
[…]. Deserve thy genius; exalt it.”90 This is what I will refer to as the global 
conception of genius. However, and this is what is most problematic, Nietzsche 
presents the propagation of these two different types of genius as a single, coherent 
task –  that is, he talks of generating genius “in uns”, and of generating genius “ausser 
uns” as “Eine Aufgabe”. But can these really be equated as simply as Nietzsche 
                                                      
88 Ibid., pp.20-2. Likewise, we find the image of the genius as the individual who unites 
society in Emerson’s writings. See Perry Miller, “Emersonian Genius and the American 
Democracy”, The New England Quarterly, 26 (1) (1953), 27-44. 
89 Ibid., p.14. 
90 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The Transcendentalist”, in The Prose Works of Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, 2 vols (Boston: Fields, Osgood & co., 1870), vol.1, pp.177-94 (p.188). 
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implies? Is culture truly being united around a single need according to Nietzsche’s 
proposed solution to social disunity?  
In favour of reading these as two separate tasks, we might look at the two 
dominant (though cursory) political interpretations of UB III – those of Rawls and 
Cavell. Rawls reads UB III as evidence that Nietzsche endorsed a perfectionist 
political arrangement according to which “it is the sole principle of a teleological 
theory directing society to arrange institutions and to define the duties and 
obligations of individuals so as to maximise the achievement of human excellence 
in art, science, and culture.”91 According to this picture of Nietzsche’s perfectionism, 
individuals sacrifice their personal self-development for the sake of expediting the 
elite genius of others. And certainly, there are texts that support this reading quite 
categorically, such as where Nietzsche states that  
[…] die Menschheit soll fortwährend daran arbeiten, einzelne grosse 
Menschen zu erzeugen — und dies und nichts Anderes sonst ist ihre 
Aufgabe […]. Denn die Frage lautet doch so: wie erhält dein, des 
Einzelnen Leben den höchsten Werth, die tiefste Bedeutung? […] 
Gewiss nur dadurch, dass du zum Vortheile der seltensten und 
werthvollsten Exemplare lebst, nicht aber zum Vortheile der Meisten, 
das heisst, der, einzeln genommen, werthlosesten Exemplare. (UB III 6 
1.383-4) 
Yet Cavell, and following in his wake, Conant, argue that Nietzsche is not proposing 
that we dedicate ourselves to serving a minority of individuals capable of achieving 
elite genius: “the ‘something higher and more human’ in question is not – not 
necessarily and in a sense not ever – that of someone else, but a further or eventual 
position of the self now dissatisfied with itself.”92 And to be sure, we can adduce 
passages to support this reading, such as where Nietzsche states that culture is “das 
                                                      
91 Rawls (1971), p.325. 
92 Cavell (1990), p.52. See also Conant (2001), p.203; see also p.225: “‘Genius’ figures in 
Nietzsche’s vocabulary as the term for a ‘productive uniqueness’ each of us harbors […]. 
Nietzsche does not seek to ‘maximize’ genius (in the way that Rawls […] [imagines]) 
because the only species of genius that concerns him is one that is already perfectly 
distributed” (p.225; my italics). 
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Kind der Selbsterkenntniss jedes Einzelnen und des Ungenügens an sich” (UB III 6 
1.385). This quite unambiguously implies that culture is not the product of an elite 
who are only able to strive for perfection by virtue of the servitude of others who 
themselves must sacrifice their own personal projects of self-cultivation to serve this 
goal; rather, it is the child of the concurrent self-perfecting activity of all the 
members of society. According to both Cavell and Conant, this vision is associated 
with a healthy, egalitarian, democracy as opposed to the aristocratic elitism that 
Rawls reads into UB III.93  
If the readings of Cavell and Conant are correct, this would vitiate my claim 
that Nietzsche is operating with an ideal of social organisation based on 
Schopenhauer’s vision of zweckmäßig organisation, within which hierarchy (i.e 
inequality) and instrumentalisation were found to be integral. So how can we explain 
the strong emphasis in UB III on self-development and global genius if, as I will 
argue, he is above all concerned with our serving the end of generating elite genius? 
And what is the goal for which we are supposed to be striving and that is supposed 
to be binding us together – the cultivation of my global genius? Or the cultivation of 
others’ elite genius? Or are these mutually complementary? Finally, in what manner 
is this goal supposed to bind us together – in a hierarchical or an egalitarian fashion? 
If we are to understand how Nietzsche proposes to resolve the problem of social 
disunity, it is essential that we answer these questions.  
Let us begin by examining the justifications Nietzsche gives for why we 
ought to serve the end of generating elite genius. This will reveal that the task of 
generating elite genius “ausser uns” is in fact the priority for Nietzsche; yet we will 
                                                      
93 See Cavell (1990), p.50. As Cavell argues, only a democratic society embraces the kind of 
value experimentation necessary for self-perfectionism; thus, “Only within the possibility of 
democracy is one committed to living with, or against, such culture. This may well produce 
personal tastes and private choices that are, let us say, exclusive, even esoteric. Then my 
question is whether this exclusiveness might be not just tolerated but treasured by the friends 
of democracy.” See also Conant (2001), pp.226ff. For a comparison of Cavell’s and Rawls’ 
distinct strains of perfectionism, see Paul Patton, “Cavell and Rawls on the Conversation of 
Justice: Moral versus Political Perfectionism”, Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian 
Studies, 2 (2014), 54-74.  
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also witness how this task is complemented by, though not coextensive with, the 
pursuit of global genius. In the final sections of UB III, Nietzsche proffers two 
arguments for why we ought to endeavour to cultivate elite genius beyond ourselves. 
The first argument is what I will call the interdependency argument, and requires 
little more than the realisation that we must each strive to become elite geniuses 
ourselves. According to this argument, Nietzsche suggests that it is in our own 
personal interest – insofar as we strive to become elite geniuses – to create a social 
environment that fosters the cultivation of this type of genius in others. This is 
because our personal struggle to attain elite genius requires the aid of other elite 
geniuses. Pulling ourselves out of the stream of our ordinary, animal state of egoistic 
striving and identifying higher goals is absolutely necessary for the cultivation of 
elite genius according to Nietzsche. But this is an arduous task and we can usually 
only achieve it temporarily. In order to emerge from this state, we ourselves must 
call on the aid of others: “wir müssen gehoben werden – und wer sind die, welche 
uns heben?” (UB III 5 1.380). The answer to Nietzsche’s question is: our exemplars, 
those who offer us a concrete vision of the elite genius that we seek to attain. As 
such, we are always in need of exemplars (i.e. educators), and it serves our own 
interests to cultivate them.  
Furthermore, in creating an environment in which elite geniuses are able to 
achieve their highest potential, Nietzsche states that we simultaneously create an 
environment in which we can independently strive to attain our highest potential: 
[Kultur] will, um die Nutzanwendung auf den Schopenhauerischen 
Menschen zu machen, dass wir seine immer neue Erzeugung 
vorbereiten und fördern, indem wir das ihr Feindselige kennen lernen 
und aus dem Wege räumen — kurz dass wir gegen Alles unermüdlich 
ankämpfen, was uns um die höchste Erfüllung unserer Existenz 
brachte, indem es uns hinderte, solche Schopenhauerische Menschen 
selber zu werden. — (UB III 5 1.383) 
In order to progress towards our own genius (whether global or elite), we must 
necessarily foster the social conditions that facilitate the creation of the elite genius 
(i.e. the Schopenhauerian man). This implies a fairly simple synchronicity of egoistic 
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and collective goals. This argument works as a motivation for prospective elite 
geniuses to further the ends of other (prospective) elite geniuses. But what about 
those individuals that know themselves to be wholly incapable of realising the 
heights of elite genius? Surely the social arrangement that is most suited to their 
needs is quite distinct from that which suits the generation of elite genius? Would 
these individuals not favour a society constructed to support the cultivation of global 
genius up to the point that the majority can achieve it? How can Nietzsche persuade 
such individuals, who are well aware that their interests do not perfectly align with 
those of the elite genius, to sacrifice their comforts for the attainment of this higher, 
cultural goal, which seems to be quite obviously at odds with their own interests? 
This brings us to the second argument for the cultivation of elite genius 
“ausser uns”, which I will call the natural purposes argument. This is intended to 
motivate those falling outside of the group of individuals who consider themselves 
prospective elite geniuses. To convince this remaining majority, then, Nietzsche 
holds that the elite genius – be they the philosopher, artist or saint – is the highest 
end of nature, and thus it is only in collectively pursuing this end that less capable 
individuals can realise their highest calling. Otherwise put, it is only in contributing 
to the fruition of elite genius that the majority realise their own global genius. 
Nietzsche argues that the elite genius is the highest goal of nature on account of the 
fact that “die Natur überhaupt der Erkenntniss bedarf” (UB III 5 1.379) and it is only 
through the elite genius that this kind of knowledge of nature is attained. It is through 
the self-knowledge endowed by the artist, saint and philosopher, that nature achieves 
its own redemption (“Erlösung”); indeed, it is by these very means that “die 
gesammte Natur [hindrängt] sich zu ihrer Erlösung” (UB III 5 1.380).  
As it stands, this argument will strike modern ears as at best esoteric, and at 
worst, simply uncogent; however, it rests upon an admixture of Hegel, Kant and 
Schopenhauer that, in Nietzsche’s day, would have seemed within the bounds of 
philosophical propriety. In Hegel we find the idea that the telos of Geist – i.e. the 
rationality or logos of the universe – is the attainment of self-understanding through 
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the reflection of rational beings.94 Similarly, in KdU, Kant suggests that human 
culture (and the rational thought that it facilitates) represents the ultimate end 
(Zweck) of nature.95 The notion of redemption from animal striving as the highest 
end of human existence is then unmistakeably Schopenhauerian, emerging from his 
view of the world as fundamentally defined by painful yearning – that is, as the 
egoistic pursuit of the will to live. We, as willing agents, partake in the suffering of 
the world as will, yet Schopenhauer thinks we can also escape from this state of 
anguish (i.e. attain redemption) in a number of different ways. Thus, the artist grants 
us a disinterested view of the ideal forms of nature and thereby releases us 
(temporarily) from time and the painful cycle of willing; the philosopher, who gives 
us abstract knowledge that striving is futile, can similarly free us from this cycle of 
desire96; and likewise, through religious insight, individuals can gain intuitive 
knowledge of this futility and adopt a saintly ethic of life-denial.97  
Obviously, one reason we might immediately object to this amalgam of Hegel 
and Schopenhauer is on account of the vehemence with which Schopenhauer rejects 
the idea that any natural purposes can be ascribed to the world “in itself” – i.e. as 
will, which is just a “blinder Drang”.98 Nevertheless, at the level of representation 
he does think that nature exhibits teleological order; indeed, we have already seen 
this in his conception of the hierarchy of Platonic Ideas, at the summit of which stood 
                                                      
94 For a succinct summary of this, see Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), pp.89ff. (esp. p.92). 
95 See KdU §83, p.431. 
96 See WWV I §54, p.374: “die Verneinung des Willens zum Leben, zeigt sich, wenn auf 
jene Erkenntniß das Wollen endet, indem sodann nicht mehr die erkannten einzelnen 
Erscheinungen als Motive des Wollens wirken, sondern die ganze, durch Auffassung der 
Ideen erwachsene Erkenntniß des Wesens der Welt, die den Willen spiegelt, zum Quietiv des 
Willens wird und so der Wille frei sich selbst aufhebt.” 
97 See WWV I §68, p.493: “Vielleicht ist also hier zum ersten Male, abstrakt und rein von 
allem Mythischen, das innere Wesen der Heiligkeit, Selbstverleugnung, Ertödtung des 
Eigenwillens, Askesis, ausgesprochen als Verneinung des Willens zum Leben, eintretend, 
nachdem ihm die vollendete Erkenntniß seines eigenen Wesens zum Quietiv alles Wollens 
geworden.” 
98 See WWV II §26. 
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man. Likewise, in his discussion of the purpose of the artist, we find Schopenhauer 
using distinctly teleological language to describe nature: 
[D]ie wirklichen Objekte [sind] fast immer nur sehr mangelhafte 
Exemplare der in ihnen sich darstellenden Idee: daher der Genius der 
Phantasie bedarf, um in den Dingen nicht Das zu sehn, was die Natur 
wirklich gebildet hat, sondern was sie zu bilden sich bemühte, aber, 
wegen des im vorigen Buche erwähnten Kampfes ihrer Formen unter 
einander, nicht zu Stande brachte. (WWV I §36, p.254)99 
In an analogous fashion, Nietzsche does not believe that nature can achieve its end 
(of producing elite geniuses) unaided, despite its struggling toward this goal; thus, 
he holds it to be necessary “dass an Stelle jenes ‘dunklen Drangs’ endlich einmal ein 
bewusstes Wollen gesetzt werde” (UB III 6 1.387). This is what he calls the 
“metaphysische Bedeutung der Kultur” (UB III 6 1.401). Culture’s true raison d’être 
is to expedite nature’s otherwise ineffective efforts at realising genius. Nietzsche 
therefore commends those who 
[…] fast überall [begegnen] der Natur in ihrer Noth […], wie sie sich 
zum Menschen hindrängt, wie sie schmerzlich das Werk wieder 
missrathen fühlt, wie ihr dennoch überall die wundervollsten Ansätze, 
Züge und Formen gelingen: so dass die Menschen, mit denen wir leben, 
einem Trümmerfelde der kostbarsten bildnerischen Entwürfe gleichen, 
wo alles uns entgegenruft: kommt, helft, vollendet, bringt zusammen, 
was zusammengehört, wir sehnen uns unermesslich, ganz zu werden. 
(UB III 6 1.386)100 
There is evidently a strong parallel between Schopenhauer’s Platonic Ideas, and 
Nietzsche’s conception of the elite genius. Just as Schopenhauer’s artistic genius 
                                                      
99 For another instance of Schopenhauer speaking of the world as will as striving for a very 
particular end, see also WWV I §27, p.205: “[Dieser] Vorgang eben nur aus der Identität des 
erscheinenden Willens in allen Ideen und aus seinem Streben zu immer höherer 
Objektivation begreiflich ist.” Compare also Wagner (1850): “Das Volk also wird die 
Erlösung vollbringen, indem es sich genügt und zugleich seine eigenen Feinde erlöst. Sein 
Verfahren wird das Unwillkürliche der Natur sein: mit der Nothwendigkeit elementarischen 
Waltens wird es den Zusammenhang zerreißen, der einzig die Bedingungen der Herrschaft 
der Unnatur ausmacht” (p.21). 
100 For the reappearance of this idea in the later writings, see NL 10[111] 12.519-20.  
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reveals the ideal Platonic forms that nature itself is unable to manifest, Nietzsche 
views the role of culture as that of facilitating the realisation of ideal human types 
(i.e. elite geniuses), towards which nature itself can only haphazardly strain.  
The natural purposes argument can therefore be phrased as follows: given that 
nature’s highest goal is the production of elite genius, it is our goal to assist nature 
in achieving this, even if we are without hope of becoming elite geniuses ourselves. 
Although Nietzsche maintains that this requires the sacrifice of our egoistic goals 
for the sake of the elite genius – “ein Einzelner dies Opfer forderte” (UB III 6 1.384; 
my italics) – on the whole, he contends that we stand to gain by acceding to this 
metaphysical duty. He assures us that knowing ourselves to be facilitating this goal, 
even if we cannot ourselves achieve it, will endow our lives with a deep and 
invaluable significance: 
Nicht Wenige, auch aus der Reihe der zweiten und dritten Begabungen, 
sind zu diesem Mithelfen bestimmt und kommen nur in der 
Unterwerfung unter eine solche Bestimmung zu dem Gefühl, einer 
Pflicht zu leben und mit Ziel und Bedeutung zu leben. Jetzt aber werden 
gerade diese Begabungen von den verführerischen Stimmen jener 
modischen “Kultur” aus ihrer Bahn abgelenkt und ihrem Instinkte 
entfremdet; an ihre eigensüchtigen Regungen, an ihre Schwächen und 
Eitelkeiten richtet sich diese Versuchung […]. (UB III 6 1.403) 
Though “[e]s […] eine Ungereimtheit [scheint], dass der Mensch eines andern 
Menschen wegen da sein sollte” (ibid.), Nietzsche maintains that it is only by serving 
elite genius that we realise nature’s highest purposes and, thereby, our own highest 
capacities. In striving to fulfil this external purpose in ever more effective ways, 
then, we concurrently work towards maximising our inner, global genius.  
Pace Rawls, therefore, Nietzsche does not view serving elite genius as a 
sacrifice or injustice for those incapable of attaining it themselves; namely, because 
it is by these very means that less gifted individuals maximise what we might call 
their self-contentedness. He further implies that ordinary people may develop a sense 
of kinship, “einer innerlichen Verwandtschaft und Verwachsenheit”, with the elite 
genius. “Denn es giebt Menschen,” says Nietzsche, “welche es als ihre Noth 
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empfinden, wenn sie diesen [den Genius] mühselig ringen und in Gefahr, sich selbst 
zu zerstören, sehen” (UB III 6 1.403). Ordinary people may therefore stave off 
distress, and even secure happiness and a sense of existential purpose, through the 
realisation of elite genius. On the other hand, Cavell’s reading is arguably more 
fallacious than that of Rawls since the only way Nietzsche thinks that most people 
strive to attain their highest self is in their subjection to the goal of propagating elite 
genius.101 To be sure, neither the reading of Rawls nor that of Cavell is adequate – 
the entire either/or approach is misguided. The error in both cases hinges on their 
assumption that in setting the generation of genius as the task of society, Nietzsche 
is working with one or the other of the aforementioned definitions of genius, whereas 
Nietzsche draws on both conceptions and understands their pursuit to be not just 
compatible, but mutually complimentary. 
In formulating these common goals, Nietzsche proves himself to be 
fulfilling what he maintains is the ideal function of the philosopher; namely, “ein 
Bündniss der bindenden Kraft sein, als Arzt der Kultur” (NL 30[8] 7.734).102 The 
identification of a common purpose acts as the foundation for establishing social 
organisation, and presents people with an alternative to their quotidian life of 
divisive, egoistic struggle, in which “der persönliche Sieg ist das Ziel” (UB III 6 
1.395). As has been demonstrated, it is the attainment of elite genius that constitutes 
the ultimate goal of humanity and which is intended to have the strongest socially 
                                                      
101 Though Cavell (1990) remarks that Nietzsche leaves himself “unguarded” with respect to 
elitist or aristocratic readings, he fails to satisfactorily account for these passages (though he 
does do so with respect to similar passages in Emerson) (see pp.53-4). To further buttress 
my refutation of Cavell, we might also turn to the early Nachlass, where Nietzsche very 
unambiguously states that “[d]as Glück des Einzelnen im Staate wird untergeordnet dem 
Gesammtwohl: was heisst das? Nicht dass die Minoritäten benutzt werden zum Wohle der 
Majoritäten. Sondern dass die Einzelnen dem Wohle der höchsten Einzelnen untergeordnet 
werden, dem Wohle der höchsten Exemplare. Die höchsten Einzelnen sind die 
schöpferischen Menschen, sei es die besten moralischen oder sonst im grossen Sinne 
nützlichen, also die reinsten Typen und Verbesserer der Menschheit. Nicht die Existenz eines 
Staates um jeden Preis, sondern dass die höchsten Exemplare in ihm leben können und 
schaffen können, ist das Ziel des Gemeinwesens” (NL 30[8] 7.733). 
102 As he says in an adjacent note, the state “muss alle binden durch ein gemeinsames Ziel”, 
and it is the task of the philosopher to provide this Ziel (NL 30[7] 7.732). 
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binding effect. Whether we are capable of achieving elite genius or not, Nietzsche 
provides us with a prudential reason for joining the concerted struggle to help 
generate such genius.  
At this point, we can see that the struggle for culture that Nietzsche is 
advocating embodies three of the criteria of the assimilative conflict we found in 
Schopenhauer. First, this conflict aims at the establishment of a functional hierarchy 
in which one group of individuals (“aus der Reihe der zweiten und dritten 
Begabungen”) labour to serve the superordinate ends of another group (i.e. that of 
elite geniuses and prospective elite geniuses). Indeed, insofar as this is the case, this 
cannot be said to be an agonistic relation, which as we saw, presupposes non-
instrumentalisation and approximate equality.103 (This said, we should note that 
Nietzsche is often ambivalent regarding the status of elite geniuses as ends in 
themselves insofar as he often describes them as a means either to furthering 
humanity in a general sense, or giving purpose to the ancillary individuals serving 
them.104) Second, since Nietzsche conceives of this end as being promoted by the 
“Artzt der Kultur”, we can soundly infer that he associates it with health. Third, we 
have also discerned that this struggle for social organisation is metaphysically 
grounded: first, both the interdependency and natural purposes arguments are 
dependent on the same form of metaphysical self-knowledge that was outlined in the 
previous subsection (it is only this that opens up a new circle of social Pflichte). But 
moreover, we have also seen that the natural purposes argument is premised on a 
teleological picture of nature. But what about the perpetuation of conflict within the 
resultant hierarchies? And the necessity of unmeasured conflict? If we take a broader 
look at the kind of social struggle to which Nietzsche is exhorting us in UB III, it 
will become evident that this has more in common with Schopenhauer’s model of 
assimilative conflict than has hitherto been demonstrated. 
                                                      
103 Vanessa Lemm (2007) has, pace Cavell, also observed the lack of equality between 
educator and pupil – i.e. between the individual and the exemplar – in UB III (see p.21). 
104 See NL 30[8] 7.733, where Nietzsche describes the elite genius as the “Verbesserer der 
Menschheit”.  
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Up until now, Nietzsche’s suggestions have remained on a highly abstract 
plane. Accordingly, it is difficult to ascertain what he is concretely urging us to do. 
And indeed, more generally, what is bound to leave any reader of UB III nonplussed 
having surveyed the Rawls-Cavell debate is the absence of any coherent, positive 
political blueprint in the text. He refrains from associating his cultural vision with 
either an elitist, aristocratic society (as he did in CV 3) or some mode of democratic 
organisation. So what kind of social praxis is Nietzsche proposing? 
Certainly, he does make a number of positive proposals. First, he quite 
minimally calls for the creation of a space for cultivating elite genius, one that is 
shielded from demands extraneous to this goal. The prospective elite genius should 
neither have to serve the ends of others – be these the fiscal needs of the wealthy, or 
the needs of the state in its struggle with other nation-states – nor have to be 
concerned with having to provide for himself (“kein Zwang zum Brod-Erwerben” 
[UB III 8 1.411]). Regarding the former, Nietzsche is critical of the social condition 
in which everyone “[kämpft] in Reih’ und Glied” for the utilitarian ends of the state, 
and where cultural institutions are merely conscripted to serve these ends. 105 In 
opposition to this conception of the purpose of cultural institutions, however, 
Nietzsche speaks of a “kleinere Schaar” (UB III 6 1.402) who view such institutions 
as serving a quite different purpose: 
[S]ie selber will, an der Schutzwehr einer festen Organisation, 
verhüten, dass sie durch jenen Schwarm weggeschwemmt und 
auseinander getrieben werde, dass ihre Einzelnen in allzufrüher 
Erschöpfung hinschwinden oder gar von ihrer grossen Aufgabe 
abspänstig gemacht werden. (Ibid.) 
Nietzsche views the ordered crowd and the republic of geniuses as perfectly 
compatible, but only where culture acts as a harbour sheltering the free activity of 
genius from the utilitarian demands of the crowd. Nietzsche’s vision is one in which 
                                                      
105 Nietzsche warns of the damaging effects of subordinating culture to “die Selbstsucht der 
Erwerbenden” or “die Selbstsucht des Staates” (UB III 6 1.388). 
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culture is embedded within, though nonetheless insulated from, the Gemeinschaft 
and its vulgar demands.106  
With respect to philosophical genius, one way Nietzsche envisions this 
being concretely achieved is through the complete purging of philosophy from the 
university system, where Nietzsche thinks it has been both subordinated to the needs 
of the state and rendered ridiculous.107 Therefore, Nietzsche calls it a “Forderung der 
Kultur” 
[D]er Philosophie jede staatliche und akademische Anerkennung zu 
entziehn und überhaupt Staat und Akademie der für sie unlösbaren 
Aufgaben zu entheben, zwischen wahrer und scheinbarer Philosophie 
zu unterscheiden. Lasst die Philosophen immerhin wild wachsen […] 
— ihr sollt Wunderdinge erleben! (UB III 8 1.422)108 
The programme outlined in this text is one of ring-fencing a space for philosophical 
practice to proceed undisturbed by society’s utilitarian demands. In his desire to 
purify philosophy, we further uncover the quite unmeasured aspiration to negate 
academic philosophy. Indeed, the “Kampf für die Kultur und die Feindseligkeit 
gegen Einflüsse, Gewohnheiten, Gesetze, Einrichtungen, in welchen er nicht sein 
Ziel wiedererkennt: die Erzeugung des Genius” is often characterised by the impetus 
towards an unmeasured negation of cultural traditions and institutions.109 Wagner is 
accordingly celebrated for having entered into the “feindseligsten Widerspruch mit 
                                                      
106 Indeed, Nietzsche refers to this as the “Refugium der Kultur” (NL 30[7] 7.733). 
107 UB III 6 1.421: “Aber zugegeben dass diese Schaar von schlechten Philosophen lächerlich 
ist — und wer wird es nicht zugeben? — in wiefern sind sie denn auch schädlich? Kurz 
geantwortet: dadurch dass sie die Philosophie zu einer lächerlichen Sache machen. […]”  
108 See also UB III 8 1.411: “Damit sind einige Bedingungen genannt, unter denen der 
philosophische Genius in unserer Zeit trotz der schädlichen Gegenwirkungen wenigstens 
entstehen kann: freie Männlichkeit des Charakters, frühzeitige Menschenkenntniss, keine 
gelehrte Erziehung, keine patriotische Einklemmung, kein Zwang zum Brod-Erwerben, 
keine Beziehung zum Staate — kurz Freiheit und immer wieder Freiheit: dasselbe 
wunderbare und gefährliche Element, in welchem die griechischen Philosophen aufwachsen 
durften.” 
109 See also BA Vorrede, where Nietzsche states that “Vielleicht liegt zwischen ihr und der 
Gegenwart die Vernichtung des Gymnasiums, vielleicht selbst die Vernichtung der 
Universität oder mindestens eine so totale Umgestaltung der eben genannten 
Bildungsanstalten” (1.648). 
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den bestehenden Formen und Ordnungen” (UB III 6 1.351; my italics). This struggle 
is superlatively hostile towards those forms and cultural orders that frustrate the 
generation of genius. On account of this endorsement of immoderate hostility, it is 
therefore misrepresentative to refer to Nietzsche’s proposed “Kampf für die Kultur” 
as an agon of individuals against society.110 As has been illuminated, Nietzsche 
undertakes a radical critique of academic philosophy, one that he hopes will be 
practically implemented in such a way as to bring about the abolishment of 
philosophy departments in universities tout court. This must then be followed, he 
instructs us, by a perpetual process of “Läuterung”, whereby any encroachment of 
political and economic demands into the cultural refuge of the genius is promptly 
thwarted. Even once the necessary hierarchy has been erected, then, the struggle is 
not over, indeed, it is never over. Nietzsche’s “Kampf für die Kultur” is a constant 
process of struggling against social structures that are inimical to the development 
of elite genius. Contrary to Rawls and Cavell, both aristocracy and democracy are 
therefore compatible with this vision so long as they serve the maintenance of the 
cultural sanctuary in which prospective elite geniuses can freely experiment and 
cultivate themselves.  
We can therefore conclude that Nietzsche’s struggle for the ideal social 
organisation (i.e. that which is maximally able to generate genius) in UB is, in its 
essentials, analogous to Schopenhauer’s vision of the struggle for zweckmäßig 
organisation:  
 
1. It is a struggle aimed at functional hierarchy; 
2. This hierarchy is associated with health; 
3. It is inextricable from unmeasured conflict; 
                                                      
110 Vanessa Lemm (2007) has argued that, in opposition to the overly individualistic political 
philosophies of Rawls and Cavell, Nietzsche’s vision of freedom is inherently public; indeed, 
she conceives of this freedom as constituted by means of “a public struggle (agon) between 
the individual and society” (p.14). 
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4. The struggle persists within the resultant hierarchies (namely, as a struggle 
to maintain this hierarchy through perpetual “Läuterung”); 
5. It is driven, or at least conditioned, by two metaphysically substantial entities 
(i.e. the self qua unchanging Kern, and nature qua quasi-Schopenhauerian 
teleological will). 
The kind of conflictual praxis he suggests we engage in if we wish to solve these 
problems, however, is paradigmatically both unagonistic and non-violent. Indeed, 
we now have a comprehensive overview of how Nietzsche proposed to solve the 
three problems of disintegration analysed in Section 1.  With respect to the 
disorganisation of the self (a), Nietzsche proposes an unagonistic struggle to 
subordinate and instrumentalise the knowledge, values, traditions and habits that we 
have acquired from other cultures through learning, thereby forming them into an 
integrated whole that facilitates agency. He proposes that we do this by testing each 
such culturally acquired phenomenon to determine whether or not it serves our true 
life-needs. By imposing order on these dissonant social and psychological 
phenomena, and forcing them into a harmony able to serve the life-needs of the 
individual and culture, they become practically applicable, and thus the paralysis of 
our agency is overcome, convention is subverted, and the diremption of our inner 
(intellectual) life and our outer (practical) life is overcome (b). Though in UB I and 
II he has already set the essential need as that of generating a truly productive culture 
– that is, one able to bring elite genius into existence – in UB III, he comprehensively 
expands upon this and further attempts to justify this higher goal, explicitly invoking 
it as a means to persuading individuals to abandon egoism and cooperatively apply 
themselves to the project of generating elite genius (c).  
While this integrative struggle can be considered measured insofar as it aims 
to preserve that which is overcome, Nietzsche also persistently emphasises the need 
for unmeasured struggle, which is to say the ferociously hostile assault on habits, 
opinions, traditions and institutions that are deemed incompatible with the 
unification of culture around the task of producing elite genius. Indeed, in EH, 
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Nietzsche describes the Betrachtungen as “durchaus Kriegerisch”, and as a series of 
“Attentaten”, and even as a “duel”.111 This unrestrained hostility is not at any point 
aimed at individuals, however, in the sense of a violent physical Vernichtungskampf, 
but at geistige phenomena and social institutions. It is therefore best conceived as an 
aggressive variety of social reform and radical critique.  
If Nietzsche genuinely deems both instrumentalisation and destructive 
critique to be indispensable aspects of the “Kampf für die Kultur”, labelling this 
struggle agonistic is not only misleading but potentially detrimental with respect to 
the project of cultural Erneuerung. This is because it risks softening the task that he 
believes is demanded of us – one of radical critique and social reorganisation, in 
which certain institutions, cultural traditions and beliefs are either forcefully 
subordinated to higher purposes or eradicated altogether. In place of agonistic 
interpretations of his socially unificatory project, I have suggested that we therefore 
think of the form of conflict Nietzsche is paradigmatically encouraging throughout 
UB as organisational conflict. That is, a mode of struggle aimed at establishing and 
maintaining functional hierarchies – one that comprises of both measured and 
unmeasured conflict: measured insofar as it preserves that which is subordinated 
within a new unity, and unmeasured insofar as it involves the destruction of outdated 
modes of organisation and the doxa that shore up such moribund conventions.  
On these grounds, I have proposed that we view Nietzsche’s recommended 
remedies through the lens of Schopenhauer’s philosophy – in particular the latter’s 
notion of universal conflict as a struggle for assimilation. Needless to say, there are 
many points of divergence between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The most striking 
perhaps, is that for Nietzsche, the struggle for organisation is not determined in the 
same way as for Schopenhauer. For Nietzsche, our attaining higher degrees of 
organisation, either as individuals or as a society, is contingent, and depends upon 
our concerted conscious effort; in contrast, for Schopenhauer, such organisation is 
                                                      
111 See EH UB 1 6.316-9. “Mein Paradies ist ‘unter dem Schatten meines Schwertes’… Im 
Grunde hatte ich eine Maxime Stendhals prakticirt: er räth an, seinen Eintritt in die 
Gesellschaft mit einem Duell zu machen” (6.319). 
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in a sense an automatic process guaranteed by the metaphysical structure of reality. 
In addition to this though, the unmeasured conflict that conditions Nietzsche’s model 
of organisational struggle is more excretory in kind, as compared with that which 
informs Schopenhauer’s model, which is more digestive in kind. Nietzsche figures 
this as a process of jettisoning that which has become redundant or harmful, even if 
this does sometimes take the form of outright eradication; conversely, for 
Schopenhauer, it is depicted as a process of breaking down existing unities in order 
to exploit their constituent parts. This can be interpreted as an attempt on Nietzsche’s 
part to give Schopenhauer’s apathetic account of organisation a socially galvanising 
dimension.  
I have now brought to light the two irrefutably metaphysical foundations of 
Nietzsche’s unificatory project. The more important of these is undoubtedly the 
unchanging, essentialist conception of character that he deploys in UB – indeed, 
knowledge of this aspect of the self is imperative to Nietzsche’s early organisational 
project. Second, we have also witnessed Nietzsche relying on a teleological vision 
of nature as striving (and largely failing) to spawn geniuses, an idea that is couched 
in a melange of Schopenhauerian, Hegelian, Wagnerian and Kantian 
Weltanschauungen. Yet, as I have already partly outlined in Chapter 1, even in the 
late 1860s, Nietzsche was becoming disaffected with metaphysics, and in MA this 
descended into an outright rejection. Indeed, we should briefly survey precisely why 
the particular metaphysical foundations he deploys in UB become untenable for him 
as he develops his critique of metaphysics. This will bring into sharp relief why he 
is consequently forced to formulate a quite novel approach to the problem of disunity 





3.4. NIETZSCHE CONTRA METAPHYSICS 
There are of course many aspects of UB that Nietzsche had come to reject by 
MA (and indeed, in his unpublished writings, even before MA), though his 
rejection of the elite genius as an exemplar at the pinnacle of society is 
perhaps most vociferous.112 Yet as we will see in the final chapter, Nietzsche 
arguably reprises this ideal in the later works in his conception of the higher 
individual. In this section, however, I will examine Nietzsche’s rejection of 
metaphysics, which is far more enduring than his rejection of genius. In 
particular, I will contend that he launches a veritable “Krieg ohne Pulver” 
against the metaphysical premises of UB’s synthetic project. Indeed, already 
in 1868, in his planned dissertation entitled “Begriff des Organischen seit 
Kant”, Nietzsche had begun to directly attack the idea that the apparent 
Zweckmäßigkeit of organisms and nature had any metaphysical basis. 
Moreover, in the very same year, as I demonstrated in Chapter 1, he embarked 
upon a searching critique of Schopenhauerian metaphysics. Then again in 
1872, in WL, he rejects the idea that ideal “forms” (such as Plato’s Ideas) 
have any reality beyond the confines of the human intellect. We might 
accordingly view UB as Nietzsche’s last effort to salvage some form of quasi-
Schopenhauerian metaphysics. But from MA onwards, the various critisms 
of metaphysics that he had been incubating in repressed form within the 
Nachlass are given full vent. We should now examine how this aspect of his 
philosophical development bears upon his synthesising project. 
                                                      
112 See e.g. VM 99 and 173. See also MA 164. This notion is also clearly rejected in CV 5. 
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3.4.1. NIETZSCHE’S GENERAL REPUDIATION OF 
METAPHYSICS 
The essentials of Nietzsche’s philosophical apostacy from Schopenhauer have 
already been delineated in Chapter 1, where we saw that, in “Zu Schopenhauer” and 
MA, Nietzsche criticises the idea that one could ascribe any properties to the world 
in itself: to describe the world in itself as an eternal, unified and free (i.e. 
undetermined) “Wille” is to trangress the Kantian critical ban. His criticism is that 
unity is a category of human experience, and so cannot be soundly predicated to the 
world in itself, which is supposed to signify the world beyond all human experience: 
 
[S]ie [Einheit, Ewigkeit und Freiheit] alle sind sammt und sonders 
unzertrennlich mit unsrer Organisation verknüpft, so daß es völlig 
zweifelhaft ist, ob sie außerhalb der menschlichen Erkenntnißsphaere 
überhaupt eine Bedeutung haben. (KGW I/4, pp.424-5)  
 
Even though Schopenhauer is at pains to point out that the unity of the will is 
incomparable to worldly unities insofar as it is beyond all plurality, Nietzsche’s 
argument is that beyond the world of appearance, the concept of unity has no sense 
and is moreover misleadingly anthropomorphic. His argument is that Schopenhauer 
simply makes too many inductively inferred, positive claims about the world in 
itself, which Nietzsche maintains is just “ein durchaus dunkles unfaßbares X” (ibid., 
p.423). In MA 16, Nietzsche then asserts that “in der Erscheinung eben durchaus 
nicht das Ding an sich erscheine, und von jener auf dieses jeder Schluss abzulehnen 
sei.” This is a position that Nietzsche later radicalises – urging us to completely 
abandon the idealist notion of an unconditioned, “wahre” world lying behind the 
merely “scheinbare” world in which we live – namely, on account of its being 
completely inaccessible and so devoid of use (“zu Nichts mehr nütz” [GD Fabel 
6.81]113) or on account of its being self-contradictory (“Dass […] ‘unmittelbare 
                                                      
113 See e.g. GD Fable 6.81: “Die wahre Welt haben wir abgeschafft: welche Welt blieb übrig? 
die scheinbare vielleicht?… Aber nein! mit der wahren Welt haben wir auch die scheinbare 
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Gewissheit’, ebenso wie ‘absolute Erkenntniss’ und ‘Ding an sich’, eine contradictio 
in adjecto in sich schliesst, werde ich hundertmal wiederholen” [JGB 16]). This 
immediately rules out the possibility of religion, myth or art granting us a 
suprahistorical refuge by putting us in touch with the metaphysical truth of reality, 
since, not only is it a logical impossibility, but even if it were possible, it could not 
be known by any means.114 But let us now inquire how, in his renunciation of 
metaphysical speculation, he specifically rejects the essentialist conceptions of the 
self and nature that were found to be fundamental to his synthetic project in UB. 
3.4.2. REFUTING THE EXISTENCE OF THE ESSENTIAL 
SELF 
Nietzsche pejoratively labels Platonic Ideas a “Volksbewußtsein” (NL 7[97] 7.160), 
and already in WL, composed in the same year as UB I (1873), he contests the belief 
that natural kinds have any existence beyond the specifically human world. Closer 
inspection of nature, he argues, reveals it to be a conglomeration of irreducibly 
                                                      
abgeschafft!” As he also says in FW 354, “wir ‘erkennen’ bei weitem nicht genug, um auch 
nur so scheiden [zwischen das ‘Ding an sich’ und die Erscheinung] zu dürfen.” 
114 Nietzsche emphatically exclaims in MA 110 that “noch nie hat eine Religion, weder 
mittelbar, noch unmittelbar, weder als Dogma, noch als Gleichniss, eine Wahrheit enthalten. 
Denn aus der Angst und dem Bedürfniss ist eine jede geboren, auf Irrgängen der Vernunft 
hat sie sich in’s Dasein geschlichen” (MA 110; see also MA 10). Religion may once have 
fulfilled the human need for consolation, and even contributed to social organisation (MA 
472), but Nietzsche tells us that these needs can be eradicated: “diese selbst kann man 
schwächen und ausrotten” (MA 27); he thus advises that we destroy this need rather than 
continue to be burdened by the regressive metaphysical and moral errors of religion. He also 
abandons the idea of art as facilitating organisation by granting individuals a consoling 
insight into the fixed truth of reality. Clearly attacking both Schopenhauer and Wagner, 
Nietzsche states in MA 146 that “[d]er Künstler hat in Hinsicht auf das Erkennen der 
Wahrheiten eine schwächere Moralität, als der Denker: er will sich die glänzenden, 
tiefsinnigen Deutungen des Lebens durchaus nicht nehmen lassen und wehrt sich gegen 
nüchterne, schlichte Methoden und Resultate”. In this aphorism, Nietzsche criticises the artist 
precisely on account of his preference for “das […] Mythische” (in lieu of more effective 
means of discerning “Wahrheiten”) indicating just how far he has moved away from his 
earlier position where together, art and myth offered the only point of access for most people 
to the unhistorische timeless truths of reality. See also MA 145 and 150. 
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unique cases. Humans then abstract from the differences between roughly 
comparable cases to create “natural” kinds.  Eliding the differences between the 
members of these approximate man-made groups 
[…] erweckt nun die Vorstellung, als ob es in der Natur ausser den 
Blättern etwas gäbe, das “Blatt” wäre, etwa eine Urform […]. Das 
Uebersehen des Individuellen und Wirklichen giebt uns den Begriff, 
wie es uns auch die Form giebt, wohingegen die Natur keine Formen 
und Begriffe, also auch keine Gattungen kennt, sondern nur ein für uns 
unzugängliches und undefinirbares X. Denn auch unser Gegensatz von 
Individuum und Gattung ist anthropomorphisch und entstammt nicht 
dem Wesen der Dinge […]. (WL 1.880)115 
For Nietzsche, in contrast to Schopenhauer, there is only unitas post rem. The belief 
that there exist “Urformen” in nature is a fallacious inductive inference. Individual 
objects are not copies (“Abbilde”) but unique instances, even if they do often exhibit 
points of resemblance with other objects. 
Still later, Nietzsche censures Schopenhauer’s conception of “Ideas” for 
being just as “dunkel, ungewiss [und] ahnungsvoll” as that of Hegel or Schelling 
(WA 6.36).116 But later in FW 372, “Warum wir keine Idealisten sind”, Nietzsche 
rejects the “[kalte] Reiche der ‘Ideen’”, less because of its epistemological status, so 
much as by reason of the harm it does to our senses, insofar as all idealism devalues 
the senses. His rejection is no longer premised on the falsity of Ideas (i.e. their lack 
of correspondence to a “real” world) per se, but more on the fact that they are more 
misleading than the senses: “die Ideen schlimmere Verführerinnen seien als die 
                                                      
115 See also MA 14, where Nietzsche states that “[…] so oft, verbürgt die Einheit des Wortes 
Nichts für die Einheit der Sache.” 
116 See also NL 41[59] 7.592, where Nietzsche critiques the Platonic notion of Ideas: “Ein 
Ding, dem ein Begriff genau entspricht, wäre ohne Herkunft. Plato’s Irrthum von den ewigen 
Ideen.” Another relevant note in this context is NL 3[124] 9.87, in which Nietzsche not only 
criticises Plato’s theory of the forms (“Plato mußte es noch erleben, daß die Lehre von den 
Ideen von einem helleren und umfänglicheren Geiste, als er war, widerlegt wurde”), but also 
refers to Schopenhauer’s philosophy as fantastical: “Einem so ingrimmigen und 
herrschsüchtigen Menschen, wie Schopenhauer war, kann man Glück wünschen, daß er es 
nicht errathen hat, wie kurz der Triumph seiner Philosophie sein solle und wie bald alle 
Prachtstücke seiner Erfindung als Trugbilder erkannt würden.” 
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Sinne”. As we read on, we see that Ideas do not tempt us away from objective reality, 
for Nietzsche, but rather life – they promote a “beständige Blässer-werden —, die 
immer idealischer ausgelegte Entsinnlichung”. Nietzsche maintains that Plato 
developed his realm of the forms as a means of controlling his overly powerful 
senses (“übermächtigen Sinnen”, which Nietzsche associates with health). In the 
case of us moderns, however, Nietzsche implies that our senses are starved 
(“[v]ielleicht sind wir Modernen nur nicht gesund genug, um Plato’s Idealismus 
nöthig zu haben”). Whereas they were a salubrious remedy for Plato’s healthy 
superabundance, for us, they merely exacerbate our state of impoverishment. 
Given these criticisms, it should be plain that Nietzsche could not sustain 
the idea that it was by means of discovering his “platonische Idee” – the 
metaphysical Kern of his self – that Schopenhauer was able to synthesise himself 
(UB III 5 1.376). Nor could he coherently maintain the subtextual belief that the elite 
genius is an embodiment of the ideal form of the human, which nature is always 
clumsily failing to realise.  Nonetheless, though these criticisms of idealism entail 
the rejection of Schopenhauer’s Platonism, they only indirectly critique the idea of 
the core self upon which Nietzsche relies in UB, and on which he in fact launches a 
more explicit attack. In MA, for example, he unequivocally rejects the 
Schopenhauerian idea of “unveränderliche[r] Charakter” as a false inference from 
the relative stability of an individual’s character across a single lifetime (MA 41), 
and he further discourages each of us from treating ourselves “als starres, 
beständiges, Eines Individuum” (MA 618).117 
Likewise, Nietzsche comes to view humans as subjecting the irreducibly 
unique experiences that they have of their own will to the same process of 
simplification and elision that produced the illusion of the forms.118 Indeed, he 
refutes Schopenhauer’s notion of empirical character. For Nietzsche, closer scrutiny 
                                                      
117 On the fluidity of character in Nietzsche, see also Alexander Nehamas, Life as Literature 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p.159. 
118 See VM 5, where Nietzsche speaks of “das Wort ‘Wille’, welches Schopenhauer zur 
gemeinsamen Bezeichnung vieler menschlicher Zustände umbildete […].” See also MA 14, 
18, and M 115. 
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always reveals acts of willing to be comprised of a complex constellation of 
physiological processes and affects, which we then misconstrue as a simple unity 
(see e.g. FW 127). Likewise, later in JGB 19, he rebuts Schopenhauer’s conception 
of the will as a simple phenomenon, arguing instead that all willing is the result of 
the combined activity of multitudinous affects (hence, “Wollen scheint [ihm] vor 
Allem etwas Complicirtes”). 
In M, as part of his attack on the notion of moral responsibility, Nietzsche 
also completely rejects the idea of a subject to which moral deserts could be 
attributed (see e.g. M 115). Rather, what we call the “Subjekt”, “Selbst”, “Ego”, or 
“Ich” is just a multiplicity of interrelated drives. In M, at any rate, a drive designates 
an appetite or behavioural inclination. In this period alone, he names a panoply of 
drives – for example, a drive “nach Ruhe” (M 109), “nach Auszeichnung” (M 113), 
“der Anhänglichkeit und Fürsorge für Andere” (M 143), “zur Erkenntniß” (M 429); 
but there is then also the “Geschlechtstrieb” (see e.g. NL 11[16] 9.447), an 
“Eigenthumstrieb”, a “Nahrungstrieb” (NL 11[47] 9.459), and a “Rachetrieb” (FW 
49). It is a combination of just such drives “die [constituiren] sein Wesen” (M 119). 
We will return to Nietzsche’s conception of drives later; for now, suffice it to say 
that, on Nietzsche account, the self is nothing more than a constellation of such 
drives – a position that he maintains throughout the later period, referring to the soul 
(“Seele”) in JGB 12 as a “Gesellschaftsbau der Triebe und Affekte”.119 Though 
Nietzsche’s deflationary attacks on the notion of a unified, atomistic self are often 
simply asserted, his argument for the composite nature of both the will and the self 
is based on what he calls “[v]orsichtiger” self-observation (recalling Hume).120 Thus, 
                                                      
119 See also JGB 6, 9, 19. For an excellent analysis of the texts concerning Nietzsche’s 
fictionalism vis-à-vis the self, see Sebastian Gardner, “Nietzsche, the Self, and the Disunity 
of Philosophical Reason”, in K. Gemes and S. May (eds.), Nietzsche on Freedom and 
Autonomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.1-32 (pp.2-5). 
120 In this sense, Nietzsche’s critique of subjectivity bears many parallels with that of Hume. 
See NL 10[19] 12.465: “‘Subjekt’ ist die Fiktion, als ob viele gleiche Zustände an uns die 
Wirkung Eines Substrats wären: aber wir haben erst die ‘Gleichheit’ dieser Zustände 
geschaffen; das Gleichsetzen und Zurechtmachen derselben ist der Thatbestand, nicht die 
Gleichheit (— diese ist vielmehr zu leugnen —)”. See also NL 6[70] 9.213: “[W]ie die Triebe 
im Kampfe sind, ist das Gefühl des Ich immer am stärksten dort, wo gerade das Übergewicht 
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in JGB 17, Nietzsche takes issue with the Cartesian “proof” of the self qua res 
cogitans, contending that we are only aware of the process (“Vorgang”) or activity 
(“Thätigkeit”) of thinking and that the existence of a self or “Ich” doing this thinking 
is a most dubious inductive inference – thus, he labels the “Ich” “eine Annahme, 
eine Behauptung” and “eine Fälschung des Thatbestandes” (JGB 17).121 This negates 
the possibility of our being able to look back over our past joys in order to access 
“das Grundgesetz [unseres] eigentlichen Selbst”, which is fundamental to the 
synthetic project outlined in UB III. 
There is no self over and above our impulses and appetites that we could call 
our “eigentliches Selbst”. Most importantly, when we think we are combatting the 
vehemence of a drive, it is never from the position of an “authentic” self that we do 
so: 
Während “wir” uns also über die Heftigkeit eines Triebes zu beklagen 
meinen, ist es im Grunde ein Trieb, welcher über einen anderen klagt; 
das heisst: die Wahrnehmung des Leidens an einer solchen Heftigkeit 
setzt voraus, dass es einen ebenso heftigen oder noch heftigeren 
anderen Trieb giebt, und dass ein Kampf bevorsteht, in welchem unser 
Intellect Partei nehmen muss. (M 119) 
This means that there is no way one could possibly organise oneself from the 
standpoint of some impulse that could be considered authentic to one’s self – 
                                                      
ist”. Compare David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: John Noon, 1739), T 
1.4.6.15: “The identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one, and of 
a like kind with that which we ascribe to vegetables and animal bodies. It cannot, therefore, 
have a different origin, but must proceed from a like operation of the imagination upon like 
objects.” Though Hume, unlike Nietzsche, believes in atomistic perceptions as the basis of 
experience. 
121 JGB 17: “Es denkt: aber dass dies ‘es’ gerade jenes alte berühmte ‘Ich’ sei, ist, milde 
geredet, nur eine Annahme, eine Behauptung, vor Allem keine ‘unmittelbare Gewissheit’. 
Zuletzt ist schon mit diesem ‘es denkt’ zu viel gethan: schon dies ‘es’ enthält eine Auslegung 
des Vorgangs und gehört nicht zum Vorgange selbst. Man schliesst hier nach der 
grammatischen Gewohnheit ‘Denken ist eine Thätigkeit, zu jeder Thätigkeit gehört Einer, 
der thätig ist, folglich —.’” See also NL 7[60]12.315, where Nietzsche states that the idea of 
the substantial self “ist nichts 
Gegebenes, sondern etwas Hinzu-Erdichtetes, Dahinter-Gestecktes.” As Gardner (2009) 
argues (quite convincingly), Nietzsche does not seriously consider Kant’s rejoinder to Hume 
in the first Kritik. 
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namely, because there is no self over and above the drives. Nietzsche thus debunks 
his earlier conviction that our struggle to order the various influences on our agency 
should be founded upon the disclosure of our “eigentliches Selbst”.  
 Why have we constructed the fiction of a unified self? Why does Nietzsche 
think “I” have fictionalised myself so that “I” believe myself to be a unified entity? 
In short, he believes some notion of the self to be necessary for survival. Nietzsche 
refers to this simplification of the self as both “nützlich” and as a 
“Lebensbedingung” insofar as it enables our survival by rendering the chaotic 
multiplicity of (interior) reality manageable.122 However, Nietzsche thinks this self 
has been hypostatised from a useful fiction into a metaphysical entity, which in turn 
has become “die Grundvoraussetzung” of life-denying religious doctrine (especially, 
“der christlichen Lehre”) (JGB 54) – particularly insofar as it posits a stable self that 
can be held morally accountable for its actions. In Chapter 4, we will expound why 
Nietzsche disparages such doctrines, and accordingly, it will become clearer why he 
would negatively value any “Grundvoraussetzung[en]” thereof. 
Alongside this, he radicalises his scepticism regarding the kind of self-
knowledge that is presupposed by UB III, where although he doubted whether we 
could find our authentic self, he nonetheless asserted that we could discern an ideal 
direction in which the self wills and develops (its “innere Gesetzlichkeit”). Thus, in 
M 115, “Das sogenannte ‘Ich’”, Nietzsche argues that the self of which one is 
conscious is only the self in its extreme states – the finer nuances always escape 
observation. Thus, “[w]ir sind Alle nicht Das, als was wir nach den Zuständen 
                                                      
122 See e.g. NL 40[21] 11.639: “Das direkte Befragen des Subjekts über das Subjekt, und alle 
Selbst-Bespiegelung des Geistes hat darin seine Gefahren, daß es für seine Thätigkeit 
nützlich und wichtig sein könnte, sich falsch zu interpretiren.” See also NL 38[3] 11.597, 
where Nietzsche describes the self as an “unentbehrlich[e]” fiction. See also NL 9[144] 
12.148, where he suggests that such processes of simplification are a precondition of human 
existence: “Man soll diese Nöthigung, Begriffe, Gattungen, Formen, Zwecke, Gesetze — 
‘eine Welt der identischen Fälle’ — zu bilden, nicht so verstehn, als ob wir damit die wahre 
Welt zu fixiren im Stande wären; sondern als Nöthigung, uns eine Welt zurechtzumachen, 
bei der unsre Existenz ermöglicht wird — wir schaffen damit eine Welt, die berechenbar, 
vereinfacht, verständlich usw. für uns ist.” See also NL 11[270] 9.545. 
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erscheinen, für die wir allein Bewusstsein und Worte — und folglich Lob und Tadel 
— haben”. In M 119, the practical consequences of this are brought to the fore:  
Wie weit Einer seine Selbstkenntniss auch treiben mag, Nichts kann 
doch unvollständiger sein, als das Bild der gesammten Triebe, die sein 
Wesen constituiren. Kaum dass er die gröberen beim Namen nennen 
kann: ihre Zahl und Stärke, ihre Ebbe und Fluth, ihr Spiel und 
Widerspiel unter einander, und vor Allem die Gesetze ihrer Ernährung 
bleiben ihm ganz unbekannt. (M 119; my italics)  
And later, in FW 354, Nietzsche theorises that (self-)consciousness only evolved to 
the extent that it helped humans identify and communicate their needs; likewise, we 
only developed language to the degree that it served the same end. Everything of 
which we can become conscious is, according to Nietzsche, “in Bezug auf 
Gemeinschafts- und Heerden-Nützlichkeit fein entwickelt”, and therefore, he 
continues,  
Jeder von uns, beim besten Willen, [wird] sich selbst so individuell wie 
möglich zu verstehen, “sich selbst zu kennen”, doch immer nur gerade 
das Nicht-Individuelle an sich zum Bewusstsein bringen […], sein 
“Durchschnittliches” […]. (FW 354).  
Nietzsche concludes from this that we only have access to “der oberflächlichste, der 
schlechteste Theil” of ourselves. The kind of self-knowledge demanded by 
Nietzsche’s synthesising project in UB is therefore rendered impossible on two 
fronts: first, there is no “Kern”, “Platonische Idee”, “persönlicher Wille”, 
“individuellen Willen[.]”, “innere Gesetzlichkeit” or “eigentliches Selbst” to be 
known according to Nietzsche. Second, even if there was a unique and “wahre 
Ursinn und Grundstoff [unseres] Wesens” (UB III 1 1.341), no prospective educator 
could lead us to consciousness of this due to the evolutionary origins of our faculties 
of self-knowledge. Indeed, it is only possible for one to know the shallowest, most 
commonplace aspects of oneself.  
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3.4.3. REFUTING TELEOLOGY IN NATURE 
The quietus to Nietzsche’s early synthesising project is his rejection of teleological 
conceptions of nature. Already in 1868, in a plan for a dissertation he intended to 
write on Kant’s conception of teleology, he argues that “äußere Zweckmäßigkeit ist 
eine Täuschung” (KGW I/4 62[12], p.553). Here he asserts that “[d]ie 
Zweckmäßigkeit des Organischen, die Gesetzmäßigkeit des Unorganischen ist von 
unserm Verstande in die Natur heineingebracht” (KGW I/4 62[7], p.551).123 He 
further states that “Ordnung u. Unordnu<n>g  giebt es nicht in der Natur” (KGW I/4 
62[19], p.555) and “Zweckmäßigkeit ist unsere Idee” (KGW I/4 62[34], p.562). He 
also makes the Empedoclean point that “der Zufall kann die schönste Melodie 
finden” (KGW I/4 62[12], p.553). Thus, at this stage, he holds that pure mechanism 
and coincidence can explain the emergence of organisms in all their complexity.124 
Contrary to Kant, this is conceivable and there is therefore no real need to posit 
teleological causality as a principle of reflective judgement. Nietzsche contends that 
Kant was only forced to posit the Zweckmäßigkeit of nature owing to a lack of 
imagination.125 Purposiveness is merely a false induction from the given fact that, in 
nature, we identify “eine Methode zur Erreichung des Zweckes oder richtiger: wir 
sehen die Existenz und ihre Mittel und schließen, das diese Mittel zweckmäßig sind” 
(KGW I/4 62[15], p.554).  Finally, Nietzsche identifies a great practical value 
(“einen praktischen Werth”) in “[d]ie Beseitigung der Teleologie”: “Es kommt nur 
darauf an den Begriff einer höheren Vernunft abzulehnen: so sind wir schon 
zufrieden” (KGW I/4 62[16], p.554).  
                                                      
123 In making this argument, he draws on Schopenhauer’s criticisms of outer Zweckmäßigkeit 
in §26 of WWV II. See also Claudia Crawford, The Beginnings of Nietzsche’s Theory of 
Language (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), pp.105-27. On Nietzsche’s critique of teleology, see 
Lawrence Hatab (2005), pp.61-3; Günter Abel, Nietzsche: die Dynamik der Willen zur Macht 
und die ewige Wiederkehr (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998), pp.133-40 and pp.439-41. 
124 See KGW I/4 62[27], p.559: “der Mechanismus verbunden mit dem Casualismus giebt 
diese Möglichkeit.” 
125 Thus, Nietzsche states in KGW I/4 62[27], p.559, that “[e]s ist nur nötig eine coordinirte 
Möglichkeit aufzuweisen, um das Zwingende der Vorstellung Kants zu beseitigen.” 
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 In MA, however, the sentiment lying behind these disjointed preparatory 
notes is developed into a more coherent series of attacks on the notion of teleological 
causality. In MA 2, for example, he criticises philosophers for characterising the 
human as an unchanging aeterna veritas, and for believing that by understanding 
man as he currently is we can deduce the purpose of every other thing in existence 
(in the manner of those defending the idea of outer Zweckmäßigkeit). However, 
according to Nietzsche, man is not a fait accompli but is himself in a state of 
becoming; thus, “die ganze Teleologie ist darauf gebaut, dass man vom Menschen 
der letzten vier Jahrtausende als von einem ewigen redet.” In opposition to this, he 
states that “es giebt keine ewigen Thatsachen: sowie es keine absoluten Wahrheiten 
giebt.” In light of this, one cannot state that nature’s final purpose is to eternally 
engender geniuses according to a single ideal mould, since (Nietzsche implies), 
humans as we know them will transform into some quite different form of life in the 
future.126 Thus, the Schopenhauerian man cannot be conceived as its highest goal. 
Likewise, in FW 109, Nietzsche adopts a similar line of argumentation, 
claiming that the order we identify in the world immediately surrounding us is most 
probably a local coincidence, and that we cannot extrapolate from this that the 
universe and nature is an ordered, end orientated whole. Indeed, Nietzsche 
contradicts this ordered vision by claiming that “Der Gesammt-Charakter der Welt 
ist dagegen in alle Ewigkeit Chaos” insofar as it lacks all “Ordnung, Gliederung, 
Form, Schönheit, Weisheit, und wie alle unsere ästhetischen Menschlichkeiten 
heissen”. The ordered world in which we happen to live is merely an exception 
(“Ausnahme”) and, he explicitly adds (in what seems like a subtle allusion to UB 
III) that “die Ausnahmen sind nicht das geheime Ziel”. To suggest that nature (i.e. 
“das All”) “strebt” for a goal is a “Vermenschlichung” to which we are not 
                                                      
126 See also MA 38, in which Nietzsche states that both Wissenschaft and nature “kennt keine 
Rücksichten auf letzte Zwecke”. Accordingly, as Günter Abel (1998) has pointed out, 
Nietzsche begins to stress that humans must posit their goals for themselves – that is “die 
Menschen [müssen] selber sich ökumenische, die ganze Erde umspannende Ziele stellen” 
(p.137, quoting MA 25). 
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permitted.127 There are no Zwecke in nature (“es [giebt] keine Zwecke”), only pure 
necessity (“Notwendigkeit”).128 The vision of the world as being in a lapsarian 
condition of suffering from which it needs to be messianically redeemed is a vestige 
of Christian-idealist thought (such ideas are “Schatten Gottes”) – a charge that very 
directly bears upon Nietzsche’s interpretation of the “metaphysische Bedeutung der 
Cultur”.  
Though Nietzsche does sometimes fall back into a way of talking about 
nature in terms of teloi, generally speaking he persistently rejects the idea of nature 
as striving towards an end after UB.129 The underlying critique of FW 109 persists 
in Nietzsche’s later thought and is even quite clearly recapitulated in GD, where he 
very clearly states that man is “nicht die Folge einer eignen Absicht, eines Willens, 
eines Zwecks, mit ihm wird nicht der Versuch gemacht, ein ‘Ideal von Mensch’ […] 
zu erreichen. Wir haben den Begriff ‘Zweck’ erfunden: in der Realität fehlt der 
Zweck…” (GD Irrthümer 8 6.96). The paradigmatic strategy used by Nietzsche to 
debunk this worldview is that it commits an anthropomorphic fallacy in projecting 
onto nature the kinds of ends, moral values and modes of activity that are peculiar 
to humans. The consequence of this rejection of final natural ends is that Nietzsche 
can no longer cogently invoke the natural purposes argument as a means of justifying 
the cooperation of society in the name of the higher goal of generating elite genius. 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
We have seen that Nietzsche presents a broadly Schopenhauerian model of 
organisational conflict as a remedy to the problem of disintegration. Though this has 
                                                      
127 With respect to this point, as well as Nietzsche’s general rejection of Schopenhauer’s 
veiled teleology, NL 4[310] 9.177 represents an important note. 
128 See also M 122. 
129 For an instance of Nietzsche slipping back into teleological language, see GM II 1 5.291: 
“Ein Thier heranzüchten, das versprechen darf — ist das nicht gerade jene paradoxe Aufgabe 
selbst, welche sich die Natur in Hinsicht auf den Menschen gestellt hat?” 
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already been recapitulated above, it is worth emphasising the fact that we found this 
model to be founded on two key metaphysical presuppositions: (A) there is an 
essential component to the self (to which we have epistemological access); and (B) 
nature acts according to ends (albeit inefficiently). However, we have witnessed that 
he rejects both the possibility of self-knowledge and the idea of natural teleology to 
such an extent that the essential metaphysical fundaments of his early synthetic 
programme are left irreparably undermined. Indeed, he had already begun to 
undercut these premises in the Nachlass well before the publication of UB. I have 
thus suggested that we read UB as his last attempt to remain within a 
Schopenhauerian philosophical framework, until in MA he publicly pulls the temple 
down upon his earlier synthetic project. As such, the questions with which we should 
now enter the final chapter are as follows: does the crisis of disintegrative conflict 
disappear from Nietzsche’s later writings? If not (as I will argue), what new 






THE LATER NIETZSCHE ON THE 




One of the main obstacles with respect to determining what kind of conflict the later 
Nietzsche principally endorses is the abundance of apparently conflicting 
statements. In support of reading his later thought as favouring measured conflict, 
he calls for a “Vergeistigung der Feindschaft” and censures those who seek the 
“Vernichtung ihrer Feinde” (GD Moral 3 6.84); likewise, he criticises Christians for 
endeavouring to “castrate” troublesome impulses rather than seeking means by 
which to exploit them (GD Moral 1 6.83). On the other hand, however, he seems to 
promote unrestrained struggle across a range of ontological levels. Thus, at the level 
of the individual’s impulses, he calls for “[d]ie Ausrottung der ‘Triebe’” (NL 
25[349] 11.104) as well as implying that we have to “vernichten” certain drives 
(“gewisse Triebe”) (NL 1[81]12.31). And at the axiological level of our values, he 
again asserts the necessity of destruction: “Damit ein Heiligthum aufgerichtet 
werden kann, muss ein Heiligthum zerbrochen werden” (GM II 24 5.335); 
furthermore, he persistently advocates the destruction of slave-morality throughout 
the late Nachlass, provocatively asserting that “[m]an muß die Moral vernichten, um 
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das Leben zu befreien” (NL 7[6] 12.274).1 Finally, he also endorses some kind of 
destructive activity at the level of society insofar as he calls for the “Vernichtung 
von Millionen Mißrathener” (NL 25[335] 11.98), where by “Mißrathener” he 
undoubtedly means a certain group of individuals. And to be sure, as was mentioned 
in Chapter 1, this has been read by some as a promotion of eugenics.2 
How can we square these calls for unmeasured struggle with his criticisms 
of destructive conflict? Have we come to an irresolvable and impracticable 
contradiction in Nietzsche’s prescriptions? It is my contention that this need not be 
our conclusion; indeed, in this final chapter, I will defend the thesis that, just as was 
the case with the early Nietzsche, the later Nietzsche’s normative philosophy is also 
best described as promoting what I have called organisational struggle, a form of 
conflict that combines measured and unmeasured Kampf. Once again, I will focus 
on how Nietzsche conceives of, and tries to foster, this type of conflict in response 
to the problem of disgregation at both the level of the individual and that of the 
collective. 
Though I intend to illuminate an analogy between the early and the late 
works, I am by no means suggesting that there is a relation of identity between the 
principal forms of conflict espoused within these respective periods. First, we find 
that the problem to which Nietzsche offers his later picture of organisational conflict 
as a solution has undergone some fundamental shifts – that is, Nietzsche conceives 
of the problem of individual and collective disgregation in quite novel terms. As 
such, I will begin in Section 1 by expounding how the later Nietzsche reformulates 
the crisis of disgregation, now attributing the problem less to philistine education so 
much as to the “Kreuzung von zu fremdartigen Rassen” (GM III 17 5.378). 
                                                      
1 Thus, he also speaks of his “Interesse an der Vernichtung der Moral” (NL 7[37] 10.254); 
see also NL 7[29] 10.548: “[D]er Böse als Zerstörer ehrwürdig — das Zerstören ist 
nothwendig”; NL 25[211] 11.69, where he also calls for “[d]ie Vernichtung der 
Sclavenhaften Werthschätzungen”; NL 14[16] 13.220: “Hier darf es keinen Vertrag geben: 
hier muß man ausmerzen, vernichten, Krieg führen — man muß das christlich-nihilistische 
Werthmaß überall noch hinausziehen und es unter jeder Maske bekämpfen”. 
2 See §1.5. 
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In Section 2, I respond to the difficulty raised by the previous chapter, where 
we saw that Nietzsche’s earlier Schopenhauerian model of organisational struggle 
was rendered untenable by his rejection of metaphysics. He thus cannot coherently 
propose the earlier notion of organisational conflict as a remedy to the problem of 
individual and collective disintegration. According to Nietzsche, then, how can we 
think about the sources of healthy organisation in a way that does not rely on any 
such metaphysical presuppositions? Someone who strove to formulate a scientific 
solution to this problem, and who had a great influence on Nietzsche, was Wilhelm 
Roux.3 I therefore begin by outlining Roux’s account of how biological organisation 
emerges from a struggle of the parts of a body to both selectively incorporate 
nutritive materials, as well as to excrete waste products. Subsequently, I illuminate 
how, although Nietzsche abandons much of Roux’s position as he develops his 
conception of the world as will to power, he retains Roux’s explanation of organised 
unity in terms of a combination of measured, exploitative struggle and unmeasured, 
exclusionary struggle. 
In Sections 3 and 4, I consider how Nietzsche applies this abstract 
theoretical model of organisation to the concrete practical problem of disgregation. 
Within the extant literature on both the psychological and socio-political aspects of 
his thought, however, we find interpretations that clash with the idea that healthy 
organisation emerges from a balance of measured and unmeasured conflict. With 
respect to Nietzsche’s thoughts on the self, there is what I call the sublimation 
reading. The foremost proponents of this reading are Walter Kaufmann and Ken 
Gemes.4 Both maintain that Nietzsche recommends the instrumentalisation, but not 
the repression or eradication of bothersome impulses. Kaufmann also attempts to 
                                                      
3 As Müller-Lauter has shown at length. See Müller-Lauter (1999), ch.9. See also Wolfgang 
Müller-Lauter, “Der Organismus als innerer Kampf: Der Einfluß von Wilhelm Roux auf 
Friedrich Nietzsche”, Nietzsche-Studien, 7 (1978), 189–235. I am heavily indebted to Müller-
Lauter’s interpretation of Roux; however, whereas Müller-Lauter’s study provides a general 
overview of the influence of Roux upon Nietzsche, I will be particularly focussed on how 
Roux’s conception of the organisational function of conflict found its way into Nietzsche’s 
thought. 
4 See Kaufmann (1974), ch.7 and ch.8; Ken Gemes (2009). 
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ground this in an interpretation of Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power, which he 
construes as a process of sublimation whereby nature strives to realise its power-
seeking impulses through ever higher means, culminating in the development of 
human reason.5 I argue in Section 3 that this suppresses the unmeasured aspect of 
Nietzsche’s description of the world as will to power. Through an analysis of 
Nietzsche’s account of psychological impulses (particularly drives) and values, I 
contend that consonant with my interpretation of the will to power, Nietzsche calls 
for the repression, exclusion and even eradication of certain behavioural tendencies 
(i.e. drives) and their associated values.  
I then turn to Nietzsche’s suggestions regarding the unification of society in 
Section 4. Here we again come to an impasse in the critical literature. This time it is 
between the agonistic democrat reading of his later social philosophy and the radical 
aristocratic reading. The agonistic democrat readers (Hatab and Connolly, for 
example) argue that Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power describes the world 
as constituted through a wholly measured form of opposition (already partly outlined 
in Chapter 2). They maintain that this translates into a politics that promotes an 
egalitarian society founded on agonistic democratic contest.6 On the other hand, 
radical aristocratic readings of Nietzsche’s thought take his conception of the will to 
power to describe thriving life as fundamentally characterised by a wholly 
unmeasured form of struggle, according to which, power is secured by whatever 
means necessary, irrespective of how destructive or cruelly exploitative such 
struggle might be. They maintain that the radical aristocratism of his later political 
thought is therefore continuous with his vision of life as will to power.7 Again, I 
adduce my reading of the will to power as a means to illustrating that both of these 
readings misrepresent Nietzsche in their own distinct ways. I largely side with the 
radical aristocrats in this debate insofar as Nietzsche’s later political thought broadly 
                                                      
5 See Kaufmann (1974), p.235: “Nature is nothing but the phenomenology of the will to 
power, and its craving for power cannot be fulfilled short of the development of reason.” 
6 See Connolly (1988), ch.6, and (1991); Hatab (1995) and (2002). 
7 See e.g. Detwiler (1990), pp.43-4.  
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promotes both exploitative and exclusionary struggle in a way that is consonant with 
his notion of the world as will to power. However, I also suggest that the radical 
aristocrats nonetheless misconceive of Nietzsche’s will to power thesis as translating 
into a wholly unmeasured form of struggle – namely, an immoral, inconsiderate and 
often fatal form of instrumentalisation (i.e. slavery). On the basis of my reading of 
both the will to power and texts from AC, I refute this thesis, contending that for 
Nietzsche, within any healthy social organisation, those in command must always 
show some form of moral consideration for their subordinates; in other words, their 
exploitative struggle must be measured.  
I will therefore conclude that each of these problematic readings of the 
normative dimension of Nietzsche’s later philosophy commits one of two errors. The 
agonistic democrat and sublimational readers overgeneralise the measured aspect of 
Nietzsche’s thought and thereby supress its unmeasured (i.e. destructive or 
exclusionary) aspect. Conversely, the radical aristocratic readers suppress the 
moment of measure or restraint in Nietzsche’s normative philosophy. Each thereby 
give us a lopsided view of the way in which the later Nietzsche thinks we should 
resolve the problem of disgregation. But let us begin by surveying just how 
Nietzsche articulates this problem from the mid-1880s onwards. 
4.2. THE CRISIS OF DISINTEGRATION IN 
THE LATER NIETZSCHE 
Though Nietzsche’s thought undergoes many permutations between his early and 
later writings, the problem of social and individual disintegration remains an 
enduring concern. In Z, for example, which is usually taken to be the inaugurating 
work of the later period, Nietzsche pejoratively names the town into which 
Zarathustra descends “die bunte Kuh”, evoking the “Jahrmarkts-Buntheit” for which 
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he indicted the Germans in UB.8 He is highly critical of the fragmented nature of 
modern man, declaring himself dedicated to the task of remedying this chronic lack 
of harmony: “das ist all mein Dichten und Trachten, dass ich in Eins dichte und 
zusammentrage, was Bruchstück ist und Räthsel und grauser Zufall” (Z II Erlösung 
4.179). Nietzsche maintains that on account of their being a mishmash of sundry 
beliefs, modern individuals are incapable of holding any particular belief: “Ja, wie 
solltet ihr glauben können, ihr Buntgesprenkelten! — die ihr Gemälde seid von 
Allem, was je geglaubt wurde!” Recalling UB, this discordance is said to leave 
moderns pessimistic and “unfruchtbar[.]” (ibid.).9 
In Z, however, the problem of disintegration has not yet undergone a notable 
transformation since, as in UB, he still tends to trace this cultural ill back to philistine 
education (Bildung).10 In 1884, however, a decisive shift occurs in the primary 
sources to which Nietzsche attributes the problem of disgregation. The first of these 
is racial mixing, which we find thematised for the first time in M, where Nietzsche 
expresses a concern with racial purification (“Reinigung der Rasse”) (M 272).11 
                                                      
8 Julian Young (2010) has suggested that, in calling the town the “die Bunte Kuh”, Nietzsche 
is also alluding to Plato’s critique of democracy in the Republic (p.368). See Republic, 558b, 
where Plato describes the democratic state as “anarchic” and “colourful”. See also, entry for 
“bunt”, in Paul van Tongeren, Gerd Schank and Herman Siemens (eds.), Nietzsche-
Wörterbuch (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004). 
9 In Z, Nietzsche considers moderns to be two different sorts of cripples (“Krüppel”) – one 
group, the regular cripples, have simply failed to cultivate certain parts of themselves 
(“Diesem fehlt ein Auge und Jenem ein Ohr und einem Dritten das Bein”); by contrast, the 
other group, the inverse cripples, have over-cultivated certain capacities at the expense of 
others, leading to a ludicrous form of disproportion. Indeed, implicitly reversing his earlier 
praise of the Wagnerian genius, Nietzsche describes the inverse cripple as merely a giant ear: 
“Und wahrhaftig, das ungeheure Ohr sass auf einem kleinen dünnen Stiele,— der Stiel aber 
war ein Mensch! […] Das Volk sagte mir aber, das grosse Ohr sei nicht nur ein Mensch, 
sondern ein grosser Mensch, ein Genie” (Z II Erlösung 4.178).  
10 See e.g. Z II Bildung. Here he again criticises the condition in which modern education 
has left us – one in  which “[a]lle Zeiten und Völker blicken bunt aus euren Schleiern; alle 
Sitten und Glauben reden bunt aus euren Gebärden” (4.154). 
11 Thus, in M 272, Nietzsche disparagingly refers to “die gekreuzten Rassen, bei denen sich 
immer, neben der Disharmonie von Körperformen […], auch Disharmonien der 
Gewohnheiten und Werthbegriffe finden müssen”. According to this aphorism, such 
disharmony and internal contradiction among a culture’s forces has a profoundly weakening 
effect. Nietzsche’s counter-ideal is the society within which each force is “auf einzelne 
ausgewählte Functionen beschränkt” in such a way that “alle jene Kraft […] [steht] dem 
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However, this celebration of racial purity (and denigration of racial mixing) is then 
put on ice until 1884-5, when its presence in the Nachlass suddenly becomes 
persistant and pronounced.12 Thus, in JGB he states that “Skepsis […] entsteht jedes 
Mal, wenn sich in entscheidender und plötzlicher Weise lang von einander 
abgetrennte Rassen oder Stände kreuzen” (JGB 208). Scepticism is in this way now 
primarily undertood as being caused by racial mixing rather than philistine 
education, as was the case in UB (or Z).  
It should be underscored that one of the crucial differences between M 272 
and Nietzsche’s later conception of Rasse is that the focus on “Körperformen”, 
which is central to M 272, has slipped into the background by JGB. In contrast to 
thinkers such as Gobineau, Nietzsche’s conception of a “Rasse” cannot be equated 
with the dominant modern conception of a “Rasse” as a set of humans grouped 
according to physical resemblance.13 Rather, we should think of a Nietzschean race 
as a group of people defined by a unicity of ways of living (Lebensweise) – that is, 
their distinct behavioural compulsions (Triebe, Instinkte) and the values (Werthe) 
that support those modes of living (thus, Nietzsche often equates social classes or 
castes with races).14 It is the concoction of these that is the problem for Nietzsche:  
                                                      
gesammten Organismus zu Gebote”. Nietzsche concludes that, as a consequence, 
“reingewordene Rassen [sind] immer auch stärker und schöner geworden”. See also NL 
12[10] 9.577, where in 1881 he also shows his concern with the breeding of a higher race, 
though here his focus is on the problem of slavery: “Das neue Problem: ob nicht ein Theil 
der Menschen auf Kosten des anderen zu einer höheren Rasse zu erziehen ist. Züchtung — 
— — —”; however, see also NL 11[273] 9.546, where Nietzsche avers that “‘Nationen’ sind 
viel feinere Begriffe als Rassen”. 
12 See NL 25[211] 11.69: “Die Vernichtung der verfallenden Rassen. Verfall Europa’s”; NL 
26[376] 11.250. For Nietzsche’s celebration of racial purity, see also e.g. NL 25[234] 11.74; 
NL 25[382]11.112; NL 25[407]11.118; NL 25[413]11.120. 
13 The first entry for “Rasse” n. in Duden for example, reads “(Biologie) Gesamtheit der auf 
eine Züchtung zurückgehenden Tiere, seltener auch Pflanzen einer Art, die sich durch 
bestimmte gemeinsame Merkmale von den übrigen derselben Art unterscheiden; 
Zuchtrasse“. 
14 As Gerd Schank has endeavoured to show at length, “Rasse” more frequently signifies 
something akin to “people” (“Volk”) or “social class” (“sozialer Stand”). See Gerd Schank, 
„Rasse“ und „Züchtung“ bei Nietzsche (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2000): “Vielmehr hat das Wort 
‘Rasse’ bei Nietzsche, in Entsprechung zu der von ihm selbst gegebenen Definition des 
Wortes ‘Rasse’ (worauf schon verwiesen wurde, und die leider oft übersehen wird), in den 
weitaus meisten Fällen die Bedeutung ‘Volk’ als einer Gemeinschaft, die durch ihre 
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Die Vergangenheit von jeder Form und Lebensweise, von Culturen, die 
früher hart neben einander, über einander lagen, strömt Dank jener 
Mischung in uns “moderne Seelen” aus, unsre Instinkte laufen nunmehr 
überallhin zurück, wir selbst sind eine Art Chaos […]. (JGB 224; my 
italics)15  
In JGB 208, Nietzsche further articulates the problem as that of “die Erbschaft einer 
vielfältigen Herkunft im Leibe […], das heisst gegensätzliche und oft nicht einmal 
nur gegensätzliche Triebe und Werthmaasse, welche mit einander kämpfen und sich 
selten Ruhe geben” (JGB 200).16 These may be biologically or culturally inherited 
for Nietzsche; indeed, he often fails to draw a sharp distinction between the two, 
implying in a Lamarckian fashion that culturally acquired traits (i.e. compulsions) 
can be biologically inherited (a point to which we will return below).17  
Of course, racial mixing cannot be taken as the sole cause of modernity’s 
pathological condition. As we read on in JGB, we discover that Nietzsche at times 
also holds democracy responsible for the mixing of races, which he accordingly calls 
the “demokratische Vermengung der Stände und Rassen” (JGB 224, my italics). 
Then at other times, he blames herd-morality, in a more general sense, for our 
                                                      
‘Umgebung’ und ihre ‘Existenzbedingungen’ bis in ihre ‘Zeichensprachen’ (Moral, 
Religion) hinein geprägt ist […]. Daneben hat es oft auch die Bedeutungen ‘sozialer Stand’, 
‘soziale Schicht’, ‘Kaste’. In einigen Fällen meint ‘Rasse’ auch den ‘Menschen allgemein’, 
‘die Menschheit’, im Unterschied etwa zur Tierwelt” (pp.29-30). See also NL 25[462] 
11.136: “Die Verschiedenheit der thierischen Charaktere: durchschnittlich ist ein Charakter 
die Folge eines Milieu — eine fest eingeprägte Rolle, vermöge deren gewisse Facta immer 
wieder unterstrichen und gestärkt werden. Auf die Länge hin entsteht so Rasse: d.h. gesetzt 
daß die Umgebung sich nicht ändert.” For an overview of Nietzsche’s relation to Gobineau, 
see Schank (2000), pp.426-41. See also Ottmann (1987), pp.246-9. 
15 In MA 475, Nietzsche also talks about the mixing of geographically distinct cultures, 
attributing this to the mobility facilitated by trade and industry and other factors that have 
rendered modern life nomadic. 
16 See also NL 34[63] 11.441. 
17 For evidence of this, see e.g. NL 26[409] 11.260: “Alle Tugend und Tüchtigkeit am Leibe 
und an der Seele ist mühsam und im Kleinen erworben worden […]: aber es giebt Menschen, 
welche die Erben und Herren dieses langsam erworbenen vielfachen Reichthums an 
Tugenden und Tüchtigkeiten sind — weil, auf Grund glücklicher und vernünftiger Ehen und 
auch glücklicher Zufälle, die erworbenen und gehäuften Kräfte vieler Geschlechter nicht 
verschleudert und versplittert, sondern durch einen festen Ring und Willen 
zusammengebunden sind.” See also John Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), p.17. 
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descent into this pathological state of racial discordance: “[D]ie Moral des gemeinen 
Mannes hat gesiegt. Man mag diesen Sieg zugleich als eine Blutvergiftung nehmen 
(er hat die Rassen durch einander gemengt)” (GM I 9 5.269). From 1884 onwards, 
then, we find that the problematic disintegration of our impulses is in a causal nexus 
with racial mixing, the enlightenment democratic movement and a certain species of 
morality. But for what specific reasons does Nietzsche think of this condition as 
being synonymous with sickness? 
4.2.1. INDIVIDUAL DISINTEGRATION AND THE 
POISONED CHALICE OF ASCETIC MORALITY  
In order to get an idea of just why the later Nietzsche characterises the disintegrated 
will as pathological, it is worth beginning by adumbrating how he thinks the healthy 
individual is ordered, since this will grant us a point of comparison. In JGB 19 
Nietzsche associates the healthy will with hierarchical order: 
Der Wollende nimmt dergestalt die Lustgefühle der ausführenden, 
erfolgreichen Werkzeuge, der dienstbaren “Unterwillen” oder Unter-
Seelen — unser Leib ist ja nur ein Gesellschaftsbau vieler Seelen — zu 
seinem Lustgefühle als Befehlender hinzu. L’effet c’est moi: es begiebt 
sich hier, was sich in jedem gut gebauten und glücklichen 
Gemeinwesen begiebt, dass die regierende Klasse sich mit den Erfolgen 
des Gemeinwesens identificirt. (JGB 19) 
For Nietzsche, the healthy or strong will is analogous to the well (i.e. hierarchically) 
ordered society. There is “einen commandirenden Gedanken”, which is able to 
command the plurality of our drives and body parts in a stable enough manner for it 
to realise itself in action.18 Proper hierarchical organisation allows for the successful 
performance of actions, which in turn elicits a pleasurable feeling of power. This 
                                                      
18 As Gemes (2009) has argued, it is this species of stable ordering that characterises 
Nietzsche’s ideal of the sovereign individual in GM II 1-2, who “versprechen darf”. Without 
this stability, “you can give no guarantee that the ascendant drive at the time of your making 
a promise will be effective when the time comes to honour that promise” (p.37). 
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coordination “unter der Vorherrschaft eines einzelnen [sic]”, which results in a 
“Präcision und Klarheit der Richtung”, is what Nietzsche refers to as a “starker 
Wille” (NL 14[219] 13.394). By contrast, Nietzsche criticises the state of akrasia 
under the heading of the “schwacher Wille”: “Die Vielheit und Disgregation der 
Antriebe, der Mangel an System unter ihnen”, which results in “das Oscilliren und 
der Mangel an Schwergewicht” (ibid.). This depressive impotence or incapacity for 
directed action is unsurprisingly of inherently negative value for Nietzsche.  
However, upon closer inspection, we begin to remark that this weakness 
takes two distinct forms in Nietzsche’s thought. First, in JGB 208 he describes 
“Willenslähmung” as manifesting itself as a form of scepticism: 
Skepsis nämlich ist der geistigste Ausdruck einer gewissen vielfachen 
physiologischen Beschaffenheit, welche man in gemeiner Sprache 
Nervenschwäche und Kränklichkeit nennt; sie entsteht jedes Mal, wenn 
sich in entscheidender und plötzlicher Weise lang von einander 
abgetrennte Rassen oder Stände kreuzen. In dem neuen Geschlechte, 
das gleichsam verschiedene Maasse und Werthe in’s Blut vererbt 
bekommt, ist Alles Unruhe, Störung, Zweifel, Versuch; die besten 
Kräfte wirken hemmend, die Tugenden selbst lassen einander nicht 
wachsen und stark werden, in Leib und Seele fehlt Gleichgewicht, 
Schwergewicht, perpendikuläre Sicherheit. Was aber in solchen 
Mischlingen am tiefsten krank wird und entartet, das ist der Wille: sie 
kennen das Unabhängige im Entschlusse, das tapfere Lustgefühl im 
Wollen gar nicht mehr […]. (JGB 208) 
No single impulse (“Kraft”) is strong enough to enable the individual to take a 
position in a given debate; as a result, they fall back on the sceptical position as a 
default and abstain. Since individuals are unable to make a choice, they try to give 
their inability to will the appearance of a virtue, asserting things like “[g]ar keine 
Hypothesen machen könnte leicht zum guten Geschmack gehören. Müsst ihr denn 
durchaus etwas Krummes gleich gerade biegen?” (ibid.; see also JGB 209). Aside 
from the fact that this state of vacillation is implicitly disparaged per se, it is also 
censured on account of its being an inherently unpleasurable experience – one 
opposed to what he views as the pleasant feeling of having successfully commanded 
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the various component parts of oneself and carried an action through to the point of 
completion (“sie kennen […] das tapfere Lustgefühl im Wollen gar nicht mehr”). 
On the other hand, Nietzsche thinks this disgregation of the instincts 
expresses itself as caprice, according to which all of the instincts are able to express 
themselves to some extent. Wagner’s works of art are, Nietzsche tells us, a perfect 
aesthetic representation of this inner state: “Vielheit, Fülle, Willkür, Ungewißheit im 
Geistigen” (NL 15[6] 13.407; my italics). One of the ways in which Nietzsche thinks 
Wagner’s capriciousness (“Willkürlichkeit”) expresses itself is in his pastiche use of 
historical references.  This is what, in JGB 224, Nietzsche rebukes under the rubric 
of the “historische Sinne”, which he views as a consequence of both the 
aforementioned “demokratische Vermengung der Stände und Rassen”, and more 
specifically, the “Mischung” of our instincts. Nonetheless, he also praises how the 
diverse chaos of our instincts gives us moderns the capacity to relate to, and imitate, 
sundry past cultures (“zeitweilig eine fremde Seele anzunehmen”); that being said, 
he is less enthusiastic about the fact that this gives us an indiscriminate (and therefore 
ignoble) taste for anything and everything (“den Geschmack und die Zunge für 
Alles” [NL 29[393] 11.254]).19 (N.B. this unscrupulousness was a defining feature 
of antiquarian history.) The undesirable upshot of this is that 
[…] wir vermögen gerade die kleinen kurzen und höchsten Glücksfälle 
und Verklärungen des menschlichen Lebens, wie sie hier und da einmal 
aufglänzen, nur schlecht, nur zögernd, nur mit Zwang in uns 
nachzubilden: jene Augenblicke und Wunder, wo eine grosse Kraft 
freiwillig vor dem Maasslosen und Unbegrenzten stehen blieb —, wo 
ein Überfluss von feiner Lust in der plötzlichen Bändigung und 
Versteinerung, im Feststehen und Sich-Fest-Stellen auf einem noch 
zitternden Boden genossen wurde. (JGB 224) 
                                                      
19 For an account of Nietzsche’s view of Wagner and Wagner’s art as a symptom of modern 
disgregation, see Michael Cowan, “Nietzsche and the Psychology of the Will”, Nietzsche-
Studien, 34 (2008), 48-74 (pp.67ff.). See also Werner Hamacher, “‘Disgregation des 
Willens’, Nietzsche über Individuum und Individualität”, Nietzsche-Studien, 15 (1986), 306-
336 (pp.322-4). 
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The problem is once again one of creative capacity and fertility – our lack of 
standards makes it difficult to select and imitate (nachbilden) exemplary forms of 
human life, which are defined by their ability to harness (bändigen) plurality and 
“Sich-Fest-Stellen”.  
But Nietzsche’s principal grievance is that the suffering caused by inner 
disgregation leads people towards ultimately harmful palliatives – particularly 
Judeo-Christian morality and its secular derivatives (i.e. Kant, Schopenhauer, 
Socialists and the Utilitarians).20 Rather than proactively organising themselves, 
people have a tendency to seek means of simply suppressing the painful inner 
turmoil of their drives. For an individual following this course of self-treatment, 
[…] sein gründlichstes Verlangen geht darnach, dass der Krieg, der er 
ist, einmal ein Ende habe; das Glück erscheint ihm, in 
Übereinstimmung mit einer beruhigenden (zum Beispiel epikurischen 
oder christlichen) Medizin und Denkweise, vornehmlich als das Glück 
des Ausruhens, der Ungestörtheit, der Sattheit, der endlichen Einheit, 
als “Sabbat der Sabbate” (JGB 200).21  
In terms of moral practice, this expresses itself as a striving for heavenly peace and 
a society based on the principle of altruism. But it is also often figured by Nietzsche, 
in philosophy, as a tendency toward idealism – i.e. an attempt to escape from the 
world of “appearance”, into an ideal “real” world of pure objective knowledge; and 
                                                      
20 Nietzsche refers to his struggle against these acolytes as his “Kampf gegen das latente 
Christenthum” (NL 10[2] 12.453). See also NL 25[407] 11.118: “Alle unsere Religionen und 
Philosophien sind Symptome unseres leiblichen Befindens: — daß das Christenthum zum 
Sieg kam, war die Folge eines allgemeinen Unlust-Gefühls und einer Rassen-Vermischung 
(d.h. eines Durch- und Gegeneinanders im Organismus)”. NL 2[165] 12.149: “Vorurtheile, 
denen Instinkte souffliren (von Rassen, Gemeinden, von verschiedenen Stufen wie Jugend 
oder Verwelken usw.) / Angewendet auf die speziell christlich-europäische Moral: unsere 
moralischen Urtheile sind Anzeichen vom Verfall, vom Unglauben an das Leben, eine 
Vorbereitung des Pessimismus.” See also NL 25[160] 11.55: “Die Consequenzen 
absterbender Rassen verschieden z.B. pessimistische Philosophie, Willens-Schwäche”.  
21 See also NL 9[35] 12.351, where he states that such individuals seek “Alles, was erquickt, 
heilt, beruhigt, betäubt, in den Vordergrund tritt, unter verschiedenen Verkleidungen, 
religiös, oder moralisch oder politisch oder ästhetisch usw.” 
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in art, as a tendency towards disinterestedness.22 Nonetheless, he maintains that these 
pseudo-remedies, particularly the adoption of Judeo-Christian morality, only serve 
to aggravate the malady they were intended to cure:  
Allgemeinste Typen der décadence: 
 
1) : man wählt, im Glauben, Heilmittel zu wählen, das, was die 
Erschöpfung beschleunigt 
— dahin gehört das Christenthum —: […] 
 
2) : man verliert die Widerstands-Kraft gegen die Reize, — man wird 
bedingt durch die Zufälle: man vergröbert und vergrößert die 
Erlebnisse ins Ungeheure… eine “Entpersönlichung”, eine 
Disgregation des Willens — 
— dahin gehört eine ganze Art Moral, die altruistische die, welche das 
Mitleiden im Munde führt: an der das Wesentliche die Schwäche der 
Persönlichkeit ist, so daß sie mitklingt und wie eine überreizte Saite 
beständig zittert… eine extreme Irritabilität…  
(NL 17[6] 13.527-8)23 
This is of course highly reminiscent of Aristotle’s distinction between the two types 
of akrasia (literally meaning “lack of command”): weakness (astheneia) and 
                                                      
22 See e.g. JGB 208: “[W]as sich heute als ‘Objektivität’, ‘Wissenschaftlichkeit’, ‘l’art pour 
l’art’, ‘reines willensfreies Erkennen’ in die Schauläden stellt, nur aufgeputzte Skepsis und 
Willenslähmung ist”. See also NL 14[83] 13.262:  “Wesentlicher: ob nicht ein Décadence-
Symptom schon in der Richtung auf solche Allgemeinheit gegeben ist: Objektivität als 
Willens-Disgregation (so fern bleiben können…” 
23 In associating health with hierarchy, as well as describing pathology in terms of 
disgregation, Nietzsche was undoubtedly influenced by a range of sources. While I have 
shown in ch.3 that in the early writings this idea can be traced back to Schopenhauer and 
Goethe, in the later works, Nietzsche’s readings in the natural sciences are possibly of greater 
influence. Michael Cowan (2008), for example, has convincingly argued that Nietzsche is 
heavily indebted to the French psychologist Théodule Ribot (Les Maladies de la Volonté 
[Paris: Alcan 1888]). Recall from ch.1 that Nietzsche appropriated Mayer’s association of a 
badly ordered “Auslösungsapparat” with sickness. Likewise, as we will see in greater detail, 
Nietzsche was influenced by the evolutionary biologist Wilhelm Roux, who saw the loss of 
order within the organism as having fatal consequences. Nietzsche, transcribes the following 
lines from Roux’s KTO: “Kampf der Gewebe muß zum Gleichgewicht zwischen den Theilen 
führen, oder das Ganze geht zu Grunde” (NL 7[190] 10.302). The influence of Paul Bourget 
on Nietzsche’s conception of disintegration and the sickness of the will has also been 
underscored by Giuliano Campioni in his Der französische Nietzsche (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
2009), see pp.313ff. 
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impetuosity (propeteia). Christian morality can either render one exhausted 
(“erschöpft”), or it can leave one hysterically capricious.24 This caprice manifests 
itself as an inability to inhibit one’s actions (“man verliert die Widerstands-Kraft 
gegen die Reize”).25 Regarding the latter, the implication is that, in constantly 
searching out opportunities to sympathise with others and reacting to their feelings, 
one becomes overly receptive and sensitive to one’s milieu, resulting in an “extreme 
Irritabilität”. Nietzsche thinks the capriciously altruistic individual suffers from a 
weakness of personality (“Schwäche der Persönlichkeit”) insofar as their actions are 
merely reactions, defined by their surroundings.26 Moreover, he holds altruism to be 
a sign of décadence – it is merely that to which we resort when we are unable to 
determine what kind of actions are good for us personally. Moreover, he suggests 
that the “Entpersönlichung” associated with altruism tends to lead to a more 
embracing rejection of life:  
Disgregation der Instinkte! — Es ist zu Ende mit ihm, wenn der Mensch 
altruistisch wird. — Statt naiv zu sagen, “ich bin nichts mehr werth”, 
sagt die Moral-Lüge im Munde des décadent: “Nichts ist etwas werth, 
— das Leben ist nichts werth”… Ein solches Urtheil bleibt zuletzt eine 
grosse Gefahr, es wirkt ansteckend — auf dem ganzen morbiden Boden 
der Gesellschaft wuchert es bald zu tropischer Begriffs-Vegetation 
empor, bald als Religion (Christenthum), bald als Philosophie 
(Schopenhauerei). (GD Streifzüge 35 6.134) 
So, altruism leads not only to a hysterical irascibility, but also to a harmful mode of 
self-neglect, and even all-out pessimism.27 But Christian morality also leads to an 
                                                      
24 Nietzsche’s description of pathology also recalls Book IX of Plato’s Republic. For 
Aristotle on the two forms of akrasia, see Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII.1–10. Ribot also 
draws a similar distinction (which is not remarked by Cowan [2008]) between two main 
types of pathologies of the will. First, there are pathologies relating to a problem with the 
“mechanism d’impulsion”, leading to “affaiblissements de la volonté” (i.e. aboulia or a 
depressive state of inaction). Second, there are those relating to a problem with the 
mechanism “d’arrêt” (“inhibition”), where reasoned plans cannot be carried out due to the 
anarchy of one’s impulses. See Ribot (1888), pp.53-5. 
25 See also NL 17[6] 13.527. 
26 See Brusotti (2012), pp.113ff. 
27 On the connection of this condition with that of pessimism, see also NL 11[228] 13.89: 
“Die Hauptarten des Pessimismus, der Pessimismus der Sensibilität (die Überreizbarkeit mit 
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unrestrained form of reactivity in another important way – namely, on account of the 
type of attitude it encourages individuals to adopt towards over-powerful impulses 
for the sake of a “Frieden der Seele”:  
[…] Verschneidung, Ausrottung, wird instinktiv im Kampfe mit einer 
Begierde von Denen gewählt, welche zu willensschwach, zu degenerirt 
sind, um sich ein Maass in ihr auflegen zu können […]. Die radikalen 
Mittel sind nur den Degenerirten unentbehrlich; die Schwäche des 
Willens, bestimmter geredet, die Unfähigkeit, auf einen Reiz nicht zu 
reagiren, ist selbst bloss eine andre Form der Degenerescenz. (GD 
Moral 2 6.83) 
This ascetic endeavour to castrate one’s passions and instincts (sexual desire, for 
example) is, according to Nietzsche, symptomatic of degeneration, since it betrays 
an inability to competently resist a desire, and thus, a complete lack of moderation 
and measure.28 A healthy, well ordered individual is able to resist and even transform 
problematic desires; indeed, great men such as Alcibiades and Caesar arise precisely 
on the basis of their being capable of “die eigentliche Meisterschaft und Feinheit im 
Kriegführen mit sich, also Selbst-Beherrschung” (JGB 200) – that is, their capacity 
to harness their impulses (again, we will return to this below). Thus, the courses of 
treatment offered by Christianity to the disorganised individual as a tonic exemplify 
and even exacerbate the very pathology of disgregation they are meant to ameliorate 
– namely, by fomenting an attitude of excessive reactivity (i.e. caprice) towards both 
other individuals and one’s own drives. 
But how is disgregation associated with exhaustion? To be sure, Nietzsche 
(like Marx) directly refers to Christianity as an opiate.29 In the third essay of GM, he 
                                                      
einem Übergewicht der Unlustgefühle) / Der Pessimismus des ‘unfreien Willens’ (anders 
gesagt: der Mangel an Hemmungskräften gegen die Reize) / Der Pessimismus des Zweifels 
(: die Scheu vor allem Festen, vor allem Fassen und Anrühren)”. 
28 Indeed, in GM II 16 (5.322f.), Nietzsche describes this kind of self-harm as symptomatic 
of the individual who is unable to discharge their rapacious instincts externally, and so 
discharges them internally. 
29 See e.g. NL 2[144] 12.138: “Thatsächlich nähert sich […] das Christenthum der 
Erschöpfung: man begnügt sich mit einem opiatischen Christenthum, weil man weder zum 
Suchen, Kämpfen, Wagen, Alleinstehen wollen die Kraft hat”. GM Vorrede 6 5.253: “[I]m 
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elaborates upon this at length in his discussion of the widespread “physiologisches 
Hemmungsgefühl” experienced by modern individuals, and the “zur Epidemie 
gewordnen Müdigkeit und Schwere”. Though he lists a variety of potential causes 
that have historically brought about this species of malady (such as bad diet, 
alcoholism, or the prevalence of diseases such as syphilis), the primary cause in 
modernity is the “Kreuzung von zu fremdartigen Rassen (oder von Ständen — 
Stände drücken immer auch Abkunfts- und Rassen-Differenzen aus […])” (GM III 
17 5.378). In the consequent “Kampf mit dem Unlustgefühl”, there are a number of 
possible strategies available to the afflicted. But what Nietzsche calls the 
“interessanter” course of action is the provocation of “eine Ausschweifung des 
Gefühls” (GM III 19 5.385) – in particular, the feeling of guilt (“das Schuldgefühl”). 
This unhealthy internal discharging of one’s instinct for animosity and cruelty 
(“[d]ie Feindschaft, die Grausamkeit”), due to the inability to externally discharge 
one’s strength, is what Nietzsche labels “schlechtes Gewissen” (GM II 14 5.321). 
The excitement of searching within oneself and one’s past for a cause of one’s pain, 
and subsequently inventing ingenious ways of punishing oneself for the sins one 
discovers in this search, provides some welcome respite from lethargy Nietzsche 
tells us.30 However, he is quick to add, this course of treatment through over-
excitation leaves sufferers with “[e]in zerrüttetes Nervensystem”, and “unter allen 
Umständen kränker”.31 It can result in the “furchtbare Lähmungen und Dauer-
Depressionen” of not just individuals, but entire communities; or it can lead to 
epileptic epidemics and “todsüchtigen Massen-Delirien” (GM III 21 5.392). The 
point is that the hangover from these electrifying palliatives leaves individuals in a 
                                                      
‘Guten’ auch ein Rückgangssymptom läge, insgleichen eine Gefahr, eine Verführung, ein 
Gift, ein Narcoticum, durch das etwa die Gegenwart auf Kosten der Zukunft lebte”. 
30 That is an attempt, Nietzsche tells us in GM III 20 5.390-1, “[zu lösen] [d]ie menschliche 
Seele einmal aus allen ihren Fugen […], sie in Schrecken, Fröste, Gluthen und Entzückungen 
derartig unterzutauchen, dass sie von allem Kleinen und Kleinlichen der Unlust, der 
Dumpfheit, der Verstimmung wie durch einen Blitzschlag loskommt”; and, Nietzsche adds, 
“mit diesem System von Prozeduren war die alte Depression, Schwere und Müdigkeit 
gründlich überwunden, das Leben wurde wieder sehr interessant: wach, ewig wach, 
übernächtig, glühend, verkohlt, erschöpft und doch nicht müde”. 
31 See also GD Sokrates 9 6.71f.  
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far greater state of exhausted incapacity than when they began the course of 
treatment.32 While embracing such frenzy may allow them to endure the suffering 
caused by their disintegrated will (by virtue of its narcotic or numbing effect), it 
makes them ever less capable of redressing their malaise. 
However, Nietzsche indicates another perhaps more trenchant problem with 
these remedies – namely, that the ascetic values and ideals associated with them are 
contagious (“ansteckend” [GD Streifzüge 35 6.134]) and undermine the health 
(“Gesundheit”) of the entire race.33 As Alexander Nehamas has highlighted, “[t]he 
ascetic ideal does not rest content with ordering the lives of those who may actually 
need it”;34 rather, it further attacks and infects the healthy, the noble, and actively 
counteracts the emergence of “die seltnen Fälle der seelisch-leiblichen Mächtigkeit” 
(GM III 14 5.367). Owing to their sickness, the weak are filled with hatred at the 
sight of the healthy and the strong (“hier wird der Aspekt des Siegreichen gehasst”). 
In order to conceal their hatred, they conceive of themselves as the “die Guten, die 
Gerechten” and correspondingly demonise the strong, which allows them to express 
their hatred as righteousness (Rechtschaffenheit; Gerechtigkeit) (GM III 14 5.369).35 
This impetus of the weak to tyrannise over, and avenge themselves upon, the strong 
is what Nietzsche calls “ressentiment” (GM III 14 5.370), and it is characteristic of 
what he describes as the “Sklavenaufstand in der Moral” (GM I 10 5.270). 
                                                      
32 On the topic of disgregation in GM, see also Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, “Nihilism as Will 
to Nothingness”, in Christa Davis Acampora (ed.), Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals: 
Critical Essays (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp.212f. 
33 See also GM III 21 5.392: “Ich wüsste kaum noch etwas Anderes geltend zu machen, was 
dermaassen zerstörerisch der Gesundheit und Rassen-Kräftigkeit, namentlich der Europäer, 
zugesetzt hat als dies Ideal”. 
34 Nehamas (1985), p.125. Nehamas is drawing on Sarah Kofman’s analysis of GM. See 
Kofman, Nietzsche et la metaphore (Paris: Payot, 1972) (esp. p.187). 
35 On this demonization of the strong and their values, see also GM I 7 and JGB 260. See 
also AC 5 6.171: “Man soll das Christenthum nicht schmücken und herausputzen: es hat 
einen Todkrieg gegen diesen höheren Typus Mensch gemacht, es hat alle Grundinstinkte 
dieses Typus in Bann gethan, es hat aus diesen Instinkten das Böse, den Bösen 
herausdestillirt, — der starke Mensch als der typisch Verwerfliche, der ‘verworfene 
Mensch’. Das Christenthum hat die Partei alles Schwachen, Niedrigen, Missrathnen 
genommen, es hat ein Ideal aus dem Widerspruch gegen die Erhaltungs-Instinkte des starken 
Lebens gemacht”. 
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According to his account, the sick then subject the strong to unceasing judgement. 
Eventually the strong and healthy “[begönnen] sich eines Tags ihres Glücks zu 
schämen […] und [sagten] vielleicht unter einander sich […]: ‘es ist eine Schande, 
glücklich zu sein! es giebt zu viel Elend!’” (GM III 14 5.371). As such, they finally 
become infected with a great nausea (“Ekel”) and feeling of compassion (“Mitleid”) 
for man; and, with this, they have succumbed to the insidious spiral of altruism.36 It 
is therefore owing to the aggressive attitude of ressentiment towards those that are 
healthy and capable of greatness that Nietzsche is most acerbically critical of the 
kinds of disgregation associated with altruistic morality. 
The disgregation of one’s impulses is therefore criticised by Nietzsche on 
the grounds that it results in depression and caprice, which impedes intended activity 
– or what we might call agency. On the other hand, Nietzsche is critical of 
disgregation on account of the fact that it leads us towards counter-productive 
pseudo-remedies; and finally, he disparages this state owing to its virulently 
contagious nature, which jeopardises the health of humanity. So much for 
Nietzsche’s critique of individual disintegration; but what about collective 
disintegration? 
4.2.2. COLLECTIVE DISINTEGRATION 
Nietzsche’s view of the healthy society largely mirrors his vision of the healthy 
individual. As we just saw, he explicitly states that the healthy subject is a 
“Gesellschaftsbau” or “Gemeinwesen[.]” (JGB 19), describing “unsrer Subjekt-
Einheit, […] als Regenten an der Spitze eines Gemeinwesens, nicht als ‘Seelen’ oder 
‘Lebenskräfte’, insgleichen von […] den Bedingungen der Rangordnung und 
Arbeitstheilung als Ermöglichung zugleich der Einzelnen und des Ganzen” (NL 
                                                      
36 This is why he states in GM, that morality is both a symptom and a cause: “Moral als 
Folge, als Symptom, als Maske, als Tartüfferie, als Krankheit, als Missverständniss; aber 
auch Moral als Ursache, als Heilmittel, als Stimulans, als Hemmung, als Gift” (GM Vorrede 
6 5.253). 
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40[21] 11.638). On this interpretation, rank-order is a sine qua non of the strong 
state. Without this, the state is at risk of decaying and even perishing altogether. Yet 
this rank-order does not just enable the continued existence of society. It also 
facilitates its highest creative achievements – namely, the generation of higher 
individuals: “Jede Erhöhung des Typus ‘Mensch’ war bisher das Werk einer 
aristokratischen Gesellschaft” (JGB 257). The creation of higher individuals is an 
instance of collective agency that requires (according to Nietzsche) a form of 
hierarchical organisation that is analogous to that which enables individual agency. 
Since Nietzsche’s vision of the healthy state will be dissected in greater depth in 
Section 4, this will suffice as a foil against which we can now illuminate Nietzsche’s 
vision of social sickness.   
As in the case of individual disintegration, Nietzsche is particularly bothered 
by the way in which social disintegration leads to the adoption of harmful moralities 
that, though sought as remedies, only serve to exacerbate the original pathology. In 
JGB 262, for example, he recounts how, when a society becomes an atomistic chaos 
of amorally self-interested individuals, each holding their own particular values, the 
members of that society become fearful of those who hold values opposed to them 
(they see danger “in den Nächsten und Freund, auf die Gasse, in’s eigne Kind”). In 
their need for law and security, the default course of action usually taken by such a 
group of individuals is to enact a blanket suppression of social conflict. This is 
achieved by resorting to moralities that encourage homogeneous mediocrity. The 
preachers of morality thus temptingly declare that mediocre humans “sind die 
Menschen der Zukunft, die einzig Überlebenden; ‘seid wie sie! werdet 
mittelmässig!’” they accordingly entreat us.37 The moralities Nietzsche has in mind 
are those promulgating “Gleichheit der Rechte”, “Würde und Pflicht und 
Nächstenliebe” (JGB 4438), as well as those which specifically support the 
                                                      
37 Compare also NL 11[130] 9.488 and NL 11[182] 9.511-2, which very clearly prefigure 
this thought.  
38 See also NL 34[176] 11.478-9. In NL 26[282] 11.224, Nietzsche also rebukes democratic 
thinkers for not believing in higher forms of humanity: “Die Demokratie repräsentirt den 
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enlightenment democratic movement. Nietzsche censures these for contriving to 
bring about pacific homogeneity by mediocritising humankind and thereby 
suppressing all oppositional tension. As such, he indicts people such as Kant, with 
his vision of the “kingdom of ends”; socialist libres-penseurs such as Rousseau, who 
promoted democracy and equal rights for all; and Utilitarians such as Bentham and 
Spencer.39  
These Christian, or Christianity-inspired secular moralities have the effect 
of taming humans according to Nietzsche. In recommending universal values, they 
diminish the difference between individuals that originally gave rise to social 
struggle; hence, Nietzsche pejoratively brands such moralists Nivellierer. The 
prospect pursued by this moral programme is the society of “der letzte Mensch” – a 
society invariably dominated by a single type of tame and feeble individual, living 
in accordance with a universally shared, altruistic morality.40 
Wehe! Es kommt die Zeit, wo der Mensch keinen Stern mehr gebären 
wird. Wehe! Es kommt die Zeit des verächtlichsten Menschen, der sich 
selber nicht mehr verachten kann. 
Seht! Ich zeige euch den letzten Menschen. […] 
Sie haben die Gegenden verlassen, wo es hart war zu leben: denn man 
braucht Wärme. Man liebt noch den Nachbar und reibt sich an ihm: 
denn man braucht Wärme. […] 
                                                      
Unglauben an große Menschen und an Elite-Gesellschaft: ‘Jeder ist jedem gleich’ ‘Im 
Grunde sind wir allesamt eigennütziges Vieh und Pöbel’”. 
39 For Nietzsche’s critque of utilitarians as representatives of slave morality, see NL 25[242] 
11.75 and NL 35[34] 11.523-4, JGB 228. On Spencer and Mill, see JGB 258. On the libres-
penseurs, see JGB 44. On Kant, see NL 25[437] 11.128, NL 35[31] 11.522 and JGB 188. On 
Rousseau, see NL 7[46] 12.310, NL 9[3] 12.340-1 and GD Streifzüge 48 6.150. 
40 On the opposition of the last human and the Übermensch, see NL 4[171] 10.162, or Z IV 
Menschen 3 4.358, where Nietzsche warns that “diese kleinen Leute: die sind des 
Übermenschen grösste Gefahr!” Or JGB 62: “[E]ndlich [ist] eine verkleinerte, fast 
lächerliche Art, ein Heerdenthier, etwas Gutwilliges, Kränkliches und Mittelmässiges, 
herangezüchtet […], der heutige Europäer….” See also NL 11[44] 9.458: “Die 
Vorwegnehmenden. — Ich zweifle, ob jener Dauermensch, welchen die Zweckmäßigkeit 
der Gattungs-Auswahl endlich produzirt, viel höher als der Chinese stehen wird. Unter den 
Würfen sind viele unnütze und in Hinsicht auf jenes Gattungsziel vergängliche und 
wirkungslose — aber höhere: darauf laßt uns achten! Emancipiren wir uns von der Moral der 
Gattungs-Zweckmäßigkeit!” 
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Ein wenig Gift ab und zu: das macht angenehme Träume. Und viel Gift 
zuletzt, zu einem angenehmen Sterben. […] 
Kein Hirt und Eine Heerde! Jeder will das Gleiche, Jeder ist gleich: wer 
anders fühlt, geht freiwillig in’s Irrenhaus. (Z Vorrede 5 4.19; my 
italics) 
The society of the last human is unable to realise higher men (what Nietzsche refers 
to as Sterne). These tame individuals not only use a poison (“Gift” – i.e. morality) 
to anesthetise themselves, but also make every effort to create a social condition free 
of danger and difficulty. In seeking “das allgemeine grüne Weide-Glück der Heerde, 
mit Sicherheit, Ungefährlichkeit, Behagen, Erleichterung des Lebens für 
Jedermann” (JGB 44), Nietzsche, echoing social Darwinists such as Spencer, 
maintains that such egalitarian and altruistic moralities negate the very conditions 
under which great individuals arise. As Nietzsche asserts in JGB 44, “die Pflanze 
‘Mensch’ [ist] am kräftigsten in die Höhe gewachsen” under conditions of 
tremendous “Gefährlichkeit”, which promote and motivate the cultivation of his 
higher capacities, particularly those of a spiritual kind; thus, “seine Erfindungs- und 
Verstellungskraft (sein ‘Geist’ — ) unter langem Druck und Zwang [entwickeln] 
sich in’s Feine und Verwegene […].”41 In furthering pacifism and comfort, idealist 
moralities suppress the conditions required for the emergence of exceptional 
individuals. Indeed, in robbing people of struggle and resistance, we can also infer 
that they rob people of the opportunity to exercise their will and enjoy the 
pleasurable feeling of freedom mentioned above. Moreover, in Nietzsche’s 
                                                      
41 In employing the metaphor of the plant, though Nietzsche is in many ways opposing 
himself to Kant, the same metaphor can be found in the latter’s Idee zu einer allgemeinen 
Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, in Königlich Preussische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (ed.), Kant's gesammelte Schriften, “Akademieausgabe”, 29 vols (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 1922), vol.8, p.22. Here Kant argues that men need to live in a competitive society 
“so wie Bäume in einem Walde eben dadurch, daß ein jeder dem andern Luft und Sonne zu 
benehmen sucht, einander nöthigen beides über sich zu suchen und dadurch einen schönen 
geraden Wuchs bekommen; statt daß die, welche in Freiheit und von einander abgesondert 
ihre Äste nach Wohlgefallen treiben, krüppelig, schief und krumm wachsen.” On the 
renaissance origins of the notion of die Pflanze Mensch, see Nikola Regent, “A ‘Wondrous 
Echo’: Burckhardt, Renaissance and Nietzsche’s Political Thought”, in Herman Siemens and 
Vasti Roodt (eds.), Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for 
Political Thought (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), pp.629-66 (pp.654ff.). 
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dystopian account of the society of the last human, the idea of a shepherd (“Hirt”), 
who had coordinated individuals into a hierarchy, has been completely done away 
with (what Nietzsche calls “misarchismus” in GM: “Die demokratische 
Idiosynkrasie gegen Alles, was herrscht und herrschen will” [GM II 12 5.315]).42 
Thus, in pushing people towards egalitarian morality, social disgregation leads those 
people to undermine the very conditions of struggle, command and hierarchy that 
enable higher forms of collective and individual agency. 
Furthermore, as we saw in our analysis of individual disgregation, the moral 
stance that proliferates in  response to the social chaos caused by racial mixing does 
not merely negate the conditions under which greatness arises, according to 
Nietzsche, but is also actively hostile towards higher individuals insofar as it brands 
them evil.43 Indeed, Nietzsche calls “das moralische Urtheil” the “Hauptmittel” in 
the struggle of the many against exceptional individuals (NL 2[168] 12.152). But 
socialist and democratic movements are not only noxious with respect to higher 
individuals insofar as they morally devalue these individuals. As Nietzsche makes 
clear in a note from 1888, the “sociale Mischmasch” brought about by the French-
revolution unleashed the hostile forces of ressentiment that were previously 
constrained to the lower strata of society: 
[…] der sociale Mischmasch, Folge der Revolution, der Herstellung 
gleicher Rechte, des Aberglaubens an “gleiche Menschen”. Dabei 
mischen sich die Träger der Niedergangs-Instinkte (des ressentiment, 
der Unzufriedenheit, des Zerstörer-Triebs, des Anarchismus und 
Nihilismus) […] der lange unten gehaltenen Schichten in alles Blut 
                                                      
42 On this topic, see also NL 37[8] 11.581, where Nietzsche castigates the hope “aller Art 
Hirten und Leithammel zu entschlagen”. 
43 See e.g. JGB 201: “Alles, was den Einzelnen über die Heerde hinaushebt und dem 
Nächsten Furcht Macht, heisst von nun an böse; die billige, bescheidene, sich einordnende, 
gleichsetzende Gesinnung, das Mittelmaass der Begierden kommt zu moralischen Namen 
und Ehren.” NL 11[153] 13.72-3: “[M]an geradezu [brandmarkte] die großen Virtuosen des 
Lebens […] mit den schimpflichsten Namen […]. Noch jetzt glaubt man einen Cesare Borgia 
mißbilligen zu müssen […]. Denkt man ein wenig consequent und außerdem mit einer 
vertieften Einsicht in das, was ein ‘großer Mensch’ ist, so unterliegt es keinem Zweifel, daß 
die Kirche alle ‘großen Menschen’ in die Hölle schickt —, sie kämpft gegen alle ‘Größe des 
Menschen’…” 
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aller Stände hinein: zwei, drei Geschlechter darauf ist die Rasse nicht 
mehr zu erkennen — Alles ist verpöbelt. Hieraus resultirt ein 
Gesammtinstinkt gegen die Auswahl, gegen das Privilegium jeder Art 
(NL 14[182] 13.367). 
By eroding the superordinate structuring elements of society (what Nietzsche 
referred to as the “Hirt” in Z), he believes that this process of emancipation only 
worsens the lack of structure within society, culminating in an “Anarchie der 
Elemente” (NL 9[8] 12.343). Thus, it comes as little surprise that he so bitterly 
scorns the democratic movement  for being “eine Verfalls-Form der politischen 
Organisation” and for driving the “Verkleinerung”, “Vermittelmässigung” and, 
indeed, the “gesammt-Entartung des Menschen” (JGB 203).44  
Nietzsche further reproaches democracy on account of its being a politics 
“des kurzen Blicks und der raschen Hand” (JGB 256) – that is, he criticises its 
capricious character. Short-term governments focus on correspondingly short-term 
goals.45 Moreover, the impetuous nature of democratic states has infiltrated the 
modern psyche more generally; hence, in modernity, “[m]an lebt für heute, man lebt 
sehr geschwind, — man lebt sehr unverantwortlich: dies gerade nennt man 
‘Freiheit’.” Nietzsche refers to this as a form of “Nervösität” (GD Streifzüge 39 
6.141). In this social condition, the search for higher forms of humanity is marked 
by caprice: “Wenn dies kein Zeitalter des Verfalls und der abnehmenden 
                                                      
44 For an informative summary of Nietzsche’s multifaceted critique of democracy, see 
Herman Siemens, “Nietzsche's Critique of Democracy (1870—1886)”, JNS, 38 (2009), 20-
37; and “Yes, No, Maybe So… Nietzsche’s Equivocations on the Relation between 
Democracy and ‘Grosse Politik’”, in Herman Siemens and Vasti Roodt (eds.), Nietzsche, 
Power and Politics: Rethinking Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
2008), pp.231-68. As Herman Siemens (amongst others) has noted, Nietzsche makes a 
numerous of positive appraisals of democracy. 
45 This concern is foreshadowed in MA 472, where Nietzsche asserts that democratic 
“Concurrenz wird bald zu gross, die Menschen und Parteien wechseln zu schnell, stürzen 
sich gegenseitig zu wild vom Berge wieder herab, nachdem sie kaum oben angelangt sind. 
Es fehlt allen Maassregeln, welche von einer Regierung durchgesetzt werden, die Bürgschaft 
ihrer Dauer; man scheut vor Unternehmungen zurück, welche auf Jahrzehnte, Jahrhunderte 
hinaus ein stilles Wachsthum haben müssten, um reife Früchte zu zeitigen. Niemand fühlt 
eine andere Verpflichtung gegen ein Gesetz mehr, als die, sich augenblicklich der Gewalt, 
welche ein Gesetz einbrachte, zu beugen: sofort geht man aber daran, es durch eine neue 
Gewalt, eine neu zu bildende Majorität zu unterminiren.” 
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Lebenskraft mit viel Melancholie ist, so ist es zum Mindesten eines des 
unbesonnenen, willkürlichen Versuchens” (NL 1[236] 12.62). Notwithstanding such 
turbulent political conditions, under which greatness is at best capriciously groped 
for, great humans do arise (“höherwerthigere Typus ist oft genug schon 
dagewesen”); however, Nietzsche’s criticism is that their realisation is still too fitful 
and unintended – it only arises “als ein Glücksfall, als eine Ausnahme, niemals als 
gewollt” (AC 3 6.170). Hence, modern Europeans suffer from a “demokratische 
Vielwollerei” (JGB 208) and an inability to commit to long-term, transgenerational 
goals – precisely what is needed for the deliberate creation of higher forms of 
humanity.46 An example of this is where Nietzsche indicates that education should 
not be directed towards the short-term needs of society, “sondern einem zukünftigen 
Nutzen” – that is, “die Züchtung einer stärkeren Rasse” (NL 9[153] 12.425). 
As JGB 208 and 256 make evident, disgregation is a condition that, for 
Nietzsche, afflicts not just the will of individuals and societies, but also that of 
Europe as a whole. This is due to the prevalence of nationalism, the “krankhaften 
Entfremdung, welche der Nationalitäts-Wahnsinn zwischen die Völker Europa’s 
gelegt hat und noch legt” (JGB 256). Nietzsche scathingly refers to this 
“Kleinstaaterei” as the “auseinanderlösende Politik” of his day. What is therefore 
exigent at this pan-European level, says Nietzsche, is “Einen Willen zu bekommen” 
(JGB 208).  
Regarding both the individual and society, then, Nietzsche warns of two 
poles of disorganisation that roughly reflect the two key pathologies of the will. First, 
that of anarchic disorganisation, where tensions are too high and the constituent parts 
lack a higher organising force. As a consequence, impulses mutually frustrate one 
                                                      
46 This need for a transgeneration project, which will be examined in greater detail below, is 
most clearly expressed in NL 37[8] 11.581-3. See also GD Streifzüge 39 6.141 and NL 
11[31] 13.17-8. On Nietzsche’s emphasis on the need for a long-term will, see also JGB 212: 
“Heute schwächt und verdünnt der Zeitgeschmack und die Zeittugend den Willen, Nichts ist 
so sehr zeitgemäss als Willensschwäche: also muss, im Ideale des Philosophen, gerade Stärke 
des Willens, Härte und Fähigkeit zu langen Entschliessungen in den Begriff ‘Grösse’ 
hineingehören”. 
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another, and the activity of the given whole is left erratic and marked by caprice. 
Secondly, we have the condition of depression – a torpid homogeneity defined by a 
wholesale loss of tension. Whether at the level of society or the individual, these 
extremes, and the therapies usually adopted to remedy them, are criticised by 
Nietzsche on account of their frustrating agency and rendering mankind impotent, 
particulrarly with respect to the goal of generating higher forms of humanity. This 
said, it is important to observe that in reality Nietzsche thinks that modern society is 
an admixutre of these extremes: 
Überall Lähmung, Mühsal, Erstarrung oder Feindschaft und Chaos: 
beides immer mehr in die Augen springend, in je höhere Formen der 
Organisation man aufsteigt. Das Ganze lebt überhaupt nicht mehr: es 
ist zusammengesetzt, gerechnet, künstlich, ein Artefakt. – ” (WA 7 
6.27; my italics) 
This excerpt from WA also demonstrates that Nietzsche understands these two 
extremes as states of mere aggregation (Zusammensetzung), in contrast to which he 
seeks to establish a form of holism (Ganzheit) – that is, a species of unity that 
navigates between the Scylla of anarchy and the Charybdis of depression. In the 
following two sections, our task is to explore in greater detail just what this condition 
of healthy measure looks like and, decisively, how it can be achieved.47 
Before examining this, however, we should consider an objection to my 
analysis – namely, that perhaps, according to Nietzsche’s presentation of the 
problem, there is no real need to actively strive for organisation at all. Indeed, there 
is a highly sanguine overtone to Nietzsche’s later thought insofar as he repeatedly 
suggests that this vicious cycle (from sickness to poisoned chalice) generates the 
very conditions for its own overcoming.48 Gerd Schank has claimed that far from 
                                                      
47 Indeed, Aristotle draws a similar distinction between aggregation and substantial holism. 
For an excellent summary of this distinction in Aristotle, see Theodore Scaltas, “Substantial 
Holism”, in Theodore Scaltsas and David Charles (eds.), Unity, Identity, and Explanation in 
Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.107-28. 
48 See e.g. NL 35[10] 11.512: “Dieselben Bedingungen, welche die Entwicklung des 
Heerdenthieres vorwärts treiben, treiben auch die Entwicklung des Führer-Thiers.” 
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being critical of the mixing of races, Nietzsche is to be distinguished from racist 
thinkers such as Gobineau insofar as, “[w]enn bei Gobineau die Mischung seiner 
biologischen ‘Rassen’ grundsätzlich nur zu negativen Resultaten führen kann, so ist 
es bei Nietzsche eher umgekehrt: die Mischung der Völker trägt zur Erhöhung des 
Menschen bei.”49 On the one hand, the psychological melee of impulses gives the 
tyrant precisely the inner tension he has to harness in order to cultivate a strong self 
(JGB 200). Added to this, the weakness of will so widespread in others, gives such 
strong individuals a vulnerable social group ripe for exploitation. As such, “die 
Demokratisirung Europa’s ist zugleich eine unfreiwillige Veranstaltung zur 
Züchtung von Tyrannen” (JGB 242).50  
Nonetheless, a close reading of the relevant texts shows Nietzsche to be at 
best deeply ambivalent towards, and more often openly critical of, the forms of 
disintegration associated with the crossing of races (and, similarly, democracy and 
herd-morality). Indeed, he describes “Willens-Disgregation” (NL 14[83] 13.263) – 
the “Gegeneinander der Leidenschaften, die Zweiheit, Dreiheit, Vielheit der ‘Seelen 
in Einer Brust’” – as “sehr ungesund, innerer Ruin, auseinanderlösend, einen inneren 
Zwiespalt und Anarchismus verrathend und steigernd”, which is to say, as the very 
quintessence of “Ungesundheit” (NL 14[157] 13.342).51 Moreover, as Paul van 
Tongeren notes, in many texts, Nietzsche certainly does not conceive of the 
overcoming of slave morality as an “automatisch[er] Prozeß”. Rather, Nietzsche 
emphasises the fact that his higher types “missrathen könnten” (JGB 201).52 Herd 
morality presents us with a very real danger: for example, in JGB 203, he warns that 
“diese Verthierung des Menschen zum Zwergthiere der gleichen Rechte und 
                                                      
49 Schank (2000), p.440; my italics. Schank also cites Ottmann (1987, p.251) in support of 
his claim. 
50As Paul van Tongeren (1989) has noted, for Nietzsche, it seems as though “[d]er 
Sklavenaufstand schlägt gewissermaßen von selbst in sein Gegenteil um” (p.148). Paul van 
Tongeren has also drawn a comparison between Nietzsche’s position and the master-slave 
dialectic in Hegel (ibid., p.148). We also find this thought articulated both in Kant’s later 
political writings and Karl Marx’s Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei.  
51 See also NL 14[83] 13.262-3, where Nietzsche associates Willens-Disgregation with 
Décadence.  
52 See also JGB 242. 
 305 
Ansprüche ist möglich, es ist kein Zweifel!” (my italics).53 Indeed, in the preface to 
GM, he states that “die Moral daran Schuld wäre, wenn eine an sich mögliche 
höchste Mächtigkeit und Pracht des Typus Mensch niemals erreicht würde”, 
signalling in the same text that he conceives of this situation as a genuine possibility 
(GM Vorrede 6 5.253). 
Accordingly, for Nietzsche, whoever has appreciated this fearsome possibility 
“kennt einen Ekel mehr, als die übrigen Menschen, — und vielleicht auch eine neue 
Aufgabe!....” (JGB 203). The task of realising higher forms of humanity is one that 
can only be achieved “mit einer grundsätzlichen künstlichen und bewußten Züchtung 
des entgegengesetzten Typus und seiner Tugenden” (NL 2[13] 12.73; my italics)54; 
and simultaneously, “[m]an muss ungeheure Gegenkräfte anrufen, um […] die 
Fortbildung des Menschen in’s Ähnliche, Gewöhnliche, Durchschnittliche, 
Heerdenhafte — in’s Gemeine! — zu kreuzen” (JGB 268). In light of these remarks, 
we can soundly conclude that Nietzsche’s optimism is not intended to breed a 
complacent sense of confidence, but rather a hopeful sense of the real possibility of 
raising “eine Stärkere Art” out of the “kosmopolitisches Affekt- und Intelligenzen-
Chaos” that characterises modern man and society (NL 11[31] 13.17).55  
As compared with UB, however, this project now faces two novel obstacles. 
First, in redescribing the problem as one of race, rather than being primarily 
associated with culturally acquired Bildung (as in UB), the crisis has now been traced 
back to drives, which have a more inveterate component. How can we reorganise 
these deeply engrained tendencies? Second, Nietzsche cannot prescribe his earlier 
remedy in response to this later diagnosis of pathological discordance – namely, on 
account of the fact that he has repudiated the metaphysical bases that preconditioned 
                                                      
53 See also GM I 12 5.278: “Denn so steht es: die Verkleinerung und Ausgleichung des 
europäischen Menschen birgt unsre grösste Gefahr”. 
54 On the need to consciously cultivate higher men, see also NL 9[153]12.425. 
55 However, compare NL 26[117] 11.181, where Nietzsche doubts whether we should 
consciously struggle for the realisation of higher individuals: “Könnten wir die günstigsten 
Bedingungen voraussehen, unter denen Wesen entstehen vom höchsten Werthe! Es ist 
tausend Mal zu complizirt, und die Wahrscheinlichkeit des Mißrathens sehr groß: so 
begeistert es nicht, danach zu streben! — Scepsis.” 
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this remedy (i.e. insight into the Platonic self, and the teleological structure of 
nature). In the following section, I will explicate how he resolves this latter obstacle 
by formulating a non-metaphysical account of how organisational struggle is able to 
generate functional coherence. 
4.3. A NON-METAPHYSICAL ACCOUNT OF 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUGGLE 
As will become evident, echoing UB, the later Nietzsche once again promotes 
organisational conflict as a means to establishing functional order – that is, he 
recommends a struggle for both the exclusion of that which is superfluous or harmful 
and the instrumentalisation of weaker forces within a hierarchy. To be sure, 
commentators have observed the parallelism between Nietzsche’s earlier and later 
conceptions of incorporation, and in support of this, I will be arguing that his later 
conception of orgnisational conflict in fact fulfils the majority of the criteria that 
characterised Schopenhauer’s notion of assimilative conflict.56 However, these 
commentators have not posed the question with which I shall now be concerned: 
how, in the later works, does Nietzsche think organisational conflict (and therefore 
the functional order that it supports) emerges without the underlying metaphysical 
presuppositions of his earlier model?   
Answering this question requires that we make a study of Roux’s Der Kampf 
der Theile im Organismus. Ein Beitrag zur Vervollständigung der mechanischen 
Zweckmässigkeitslehre, which represents a sustained attempt to formulate an 
account of how the (inner) Zweckmäßigkeit of organisms can emerge from purely 
                                                      
56 See e.g. Keith Ansell-Pearson, “The Incorporation of Truth: Towards the Overhuman”, in 
Keith Ansell-Pearson (ed.), A Companion to Nietzsche (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp.230-
49 (p.235). See also Vanessa Lemm (2013), 3-19.  
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mechanical causal processes.57 Indeed, an overview of Nietzsche’s writings shows 
that, despite some notable exceptions, following UB, there is almost no discussion 
of Einverleibung or Assimilieren until his reading of Wilhelm Roux in 1881. At this 
point, this theme suddenly becomes a Schwerpunkt in Nietzsche’s thought.58 If we 
want to get a clear view of his non-metaphysical account of how Zweckmäßigkeit 
arises from a struggle for organisation, we must therefore first turn to Roux. 
4.3.1. ROUX ON THE SOURCES OF ZWECKMÄßIGKEIT  
For Roux, organisms are characterised by pervasive internal struggle. Indeed, as with 
Schopenhauer, it is through this struggle that the organism emerges as a complex 
zweckmäßig unity. In KTO, Roux first pits himself against Darwin’s and Wallace’s 
thesis that evolutionary development is a result of natural selection, understood as a 
struggle for existence (“Kampf ums Dasein”) that is fought between organisms.59 He 
does not deny that this account identifies a pivotal  mechanism of evolutionary 
development, but he nevertheless criticises it for overlooking the role of the struggle 
fought within the individual organism itself – that is, between its constituent parts. 
Building on Virchow’s discovery that cells could be extracted from one organism 
and transplanted into another – and thus that the organism was a “Bund” or 
“Gesellschaft” of relatively independent parts – Roux makes the further claim that 
these semi-autonomous components are engaged in a Darwinian contest with one 
another. In other words, there is an internal, as well as an external, process of natural 
selection.60 On the other hand, and more importantly with respect to our current 
                                                      
57 As the Nachlass reveals, Nietzsche’s first encounter with KTO was in 1881 and he 
subsequently revisited the book in 1883 and 1884. See Müller-Lauter (1999), p.163. 
58 As David Krell has observed. However, as Keith Ansell Pearson (2006, p.235) notes, Krell 
underemphasises the presence of the theme of incorporation in the early works. See David 
Krell, Infectious Nietzsche (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996). 
59 See KTO, pp.3-4. 
60 See KTO, p.65: “Wie dort der Kampf der Ganzen zum Uebrigbleiben des Besten führte, 
so kann er es wohl auch unter den Theilen gethan haben und noch thun”. On Roux’s use of 
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focus, Roux also opposes himself to the idea of teleological causality – specifically 
the idea (which we saw was propounded by Kant and Aristotle) that we cannot 
conceive of the origin of organic organisations without resorting to the supposition 
that they have been desired (“gewollt”) by nature. Like the Nietzsche of 1868, Roux 
sides with Empedocles, rejecting the notion of “einer nach vorbedachten Zielen 
gestaltenden Kraft”, and wanting to defend the idea that inner Zweckmäßigkeit is 
“eine gewordene, keine teleologische, sondern eine naturhistorische, auf 
mechanische Weise entstandene.”61  
 Roux hypothesises that this internal conflict occurs at four different levels: 
among (intra-cellular) molecules; among cells; among tissues; and among organs.62 
Recalling Nietzsche’s vision of the Wettkampf, Roux sees this internal conflict as 
taking place inter pares – i.e. confined to parts of similar orders of complexity (cells 
struggle with cells, organs with organs, etc.). Thus, whereas those co-existing within 
a given strata are engaged in mutual struggle, there is no such struggle between these 
strata: 
[I]n einen Kampf der Zellentheilchen, der Zellen, der Gewebe und der 
Organe, jede Einheit nur mit Ihresgleichen kämpfend. Denn ein Kampf 
zwischen Angehörigen verschiedener Einheiten, etwa eines Plasson-
Moleküls mit einer Zelle, oder einer Zelle mit einem Organ wäre wie 
eine Summation von Differentialen verschiedener Ordnung.63 
Though the nature of this conflict varies depending on the physiological order in 
question, the struggle is consistently figured as a struggle over space and nutrition 
                                                      
Virchow, see KTO, pp.65-6. Nietzsche notes this independence in NL 7[92] 10.274: 
“Relative Selbständigkeit der Theile selbst in den höchsten Organismen Roux p 65.” 
61 KTO, p.1, p.2. 
62 As we can see from NL 11[128] 9.487, Nietzsche was clearly aware of this: “Jetzt hat man 
den Kampf überall wieder entdeckt und redet vom Kampfe der Zellen, Gewebe, Organe, 
Organismen.” 
63 KTO, p.72. Yet there are exceptions to this rule – i.e. there is some mobility between the 
various orders of unities – as cells develop into tissues or organs develop out of tissues 
through extended use: “Erst wenn sich die Eigenschaft eines Theilchens niederer Ordnung 
durch Ausbreitung zu einer Individualität höherer Ordnung vergrössert hat, also erst, wenn 
das Differential zweiter Ordnung zu einem erster Ordnung integrirt ist, kann der Kampf mit 
einem anderen Individuum dieser höheren Ordnung beginnen” (ibid.). 
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(“Raum und Nahrung”). Roux continues by showing how this conflict is driven by 
the fact that “die Theile nicht vollkommen gleich unter einander sind”.64 Certainly, 
there can be approximate, temporary equality, but never absolute equality (“absolute 
Gleichheit”) according to Roux: astute observation of nature, he tells us, 
demonstrates that all apparently stable relations of equality are only ever temporarily 
so, and any state of equality between the parts of an organisation (whether organic 
or inorganic) will inevitably be disrupted.65 
Of the four orders of complexity, Roux begins at the bottom with the 
struggle between molecules (“Molekel”). Within cells, he tells us, there are 
molecules that serve the function of producing energy. There is then variation in the 
efficiency with which these molecules are able to assimilate nutrients from their 
surroundings. It is by means of this assimilation that they replace the energy they 
have expended in striving to regenerate themselves (i.e. grow and reproduce). This 
capacity is then correlated with relative differences in how effectively they can 
respond to certain available “trophic” stimuli, which facilitate this process of 
assimilation and growth (e.g. warmth, nervous stimulation, or different wavelengths 
of light).66 Roux theorises that, given this inequality, those molecules that exhibit 
greater efficiency in this struggle will reproduce at a greater rate than other 
competing variants; consequently, given the limited space within an organism, those 
lacking the advantageous trait are edged out of existence.67 Between molecules of a 
similar function, responding to similar stimuli, this is an eliminative struggle, and, 
                                                      
64 KTO, p.68. 
65 KTO, p.69: “Jeder Naturkundige weiss, dass nie dasselbe Geschehen unverändert längere 
Zeit fortbesteht, nie in vollkommen gleicher Weise wiederkehrt, dass alles in fortwährendem 
Wechsel ist, das Anorganische wie das Organische.” For evidence of Nietzsche’s having read 
this, see NL [93] 10.274: “Über die thatsächliche vorhandene Ungleichheit Roux. 69.” 
66  KTO, pp.79-80. 
67 See KTO, p.73: “So wird zunächst bei dem Ersatze des im Stoffwechsel Verbrauchten das 
mit stärkeren Affinitäten Versehene und stärker Assimilirende sich rascher regeneriren, als 
das weniger mit diesen Eigenschaften Ausgestattete.” See also p.75: “Wenn die Substanzen 
derartig verschieden sind, dass die eine mit der gebotenen Qualität des Nahrungsmaterials 
vollkommener sich regeneriren kann, als die andere, so wird schliesslich die so günstiger 
gestellte die stärkere warden und beim Wachsthum die andere verdrängen, wiederum im 
Kampfe um den Raum.” 
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as Roux puts it, the strongest achieve “Alleinherrschaft” (though new varients are 
always emerging and challenging this monopoly).68 
For types of molecules that respond to different trophic stimuli, however, it 
remains difficult for them to eliminate one another; since they are unable to exploit 
the same stimuli, each occupy an environmental niche. Hence, various types of 
molecules, ever more specialised to particular stimuli, are continually emerging 
from the struggle; these variously specialised molecules are then said to exist in a 
state of dynamic “Gleichgewicht” as they compete over space and nutrition but are 
nonetheless unable to eradicate one another.69 This improved efficiency and 
functional differentiation aids the organism as a whole, though it should be 
underscored that, for Roux, this improvement takes place “ohne jede Rücksicht auf 
Specialzweckmässigkeit für den ganzen Organismus”.70  
We find a similar dynamic as we ascend to the higher strata of this intra-
organismic struggle, where there is again conflict between functionally 
differentiated parts, though now the survival of each of these parts is equally 
indispensable for the whole. This applies not only to the struggle between different 
types of cells, but also to the struggle among tissue types or organs. In this case, the 
stronger organs cannot simply force the less efficient out of existence, for this would 
result in a Phyrric victory, leading to the death of the whole organism (and a fortiori, 
the victorious part). Any part that develops a variation that makes it excessively 
aggressive, to the detriment of other necessary parts, will either outrightly kill the 
organism or sufficiently weaken it in its Darwinian struggle against other organisms 
that this variation will be edged out of existence (as an example, Roux cites the 
                                                      
68 See KTO, p.76: “[S]o muss diese wichtige Eigenschaft die Alleinherrschaft über alle 
anderen Quali- 
täten gewinnen”. See also p.78. For evidence of Nietzsche’s being aware of this, see NL 
7[86] 10.272: “[B]essere Fähigkeit, sich zu ernähren und geringerer Verbrauch für die 
eigenen Bedürfnisse — moralisch zu wenden! — günstige Vorbedingungen des Wachsthums 
und somit der Alleinherrschaft.” 
69 See KTO, p.82; see also p.86 on the Gleichgewicht of molecule types. 
70 KTO, p.86. 
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adverse effect that an excess of fatty tissue has on the heart71). Indeed, to a limited 
extent we might consider this process as analogous to the practice of ostracism, 
whereby excessively dominant individuals (i.e. varients) are removed for the sake of 
the whole; however, now this measure arises by virtue of a Darwinistic mechanism 
in nature, rather than (collectively) intended action.72 Thus, these biological parts 
will automatically tend towards relations of harmony with one other, which are 
always being disrupted and adjusted due to the emergence of novel variations.73 On 
this account, the struggle over space, nutrition and trophic stimuli must therefore 
proceed in such a way that an equilibrium (“Gleichgewicht”) is maintained.74 
However, Roux maintains that this Gleichgewicht can, within certain 
bounds, be actively maintained by the higher functions of the organism – namely, 
insofar as the capacity for growth exhibited by a given part of an organism is 
conditioned by what he calls functional stimulation (“funktionelle Reize”). This is a 
type of nervous stimulus that faciliates assimilation and growth: the more 
                                                      
71 KTO, p.97. 
72 KTO, p.103: “Wenn der Kampf der Organe somit das Gute hat, dass er Unhaltbares aus 
der Reihe des Lebenden rasch entfernt, so muss auch daran gedacht werden, dass er zugleich 
im Stande sein kann, manche vielleicht das stärkste für den Organismus leistenden 
Verbindungen zu unterdrücken, wenn sie morphologisch kräftiger sind als die der anderen 
Organe.” Compare Aristotle’s description of why the strongest individual in a human 
collective must often be removed for the sake of the whole. He compares this political 
observation to the fact that “the painter will not allow the figure to have a foot which, 
however beautiful, is not in proportion, nor will the ship-builder allow the stern or any other 
part of the vessel to be unduly large, any more than the chorus-master will allow anyone who 
sings louder or better than all the rest to sing in the choir” (Politics, 1284b4-1284b34). 
73 See KTO, p.98: “Da Mangel des Gleichgewichts zwischen den verschiedenen Geweben 
sehr rasch zum Tode der Individuen und somit zur Elimination derselben und ihrer 
nachtheiligen Qualität aus der Reihe der Lebenden führt, so mussten in den überlebenden 
Individuen blos Zustände des Gleichgewichts der Gewebe übrig 
bleiben und so eine harmonische Einheit des ganzen Organismus durch Selbstelimination 
des Abweichenden gezüchtet werden. Das so entstandene Gleichgewicht wurde aber blos für 
eine gewisse normale Lebensbreite erworben und kann durch Veränderung der Bedingungen 
leicht gestört werden.” 
74 For evidence that Nietzsche read this, see NL 7[190] 10.302-3: “Mangel an Gleichgewicht 
zwischen den Geweben führt rasch zum Tode der Individuen und zur Elimination derselben 
und ihrer nachtheilhaften Qualität aus der Reihe der Lebenden: bloß Zustände des 
Gleichgewichts bleiben übrig: so würde eine harmonische Einheit des ganzen Organism 
gezüchtet durch Selbst-Elimination des Abweichenden.” 
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stimulation received by a part, or the more responsive a part is to that stimulation, 
the more nutritrients it can assimilate and the more it can therefore grow. Since for 
Roux use increases stimulation, the brain apportions this functional stimulus in such 
a way that growth correlates to use. Growth is therefore regulated without the need 
of an internal entelechy or conscious intention, as organisms naturally tend towards 
a balance between the organs that is suited to their needs.75 This is what Roux calls 
“Selbstregulierung”.76 Nonetheless, every organ is perpetually pushing to assimilate 
and grow as much as possible. As soon as an organ receives more stimulation, it will 
further succeed in its struggle against other organs and thereby grow at the expense 
of their counterparts (Roux gives the example of a breastfeeding woman whose 
bones suffer as a result of the increased growth of the breasts).77 In this way, the 
tense struggle of counterforces over nutrition and space is constant and the 
Gleichgewicht of bodily parts is dynamic and ceaselessly shifting with the changing 
requirements of the organism.  
Roux mistakenly defends the Lamarkian idea that characteristics acquired 
through these internal conflicts would be passed on to progeny, and that the 
complexity of organs and bodily systems are the result of their increased use and 
activity across successive generations.78 On his account, inner conflict thereby 
generates the fittest Darwinian organisms in a non-teleological manner. With the 
constant variation of individual parts blindly struggling for Reiz, Raum and Nahrung, 
and the capacity and balance of these parts perpetually being tested in the struggle 
against other organisms, the whole will naturally tend towards a complex and 
                                                      
75 KTO, p.113: “Da diese Reize aber blos infolge der Thätigkeit des ganzen Organismus 
stattfinden, indem sie alle direct oder indirect von dem Reizcentrum in dem Gehirn abhängen, 
so werden sie eben blos das für den ganzen Organismus Zweckmässige hervorbringen”. 
76 See e.g. KTO, p.112. 
77 KTO, p.106. 
78 KTO, p.61: “Durch die Zurückführung erworbener Formänderungen auf chemische 
Aenderungen und durch deren leichtere Uebertragbarkeit auf den Samen und auf das Ei in 
dem chemische Stoffwechsel, welcher zwischen ihnen und dem Vater resp. der Mutter 
stattfindet, wird das Problem der Vererbung als solches aufgehoben […].” See also, p.24. 
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functionally integrated holism, although many poorly organised organisms have to 
perish in the process.79 
Now that we have a general overview of the struggle Roux identifies within 
the body of any organism, we should take a closer look at the process of assimilation, 
which we have seen to be fundemantal to this struggle. Assimilation takes two forms 
for Roux. The first is of a catabolic, nutritive kind. Roux argues that a necessary (and 
even sufficient) condition of being an organism is having a certain degree of 
durability (“Dauerhaftigkeit”). In order to survive, he tells us, an organism must 
consume more energy than it expends – a capacity that is conditioned by the 
organism’s “Assimilationsfähigkeit”: 
Die erste Eigenschaft, welche ihn unter diesen ungünstigen Umständen 
in der Dauer begünstigt, ist die Assimilationsfähigkeit. Sie besteht 
darin, dass der organische Process das Vermögen hat, fremd 
beschaffene Theile in ihm gleiche umzuwandeln, differente 
Atomgruppirungen in ihm gleiche umzugruppiren, also Fremdes 
qualitativ sich anzueignen und so das Nöthige sich selber zu 
produciren, wenn nur die Rohmaterialien dazu vorhanden sind. Das 
Wesen dieser Fähigkeit ist eine Art Selbstproduction, “Selbstgestaltung 
des Nöthigen”. (KTO, p.216) 
Recalling Nietzsche’s notion of “plastische Kraft”, this is a process of rendering that 
which is foreign familiar (“Fremdes qualitativ sich anzueignen”). However, Roux’s 
conception of assimilation is, like Schopenhauer’s, far more obviously destructive – 
namely, insofar as it involves the attraction and catabolism of existing foreign unities 
into their different constituent “Atomgruppierungen”, followed by the incoporation 
of those groupings of atoms that can be used as energetic compensation for the 
                                                      
79 We should observe, however, that Roux does not give a clear account of how life and self-
organisation originally emerged from mechanical laws, nor does he explain how variation 
occurs. Indeed, at the close of KTO, though he hypothesises that organismic assimilative 
processes may have originated in fire, he indicates that we must simply wonder at why life 
processes take place at all, just as we must wonder at why there are physical or chemical 
laws. See KTO, p.230, pp.240-1.  
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organismic part in question.80 This then issues in growth (“Wachsthum”) and 
reproduction (“Fortpflanzung”). What should also be accented is that Roux states 
that what defines an organism is its capacity not merely to compensate, but to over-
compensate, for its energetic losses.81 This is the very foundation of an organism’s 
“Dauerhaftigkeit” because under-compensation results in diminuation and death, 
and mere compensation does not allow for periods during which there is no available 
nutrition or during which there are other unanticipated environmental pressures.82 
Roux describes assimilation as motivated by a form of hunger; however, in this 
context, hunger does not signify a psychologically represented craving, but rather 
simply a strong affinity for nutrition when there is a need for said nutrition.83 
Likewise, in connection with these processes, of almost equal priority for 
the survival and success of any intra-organismic entity in the Kampf der Theile is 
the organic function of excretion or Beseitigung. This involves the removal of the 
harmful byproducts of catabolic assimilation: those parts of the foreign that cannot 
be rendered familiar and exploited. Thus, as Roux puts it: “Zu den wichtigen 
allgemeinen Lebensbedingungen gehört auch die Beseitigung der 
Stoffwechselproducte; denn ihre Anhäufung würde schädlich sein.”84 Those parts of 
the body better able to remove (beseitigen) the detrimental byproducts of 
                                                      
80 Roux compares this to the process by which a military regiment trains and then 
incorporates new recruits while expelling old ones – all the while, the regiment retains its 
general structure: “[Die Assimilation] ist zu vergleichen der Ausbildung der Recruten bei 
einem Regimente; immer werden neue Mannschaften durch die Unterofficiere eingeschult, 
‘assimilirt’, und dies geschieht in den Regimentern jeder Waffengattung in anderer Weise. 
Und immer scheiden wieder alte oder getödtete aus dem Verbande aus” (KTO, p.56). 
81 See KTO, pp.216-7. 
82 See KTO, p.217: “[N]eben der Assimilation ist das nächste allgemeine Erforderniss der 
organischen Wesen die Uebercomensation des Verbrauches.” He also places 
Uebercompensation on an equal footing with Selbstregulation: “Selbstregulation und 
Uebercompensation sind also die Grundeigenschaften und die nöthigen Vorbedingungen des 
Lebens.” (KTO, p.226). For evidence of Nietzsche’s knowledge of these passages, see e.g. 
NL 7[95] 10.274. 
83 See KTO, p.222: “Die Dauerprocesse müssen Hunger haben. Dieses Wort ist hier natürlich 
nicht als eine bewusste Empfindung, sondern in der Bedeutung einer stärkeren chemischen 
Affinität zur Nahrung bei stärkerem Nahrungsbedürfniss aufzufassen.” 
84 KTO, p.95. 
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metabolism are favoured in the Kampf der Theile since the accumulation of such 
waste reduces the efficiency with which assimilation and growth can proceed. At the 
level of functionally similar cells and molecules, those varients which excrete with 
relatively less efficiency are therefore selected out. 
This catabolic process certainly represents the dominant mode of 
assimilation in Roux’s account; however, we also find that he mentions another 
model. Catabolic assimilation represents an indirect form of conflict, in which parts 
only struggle against one another insofar as they compete for space and nutrition; 
however, he also contends that parts exhibiting novel traits (i.e. “neu auftretende 
Eigenschaften”) can  
[i]m directen Kampfe mit den alten siegen und sich ausbreiten, indem 
letztere entweder direct zerstört oder von den neuen verbraucht, 
assimilirt werden (die Assimilation ist ja selber der allgemeinste 
progressive Process), vielleicht unter fermentativer Wirkungsweise 
oder ähnlich wie der Erregungszustand in Nerven und Muskeln sich 
ausbreitet, oder auf sonst eine noch unbekannte Weise. (KTO, p.87)85 
In the direct struggle of molecules, weaker molecules are often simply destroyed 
(“zerstört”); yet, sometimes, the weaker molecules are assimilated. This is a type of 
assimilation that results in what contemporary biologists would call 
“endosymbiosis”, in which an existing biological unity is preserved in being 
incorporated, but in such a way as to allow the stronger, assimilating entity to exploit 
the activity of the assimilated part. Unfortunately, however, Roux says very little 
about this secondary type of assimilation.86  
                                                      
85 Nietzsche transcribes this quotation in NL 7[86] 10.272. 
86 Roux also discusses another form of assimilation – namely, embryonic assimilation, which 
is not so pertinent to our current study. Moreover, there no evidence (of which I am aware) 
in the Nachlass that Nietzsche paid this much attention. In short, Roux tells us that while an 
organism is still growing, what it assimilates can alter the structure of the organism itself – 
namely, because in the process of assimilating new substances, the organism exercises and 
uses its body and thereby actively alters the way in which it will develop. In opposition to 
the example of the rigid military regiment, Roux compares this to the school class whose 
teachers accept new pupils, but as they do so, the teachers are also replaced (and the 
organisational statutes transformed): “[D]as Wunderbare ist nun, dass die Lehrer sich dabei 
weiter verändern und die Schüler ebenfalls. Die Statuten sind also keine festen, sondern für 
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As such, Roux offers us a naturalised account (albeit one that has dated 
badly) of how complex higher organisms come into existence – that is to say, an 
account that does not rely on the existence of pregiven metaphysical unities such as 
Aristotle’s essences or Schopenhauer’s Platonic Ideen, or the the idea of such unity 
in the mind of a divine creator (à la Kant). Over the course of generations, how a 
given organisation will develop out of this process of internal conflict – driven by 
the impetus for nutritive assimilation, over-compensation and growth – is 
contingent, being determined by the organism’s activity in relation to its 
environment, rather than by a metaphysically predetermined blueprint. The 
Zweckmäßigkeit of the organism develops simply from the relation of the various 
parts struggling to overcompensate for losses (“[d]ie Theile leben blos für die eigene 
Erhaltung”87) combined with the higher Darwinian contest between organisms, 
which forces imbalanced organisations out of existence. On the one hand, this is a 
measured process, whereby certain nutritive materials, or exploitable cells, are 
selected from the environment and incorporated, and, furthermore, where the 
struggle of functionally differentiated parts is characterised by a species of 
Gleichgewicht. But we have also discerned that this struggle is conditioned by 
unmeasured processes: organismic parts must firstly engage in the catabolism of 
higher unities as a means to extracting nutrition therefrom, and secondly, the 
exclusion or excretion of unuseable metabolic by-products. Looking ahead to our 
critique of agonistic readings of Nietzsche, what should be accented is that in Roux, 
exploitation and exclusion are preconditions of healthy conflictual organisation. On 
the other hand, against the unmeasured or destructive understanding of exploitation 
we find in the radical aristocratic reading, Roux’s weaker entities must often be 
preserved if they are functionally unique, or if they have been incorporated through 
direct struggle. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen to what extent Roux’s vision of 
the grounds of healthy organisation is taken up by Nietzsche.  
                                                      
jede folgende Zeit andere für Lehrer und Schüler” (KTO, p.56). See also pp.66-7. Indeed, in 
this sense, we might view Roux as a forerunner of epigenetics. 
87 KTO, p.220. 
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4.3.2. EXPLOITATION NOT PRESERVATION 
We know from the Nachlass and his heavily annotated copy of KTO, that Nietzsche 
was very much familiar with Roux’s construal of the organism.88 Indeed, almost 
without reservation, Nietzsche initially accepts Roux’s model of healthy 
organisation and the processes that underpin it (i.e. assimilation, over-compensation 
and self-regulation); moreover, he tries to apply this model to the problem of social 
and psychological organisation.89 However, we should note the way in which, from 
the outset, he appropriates Roux’s vision of the body. As Müller-Lauter has stressed, 
Nietzsche rejects KTO as an example of scientific realism.90 As Nietzsche states: 
“Jetzt hat man den Kampf überall wieder entdeckt und redet vom Kampfe der Zellen, 
Gewebe, Organe, Organismen”; however, he argues, struggle is in some sense a 
peculiarly human affect (i.e. the feeling of being in a state of conflict), and projecting 
it onto the intraorganismic relation of parts can only ever produce an 
“intellektuelle[.] Ausdeutung[..]” of “physiologischen Bewegungen,” (“dort wo der 
Intellekt gar nichts weiß, aber doch alles zu wissen meint”).91 As such,  
Unsere Naturwissenschaft ist jetzt auf dem Wege, sich die kleinsten 
Vorgänge zu verdeutlichen durch unsere angelernten Affekt-Gefühle, 
kurz eine Sprechart zu schaffen für jene Vorgänge: sehr gut! Aber es 
bleibt eine Bilderrede. (NL 11[128] 9.487) 
Despite the lack of its objective truth, he still holds this Sprechart to be a helpful 
heuristic device for talking about fundamental organic processes and rendering them 
                                                      
88 See also Giuliano Campioni, Paolo d’Iorio, Maria Christina Fornari, Francesco 
Fronterotta, Andrea Orsucci, Nietzsches persönliche Bibliothek (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2003), 
p.511. 
89 See e.g. NL 11[130] 9.487-8; NL 11[134] 9.490-1; NL 11[182] 9.509-12. 
90 Müller-Lauter (1999), p.165. See also (1978), pp.195f. 
91 See also NL 11[241] 9.532: “Wenn unsere Affekte das Mittel sind, um die Bewegungen 
und Bildungen eines gesellschaftlichen Organism zu unterhalten, so würde doch nichts 
fehlerhafter sein als nun zurückzuschließen, daß im niedrigsten Organism es eben auch die 
Affekte seien, welche hier selbstreguliren, assimiliren, exkretiren umwandeln, regeneriren 
— also Affekte auch da vorauszusetzen, Lust Unlust Willen Neigung Abneigung.” 
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in some sense comprehensible. So long as we remember that this way of speaking 
remains a mere Bilderrede, using the language of conflict to interpret the world 
represents an enlightening enterprise. But how does Nietzsche apply this Bilderrede 
himself?92  
To be sure, between 1881 and 1883, Nietzsche repeatedly employs this 
Bilderrede as a means to describing the domains of both the individual and society. 
While it would no doubt prove illuminating to give a full reconstruction of 
Nietzsche’s early appropriation of Roux (and I will be drawing on some of this in 
the final sections of this chapter), from 1884 onwards Nietzsche began to reject 
major aspects of the vision of nature depicted in KTO. Consequently, if we want to 
get a representative view of the extent to which his mature Weltanschauung was 
influenced by Roux, we should begin at this point. What I will demonstrate is that 
despite rejecting key points of Roux’s account, he retains and even expands the idea 
of life as ineluctably characterised by both a measured struggle for 
instrumentalisation and an unmeasured struggle to excrete and exclude potentially 
harmful entities. 
The first way in which Nietzsche departs from Roux, and which will form 
the focal point of our current subsection, is in his rejection of Roux’s account of the 
three main teloi or ends towards which the dynamic of intra-organismic struggle 
tends – namely: 
 
a) Survival (Erhaltung). The idea that “[d]ie ununterbrochene Dauerfähigkeit 
ist die erste Vorbedingung des Organischen”93 and that “[d]ie Theile leben 
blos für die eigene Erhaltung”.94  
                                                      
92 Indeed, Nietzsche conceives of nation-states as the highest form of organisms. See NL 
12[163] 9.604: “Heerden und Staaten sind die höchsten uns bekannten — sehr 
unvollkommenen Organismen.” See also NL 11[316] 9.563. On Nietzsche’s early 
application of Roux to social issues, see e.g. NL 11[132] 9.490; NL 11[134] 9.490-2. 
93 KTO, p.214. 
94 KTO, p.220. 
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b) The assimilation of nutrition. The idea that the struggle of the parts is most 
fundamentally a “Kampf um der Nährung”. 
c) Overcompensation. The idea that the tendency “zur Assimilation” can be 
described as a struggle to replace losses – that is, as a tendency “zum Ersatz 
und zur Uebercompensation des Verbrauchten”.95 
I will now briefly unpack how Nietzsche rejected each of these. Let us begin with 
(a) – i.e. the conception of survival as a fundamental end of life. Already in Z II 
Selbstueberwindung, Nietzsche criticises the idea of Erhaltung as an underlying 
motivation driving nature (particularly as a Spinozistic conatus or Schopenhauerian 
will to live).96 However, it was only after reading Wilhelm Rolph’s Biologische 
Probleme zugleich als Versuch zur Entwicklung einer rationellen Ethik in 1884 that 
Nietzsche began to formulate a more thoroughgoing refutation of the logic of 
preservation.97 Aside from Schopenhauer and Spinoza, Nietzsche’s critique of 
Erhaltung as the ultimate end towards which all life (either consciously or 
unconsciously) tends is, like Rolph’s, (mistakenly) framed as a critique of Darwin 
and (less mistakenly) Spencer.98  
                                                      
95 KTO, p.238. 
96 “Der traf freilich die Wahrheit nicht, der das Wort nach ihr schoss vom ‘Willen zum 
Dasein’: diesen Willen — giebt es nicht! ‘Denn: was nicht ist, das kann nicht wollen; was 
aber im Dasein ist, wie könnte das noch zum Dasein wollen!’” (4.149). Nietzsche’s argument 
here is doubtful. It is an enthymeme, where the missing premise is that we cannot want that 
which we already have, which is patently false since we can desire the continued possession 
of that thing. 
97 Evidence of Nietzsche having read BP can be found in Campioni et al. (2003), p.504. The 
impact of Rolph on Nietzsche’s thought has been investigated by Moore (2002) (see esp. 
pp.47-53) and Thomas J. Brobjer, in Nietzsche's Philosophical Context: An Intellectual 
Biography (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2008) (see esp. pp.170-1). See also Gregory 
Moore, ‘Beiträge zur Quellenforschung’, Nietzsche-Studien, 27 (1998), 535–51. 
98 See e.g. Richardson (2004), p.16. On the problems with Nietzsche’s critique of Darwin, 
see also pp.20-6. As Richardson notes, for Darwin, the unconscious tendency that underlies 
evolutionary processes is that of reproductive success, not survival. Moore (2002) has also 
noted that Rolph attacks a straw-man Darwin (see p.51, fn.42). However, the notion of a 
drive for self-preservation is far more present in Herbert Spencer’s The Data of Ethics (New 
York: D. Appleton and Co., 1882), which Nietzsche was reading in the early 1880s. See e.g. 
p.135: “As fast as the social state establishes itself, the preservation of the society becomes 
a means of preserving its units. Living together arose because, on the average, it proved more 
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Rolph raises the tendency towards accumulation (what he calls 
Anziehungskraft) to the level of an “ürsprungliche Kraft”; indeed, he describes it as 
the original and fundamental driving force of nature.99 Growth (“Wachsthum”) is 
then figured as the result of this process of attraction, as can be seen in the inorganic 
growth of crystals as well as in the growth of organisms. According to Rolph, then, 
both the organic and inorganic are similarly characterised by this “Trieb”: “ein 
dauerndes Streben nach Steigerung seiner Einnahmen”; however, observing 
protoplasma, Rolph claims that what distinguishes organisms from inorganic entities 
is that for the former, this impulse is “unersättlich”.100 One might object to Rolph’s 
conception of unersättliche Aufnahme as the defining process of the organic on 
account of the fact that some organisms only grow during the adolescent phase of 
their life-span, and that therefore with such organisms the process of excessive 
consumption would appear to cease after a certain stage. Against this conclusion, 
however, Rolph argues that cell division demonstrates that once the organism 
reaches the boundary (“Grenze”) of its “Aufnahmfähigkeit”, it begins to reproduce: 
“Dann entstehen zwei junge Zellen, die nun das Spiel aufs neue beginnen”.101 
According to Rolph, the nucleus of a cell plays the role of ordering newly assimilated 
material. But, when “eine zu grosse Anhäufung von Masse die centralisirende 
Anziehungskraft des Kernes überwindet”, there arises a pressure on the periphery of 
the cell that forces the cell to undergo division.102 For Rolph, like Mayer, the idea of 
                                                      
advantageous to each than living apart; and this implies that maintenance of combination is 
maintenance of the conditions to more satisfactory living than the combined persons would 
otherwise have. Hence, social self-preservation becomes a proximate aim taking precedence 
of the ultimate aim, individual self-preservation.” Nietzsche obtained The Data of Ethics in 
1880 and his close reading of the text is evidenced by the degree to which he annotated the 
text. See Campioni et al. (2003), pp.565-6. Assoun has called Nietzsche’s rejection of Darwin 
a “spectacular evolution” in Nietzsche’s thought. See Assoun (2000), p.85. See pp.85-7 for 
an informative summary of Nietzsche’s rejection of survival and hunger as the motivating 
teloi of living organisms. 
99 BP, p.59. 
100 BP, p.59; see also p.61. 
101 BP, p.67. 
102 With higher organisms that reproduce sexually, this process is displaced to the sexually 
reproductive organs, where there is subsequently a build-up of “Zeugungsstoffe” that 
generates discomfort in the organism. Such organisms are then driven to discharge this 
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a “Selbsterhaltungstrieb” is unable to explain organic processes on account of the 
fact that this assimilation always outstrips the survival needs of the organism: “[D]as 
Geschöpf bestreitet aus seinen Einnahmen auch die Function der Fortpflanzung, 
welche doch keineswegs zur Selbsterhaltung gehört.”103  
Rolph also rejects the Darwinian-Malthusian view of nature, as represented 
by Darwin’s wedge metaphor – one in which every organism is characterised by an 
unrelenting struggle over limited resources.104 Rolph (mistakenly) reads Darwin as 
suggesting that this is the primary motor of evolution.105 It is only in times of 
environmental paucity, says Rolph, that the brutal “Darwinian” picture can be said 
to correspond to nature. Interestingly, Rolph thinks that under such conditions of 
privation, protoplasma satisfy their urge for assimilation through a quite different 
form of activity, namely, what Rolph calls “Conjugation”. Rolph’s hypothesis is 
based on the observation of vorticella, which can reproduce by means of both binary 
fission and conjugation. In the latter case, an impoverished male cell tries to unite 
with a healthy female cell (which itself is reluctant to conjugate) in order to benefit 
from fusing together into a new single cell. This results in a cell that is stronger than 
the original male. Rolph describes this as a process of self-consumption or isophagy 
since it pools together the stored energy of two cells, though now this is only needed 
to feed one cell, which can consequently consume the excess. Though this is a 
mischaracterisation of conjugation (which, it was discovered in the 1950s is rather a 
means by which cells transfer genetic information rather than a form of isophagy), 
                                                      
through copulation (in the case of the male) or through parturition (in the case of the female). 
See BP, pp.168-70. This is what Rolph refers to as the “Entleerung”, or what I have called 
the “displacement”, of the the splitting process. See BP, p.168: “Die Entleerung der 
Zersetzungsprocesse oder der Nahrungsrückstände, sowie endlich die der Keimproducte, 
erfolgt auf einen Reiz, der seinen psychischen Ausdruck in einem Drange, im Leid findet.” 
Compare NL 25[179] 11.62: “Der Mensch, als organisches Wesen, hat Triebe der Ernährung 
(Habsucht) NB Hier nur die Innere [sic] Welt ins Auge gefaßt! Triebe der Ausscheidung 
(Liebe) (wozu auch die Regeneration gehört) […].” 
103 BP, p.92. Yet, Rolph does note that Fortpflanzung is recognised by Darwin as a 
fundamental goal of organisms. 
104 On this, see ch.1, fn.41. 
105 Of course, as Moore (2002) has pointed out, Darwin held no such view (p.51, fn.42). 
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it is nonetheless relevant because it shows us that there is a type of assimilation that 
is symptomatic of declining health, and by which the weaker exploit the stronger.  
This type of assimilation, then, is opposed to the process of Fortplanzung 
that underpins evolution. Indeed, Rolph claims that evolutionary progress only 
occurs under conditions of plenitude, precisely when a species is not engaged in an 
exhausting struggle for survival. This is because it is only under such conditions that 
variation arises. The variety of well adapted flora and fauna existing today is, 
according to Rolph, proof that species must often exist in situations of plenitude. 
The struggle that is common to both of these conditions, and which is therefore the 
truly fundamental organic drive, is therefore not a “Kampf um die ‘Erwerbung der 
unentbehrlichsten Lebensbedürfnisse’, sondern ein Kampf um Mehrerwerb.”106 On 
these grounds, Rolph claims that life should be conceived as a struggle for 
“Lebensvermehrung”, “Vervollkommung”, and “Wachsthum” rather than mere 
survival. Animals are only ever temporarily engaged in a defensive struggle 
(Vertheidigungskampf) for preservation, that is, under extreme conditions of 
hardship.107 
Nietzsche seems to draw very directly on Rolph in rejecting the idea of 
Erhaltung as the fundamental tendency of assimilative processes. In FW 349, his 
argumentation resonates with that of Rolph, though he now places an emphasis on 
power, which is completely absent in BP: 
Sich selbst erhalten wollen ist der Ausdruck einer Nothlage, einer 
Einschränkung des eigentlichen Lebens-Grundtriebes, der auf 
Machterweiterung hinausgeht und in diesem Willen oft genug die 
Selbsterhaltung in Frage stellt und opfert. […] [I]n der Natur herrscht 
nicht die Nothlage, sondern der Ueberfluss, die Verschwendung, sogar 
                                                      
106 See also BP, p.114: “Die Punkte, in denen ich von der Darwinschen Theorie abweiche, 
sind also […] folgende: Der Daseinskampf ist in Wirklichkeit ein Streben nach vermehrter 
Einnahme, nach Lebensmehrung, und unabhängig von dem jedesmaligen Nahrungsangebot; 
er findet jederzeit, also auch in Ueberflusslage statt.” 
107 See BP, p.97: “[D]er Daseinskampf [ist] kein Vertheidigungskampf, sondern ein 
Angriffskrieg, der nur unter gewissen Umständen zu einem Vertheidigungskampfe 
umgewandelt werden kann. Wachsthum aber und Vermehrung und Vervollkommnung sind 
die Folgen jenes erfolgreichen Angriffskrieges […].” 
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bis in’s Unsinnige. Der Kampf um’s Dasein ist nur eine Ausnahme, 
eine zeitweilige Restriktion des Lebenswillens; der grosse und kleine 
Kampf dreht sich allenthalben um’s Uebergewicht, um Wachsthum und 
Ausbreitung, um Macht, gemäss dem Willen zur Macht, der eben der 
Wille des Lebens ist. 
As we can see, Nietzsche understands nature to be characterised by opulence and 
profligacy (“Ueberfluss” and “Verschwendung”).108 (Elsewhere, he also reiterates 
Rolph’s argument that variation only arises under conditions of plenitude.)109 Under 
such conditions, everything struggles for Wachsthum. Nietzsche thus characterises 
the “Lebens-Grundtrieb” as a drive for growth and Machterweiterung – a struggle 
for which animals and individuals will often risk their survival. To be sure, the 
impetus toward power often coincides with the goal of self-preservation insofar as 
it often indirectly promotes our survival or Dauer.110  However, it is this very 
coincidence that can make it appear, to the myopic observer of an impoverished 
environment, as though survival were the motivating telos of all life, and not merely 
an epiphenomenon or a particular mode of pursuing power expansion under 
conditions of scarcity. As Nietzsche says in JGB 16, again echoing Rolph’s 
discharge based economic model of the organism, though again with an emphasis 
on power or force (“Kraft”) that is totally absent in Rolph: 
Vor Allem will etwas Lebendiges seine Kraft auslassen — Leben selbst 
ist Wille zur Macht —: die Selbsterhaltung ist nur eine der indirekten 
                                                      
108 See also GD Streifzüge 14 6.120: “Anti-Darwin. — Was den berühmten ‘Kampf um’s 
Leben’ betrifft, so scheint er mir einstweilen mehr behauptet als bewiesen. Er kommt vor, 
aber als Ausnahme; der Gesammt-Aspekt des Lebens ist nicht die Nothlage, die Hungerlage, 
vielmehr der Reichthum, die Üppigkeit, selbst die absurde Verschwendung, — wo gekämpft 
wird, kämpft man um Macht…” 
109 See JGB 262: “Arten, denen eine überreichliche Ernährung und überhaupt ein Mehr von 
Schutz und Sorgfalt zu Theil wird, [sind] alsbald in der stärksten Weise zur Variation des 
Typus neigen und reich an Wundern und Monstrositäten (auch an monströsen Lastern)”. See 
also NL 35[22] 11.516-8. 
110 See also AC 6 6.172: “Das Leben selbst gilt mir als Instinkt für Wachsthum, für Dauer, 
für Häufung von Kräften, für Macht”. NL 2[68] 12.92: “Selbst Erhaltung nur als eine der 
Folgen der Selbsterweiterung.” 
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und häufigsten Folgen davon. — Kurz, hier wie überall, Vorsicht vor 
überflüssigen teleologischen Principien!111 
Nietzsche thus launches a deflationary attack on the idea of a fundamental 
(conscious or unconscious) drive for self-preservation, even exclaiming in one note 
that “[e]s giebt keinen Selbsterhaltungstrieb!” (NL 11[108] 9.479). In more 
moderate moments, however, he drops this conception of the tendency to survive as 
pure epiphenomenon, suggesting instead that organisms do sometimes actively (or 
in the case of humans, consciously) strive for preservation, but that this is an 
exceptional state only arising when organisms are weak and their existence is in 
immediate danger (hence, it represents an “Ausnahme” as in FW 349). 
Notwithstanding, this counters the idea of self-preservation as a fundamental, 
represented telos of organic beings. 
Naturally, the fact that the tendency for power often coincides with that of 
survival does not entail a necessary connection between the two. In his description 
of the protoplasma, Nietzsche draws on Rolph in arguing that it consumes until it is 
forced to relinquish the preservation of its original unity and split into two new 
protoplasma: 
[M]an kann die unterste und ursprünglichste Thätigkeit im Protoplasma 
nicht aus einem Willen zur Selbsterhaltung ableiten: denn es nimmt auf 
eine unsinnige Art mehr in sich hinein, als die Erhaltung bedingen 
würde: und vor allem, es “erhält sich” damit eben nicht, sondern 
zerfällt… Der Trieb, der hier waltet, hat gerade dieses Sich-nicht-
erhalten-Wollen zu erklären […]. (NL 11[121] 13.57) 
At the human level, this tendency towards power, over and against survival, is 
particularly marked in strong races (“die starken Rassen”), who “dezimiren sich 
gegenseitig: Krieg, Machtbegierde, Abenteuer; ihre Existenz ist kostspielig, kurz, — 
sie reiben sich unter einander auf”. Indeed, those that are proficient at pursuing 
power are often highly inefficient at surviving (and vice versa) (NL 14[182] 13.369). 
Or we might invoke Nietzsche’s analysis of martyrs, who, he points out, in their 
                                                      
111 See also JGB 13; NL 26[277] 11.222-3. 
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desire to possess the truth, and the “Machtgefühl” elicited by this possession, will 
gladly sacrifice their own life.112  
But the chief way in which Nietzsche distinguishes himself from Rolph (and 
Roux for that matter), is in his rejection of (b), that is, the idea of nutrition as a 
fundamental driving telos of the struggle that defines life. For Nietzsche, the struggle 
is for power – Macht or Übergewicht – i.e. to overpower foreign entities and 
assimilate them into the power organisation over which one has control: to command 
them.113 And, as we saw in Chapter 1, this can take an infinitude of forms.114 Indeed, 
for Nietzsche, the struggle for Nahrung is merely one particular way in which this 
“Lebens-Grundtrieb” expresses itself: “der Wille zur Macht sich spezialisirend als 
Wille zur Nahrung, nach Eigenthum, nach Werkzeugen, nach Dienern — Gehorchen 
und Herrschen: der Leib. — der stärkere Wille dirigirt den schwächeren.” (NL 
35[15] 11.514; my italics).115  
Congruent with this, the parts of the body are first and foremost concerned 
with the command of their counterparts rather than any struggle for nutrition. Higher 
organisms are of course sometimes motivated by feelings of hunger; however, 
Nietzsche maintains that this “Hunger ist eine spezialisirte und spätere Form des 
                                                      
112 See FW 13: “[S]elbst wenn wir unser Leben daran setzen, wie der Märtyrer zu Gunsten 
seiner Kirche, es ist ein Opfer, gebracht unserem Verlangen nach Macht, oder zum Zweck 
der Erhaltung unseres Machtgefühls. Wer da empfindet ‘ich bin im Besitz der Wahrheit’, wie 
viel Besitzthümer lässt der nicht fahren, um diese Empfindung zu retten!” See also Z II 
Selbst-Ueberwindung 4.148: “Lieber noch gehe ich unter, als dass ich diesem Einen absagte; 
und wahrlich, wo es Untergang giebt und Blätterfallen, siehe, da opfert sich Leben — um 
Macht!” 
113 Clearly drawing on Rolph, Nietzsche states that “— Gelingt diese Einverleibung nicht, so 
zerfällt wohl das Gebilde; und die Zweiheit erscheint als Folge des Willens zur Macht: um 
nicht fahren zu lassen, was erobert ist, tritt der Wille zur Macht in zwei Willen auseinander 
(unter Umständen ohne seine Verbindung unter einander völlig aufzugeben)” (NL 9 [151] 
12.424). 
114 See ch.1, §1.4.2. 
115 Paul Katsafanas, in The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the 
Unconscious (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), has argued that the will to power is 
“not a drive but the form drives take” (p.170); however, Nietzsche frequent refers to it as a 
drive – particularly as a Grundtrieb or Lebenstrieb. See GD Alten 3 6.157. NL 9[151] 12.424: 
“‘Hunger’ ist nur eine engere Anpassung, nachdem der Grundtrieb nach Macht geistigere 
Gestalt gewonnen hat.” NL 1[30] 12.17: “[D]ie Begehrungen spezialisiren sich immer mehr: 
ihre Einheit ist der Wille zur Macht (um den Ausdruck vom stärksten aller Triebe 
herzunehmen, der alle organische Entwicklung bis jetzt dirigirt hat)”. 
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Triebes [nach Macht], ein Ausdruck der Arbeitstheilung, im Dienst eines darüber 
waltenden höheren Triebes” (NL 11[121] 13.58). Behind any feeling of hunger, 
there is always some drive that is actively seeking power.  
[D]as Protoplasma streckt seine Pseudopodien aus, um nach etwas zu 
suchen, was ihm widersteht — nicht aus Hunger, sondern aus Willen 
zur Macht. Darauf macht es den Versuch, dasselbe zu überwinden, sich 
anzueignen, sich einzuverleiben […]. (NL 14[174] 13.360) 
 
“Ernährung” ist nur abgeleitet, das Ursprüngliche ist Alles in sich 
einschließen wollen[.] (NL 5[64] 12.209) 
Nietzsche wants to repudiate the Schopenhauerian supposition that willing is 
inherently motivated by pain and a feeling of lack (also to be found in Rolph).116 
Nietzsche’s position is that willing is grounded in excess, and a need for discharge 
through the activity of striving to overpower opposed entities. In the act of stretching 
out its pseudopodia, in the act of trying to increase its power, a protoplasma is 
releasing pent up power.  
We then find Nietzsche’s rejection of (c) – the idea of overcompensation, or 
Ersatz, as a fundamental organic end – bound up with these affirmations of power 
                                                      
116 For Rolph’s defence of this thesis, see BP, p.177: “Alle Thätigkeit im organischen Leben 
ist ihrem inneren Kern nach auf ein Fliehen des Leides zurückführbar, welches in seiner 
primitivsten Gestalt in dem Gefühl des Hungers, des Sättisgungsstrebens auftritt.” See also 
BP, pp.169-70; and p.181. See Moore (2002), p.75 (fn.25). 
116 At other times, Nietzsche also indicates that pain is a constitutive part of pleasure: “[W]as 
ist denn Lust anderes als: eine Reizung des Machtgefühls durch ein Hemmniß (noch stärker 
durch rhythmische Hemmungen und Widerstände) — so daß es dadurch anschwillt: Also in 
aller Lust ist Schmerz einbegriffen” (NL 35[15] 11.514). See also NL 16[15] 10.505: “Lust-
Unlust sind Begleit -Erscheinungen, keine Zwecke.” NL 5[64] 12.209: “Lust als 
Machtgefühl (die Unlust voraussetzend)”. NL 7[18] 12.302-2; NL 11[71] 13.33-4. NL 
14[173] 13.358: “[D]as Wesen der Lust zutreffend bezeichnet worden ist als ein Plus-Gefühl 
von Macht”. Another interesting note in this context is NL 25[378] 11.111: “Die Instinkte 
als Urtheile auf Grund früherer Erfahrungen: nicht von Lust- und Unlust-Erfahrungen: denn 
die Lust ist erst die Form eines Instinkt-Urtheils (ein Gefühl von vermehrter Macht oder: wie 
wenn sich die Macht vermehrt hätte) Vor den Lust- und Unlustgefühlen giebt es Kraft- und 
Schwächegefühle im Ganzen.” See also NL 14[174] 13.360: “Der Mensch sucht nicht die 
Lust und vermeidet nicht die Unlust […]. Lust und Unlust sind bloße Folge, bloße 
Begleiterscheinung, — was der Mensch will, was jeder kleinste Theil eines lebenden 
Organismus will, das ist ein plus von Macht. Im Streben danach folgt sowohl Lust als 
Unlust”. 
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qua fundamental telos. To figure this process of seeking assimilation “als sei er auf 
‘Ersatz’, wohl gar auf ‘überreichlichen Ersatz’ gerichtet, ein tiefes und gefährliches 
Missverständniss enthalte”.117 The expression of power is always an act of striving 
to increase, not merely replace, one’s power in relation to another resisting 
power.118 As we saw above, the pleasurable feeling of freedom comes from precisely 
the feeling of exercising the will. As Deleuze has noted, for Nietzsche, the will is 
“joyful”.119  
The will to power is therefore a “Willen der Überwältigung, der an sich kein 
Ende hat” (NL 9[91] 12.385). Needless to say, this figuration of the will to power is 
wholly at odds with what we found to be the non-instrumentalising character of 
Nietzsche’s conception of agonal struggle. And to be sure, when we read the 
remainder of the note cited by Hatab and Connolly to substantiate the agonistic 
reading of Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power (NL 9[151] 12.424), we can 
see that the vision of nature contained therein is in fact wholly incompatible with 
agonism insofar as it forcefully asserts the necessity of instrumentalisation: 
Der Wille zur Macht kann sich nur an Widerständen äußern; er sucht 
also nach dem, was ihm widersteht, — dies die ursprüngliche Tendenz 
des Protoplasma, wenn es Pseudopodien ausschickt und um sich tastet. 
Die Aneignung und Einverleibung ist vor allem ein Überwältigen-
wollen, ein Formen u<nd> An- und Umbilden, bis endlich das 
Überwältigte ganz in die Macht des Angreifers übergegangen ist u<nd> 
denselben vermehrt hat. (NL 9[151] 12.424; my italics) 
Thus, although Nietzsche rejects Roux’s hypothesis that survival and 
overcompensation for energetic loss are the fundamental tendencies (in either a 
conscious or unconscious sense) driving living beings, he nonetheless clearly retains 
Roux’s vision of nature as a struggle for instrumentalisation and exploitation – i.e. 
incorporation. We should now further examine the nature of this impetus. 
                                                      
117 Quoted in Müller-Lauter (1978), p.207. 
118 See Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (London: Continuum, 1983), p.85. See also Ciano 
Aydin, “Nietzsche on Reality as Will to Power: Toward an ‘Organization–Struggle’ Model”, 
Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 33(1) (2007), 25-48 (p.26). See also NL 14[82] 13.261-2. 
119 See Deleuze (1983), p.85. 
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4.3.3. PATHOS NOT MECHANISM  
In this subsection, I will inquire into Nietzsche’s reasons for abandoning Roux’s 
method of purging the concept of Zweckmäßigkeit of its metaphysical 
presuppositions – namely, insofar as Nietzsche rejects Roux’s mechanistic 
explanation of nature, preferring to conceptualise existence as a constellation of 
actively striving forces. Nonetheless, it will become manifest that he retains, and 
even foregrounds, Roux’s measured conception of exploitative conflictual relations. 
Crucially, as we shall then see in the final sections, this contradicts the radical 
aristocratic interpretation of Nietzsche’s view of nature.  
For Roux, the parts of the body are not affective agents. They are merely 
physical entities defined by a particular set of mechanical processes.120 Yet recall 
how, for Nietzsche, what we call willing is merely an “Affekt des Commandos” 
(JGB 19). Correspondingly, Nietzsche suggests that the body is suffused with this 
affect or pathos.121 The parts of the body, he contends, have some form of affective, 
agential existence: “Hier ist die Voraussetzung gemacht, daß der ganze Organismus 
denkt, daß alle organischen Gebilde Theil haben am Denken Fühlen Wollen” (NL 
27[19] 11.280).122 In Z II Selbst-Ueberwindung, for example, every living thing that 
is commanded, is fundamentally characterised by an endogenous “Lust” to 
instrumentalise entities that are yet weaker than it.123 And continuing the idea that 
there exists an experiential or perceptual relation of symmetry between the 
                                                      
120 As Müller-Lauter has noted, for Roux, “[d]ie Lebewesen sind für [Roux] 
‘Selbsterhaltungs-, Selbstvermehrungs- und Selbstregulierungsmaschinen’ geblieben”. See 
Müller-Lauter (1978), p.209, quoting Wilhelm Roux, “Prinzipielles der 
Entwicklungsmechanik”, Annalen der Philosophie, 3 (1923), 454-473 (p.471). 
121 See NL 14[79] 13.259: “[D]er Wille zur Macht nicht ein Sein, nicht ein Werden, sondern 
ein Pathos ist die elementarste Thatsache”. 
122 See also NL 34[124] 11.462: “Die Logik unseres bewußten Denkens ist nur eine grobe 
und erleichterte Form jenes Denkens, welches unser Organismus, ja die einzelnen Organe 
desselben, nöthig hat.” 
123 See Z II Selbst-Ueberwindung 4.148: “[N]och im Willen des Dienenden fand ich den 
Willen, Herr zu sein. Dass dem Stärkeren diene das Schwächere, dazu überredet es sein 
Wille, der über noch Schwächeres Herr sein will: dieser Lust allein mag es nicht entrathen.” 
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macrocosmic world of willing humans and the microcosmic world of striving 
organismic parts, he compares the body to a society of under-souls (“ein 
Gesellschaftsbau vieler Seelen”) (JGB 19; my italics).124  
In the Nachlass, Nietzsche’s principal justification for attributing awareness 
to the parts of organisms is that in order for a living unity to bring a foreign entity 
under its command (i.e. assimilate it) – or to jettison an entity that cannot be 
assimilated (i.e. excrete it) – it must evaluate what practical stance it should take 
towards each body that it encounters. He calls this “ein Abschätzen in Bezug auf 
Einverleibung oder Abscheidung” (NL 24[14] 10.651; my italics). They must have 
some form of perceptual awareness. For Nietzsche, this act of evaluation requires 
an active form of “Fühlen, Vorstellen, Denken” (ibid.). He then makes the further 
argument that in order for an entity to command another entity, there must exist the 
possibility of communication between said entities.125 In other words, there must be 
“[e]in Zugleich-denken” (NL 34[124]11.462) and a “sich-verstehen” – as Nietzsche 
points out, “ein Fels läßt sich nicht kommandiren” (NL 2[69] 12.92).126  
What is more, he does not think that this argument solely applies to organic 
unities. Just like the organic parts of the body, he understands inorganic entities as 
being likewise characterised by a “Denken, Fühlen, Wollen”. This is evidenced (he 
claims) by the fact that inorganic entities need to be able to distinguish what they 
need to assimilate from that which they need to repel: “[D]amit dieser Wille zur 
Macht sich äußern könne, er jene Dinge wahrnehmen muß, welche er zieht, daß er 
                                                      
124 On Nietzsche’s use of political metaphors to describe the body, see Eric Blondel, 
Nietzsche. The Body and Culture, trans. by Sean Hand (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1991), pp.230-4. 
125 See also NL 14[21] 11.638: “Das Wichtigste ist aber: daß wir den Beherrscher und seine 
Unterthanen als gleicher Art verstehn, alle fühlend, wollend, denkend — und daß wir überall, 
wo wir Bewegung im Leibe sehen oder errathen, wir auch ein zugehöriges subjektives 
unsichtbares Leben hinzuschließen lernen.” 
126 See NL 34[123] 11.461: “Alle diese lebendigen Wesen müssen verwandter Art sein, sonst 
könnten sie nicht so einander dienen und gehorchen.” On this issue, see Patrick Wotling, 
“What Language do the Drives Speak?”, in João Constâncio and Maria João Mayer Branco 
(eds.), Nietzsche on Instinct and Language (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011), pp.80-116 (esp. 
pp.73ff.). See also Moore (2002), p.39, who claims that Michael Forster had an important 
influence on Nietzsche thoughts on this topic.  
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fühlt, wenn sich ihm etwas nähert, das ihm assimilirbar ist” (NL 34[247] 11.504). In 
this manner, he collapses the organic–inorganic distinction.127 On the one hand, 
Nietzsche seems to be attempting to make a deductive argument: given that atoms 
behave in a particular way (attracting and repelling other atoms), they must have 
perceptual awareness and be driven by an active endogenous willing.128 On the other 
hand, we might read him as trying to find the best Bilderrede or Sprechart for 
expressing the dynamic nature of reality. In either case, however, Nietzsche’s 
hypothesis is incompatible with mechanistic ontologies, which figure the external 
world as a collection of corpuscular bodies whose motion is merely the result of their 
reacting to an impact received from another corpuscular body. The corollary of 
Nietzsche’s thesis is that existence must be conceived as a conglomeration of 
organisations engaged in direct conflict with one another – i.e. insofar as each 
opposed organisation strives to incorporate its counterpart; hence: “Alles Geschehen, 
alle Bewegung, alles Werden als ein Feststellen von Grad- und Kraftverhältnissen, 
als ein Kampf…” (NL 9[91] 12.385; my italics).129 
Nietzsche further maintains that these organised entities must practice 
certain virtues (“Tugenden”) towards one another: “[I]m Verhältniß der Organe zu 
einander müssen schon alle Tugenden geübt werden — Gehorsam, Fleiß, Zu-
Hülfekommen, Wachsamkeit — es fehlt ganz der Maschinen-Charakter in allem 
Organischen (Selbst-Regulirung)” (NL 25[426] 11.124).130 Any organised body 
                                                      
127 See also NL 2[172] 12.153: “Das ‘Sein’ — wir haben keine andere Vorstellung davon als 
‘leben’. — Wie kann also etwas Todtes ‘sein’?” See also NL 36[21] 11.560. NL 25[356] 
11.106: “Aber der Gegensatz ‘organisch’ ‘unorganisch’ gehört ja in die Erscheinungswelt!” 
128 On the need for inorganic organisations to have some endogenous source of activity 
(rather than being merely reactively propelled), see NL 1[30] 12.17: “Frage, ob er nicht das 
mobile ebenfalls in der unorganischen Welt ist? Denn in der mechanistischen Welt-
Auslegung bedarf es immer noch eines mobile.” 
129 Harking back to Schopenhauer (and Nietzsche’s reading of Balfour Stewart in NL 9[2] 
8.183), Nietzsche also argues that this process takes place at the level of atoms, which he 
conceives as being in a state of struggle with one another: “Das Atom kämpft um seinen 
Bestand, aber andere Atome greifen es an, um ihre Kraft zu vermehren. Beide Prozesse: den 
der Auflösung und den der Verdichtung als Wirkungen des Willens zur Macht zu begreifen” 
(NL 43[2] 11.702). 
130 See also NL 37[4] 11.578, where Nietzsche speaks of “[d]ie prachtvolle 
Zusammenbindung des vielfachsten Lebens, die Anordnung und Einordnung der höheren 
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must, says Nietzsche, be governed by a kind of moral order that is completely 
incompatible with the vision of the body as a machine. Moreover, he argues that the 
simultaneity and reciprocity of the relations that define such organisation are 
incompatible with the cause and effect structure of mechanical explanation, which 
construes the world as a series of diachronic relations of the form A causes B; B 
causes C; etc.131 
Nietzsche’s analysis prompts us to ask the following epistemic question: 
How can we possibly know that, on the inside, things are all thinking, feeling, 
desiring? It is worth stating that in the published works, Nietzsche frames his 
argument in a slightly different manner. In JGB 22, he thus suggests that it is merely 
possible to posit the world as will to power, rather than as a realm of atomistic units 
of matter governed by natural law:  
[E]s könnte Jemand kommen, der, mit der entgegengesetzten Absicht 
und Interpretationskunst, aus der gleichen Natur und im Hinblick auf 
die gleichen Erscheinungen, gerade die tyrannisch-rücksichtenlose und 
unerbittliche Durchsetzung von Machtansprüchen herauszulesen 
verstünde. 
Here the will to power is offered as an explanatory model, equally able to account 
for phenomenal effects as the notion of natural law. The subtext of this aphorism is 
that Nietzsche deems the will to power thesis to be a better or stronger interpretation 
by virtue of the fact that it refuses an interpretation of nature that vindicates the 
movement towards degenerate democratic homogeneity – that is, it eschews the 
                                                      
und niederen Thätigkeiten, der tausendfältige Gehorsam welcher kein blinder, noch weniger 
ein mechanischer sondern ein wählender, kluger, rücksichtsvoller, selbst widerstrebender 
Gehorsam ist […].” Thus, he concludes, “[a]m Leitfaden des Leibes wie gesagt, lernen wir 
daß unser Leben durch ein Zusammenspiel vieler sehr ungleichwerthigen Intelligenzen und 
also nur durch ein beständiges tausendfältiges Gehorchen und Befehlen — moralisch 
geredet: durch die unausgesetzte Übung vieler Tugenden — möglich ist.” 
131 NL 34[124] 11.462: “Unser Causal-Gefühl ist etwas ganz Grobes und Vereinzeltes gegen 
die wirklichen Causal-Gefühle unseres Organismus. Namentlich ist das ‘Vorher’ und 
‘Nachher’ eine große Naivetät.” 
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judgement that there exists “‘[ü]berall Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz, — die Natur hat 
es darin nicht anders und nicht besser als wir’”.132  
Nietzsche similarly refrains from arguing for the objective truth of his vision 
of the world as will to power in JGB 36. Rather, he indicates that his account 
“ausreicht, um […] die sogenannte mechanistische […] Welt zu verstehen”. It is 
enough to comprehend (“verstehen”) the world.133 On this reading, we are justified 
in assenting to the hypothesis that the world is will to power on the grounds that it 
is both possible and practically desirable (as demonstrated by JGB 22)?134 
But given that every entity is hypothetically a will to power organisation, 
how does this relate to Zweckmäßigkeit? According to his model, a part exhibits a 
certain function with respect to the whole in which it is contained not because that 
part was originally designed to fit within that whole, but because it was perceived 
                                                      
132 This argument was already roughly outlined in §2.4.2.3., though it is worthwhile 
reiterating it here.  
133 In the same aphorism, Nietzsche also proposes the will to power thesis on the grounds of 
its explanatory simplicity. He speculates that in describing the world, we should, if possible, 
try to employ only one form of causality (according to the principle of parsimony). Since we 
know that we act by means of the commanding force of our (non-Schopenhauerian, synthetic) 
“will”, and “‘Wille’ kann natürlich nur auf ‘Wille’ wirken — und nicht auf ‘Stoffe’”, he 
contends that we are justified in extrapolating from this that all activity is the product of 
(synthetic) wills working upon (synthetic) wills. 
134 In this way, I reject interpretations of JGB 36 as ironic (i.e. the idea that Nietzsche does 
not actually hold the proposition that he is prima facie defending in this aphorism – namely, 
that the world is actually will to power). Maudmarie Clark and David Dudrick contend that, 
“[b]oth the rhetoric and the logic of BGE 36 indicate that Nietzsche does not accept the 
argument’s conclusion: he does not, that is, accept the claim that the world is will to power. 
This absolves Nietzsche of the implausible metaphysical view sometimes attributed to him 
on the basis of this passage […].” See Maudmarie Clark and David Dudrick, The Soul of 
Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.242. 
See also Paul Loeb, “Will to Power and Panpsychism”, in Manuel Dries & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), 
Nietzsche on Mind and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), ch.4. Indeed, in 
light of the extensive attempt to understand the world as will to power that we find in the 
notebooks at this time, it would be very odd for Nietzsche to invert this position in the 
published works. Indeed, the ironic reading only seems tenable if one neglects to read the 
preparatory work that informs these published aphorisms. For an argument (with which I 
broadly concur) against this reading, see Christopher Janaway, Beyond Selflessness: Reading 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.153-63. Janaway also 
gives an informative overview of the Anglophone debate over how the concept of the will to 
power should be interpreted. 
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by an organisation to be useful in some way, then overpowered and finally 
incorporated – i.e. shaped and augmented to fulfil that use – by the predominant 
power organisation: 
— Das Individuum selbst als Kampf der Theile (um Nahrung, Raum 
usw.): seine Entwicklung geknüpft an ein Siegen, Vorherrschen 
einzelner Theile, an ein Verkümmern, “Organwerden” anderer Theile 
[…] 
— daß die von Innen her gebildeten neuen Formen nicht auf einen 
Zweck hin geformt sind, aber daß im Kampf der Theile eine neue Form 
nicht lange ohne eine Beziehung zu einem partiellen Nutzen stehen 
wird, und dann dem Gebrauche nach sich immer vollkommener 
ausgestaltet[.] (NL 7[25] 12.304) 
In this way, the ascendant power and the subjugated organ form into a new relation 
of ends and means: “sobald die Übermacht über eine geringere Macht erreicht ist 
und letztere als Funktion der größeren arbeitet, eine Ordnung des Rangs, der 
Organisation den Anschein einer Ordnung von Mittel und Zweck erwecken muß” 
(NL 9[91] 12.386).135 So whereas for Roux it was indirect struggle over Raum and 
Nahrung, and the effect of the functional Reiz, which together formed the mainspring 
driving organisational development, for Nietzsche it is the direct struggle for 
command that performs this function (NL 26[272] 11.221).  
This should be sufficient to show that Nietzsche repudiates the 
mechanistic view of the organism in favour of an understanding of any 
functionally organised entity as constituted through the active struggle for 
command among its parts. We have seen him put forward various arguments 
for this rejection. Thus, he argues that it is the only means of explaining the 
relational activity of entities (which in some sense entails perception and 
                                                      
135 The preceding part of NL 9[91] 12.386, which is also pertinent, reads: “[…] [D]ie 
anscheinende ‘Zweckmäßigkeit’ (‘die aller menschlichen Kunst unendlich überlegene 
Zweckmäßigkeit’) bloß die Folge jenes in allem Geschehen <sich> abspielenden Willens zur 
Macht ist daß das Stärkerwerden Ordnungen mit sich bringt, die einem Zweckmäßigkeits-
Entwurfe ähnlich sehen.” 
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endogenous striving), and that it is pragmatically preferable while being just 
as epistemically possible as the mechanistic worldview.  
But what kind of exploitative command defines a healthy organisation 
in Nietzsche’s eyes? In the first place, he does not view this as a monarchic 
organisation centralised around a single ruling centre. Indeed, he asks whether it is 
more likely “[e]ine Art Aristokratie von ‘Zellen’, in denen die Herrschaft ruht? 
Gewiß von pares, welche mit einander an’s Regieren gewöhnt sind und zu befehlen 
verstehen?”136 In order to see just how Nietzsche envisions this aristocratic order, it 
is worth making a close reading of NL 40[21] 11.638-9, where he describes the 
human subject in a manner that sheds light on his general conception of functional 
unity: 
Wir gewinnen die richtige Vorstellung von der Art unsrer Subjekt-
Einheit, nämlich als Regenten an der Spitze eines Gemeinwesens, nicht 
als “Seelen” oder “Lebenskräfte”, insgleichen von der Abhängigkeit 
dieser Regenten von den Regierten und den Bedingungen der 
Rangordnung und Arbeitstheilung als Ermöglichung zugleich der 
Einzelnen und des Ganzen. Ebenso wie fortwährend die lebendigen 
Einheiten entstehen und sterben und wie zum “Subjekt” nicht Ewigkeit 
gehört; ebenso daß der Kampf auch in Gehorchen und Befehlen sich 
ausdrückt und ein fließendes Machtgrenzen-bestimmen zum Leben 
gehört. Die gewisse Unwissenheit, in der der Regent gehalten wird über 
die einzelnen Verrichtungen und selbst Störungen des Gemeinwesens, 
gehört mit zu den Bedingungen, unter denen regirt werden kann. Kurz, 
wir gewinnen eine Schätzung auch für das Nichtwissen, das Im-
Großen-und-Groben-Sehen, das Vereinfachen und Fälschen, das 
Perspectivische. 
There are three key points that should be foregrounded in this note insofar as they 
tell us what kind of aristocracy characterises functional organisations. The first is 
that Nietzsche does not envision this hierarchy as analogous to rigid hereditary 
nobility, but rather as a flexible oligarchy, which is never kept wholly isolated from 
                                                      
136 See also NL 40 [38] 11.647, where Nietzsche states that the affects “sind eine Vielheit, 
hinter der es nicht nöthig ist eine Einheit anzusetzen: es genügt sie als eine Regentschaft zu 
fassen.” 
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subordinate groups, and whose membership is always shifting. Since rule within the 
organism is always fluctuating between different drives or organs, these living 
unities are defined by “ein fließendes Machtgrenzen-bestimmen”. As he also states, 
“[d]iese Wesen sind isolirt gar nicht vorhanden: das centrale Schwergewicht ist 
etwas Wandlbares […]” (NL 34[123] 11.462).137 Moreover, if we look elsewhere, 
we can see that Nietzsche views these units or parts as being just as fluid and 
changeable as the whole: “[J]ene kleinsten lebendigen Wesen, welche unseren Leib 
constituiren […] gelten uns nicht als Seelen-Atome, vielmehr als etwas Wachsendes, 
Kämpfendes, Sich-Vermehrendes und Wieder-Absterbendes” (NL 37[4] 11.577). 
Every commanding unit is itself therefore a fluid power organisation.138 We are left 
with a world that is will to power all the way down, so to speak: “Bis in seine 
kleinsten Fragmente hinein hat er den Willen, sich zu verdichten. […] Weltkörper 
und Atome nur größenverschieden, aber gleiche Gesetze” (NL 43[2] 11.702). There 
is therefore no ultimate stable reality to the commanding unit(s) of any organisation. 
Moreover, since the locus of power is relatively flexible, we can assume that 
Nietzsche affirms the idea that previously subordinate units may climb to participate 
in executive command, or, vice versa, formerly commanding units may 
correspondingly suffer demotion. 
It is thus the units that contingently happen to be commanding an 
organisation at a given time that impose a function on the subordinate parts and 
                                                      
137 See also NL 9[98] 12.391: “Keine Subjekt- ‘Atome’. Die Sphäre eines Subjektes 
beständig wachsend oder sich vermindernd — der Mittelpunkt des Systems sich beständig 
verschiebend […].” 
138 Nietzsche draws on Boscovich’s critique of atomism to make this argument. Boscovich’s 
alternative to atomism was to posit extensionless “centres of force” that either repel or attract 
other centres of force. Nietzsche combines this idea with the observations in cellular biology 
made by Wilhelm Rolph, according to which cells can divide and unite: “Bei gewisser 
Stärkeverschiedenheit wird aus zwei Atomen Eins, und aus zwei Individuen Eins. Ebenso 
umgekehrt aus Eins werden zwei […]. Also gegen den absoluten Begriff ‘Atom’” (NL 43[2] 
11.701). As Gregory Moore (2002) has noted, Nietzsche “elevates Rolph’s discussion of 
reproduction in primitive organisms to the level of a universally valid principle describing 
the behaviour of entities in the inorganic as well as the organic world” (p.49). On Nietzsche’s 
use of Boscovich, See Peter Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), pp.46ff.  
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create an order of means and ends. However, the second point of note, is that these 
commanding units rule in partial ignorance (“[d]ie gewisse Unwissenheit, in der der 
Regent gehalten wird”). Therefore, no commanding unit could intentionally organise 
the whole because they could not possibly know (or “feel”) the whole. There is 
simply too much information to process – an infinitude of actions and relations.139 
Nietzsche uses this argument to reject the Kantian position that we must assume that 
the Zweckmäßikeit of the body is the result of any kind of “zweckbewußter 
Wesen”.140 
The third point of interest is that Nietzsche does not limit conflict to the 
separate orders of the organisation in question, as was the case with Roux, or indeed, 
Nietzsche’s conception of agonal struggle. For Nietzsche, this species of struggle is 
primarily figured as one occurring between the various orders. Moreover, we now 
see that subalterns continue to struggle upwards in resisting their commanders (“der 
Kampf auch in Gehorchen und Befehlen sich ausdrückt”).141 The process by which 
                                                      
139 This particularly applies to human consciousness: “Wie ein Feldherr von vielen Dingen 
nichts erfahren will und erfahren darf, um nicht die Gesamt-Überschau zu verlieren: so muß 
es auch in unserem bewußten Geiste vor Allem einen ausschließenden wegscheuchenden 
Trieb geben, einen auslesenden, welcher nur gewisse facta sich vorführen läßt” (NL 34[131] 
11.464). 
140 See also NL 26[60] 11.164: “Daß etwas zweckmäßig vor sich geht z.B. der Prozeß des 
Verdauens, das wird durch die Annahme eines hundertfältig verfeinerten 
Erkenntnißapparates nach Art des bewußten Intellekts noch keineswegs erklärt: er könnte 
der Aufgabe, die thatsächlich geleistet wird, nicht angemessen gedacht werden können, weil 
viel zu feine Verhältnisse (in Zahlen) in Betracht kämen. Der zweite Intellekt würde immer 
noch das Räthsel ungelöst lassen.” Compare NL 24[16] 10.654, where Nietzsche suggests 
that there is an unconscious intellect ordering the body: “[N]ehmen wir wahr, daß eine 
Zweckmäßigkeit im Kleinsten Geschehn herrscht, der unser bestes Wissen nicht gewachsen 
ist, eine Vorsorglichkeit, eine Auswahl, ein Zusammenbringen, Wieder-Gut-Machen usw. 
Kurz, wir finden eine Thätigkeit vor, die einem ungeheuer viel höheren und überschauenden 
Intellekte zuzuschreiben wäre als der uns bewußte ist. Wir lernen von allem Bewußten 
geringer denken: wir verlernen uns für unser Selbst verantwortlich zu machen, da wir als 
bewußte, zwecksetzende Wesen nur der kleinste Theil davon sind.” See also NL 14[144] 
13.328: “Wir werden uns hüten, die Zweckmäßigkeit durch den Geist zu erklären: es fehlt 
jeder Grund, dem Geiste die Eigenthümlichkeit zu organisiren und zu systematisiren 
zuzuschreiben.” 
141 Regarding this point, see Tongeren (1989), pp.184-5. 
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these relations are established (festgestellt) – a kind of Selbst-Regulierung that 
controls growth – is described by Nietzsche as 
[…] ein Kampf, vorausgesetzt, daß man dies Wort so weit und tief 
versteht, um auch das Verhältniß des Herrschenden zum Beherrschten 
noch als ein Ringen, und das Verhältniß des Gehorchenden zum 
Herrschenden noch als ein Widerstreben zu verstehen.  
(NL 40[55] 11.655)142 
As will become more apparent as we progress through this chapter, subordinate 
entities are able to successfully resist their superordinates since, as in Roux, the 
higher orders depend upon the lower for their existence (Nietzsche speaks “von der 
Abhängigkeit dieser Regenten von den Regierten”). The dominant parties must 
therefore limit their exploitative practices and even actively care for the existence of 
their functionaries – i.e. satisfy or obey their demands. Thus, within these hierarchies 
(“Rangordnungen”), “der Befehlende den Gehorchenden alles schaffen muß, was zu 
ihrer Erhaltung dient, somit selber durch deren Existenz bedingt ist” (NL 34[123] 
11.461).143 As Heidegger (recalling Hegel’s master–slave dialectic) puts it, “sofern 
der Diener als ein solcher dem Herrn sich unentbehrlich macht und den Herrn so an 
sich zwingt und auf sich (den Knecht) anweist, herrscht der Knecht über den 
Herrn”.144 In this way, then, the moral order of virtues that underpins a healthy power 
organisation is not unidirectional. The ideal commanders do not amorally stand 
                                                      
142  See also NL 26[276] 11.222: “Herrschen ist das Gegengewicht der schwächeren Kraft 
ertragen, also eine Art Fortsetzung des Kampfs. Gehorchen ebenso ein Kampf: so viel Kraft 
eben zum Widerstehen bleibt.” See also NL 36[22] 11.561: “In wie fern auch im Gehorchen 
ein Widerstreben liegt; es ist die Eigenmacht durchaus nicht aufgegeben. Ebenso ist im 
Befehlen ein Zugestehen, daß die absolute Macht des Gegners nicht besiegt ist, nicht 
einverleibt, aufgelöst. ‘Gehorchen’ wie ‘Befehlen’ sind Formen des Kampfspiels.” 
143 Indeed, Nietzsche highlights the non-destructive nature of this process by which “sich ein 
schwächeres Subjekt, ohne es zu vernichten, zu seinem Funktionär umbilden und bis zu 
einem gewissen Grad mit ihm zusammen eine neue Einheit bilden” (NL 9[98] 12.392; my 
italics). Compare, however, NL 9[151] 12.424, where Nietzsche also states that incorporation 
proceeds until “endlich das Überwältigte ganz in die Macht des Angreifers übergegangen ist 
u<nd> denselben vermehrt hat.” However, this note, which suggests that incorporation is an 
unmeasured process, represents an exception to the rule with respect to the later Nietzsche’s 
conception of incorporation. 
144 See Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 2 vols (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), vol.2, p.265. 
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above the order of virtues that supports the organisation, determining it from above, 
but must themselves practice certain Tugenden towards those whom they command. 
It is this reciprocal process of overcoming – of command and obedience – that 
Nietzsche refers to as the “Kampfspiel” that is the organism (NL 36[22] 11.561):  
Alle Einheit ist nur als Organisation und Zusammenspiel Einheit: nicht 
anders als wie ein menschliches Gemeinwesen eine Einheit ist: also 
Gegensatz der atomistischen Anarchie; somit ein Herrschafts-Gebilde, 
das Eins bedeutet, aber nicht eins ist. (NL 2[87] 12.104) 
The ramification of these postulations is that the way in which a power 
organisation expresses itself is a function of its relation to those parts of 
“itself” or alterity, which it is trying to command. It has no essence to speak 
of, and can only manifest itself in its reciprocal relations with other living 
unities.145 In this way, “die anscheinende ‘Zweckmäßigkeit’”, which all (and not 
just organic) purposive organisations exhibit, is “bloß die Folge jenes in allem 
Geschehen <sich> abspielenden Willens zur Macht” (NL 9[91] 12.386).   
So though Nietzsche does away with Roux’s mechanistic interpretation of 
the organism in favour of positing active command as the basis of inner 
Zweckmäßigkeit, he retains the idea contained in Roux’s notion of direct struggle 
that assimilation is a measured process, which tends to establish relations of 
interdependence. In this way, we will see that Nietzsche’s vision of nature is at odds 
with the radical aristocratic readings of his work insofar as it does not unequivocally 
identify healthy command with the amoral and destructive exploitation of weaker 
subordinate parties. Notwithstanding, as we shall now see, this does not mean that 
Nietzsche does not see unmeasured conflict as a vital life process. 
                                                      
145 We therefore certainly cannot assent to Müller-Lauter’s (1999) claim (on the basis of this 
note) that Nietzsche felt himself “moved to accept fundamentally determinative 
commanders” at the head of the body (p.179). Indeed, Nietzsche also uses this critique of 
organismic command to further undermine the idea of a Selbsterhaltungstrieb, namely by 
rejecting the idea that there is any fixed thing, or “essence” (“Wesen”), that is trying to 
preserve itself: “sich nicht ein Wesen, sondern der Kampf selber erhalten will, wachsen will 
und sich bewußt sein will” (NL 1[124] 12.40); quoted in Tongeren (1989), p.184. 
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4.3.4. EXCLUSION AND EXCRETION 
Despite discarding much of Roux’s account, Nietzsche nonetheless retains Roux’s 
conviction that the struggle for incorporation is conditioned by unmeasured conflict, 
which likewise constitutes an essential life-process. Nietzsche views the two 
fundamental activities that define the struggle for organisation (i.e. the activity of 
will to power) as shared by the organic and inorganic alike: “Der Trieb, sich 
anzunähern — und der Trieb, etwas zurückzustoßen, sind in der unorganischen wie 
organischen Welt das Band. Die ganze Scheidung ist ein Vorurtheil” (NL 36[21] 
11.560). But this process of Zurückstoßen takes a number of forms. On the one hand, 
echoing Rolph, Nietzsche thinks that the weaker are always seeking to conjugate 
with the stronger and must accordingly be repelled by the latter.146 Exclusionary 
activity is also central to his account of the will to power as interpretation. Nietzsche 
claims that in order to exploit that which has been overpowered, a will to power 
organisation has to be able to “reinterpret” the overpowered organisation into an 
organ, to impose a new meaning and function on it and fit it into a new command 
structure: “Der Wille zur Macht interpretirt: bei der Bildung eines Organs handelt es 
sich um eine Interpretation; er grenzt ab, bestimmt Grade, Machtverschiedenheiten” 
(NL 2[145] 12.139).147 However, this process demands the occlusion of those things 
that are perceived to be harmful or useless to the dominant power organisation, what 
Nietzsche also refers to as the darkening (Verdunkeln), thinking away (Wegdenken) 
                                                      
146 See NL 36[21] 11.560: “Das Schwächere drängt sich zum Stärkeren, aus Nahrungsnoth; 
es will unterschlüpfen, mit ihm womöglich Eins werden. Der Stärkere wehrt umgekehrt ab 
von sich, er will nicht in dieser Weise zu Grunde gehen; vielmehr, im Wachsen, spaltet er 
sich zu Zweien und Mehreren. […] [J]e mehr der Drang nach Varietät, Differenz, 
innerlichem Zerfall, um so mehr Kraft ist da.” 
147 Thus, Nietzsche states the following in NL 2[145] 12.140: “In Wahrheit ist Interpretation 
ein Mittel selbst, um Herr über etwas zu werden”. See also GM II 12 5.314: “Aber alle 
Zwecke, alle Nützlichkeiten sind nur Anzeichen davon, dass ein Wille zur Macht über etwas 
weniger Mächtiges Herr geworden ist und ihm von sich aus den Sinn einer Funktion 
aufgeprägt hat; und die ganze Geschichte eines “Dings”, eines Organs, eines Brauchs kann 
dergestalt eine fortgesetzte Zeichen-Kette von immer neuen Interpretationen und 
Zurechtmachungen sein.” 
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or even extinguishing (Auslöschen) of previous interpretations that were imposed on 
the power-organisation that is to be assimilated.148 Thus, referring to the organic – 
though he also claims this describes “die ganze Geschichte eines ‘Dings’” – he states 
[…] dass alles Geschehen in der organischen Welt ein Überwältigen, 
Herrwerden und dass wiederum alles Überwältigen und Herrwerden 
ein Neu-Interpretieren, ein Zurechtmachen ist, bei dem der bisherige 
“Sinn” und “Zweck” nothwendig verdunkelt oder ganz ausgelöscht 
werden muss (GM II 12 5.313-4). 
With this dynamic in mind, we can also further elucidate the logic of 
“Selbstüberwindung”. As any power organisation grows and has to reorder its own 
internal hierarchy, it concurrently has to break apart its own self-interpretation. As 
part of this reshuffle, the organisation must also undertake a process of 
Ausscheidung, excluding the functions that, though previously serviceable, now fail 
to fit within the new ordering: 
Daß die Organe sich überall herausgebildet haben, was die 
morphologische Entwicklung zeigt, darf als Gleichniß gewiß auch für 
das Geistige benutzt werden: so daß etwas “Neues” immer nur durch 
Ausscheidung einer einzelnen Kraft aus einer synthetischen Kraft zu 
fassen ist. (NL 40[38] 11.647; my italics) 
According to Nietzsche then, the process of development – of growing, commanding 
new organs and forces, of producing new synthetic forces – is inextricable from the 
unagonistic activity of excluding parts of this synthesis that have become redundant 
or even counter-productive.149 This is why “das Leben” tells Zarathustra that it is 
                                                      
148 See also NL 5[99] 12.226-7: “— der Wille, der alles das unterstreicht (und das Übrige 
eliminirt), was ihm an einem Objekte dazu dient, mit sich selbst zufrieden u<nd> harmonisch 
zu sein […][.] [D]as Wegdenken aller schädigenden und feindseligen Faktoren im 
Angeschauten […]” (my italics). 
149 See also NL 7[9] 12.297:  “— die größere Complicirtheit, die scharfe Abscheidung, das 
Nebeneinander der ausgebildeten Organe und Funktionen, mit Verschwinden der 
Mittelglieder — wenn das Vollkommenheit ist, so ergiebt sich ein Wille zur Macht im 
organischen Prozeß, vermöge dessen herrschaftliche gestaltende befehlende Kräfte immer 
das Gebiet ihrer Macht mehren und innerhalb desselben immer wieder vereinfachen […]” 
(my italics). NL 34[194] 11.486: “‘Entwicklung’ in jedem Sinne ist immer auch ein Verlust, 
eine Schädigung; selbst die Spezialisirung jedes Organs.” Compare also NL 7[9] 12.296: 
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“das, was sich immer selber überwinden muss”: “was ich auch schaffe und wie ich’s 
auch liebe, — bald muss ich Gegner ihm sein und meiner Liebe” (Z II Selbst-
Ueberwindung 4.148). A condition of possibility of an organisation’s growth and 
transformation is that it breaks out of its outmoded hierarchical organisation. This is 
Nietzsche’s own cosmological conception of creative-destruction – or what he also 
dubs his “Dionysian” view of reality.150  
This should make clear the various reasons why Nietzsche views 
unmeasured struggle as indissociable from healthy organisation. Indeed, his 
commitment to the idea that will to power can only manifest itself against resistances 
does not entail that it cannot reject, exclude or even destroy a particular entity or 
interpretation presenting itself as a resistance. It merely means that resistance cannot 
be eschewed completely. This affirmation of exclusion and excretion starkly 
contravenes any reading of the will to power as a wholly non-destructive process of 
agonistic struggle or sublimation. 
With this affirmation of unmeasured conflict posited as a necessary 
condition of forming strong organisations, we can see that, coming through Roux, 
Nietzsche has in fact reprised the majority of the key features of his earlier, 
Schopenhauerian conception of the kind of conflict that underpins vitality. We can 
therefore state that Nietzsche’s later conception of organisational struggle fulfils the 
first four criteria of Schopenhauer’s assimilative struggle: 
 
1. Within it, opposed relata (will to power organisations) are aimed at 
subjugating their counterparts into a functional hierarchy; 
                                                      
“Die Individuation, vom Standpunkte der Abstammungstheorie beurtheilt, zeigt das 
beständige Zerfallen von Eins in Zwei, und das ebenso beständige Vergehen der Individuen 
auf den Gewinn von wenig Individuen, die die Entwicklung fortsetzen: die übergroße Masse 
stirbt jedes Mal ab (‘der Leib’) Das Grundphänomen: unzählige Individuen geopfert um 
weniger willen, als deren Ermöglichung. — Man muß sich nicht täuschen lassen: ganz so 
steht es mit den Völkern und Rassen: sie bilden den ‘Leib’ zur Erzeugung von einzelnen 
werthvollen Individuen, die den großen Prozeß fortsetzen.” 
150 See FW 371; see also EH GT 3 and 4 (6.312-5). We find an interesting precursor of this 
in VM 323. 
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2. Its telos is instrumental hierarchy (which for Nietzsche is synonymous 
with power expansion), and this is associated with health; 
3. It is inextricably connected to unmeasured conflict (the exclusion of 
that which cannot be incorporated); 
4. It continues within instrumental hierarchies even once these have 
been established. 
What we have crucially found, however, is that it is no longer the case that 
this struggle is driven by a species of metaphysically substantial entity (5). 
Every actively striving will to power, which drives a given organising process 
in its struggle for power, is inherently immanent to reality, there is nothing 
beyond or behind the plurality of wills to power that compose the world in 
which we live. We should now turn to how Nietzsche suggests we implement 
this conception of organisation as a means to overcoming the collective and 
personal maladies of depression and anarchy. 
4.4. INDIVIDUAL ORGANISATION 
In these final two sections, I will now explore how Nietzsche thinks this description 
translates into a practical ethic. We should begin by asking how he deploys the above 
model in trying to combat disgregation at an individual level. Since social existence 
supervenes on that of individuals, this analysis will give us the basis we need to 
move up to the ontological level of the collective in the final section. As we saw in 
Section 1, the malady affecting humans was one that was traced back to a 
disgregation of Triebe and Wertschätzungen. In this section, beginning with drives, 
and then moving on to his account of values, I will give a reconstruction of how 
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Nietzsche describes these in terms of will to power, and how he thinks we can go 
about actively organising them. My chief objective is to show that, consonant with 
his account of the world as will to power, Nietzsche valorises organisational 
conflict, which combines a measured struggle to exploit some drives and values, 
with an unmeasured struggle to exclude, eradicate or repress others.  
Despite Nietzsche’s emphasis on the analogy between different ontological 
levels of power organisations, commentators have generally found it much easier to 
accept that Nietzsche promotes exploitation at the level of the self than at the socio-
political level. However, they nonetheless almost invariably argue that Nietzsche 
promotes a non-destructive or measured form of struggle with respect to our 
discordant behavioural tendencies. The critic who initiated this line of interpretation 
was undoubtedly Walter Kaufmann. Based on his reading of Z II Selbst-
Ueberwindung, Kaufmann claims that, according to Nietzsche’s conception of the 
world as will to power, “all that exists strives to transcend itself – and is thus engaged 
in a fight against itself. The acorn strives to become an oak tree, though this involves 
its ceasing to be an acorn and, to that extent, self-overcoming”.151 At the specifically 
human level, however, it is through the exercise of rationality that man achieves self-
mastery and enacts the process of self-overcoming, since rationality allows him “to 
develop foresight and to give consideration to all the impulses, to organize their 
chaos, to integrate them into a harmony – and thus to give man power: power over 
himself and over nature.” But pivotally, for Kaufmann, this process of overcoming 
caprice (enslavement to our impulses) is a non-destructive process:  
We would do this now, and another thing the next moment—and even 
a great number of things at the same time. We think one way and live 
another; we want one thing and do another. No man can live without 
bringing some order into this chaos. This may be done by thoroughly 
weakening the whole organism or by repudiating and repressing many 
of the impulses: but the result in that case is not a “harmony,” and the 
physis is castrated, not “improved.” Yet there is another way—namely, 
                                                      
151 Kaufmann (1974), p.242. See pp.206f. and p.248 for Kaufmann’s reading of Z II Selbst-
Ueberwindung. 
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to “organize the chaos”: sublimation allows for the achievement of an 
organic harmony […].152 
Reason enables man to conceive of ways in which his brutal impulses can be put to 
new more advantageous ends instead of being repressed. This is what Kaufmann 
calls Nietzsche’s theory of sublimation. Kaufmann implies that it was by this means 
that “a sexual impulse, for example, could be channelled into a creative spiritual 
activity, instead of being fulfilled directly”, or “the barbarian's desire to torture his 
foe [could] be sublimated into the desire to defeat one’s rival, say, in the Olympic 
contests”.153 To support his non-destructive reading, Kaufmann refers us to texts 
from GD (particularly GD Moral 1-4 6.82-5), where Nietzsche criticises Christianity 
for trying to extirpate, rather than exploit, the affects. In addition, he also explicitly 
cites NL 1[122] 12.39:  
Überwindung der Affekte? Nein, wenn es Schwächung und 
Vernichtung derselben bedeuten soll. Sondern in Dienst nehmen: wozu 
gehören mag, sie lange zu tyrannisiren (nicht erst als Einzelne, sondern 
als Gemeinde, Rasse usw.) Endlich giebt man ihnen immer 
vertrauensvoller Freiheit wieder: sie lieben uns wie gute Diener und 
gehen freiwillig dorthin, wo unser Bestes hin will. 
To be sure, texts such as this would appear to vindicate Kaufmann’s reading of 
Nietzsche as suggesting that “the impulses should be ‘overcome’: not by extirpation, 
but by sublimation.”154 Indeed, Ken Gemes has also drawn on the same text to argue 
that Nietzsche’s ideal is a non-destructive process of sublimation, according to 
which, “weaker drives are not suppressed or shackled. Rather, they are to be 
harnessed to allow their expression in service to a higher aim.”155  
Yet this model of human overcoming does not sit well with our exposition 
of the exclusionary character of the will to power. Of course, Kaufmann does accept 
                                                      
152 Kaufmann (1974), p.227. 
153 Ibid, p.220. 
154 Kaufmann (1974), p.226. 
155 See Gemes (2009), pp.47f. See also Günter Haberkamp, Triebgeschehen und Wille zur 
Macht: Nietzsche – zwischen Philosophie und Psychologie (Würzburg: Königshausen und 
Neumann, 2000), pp.114-30. 
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that there is a destructive dimension to this dynamic, namely, insofar as the 
impulse’s “essential objective is preserved no less than is the energy, while the 
immediate objective is cancelled”.156 The essential objective of every impulse, 
according to Kaufmann, is power. However, the idea that it is only the ideational 
content of an impulse that is negated is at odds with our exposition of Nietzsche’s 
notion of the will to power, by which the formation of a new synthesis can only be 
achieved “durch Ausscheidung einer einzelnen Kraft”. If our drives and affects are 
open to a “Reduction […] auf den Willen zur Macht”, and psychology is understood 
merely as a “Morphologie und Entwicklungslehre des Willens zur Macht”, then 
surely we would expect an unmeasured struggle to exclude certain drives or impulses 
– that is, the forces (Kräfte) themselves, rather than their mere ideational content. Is 
Nietzsche’s view of human psychology simply inconsistent with his vision of the 
world as will to power? Or can we make these texts cohere? Let us begin by making 
a detailed study of how Nietzsche conceives of the subject and their impulses as will 
to power organisations. 
4.4.1. THE SELF AS WILLS TO POWER 
In the introduction to this chapter, we established that Nietzsche thinks that our 
impulses should ideally be organised hierarchically. But before establishing how this 
is achieved, we should first inquire into what impulses actually are for Nietzsche. 
Although he usually refers to the impulses, or spiritual forces that constitute the self, 
as Triebe or “drives”, he uses a panoply of different terms in close conjunction, or 
                                                      
156 Kaufmann (1974), p.236. 
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interchangeably with Trieb – for example, Affekt,157 Gefühl,158 Instinkt,159 
Begierde,160 and Hang.161 Deciphering what Nietzsche means by Trieb has thus 
come to represent a thorny philosophical problem, over which there has been much 
interpretive dispute. Peter Poellner, for instance, has argued that Nietzsche’s drives 
are akin to homunculi with much the same kind of agency and even consciousness 
as our higher self.162 Against this, Paul Katsafanas has argued that we can describe 
a drive as merely that which generates a particular “evaluative orientation” within 
our mind, and that we can therefore account for them “without treating drives as 
homunculi”.163 John Richardson, taking an evolutionary biological tack, has then 
presented the case for interpreting drives as genetically ingrained behavioural 
dispositions.164 Finally, Tom Stern has even urged that the lack of consistency in 
                                                      
157 In JGB 117, Nietzsche refers to affects in a way that gives them a will, thereby rendering 
them remarkably similar to Triebe (though he does often distinguish between Trieb and 
Affekt). See also NL 7[76] 10.268: “Die Thiere folgen ihren Trieben und Affekten: wir sind 
Thiere.” NL 4[142] 10.155: “[A]lle Affekte und Triebe sind durch unsere Werthschätzungen 
gefärbt”. NL 9[173] 10.155: “In Anbetracht, daß Affekte und Grundtriebe bei jeder Rasse 
und bei jedem Stande etwas von ihren Existenzbedingungen ausdrücken”. 
158 See e.g. NL 25[413] 11.120: “Der ganze innere Widerstreit der Gefühle, das Bewußtsein 
der übermächtigen Triebe”. 
159 See e.g. NL 14[92] 13.270, where Nietzsche speaks almost synonymously of the “[d]ie 
Wildheit und Anarchie der Instinkte” and “die Wildheit der Triebe”. See Assoun (2003) 
(pp.54-8) on the connection of drive and instinct in the early works. 
160 See e.g. NL 17[81] 10.564: “Die Triebe, deren Wirken am stärksten selbstsüchtig genannt 
wird, sind es am wenigsten, z.B. die Begierden des Essens Geschlechtes und Reichthums. 
Hier ist an Ein Selbst noch nicht gedacht, sondern nur an die Erhaltung eines Exemplars 
‘Mensch’.” 
161 NL 25[460] 11.135. See also FW 294. 
162 See Poellner (1995). Poellner claims that, “when it comes to specifying the actual mode 
of operation or agency of these drives, which [Nietzsche] in fact seems to conceive as 
ultimate agents, Nietzsche invariably uses intentional-mentalistic terms” (p.215). 
Nonetheless, Poellner does also take stock of Nietzsche’s attempt to describe the drives in 
non-conscious, non-mentalistic terms. Likewise, as Katsafanas has noted, this reading can 
be found in Clarke and Dudrick (2009) (pp.264-5).  
163 Paul Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology”, in Ken Gemes and John 
Richardson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), pp.727-55 (p.745). 
164 See John Richardson, Nietzsche’s System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.38. 
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Nietzsche’s usage renders the concept totally devoid of any determinate meaning 
whatsoever.165 
In contrast to Stern’s defeatism, or Richardson’s and Katsafanas’ excessive 
specificity, I would suggest that drives should be quite loosely conceived as the 
power wills of which our self is composed, and which express themselves as 
impulses towards particular patterns of behaviour. They do not have a precise 
definition beyond this, and are more of a heuristic device (i.e. a Bilderrede) for 
talking about the murky conglomerate of “organs” that constitutes the self.166 These 
forms of behaviour then support the conditions of existence (i.e. of power 
augmentation) of a particular form of life: “Alle menschlichen Triebe, wie alle 
thierischen sind unter gewissen Umständen als Existenz-Bedingungen ausgebildet” 
(NL 25[460] 11.135).167 However, it is important to remark that the unit whose 
existence is furthered by those compulsions is not necessarily that of the individual 
– it could also be that of the community, or one’s family (even at the expense of the 
individual agent).168 Nietzsche does nonetheless seem to distinguish between 
subjective forces that are engrained in a deeper fashion and those that are only 
superficially rooted in the individual. John Richardson, for example, has argued that 
the driving forces of human behaviour should be parsed into two separate groups: 
“drives”, which are biologically selected, and therefore biologically encoded; and 
habits, customs and practices, which are tendencies that can be acquired culturally, 
and which Nietzsche treats “as less securely or solidly or deeply settled in this way 
                                                      
165 Tom Stern, “Against Nietzsche’s ‘Theory’ of the Drives”, Journal of the American 
Philosophical Association, 1 (2015), 121-140. Stern argues that “Nietzsche did not in fact 
have anything like a coherent account of ‘the drives’, according to which the self, the 
relationship between thought and action, or consciousness could be explained […] [or] on 
which his positive ethics could rest” (p.121). 
166 Indeed, in NL 7[198] 10.304, Nietzsche writes that “Triebe sind höhere Organe …” 
167 See also NL 26[72] 11.167: ‘Jeder Trieb ist angezüchtet worden als zeitweilige Existenz-
Bedingung.” NL 27[29] 11.283: “Je nach der Umgebung und den Bedingungen unseres 
Lebens tritt ein Trieb als der höchstgeschätzte und herrschendste hervor”. 
168 See NL 26[72] 11.167: “Es giebt ein Gutes, das die Erhaltung des Einzelnen; ein Gutes, 
das die Erhaltung seiner Familie oder seiner Gemeinde oder seines Stammes zum Maaße hat 
— es kann ein Widerstreit im Individuum entstehen, zwei Triebe.”  
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than our animal inheritance; they can go as quickly as they came.”169 However, as 
we have seen from the proximity of Hang and Trieb, there is not such a clear-cut 
line between culturally acquired inclinations and Nietzsche’s conception of drives – 
in fact, Nietzsche suggests that there exists a relation of continuity between the two 
insofar as culturally acquired habits can become drives as they grow increasingly 
inveterate: “Zuerst Zwang, dann Gewöhnung, dann Bedürfniß, dann natürlicher 
Hang (Trieb)” (NL 25[460] 11.135).  
He thus appears to use the term Trieb to signify an impulse with a certain 
degree of embeddedness.170 Richardson has tried to argue that Nietzsche is a 
Lamarckian through a literal reading of Nietzsche’s statement that we inherit cultural 
mores in our blood (i.e. they are “in’s Blut vererbt” [JGB 208]). There is 
unfortunately not space for a full interrogation of this issue; however, it is well worth 
pointing out that in UB, the process of “taking into the blood” was merely a metaphor 
for cultural incorporation (“alles Vergangene, eigenes und fremdestes, würde sie an 
sich heran, in sich hineinziehen und gleichsam zu Blut umschaffen” [UB II 1 
1.251]).171 Accordingly, I would submit that Nietzsche merely distinguishes between 
deeply ingrained behavioural tendencies, which may be deeply culturally or 
biologically entrenched, and those that are more superficial or malleable, which are 
more directly associated with culturally instilled habits. 
Since drives are described as will to power organisations (“Unterwillen”), 
we can anticipate that Nietzsche would ascribe some form of independent perceptual 
and affective awareness to them (i.e. a “Denken, Fühlen, Wollen”). And indeed, as 
Poellner has pointed out, Nietzsche speaks of our drives as “feeling”, “choosing, 
                                                      
169 See Richardson (2004), p.35 and pp.81-2. 
170 See also NL 25[408] 11.118: “Ehrfurcht vor den Instinkten, Trieben, Begierden, kurz 
alledem, dessen Grund man nicht völlig durchschaut! Es sind Kräfte da, welche stärker sind 
als alles, was formulirt werden kann am Menschen. Aber ebenso Furcht und Mißtrauen gegen 
dies Alles, weil es das Erbe sehr verschiedenwerthiger Zeiten und Menschen ist, das wir da 
in uns herumschleppen!” 
171 See Richardson (2004), p.79, where on the basis of JGB 208 (and JGB 261 and 264), he 
claims that “[v]alues and drives […][are] carried in the ‘blood’ of organisms […] and 
transmitted in that blood to genetic descendants.” See also p.17, fn.23; p.41; p.84, p.157, 
p.160, p.192. 
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commanding, and obeying”, and as being able to “reason”.172 Indeed, Poellner 
continues, Nietzsche even states that they are often conceived as in some sense 
“conscious”.173 Each drive is a will to power organisation that seeks to direct the 
perception and activity of the organism – primarily by means of taking control of its 
intellect – in such a way as to provide itself with what it needs to augment its power. 
Thus, through control of the intellect, ascendant drives can direct the organism 
towards forms of behaviour that allow them to expand – the sex drive wants to drive 
us towards sexual activity, the drive for truth would like to compel us to pursue truth, 
and so on.174 It goes without saying that this deeply problematizes Kaufmann’s claim 
that, for Nietzsche, rationality can be used to control our impulses, since our 
rationality is not something over and above our impulses; indeed, it is more 
commonly described by Nietzsche as a tool of our impulses.175 
But the drives do not just seek to control our intellect, they also strive to 
command each other: “Jeder Trieb ist eine Art Herrschsucht, jeder hat seine 
Perspektive, welche er als Norm allen übrigen Trieben aufzwingen möchte” (NL 
7[60] 12.315).176 According to Nietzsche, this command consists in the lower drive 
                                                      
172 See Poellner (1995), p.215. 
173 See Poellner (1995), p.223. Of course, Nietzsche does not think drive-consciousness 
should be identified with our own consciousness, but his way of talking certainly implies that 
there is degree of symmetry between our higher synthetic will, and the structure and 
awareness of our many “Unterwillen”. 
174 See NL 26[72] 10.274: “Das allgemeinste Bild unseres Wesens ist eine 
Vergesellschaftung von Trieben, mit fortwährender Rivalität und Einzelbündnissen unter 
einander. Der Intellekt Objekt des Wettbewerbes”. As Katsafanas (2013) has observed, 
drives often express their command by making certain features in our environment more 
salient (p.470). We also find this reading in Ken Gemes (2009), pp.50-1. 
175 As Detwiler (1990) has remarked (pp.158-9). Though Gemes suppresses the destructive 
aspect of Nietzsche’s project, he is alert to this problem, preferring to talk only about one 
drive overcoming another drive – there is no rationality or individual over and above the 
drives themselves bringing about ordering (as Kaufmann’s analysis often inadvertently 
implies). 
176 See also JGB 6. For an earlier example of this, see NL 11[119] 9.483: “In Wahrheit sind 
alle unsere Triebe thätig, aber in einer besonderen gleichsam staatlichen Ordnung und 
Anpassung an einander, so daß ihr Resultat kein Phantasma wird: ein Trieb regt den anderen 
an, jeder phantasirt und will seine Art Irrthum durchsetzen: aber jeder dieser Irrthümer wird 
sofort wieder die Handhabe für einen anderen Trieb […]” (my italics). 
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having to act as an impulse or Reiz for another, superordinate drive.177 Thus, when a 
scholar thinks he is exercising his disinterested and objective drive for truth, he 
might in actuality be discharging his drive to hunt, or merely fulfilling his interests 
“in der Familie oder im Gelderwerb oder in der Politik” (JGB 6).178 And to be sure, 
our drives are always in contention with one another according to Nietzsche. Just 
like the body’s organs, they have to organise themselves into a tense hierarchy of 
command and obedience.179 As in Roux, this inner struggle of impulses strengthens 
the individual so long as it is kept within bounds, which is to say gebändigt or 
measured: 
Der höchste Mensch würde die größte Vielheit der Triebe haben, und 
auch in der relativ größten Stärke, die sich noch ertragen läßt. In der 
That: wo die Pflanze Mensch sich stark zeigt, findet man die mächtig 
gegen einander treibenden Instinkte (z.B. Shakespeare), aber 
gebändigt. (NL 27[59] 11.289)180 
Ideally, the contention of our drives, and the mutual stimulation arising therefrom, 
leaves us strong and active and, we might infer, forecloses depression insofar as it 
renders our impulses vivacious enough to initiate action; on the other hand, their 
ordering forecloses caprice. Thus, Nietzsche seems to call on us to actively 
undertake a conscious struggle to organise our drives and to incorporate them into a 
vibrant hierarchy. But how can we actually achieve this? How is it that the strongest 
man “bändigt” his drives according to the later Nietzsche?  
                                                      
177 See NL 27[59] 11.289: “[A]lso ein Trieb als Herr, sein Gegentrieb geschwächt, verfeinert, 
als Impuls, der den Reiz für die Thätigkeit des Haupttriebes abgiebt.” 
178 We find the hunting example in an earlier note from 1881, NL 11[47] 9.459: “[D]er 
Eigenthumstrieb – Fortsetzung des Nahrungs und Jagd-Triebs.” As Richardson (1996) has 
put it, “Drive A rules B insofar as it has turned B towards A’s own end, so that B now 
participates in A’s distinctive activity” (p.33; quoted in Gemes [2009], p.48). See also NL 
14[142] 13.326: “Der sogenannte Erkenntnißtrieb ist zurückzuführen auf einen Aneignungs- 
und Überwältigungstrieb”. 
179 NL 25[411] 11.119: “Unterschied von niederen und höheren Funktionen: Rangordnung 
der Organe und Triebe, dargestellt durch Befehlende und Gehorchende.” 
180 See NL 27[59] 11.289: “Der Mensch hat, im Gegensatz zum Thier, eine Fülle 
gegensätzlicher Triebe und Impulse in sich groß gezüchtet: vermöge dieser Synthesis ist er 
der Herr der Erde.” See also NL 1[4] 12.11. 
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As he informs us in JGB 284, it is necessary “[s]eine Affekte, sein Für und 
Wider willkürlich haben und nicht haben, sich auf sie herablassen, für Stunden; sich 
auf sie setzen”.181 We might read this as one of Nietzsche’s primary solutions to the 
problem of depressive akrasia since it keeps the deeper forces of oneself active. But 
how then to order this cacophony once “we” have lent it our ear and successfully 
identified a drive that is problematically discordant. We can certainly say that what 
Nietzsche discourages is the precipitous attempt to fully negate, exclude or silence 
any troublesome impulse, which he argues characterises the Christian strategy of 
controlling passions: 
Die Kirche bekämpft die Leidenschaft mit Ausschneidung in jedem 
Sinne: ihre Praktik, ihre “Kur” ist der Castratismus. Sie fragt nie: “wie 
vergeistigt, verschönt, vergöttlicht man eine Begierde?” — sie hat zu 
allen Zeiten den Nachdruck der Disciplin auf die Ausrottung (der 
Sinnlichkeit, des Stolzes, der Herrschsucht, der Habsucht, der 
Rachsucht) gelegt. — Aber die Leidenschaften an der Wurzel angreifen 
heisst das Leben an der Wurzel angreifen: die Praxis der Kirche ist 
lebensfeindlich… (GD Moral 1 6.83)182 
Our passions constitute the root (“Wurzel”) of our vitality, and to try to eradicate 
them is therefore to attempt to deny life itself. Crucially, in this context, Nietzsche 
is referring to passions such as sexual desire – that is, passions that are indispensable 
for the furtherance of life (after all, we must reproduce). According to Nietzsche, 
this is a process of categorising passions as separate from oneself, and then 
subsequently trying to excise these passions (which underpin one’s very existence): 
Dasselbe Mittel, Verschneidung, Ausrottung, wird instinktiv im 
Kampfe mit einer Begierde von Denen gewählt, welche zu 
willensschwach, zu degenerirt sind, um sich ein Maass in ihr auflegen 
zu können […]. [I]rgend eine endgültige Feindschafts-Erklärung, eine 
                                                      
181 See NL 9[139] 12.414: “[J]e größer die Herren-Kraft des Willens ist, um so viel mehr 
Freiheit darf den Leidenschaften gegeben werden. [D]er ‘große Mensch’ ist groß durch den 
Freiheits-Spielraum seiner Begierden und durch die noch größere Macht, welche diese 
prachtvollen Unthiere in Dienst zu nehmen weiß.” 
182 On Nietzsche’s criticism of the church’s destructive impulse, see also AC 58.  
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Kluft zwischen sich und einer Passion. Die radikalen Mittel sind nur 
den Degenerirten unentbehrlich. (GD Moral 2 6.83)183 
Prima facie, these texts might have the appearance of an unqualified rejection of 
repressive spiritual exercises. But closer scrutiny reveals that he is specifically 
criticising those who A) unreflectively resort to castration – i.e. who instinctively 
resort to this method, without first asking “how can a desire be spiritualized” (which 
does not entail that a desire can always be spiritualised); B) only resort to castration 
in the face of a troublesome passion – i.e. for whom this method is in all 
circumstances “indispensable” (unentbehrlich); C) try to eradicate impulses that are 
fundamental to life – such as the acquisitive drives (e.g. “greed”), and the sexual (or 
“sensual”) passions. That his criticisms are qualified suggests there might be 
conditions under which we might, after deliberation, decide that a given impulse is 
not necessary for life and cannot be sublimated into the conglomerate of our drives 
(though let us recall that for Nietzsche this deliberating “I” is not a rational ego 
distinct from our impulses, but a dominant drive, or alliance of drives184). 
But what about his positive thesis? In one of the few notes from the later 
period where Nietzsche gives us an explicit account of how we might achieve control 
of a drive, we find that the strong individual should in fact, to some extent at least, 
employ ascetic practices. Indeed, he even advocates practices of the self involving 
Entsagung: “Alle Tugend und Tüchtigkeit am Leibe und an der Seele ist mühsam 
und im Kleinen erworben worden, durch viel Fleiß, Selbstbezwingung, 
Beschränkung auf Weniges, durch viel zähe treue Wiederholung der gleichen 
Arbeiten, der gleichen Entsagungen” (NL 26[409] 11.260; my italics).185 Though 
                                                      
183 On Nietzsche’s critique of castration as a method of self-cultivation, see also NL 10[157] 
12.545, entitled, “Moral-Castratismus. — Das Castraten-Ideal.” 
184 See JGB 117: “Der Wille, einen Affekt zu überwinden, ist zuletzt doch nur der Wille 
eines anderen oder mehrer anderer Affekte.” See also D 109. 
185 See also M 109. See also NL 9[93] 12.387, where Nietzsche also indicates that ascetic 
practices can be employed to strengthen drives: “Ich will auch die Asketik wieder 
vernatürlichen; an Stelle der Absicht auf Verneinung die Absicht auf Verstärkung; eine 
Gymnastik des Willens; eine Entbehrung und eingelegte Fastenzeiten jeder Art, auch im 
Geistigsten”. 
 353 
this remains vague, self-discipline is posited as requisite, and it is undeniable that 
Nietzsche is advocating some kind of temporary suppression, if not repression, even 
if the eventual idea is that, having been denied release for a period of time, the drive 
will thereby be tamed and once again be allowed to exercise itself. 
But on my reading of Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power, and assuming 
that “[u]nsere Triebe sind reduzirbar auf den Willen zur Macht” (NL 40[61] 11.661), 
we might expect Nietzsche to propound an even more unmeasured approach. After 
all, in JGB 36, he describes our “Triebleben” as being defined not just by the 
debatably limited processes of “Selbst-Regulirung, Assimilation, Ernährung”, but 
also by the unmeasured process of “Ausscheidung”. Indeed, one of the major 
problems is that we have inherited, or been infected by, drives and instincts that are 
harmful to us. As he states in one note: “Jeder Trieb ist angezüchtet worden als 
zeitweilige Existenz-Bedingung. Er vererbt sich lange, auch nachdem er aufgehört 
hat, es zu sein” (NL 26[72] 11.167). Moreover, we also remarked how noble 
individuals have been infected by altruistic herd-morality. We thus have impulses to 
particular patterns of behaviour that simply cannot be bent to fit within what 
Nietzsche would consider a healthy ordering.  
At times, he implies that this merely means that parts or degrees of inherited 
drives are simply allowed to disappear with time as they fall out of use across the 
generations: “Ein bestimmter Grad des Triebes im Verhältniß zu anderen Trieben 
wird, als erhaltungsfähig, immer wieder vererbt; ein entgegengesetzter 
verschwindet” (NL 26[72] 11.168). But at other times, he proposes a far more radical 
kind of excision. For example, in GD, the very same book in which he censures the 
excision of our instincts, he can also be found recommending that we take an 
aggressively unmeasured stance towards at least some of these instincts. Thus, after 
defining the modern human as a “physiologischen Selbst-Widerspruch” of instincts, 
he claims the following:  
Die Vernunft der Erziehung würde wollen, dass unter einem eisernen 
Drucke wenigstens Eins dieser Instinkt-Systeme paralysirt würde, um 
einem andren zu erlauben, zu Kräften zu kommen, stark zu werden, 
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Herr zu werden. Heute müsste man das Individuum erst möglich 
machen, indem man dasselbe beschneidet: möglich, das heisst ganz … 
(GD Streifzüge 41 6.143; my italics) 
Forging the self into a holistic organisation is not merely a matter of mastering our 
instincts and pressing them into the service of higher goals. Where those instincts 
are simply harmful or incompatible we must often paralyse them, and even excise 
them – the individual must be “beschneidet” Nietzsche asserts. The hope underlying 
his comments is that if certain impulses are denied satisfaction for long enough, they 
will eventually wither out of existence altogether. This call for excision is then 
repeated in AC with reference to what Nietzsche considers to be the harmful impulse 
towards Mitleid: 
Nichts ist ungesunder, inmitten unsrer ungesunden Modernität, als das 
christliche Mitleid. Hier Arzt sein, hier unerbittlich sein, hier das 
Messer führen — das gehört zu uns, das ist unsre Art Menschenliebe, 
damit sind wir Philosophen, wir Hyperboreer! — — —  
(AC 7; my italics) 
Moreover, we find further texts in the Nachlass in which Nietzsche ostensibly calls 
for an Ausrottung, or Vernichtung of certain impulses; and indeed, he gestures 
towards the fact that he wants us to undertake this without resentment: 
[S]o wenig werden wir eines Tages die Verleumdung und Verlästerung 
nöthig haben, um gewisse Triebe in uns als Feinde zu behandeln; […] 
mit göttlichem Auge und ungestört vernichten! (NL 1[81] 12.31) 
 
Die Ausrottung der “Triebe” 
die Tugenden, die unmöglich sind oder 
die Tugenden, welche bei Sclaven, von Priestern beherrscht, am 
schätzenswerthesten sind  
(NL 25[349] 11.104) 
Though the quotation marks in the second quote indicate that Nietzsche does not 
consider the impulses underlying our life-denying values to be genuine “Triebe”, he 
is nonetheless calling for some kind of an eliminative struggle towards our impulses 
more broadly conceived.  
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We might add that this is an impetus that is not confined to the notebooks 
and texts from 1888, where it might be argued that his thought tends towards 
hyperbole in a way that is often suppressed from the majority of his later published 
works. In the second essay of GM, for instance, Nietzsche advises that we turn our 
“schlechtes Gewissen” – what he describes as the inwardly turned “Lust an der 
Verfolgung, am Überfall, am Wechsel, an der Zerstörung” (GM II 16 5.323) – onto 
our life-denying “unnatürliche Hänge”, which, as we saw earlier, promote the 
various pathologies of the will: 
Der Mensch hat allzulange seine natürlichen Hänge mit “bösem Blick” 
betrachtet, so dass sie sich in ihm schliesslich mit dem “schlechten 
Gewissen” verschwistert haben. Ein umgekehrter Versuch wäre an sich 
möglich — aber wer ist stark genug dazu? — nämlich die unnatürlichen 
Hänge, alle jene Aspirationen zum Jenseitigen, Sinnenwidrigen, 
Instinktwidrigen, Naturwidrigen, Thierwidrigen, kurz die bisherigen 
Ideale, die allesammt lebensfeindliche Ideale, Weltverleumder-Ideale 
sind, mit dem schlechten Gewissen zu verschwistern. (GM II 24 5.335) 
In this way, Nietzsche hopes that an essential component of the ascetic ideal – i.e. 
the “schlechtes Gewissen” – can be used to undermine that ideal itself in favour of 
the counter-ideal of “grossen Gesundheit”. Such a text reveals just how Nietzsche’s 
ideal of sublimation is married to a destructive impetus – he calls for a mastery of 
our “schlechtes Gewissen” but only in order to purify ourselves of the Hänge that 
are wholly incompatible with his vision of the healthy self. While Nietzsche often 
wants to avoid labelling these life-denying impulses “Triebe”, it is undeniable that 
he seeks the complete exclusion, eradication or repression of certain impulses.  
It is of course hard to square this with his proto-Freudian belief in the 
pathological “return of the repressed”– that is, the idea that engrained impulses that 
are denied external release will inevitably discharge themselves internally. As he 
also states earlier in WS 83, when the Christian believes he has “ertödtet” his 
sensuality, it in fact “lebt auf eine unheimliche vampyrische Art fort und quält ihn 
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in widerlichen Vermummungen.”186 We might speculate that Nietzsche’s policy of 
amputation avoids this problem insofar as it is only impulses or facets of our 
character that are indispensable to life (qua will to power) that are forced to return. 
Needless to say, ascetic impulses are not preconditions of life, as are the impulses 
for sensuality and acquisition. I do not propose to resolve this problem here, since 
my aim has merely been to illustrate that, as our exposition of his conception of the 
will to power anticipated, Nietzsche’s ethics of self-cultivation cannot sufficiently 
be explained in terms of sublimation or measured struggle.  
4.4.2. ORGANISATION THROUGH UMWERTHUNG  
Aside from the failure of the sublimational reading to countenance the repressively 
unmeasured aspect of the practices of the self affirmed by Nietzsche, there are 
further reasons for why we might want to reject this reading. In addition to the fact 
that our rational self does not exist in opposition to our drives, a major practical issue 
for the sublimational model of self-cultivation concerns the degree of 
epistemological access that we have to our drives and, correspondingly, the degree 
to which we can practically engage with them. Nietzsche (in contrast to Descartes, 
for example) did not think that the individual enjoys self-transparency. As 
Katsafanas has emphasised, our drives should not be equated with the compulsions 
or motives for action that we consciously feel. This is because the drives are often 
conceived by Nietzsche as pre-conscious – presenting our consciousness with 
motives (whether these be strictly rational or affective) like carrots on a stick. As we 
just saw, the desire for truth may appear to a scholar as the main motive for his work, 
when really there are other deeper interests – i.e. drives – being served by this 
                                                      
186 See Adrian del Caro, Grounding the Nietzsche Rhetoric of Earth (Berlin: de Gruyter, 
2004), p.124. See also FW 292. 
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activity.187 Accordingly, Nietzsche is highly sceptical regarding the degree of 
knowledge we can expect to obtain with respect to our drives. Often they are 
represented as wholly inscrutable: “[D]er Haushalt unsrer Triebe geht […] weit über 
unsre Einsicht (NL 7[268] 10.323).”188 And self-consciousness is accordingly a 
deeply problematic notion for Nietzsche: “[D]as ‘Selbstbewußtsein’ ist fiktiv!” (NL 
1[58] 12.25). The scepticism which is already prominent in M thus perseveres 
through his later writings. How can one make rational decisions as to how one might 
best organise one’s self when the component parts of that self are largely hidden 
from view? 
Although Nietzsche sometimes indicates that the life of our drives is 
characterised by complete opacity, at other times he also intimates that we only have 
very limited access to our drives, and that we should not mistake this for no access 
whatsoever; our drives often do manifest themselves to our consciousness.189 To be 
sure, he describes our conscience (Gewissen) as “das Gefühl, in dem uns die 
Rangordnung unsrer Triebe zum Bewußtsein kommt” (NL 15[51] 10.493). Another 
important way in which our drives and their ordering are discernable to us is through 
our values. As he tells us in JGB 268, “[d]ie Werthschätzungen eines Menschen 
                                                      
187 See Katsafanas (2013), pp.731ff. See also NL 1[20] 12.15: “Alle unsere bewußten Motive 
sind Oberflächen-Phänomene: hinter ihnen steht der Kampf unserer Triebe und Zustände, 
der Kampf um die Gewalt.” NL 27[26] 11.282: “Die Vielheit der Triebe — wir müssen einen 
Herrn annehmen, aber der ist nicht im Bewußtsein, sondern das Bewußtsein ist ein Organ, 
wie der Magen.” NL 39[6] 11.621: “Hinter dem Bewußtsein arbeiten die Triebe.” 
188 See NL 27[27] 11.282: “Die Gesammtheit des Menschen hat alle jene Eigenschaften des 
Organischen, die uns zum Theil unbewußt bleiben <zum Theil> in der Gestalt von Trieben 
bewußt werden.” NL 25[359] 11.107: “Der größte Theil unserer Erlebnisse ist ungewußt und 
wirkt”. NL 40[21] 11.638. See Haberkamp (2000), pp.88-92. 
189 Stern (2015) has pointed out that Nietzsche occasionally refers to certain conscious Affekte 
as drives (see p.126). Nietzsche often implies that our feelings and thoughts reflect the 
underlying “Gesamtzustand” of our drives. See e.g. NL 1[61] 12.26: “Jeder Gedanke, jedes 
Gefühl, jeder Wille ist nicht geboren aus Einem bestimmten Triebe, sondern er ist ein 
Gesamtzustand, eine ganze Oberfläche des ganzen Bewußtseins und resultirt aus der 
augenblicklichen Macht-Feststellung aller der uns constituirenden Triebe — also des eben 
herrschenden Triebes sowohl als der ihm gehorchenden oder widerstrebenden.” NL 1[58] 
12.25: “Die einzelne angeblichen ‘Leidenschaften’ (z.B. der Mensch ist grausam) sind nur 
fiktive Einheiten, insofern das, was von den verschiedenen Grundtrieben her als gleichartig 
ins Bewußtsein tritt, synthetisch zu einem ‘Wesen’ oder ‘Vermögen’, zu einer Leidenschaft 
zusammengedichtet wird.” 
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verrathen etwas vom Aufbau seiner Seele, und worin sie ihre Lebensbedingungen, 
ihre eigentliche Noth sieht.” Our “Werthschätzungen” “entsprechen unseren 
Trieben” according to Nietzsche (NL 40[61] 11.661).190 We can therefore glean at 
least some epistemological access to our drives through an analysis of our values. In 
the remainder of this section, I will therefore examine how he thinks we should 
struggle to organise our drives via our values (Werthe, Werthschätzungen), ideals 
(Ideale) and aims (Ziele), and how, even by this route, we find him promoting an 
aggressively unmeasured approach to our impulses. 
Values represent and promote the behavioural means by which a drive, or 
alliance of drives, augments its power and towards which it therefore strives: “Jeder 
‘Trieb’ ist der Trieb zu ‘etwas Gutem’, von irgend einem Standpunkte aus gesehen; 
es ist Werthschätzung darin, nur deswegen hat er sich einverleibt.” (NL 26[72] 
11.162).191 It is also imperative to observe that in this fragment Nietzsche indicates 
that there is a disparity between the “good” sought by a drive, and what we would 
call a “Werthschätzung”. Drives lead us towards “goods”, but it is only when these 
drives have been incorporated into the command structure of the self, that their 
“etwas Gutem” is accepted as an end for the organism and thereby becomes a 
“Werthschätzung”.192 Echoing his distinction between superficial habits and 
embedded drives, Nietzsche thus wants to distinguish between the transitory 
“goods” posited by less sedimented drives, and the deeper values intrinsic to our 
existence.193  
                                                      
190 See also NL 27[28] 11.283: “Das verschiedene Werthgefühl, mit dem wir diese Triebe 
von einander abheben, ist die Folge ihrer größeren oder geringeren Wichtigkeit, ihrer 
thatsächlichen Rangordnung in Hinsicht auf unsere Erhaltung.” 
191 See also NL 9[35] 12.350: “[D]ie Kraft des Geistes kann so angewachsen sein, daß ihr 
die bisherigen Ziele (‘Überzeugungen’, Glaubensartikel) unangemessen sind — ein Glaube 
nämlich drückt im Allgemeinen den Zwang von Existenzbedingungen aus, eine 
Unterwerfung unter die Autorität von Verhältnissen, unter denen ein Wesen gedeiht, wächst, 
Macht gewinnt…” 
192 Compare M 38. 
193 See also NL 14[104] 13.282, where Nietzsche once again draws a similar distinction: “Die 
Moralwerthe als Scheinwerthe, verglichen mit den physiologischen”. Indeed, Schacht 
distinguishes between two orders of value in Nietzsche. See e.g. Richard Schacht, Nietzsche 
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But as he already suggests in FW, our values can in fact affect the very 
ordering of our behavioural impulses: “[S]icherlich [gehören] unsere Meinungen, 
Werthschätzungen und Gütertafeln zu den mächtigsten Hebeln im Räderwerk 
unserer Handlungen” (FW 335). Contrary to objectivists about value, and sounding 
more like an expressivist, Nietzsche holds all values to be the contingent expression 
of a particular power organisation with a particular perspective.194 On this 
understanding, our values are irreducibly man-made; as he states in Z, “Werthe legte 
erst der Mensch in die Dinge, sich zu erhalten” (Z I Ziele 4.75), and they are created 
to serve the power augmenting needs of particular human organisations (individual, 
family, state, etc.).195 These organisations increase their power by regulating the 
drives out of which they are composed, namely, through the propagation of moral 
values: 
Moralen sind der Ausdruck lokal beschränkter Rangordnungen in 
dieser vielfachen Welt der Triebe: so daß an ihren Widersprüchen der 
Mensch nicht zu Grunde geht. Also ein Trieb als Herr, sein Gegentrieb 
geschwächt, verfeinert, als Impuls, der den Reiz für die Thätigkeit des 
Haupttriebes abgiebt. (NL 27[59] 11.289) 
By disparaging harmful drives and promoting those that are expedient to the given 
organisation’s power-augmenting needs, moral values serve as a form of 
functioneller Reiz that ensures an economy by which the various parts of the whole 
are kept in healthy hierarchy and balance so as to serve the organisation’s higher 
                                                      
(London: Routledge, 1983), p.403. As I have argued, however, the degree of continuity in 
Nietzsche model of the self disallows us from making such a clear distinction. 
194 See NL 11[96] 13.44f., where Nietzsche, in describing the will to power, states the 
following: “[D]aß Zwecke, Ziele, Absichten haben, wollen überhaupt soviel ist wie Stärker-
werden-wollen, wachsen wollen, und dazu auch die Mittel wollen; […] Alle 
Werthschätzungen sind nur Folgen und engere Perspektiven im Dienste dieses Einen Willens 
[…].” 
195 As with the drives, then, the power-organisation whose augmentation is being promoted 
by a given value is not necessarily that of the individual: “[B]ei aller Werthschätzung handelt 
es sich um eine bestimmte Perspective: Erhaltung des Individuums, einer Gemeinde, einer 
Rasse, eines Staates, einer Kirche, eines Glaubens, einer Cultur” (NL 26[119] 11.181). 
Hence, Nietzsche speaks of “die Rangordnung von Werthschätzungen […] nach welchen ein 
Volk, eine Gesellschaft, ein Mensch lebt” (NL 35[2] 11.509; see also JGB 224). 
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ends.196 The chief polemical target of this naturalisation of values is of course idealist 
morality. So-called altruistic moral values can now be seen to be hypocritically 
grounded in selfish interests; moreover, Nietzsche has also denuded the absurdity of 
the idea of a universal morality insofar as he emphasises the fact that every 
individual and organisation has its distinct needs and therefore requires, and tends 
to generate, its own distinct morality.197  
As the opening section of this chapter (§4.2.) indicates, however, far from 
being opposed to the will to power, these universalizing and altruistic values are in 
fact posited as part of a long-term power-winning strategy of weaker individuals: 
“[D]as asketische Ideal entspringt dem Schutz- und Heil-Instinkte eines 
degenerirenden Lebens, welches sich mit allen Mitteln zu halten sucht und um sein 
Dasein kämpft” (GM III 13 5.366).198 Just like the defensive strategies of Rolph’s 
conjugating protoplasma, under conditions of weakness, humans pursue power 
expansion in an abnormal fashion, and accordingly have values that promote this 
behaviour. For example, in their desire to form a herd, Nietzsche describes the 
                                                      
196 See NL 10[10] 12.459: “Die ökonomische Abschätzung der bisherigen Ideale. Der 
Gesetzgeber (oder der Instinkt der Gesellschaft) wählt eine Anzahl Zustände und Affekte 
aus, mit deren Thätigkeit eine reguläre Leistung verbürgt ist […][.] Gesetzt, daß diese 
Zustände und Affekte Ingredienzien des Peinlichen anschlagen, so muß ein Mittel gefunden 
werden, dieses Peinliche durch eine Werthvorstellung zu überwinden, die Unlust als 
werthvoll, also, in Ehren dh lustvoll empfinden zu machen.” See also NL 10[57] 12.490: “— 
der Begriff des Lebens — es drücken sich in dem anscheinenden Gegensatze (von ‘gut und 
böse’) Machtgrade von Instinkten aus, zeitweilige Rangordnung, unter der gewisse Instinkte 
im Zaum gehalten werden oder in Dienst genommen werden (— Rechtfertigung der Moral: 
ökonomisch usw.” 
197 As Nehamas (1974) has laconically articulated it, “[t]he revaluation [of values] is thus the 
alleged discovery that our morality is, by its own standards, poisonously immoral” (p.113; 
quoted in Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality [London: Routledge, 2015], p.60]). Leiter also 
enumerates the various other Anglophone scholars who have argued that it is this revelation 
of hypocrisy that is the core feature of Nietzsche’s moral critique. See also NL 10[154] 
12.542 (which is contra hypocrisy): “Meine Absicht, […] zu zeigen, wie all das, was 
moralisch gelobt wird, wesensgleich mit allem Unmoralischen ist und nur, wie jede 
Entwicklung der Moral, mit unmoralischen Mitteln und zu unmoralischen Zwecken 
ermöglicht worden ist…”. See e.g. JGB 43 (which is contra universality): “‘Gut’ ist nicht 
mehr gut, wenn der Nachbar es in den Mund nimmt. Und wie könnte es gar ein ‘Gemeingut’ 
geben! Das Wort widerspricht sich selbst: was gemein sein kann, hat immer nur wenig 
Werth.” 
198 See also AC 10. 
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slavish as practising a form of isophagy. The formation of a herd allows individuals 
to exercise their will to power and incorporation in a manner internal to the social 
whole – namely, by means of performing small acts of pity towards one another. 
This enables them to experience a feeling of power over others, in spite of their 
impotence.199 Hence, just like Rolph’s starving protoplasma, “[a]lle Kranken, 
Krankhaften streben instinktiv […] nach einer Heerden-Organisation […]” (GM III 
18 5.384). However, this also requires propagating values that support this weak 
form of human organisation. 
As we also saw in Section 4.2., however, these altruistic values have come 
to dominate modernity. Hence, we might articulate the problem facing us moderns 
as that of dealing with having inherited, or having been infected by, values that 
further the interests of the weak; aggravating this problem, these harmful values have 
become ossified and placed beyond question. As such, 
[…] wir haben eine Kritik der moralischen Werthe nöthig, der Werth 
dieser Werthe ist selbst erst einmal in Frage zu stellen — und dazu thut 
eine Kenntniss der Bedingungen und Umstände noth, aus denen sie 
gewachsen, unter denen sie sich entwickelt und verschoben haben […]. 
(GM Vorrede 6 5.253)200 
One of the first steps towards formulating a remedy is to distinguish pathological 
from healthy values, which can be achieved through a genealogy of all the various 
moralities. Rather than producing a mere catalogue, however, this involves the 
formation of a Rangordnung of moral values:  
Unterschied von niederen und höheren Funktionen: Rangordnung der 
Organe und Triebe, dargestellt durch Befehlende und Gehorchende. 
Aufgabe der Ethik: die Werthunterschiede als physiologische 
                                                      
199 See GM III 18 5.383: “Das Glück der ‘kleinsten Überlegenheit’, wie es alles Wohlthun, 
Nützen, Helfen, Auszeichnen mit sich bringt, ist das reichlichste Trostmittel, dessen sich die 
Physiologisch-Gehemmten zu bedienen pflegen”. 
200 See also JGB 186, where Nietzsche calls for a “Sammlung des Materials, begriffliche 
Fassung und Zusammenordnung eines ungeheuren Reichs zarter Werthgefühle und 
Werthunterschiede, welche leben, wachsen, zeugen und zu Grunde gehn, — und, vielleicht, 
Versuche, die wiederkehrenden und häufigeren Gestaltungen dieser lebenden Krystallisation 
anschaulich zu machen, — als Vorbereitung zu einer Typenlehre der Moral.” 
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Rangordnung von “höher” und “nieder” (“wichtiger, wesentlicher, 
unentbehrlicher, unersetzlicher” usw.)[.] (NL 25[4110] 11.119)201 
But on what basis can Nietzsche establish such a rank-order? What is his Maßstab? 
In his own words: 
Woran mißt sich objektiv der Werth? Allein an dem Quantum 
gesteigerter und organisirter Macht, nach dem, was in allem Geschehen 
geschieht, ein Wille zum Mehr… (NL 11[83] 13.40)202 
As he indicates in another note, it is the “Wille zur Macht” that represents the 
“Maaßstab, wonach der Werth der moralischen Werthschätzungen zu bestimmen 
ist” (NL 2[131] 12.132). The conception of life and the world as will to power acts 
as the new fulcrum around which the task of self-organisation can begin to take 
place; in contrast to the metaphysical fulcrum of UB, however, this is purely 
immanent – that is, it does not involve positing any unchanging metaphysical 
essences that exist beyond the world in which we live.203  
                                                      
201 See also GM Vorrede 3 5.249, where Nietzsche asks, “unter welchen Bedingungen erfand 
sich der Mensch jene Werthurtheile gut und böse? und welchen Werth haben sie selbst? 
Hemmten oder förderten sie bisher das menschliche Gedeihen? Sind sie ein Zeichen von 
Nothstand, von Verarmung, von Entartung des Lebens? Oder umgekehrt, verräth sich in 
ihnen die Fülle, die Kraft, der Wille des Lebens, sein Muth, seine Zuversicht, seine Zukunft? 
—” See also NL 7[42] 12.308: “Der Antagonism zwischen der ‘wahren Welt’, wie sie der 
Pessimismus aufdeckt, und einer lebensmöglichen Welt: — dazu muß man die Rechte der 
Wahrheit prüfen, es ist nöthig, den Sinn aller dieser ‘idealen Triebe’ am Leben zu messen, 
um zu begreifen, was eigentlich jener Antagonism ist: der Kampf des krankhaften 
verzweifelnden, sich an Jenseitiges klammernden Lebens mit dem gesünderen dümmeren 
verlogneren reicheren unzersetzteren Leben. Also nicht ‘Wahrheit’ im Kampf mit Leben, 
sondern eine Art Leben mit einer anderen. — Aber es will die höhere Art sein! — Hier muß 
die Beweisführung einsetzen, daß eine Rangordnung noth thut, — daß das erste Problem das 
der Rangordnung der Arten Leben ist.” 
202 See also NL 5[71] 12.215: “Es giebt nichts am Leben, was Werth hat, außer dem Grade 
der Macht — gesetzt eben, daß Leben selbst der Wille zur Macht ist.” NL 11[414] 13.192: 
“Was ist gut? — Alles, was das Gefühl der Macht, den Willen zur Macht, die Macht selbst 
im Menschen steigert.” NL 5[71] 12.215. For an earlier example of this thought, see NL 
4[104] 9.126: “[U]nsere Moralität hat das Maaß ihrer Idealität an dem Maaße der uns 
möglichen Kraft, vorausgesetzt daß wir diese steigern können.” 
203 See Paul Katsafanas, Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) on the way in which Nietzsche posits life as an 
ultimate value (p.151, fn.11). As commentators have noted, life has a privileged position as 
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Since it is the human richest in (controlled) opposition who is most vibrant 
and flourishing for Nietzsche, he sets this individual up as the ultimate standard: 
“[…] die höchste Kraft, als Herrschaft über Gegensätze, [abgiebt] den Maaßstab” 
(NL 25[408] 11.119). Nietzsche wants to aggrandize the values that serve the 
generation of such individuals and disparage those that frustrate this goal.204 We 
have already seen at length why he deems universalising, egalitarian and altruistic 
moral values to be degenerate, but it would be a mistake to interpret this as an all-
out rejection of the concept of morality or moral values. For example, Nietzsche 
himself positively values (among other things) socially exploitative practices (JGB 
259); Rangordnung, and the feeling of distance between the different strata of 
society and the self (“zwischen Mensch und Mensch” [JGB 62] and “innerhalb der 
Seele selbst” [JGB 257]); the need for a plurality of moralities suited to the different 
types of individuals within society (and “nie daran denken, unsre Pflichten zu 
Pflichten für Jedermann herabzusetzen” [JGB 272]); and externally directed 
expressions of the struggle for power – i.e. “Krieg, Abenteuer, Jagd, Tanz, 
Kampfspiele” (GM I 7 5.266).205 These values are all those values associated with 
what Nietzsche sees as the vital features of any healthy organisation – namely, 
hierarchy and power augmentation through discharge and struggle. 
But the values that Nietzsche sanctions cannot be said to amount to a 
complete morality. Rather, what they do is promote the very struggle for 
incorporation that forces us to develop our own morality, which is to say a 
Rangordnung of values that promotes the most effective economy of impulses given 
the idiosyncratic set of drives we possess and our specific environmental 
                                                      
the highest ordering principle in Nietzsche’s normative worldview. See e.g. Ansell-Pearson 
(2006), p.243. 
204 See e.g. JGB 260: “Die moralischen Werthunterscheidungen sind entweder unter einer 
herrschenden Art entstanden, welche sich ihres Unterschieds gegen die beherrschte mit 
Wohlgefühl bewusst wurde, — oder unter den Beherrschten, den Sklaven und Abhängigen 
jeden Grades.” Indeed, since all our values are an expression of the will to power, we should 
not interpret this project as Paul Katsafanas (2015) has: “In sum, the Nietzschean theory 
holds that values are legitimate insofar as they do not generate conflicts with will to power” 
(p.189). 
205 See also JGB 270. 
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conditions.206 But again, this raises another problem: Surely we cannot use our 
rationality to consciously create a new order of values and drives, since (as we have 
already seen) reason and consciousness are simply the tools of our drives: “Unserm 
stärksten Triebe, dem Tyrannen in uns, unterwirft sich […] unsre Vernunft” (JGB 
158); and as he unequivocally states in JGB 191, “die Vernunft ist nur ein 
Werkzeug”. It would therefore appear that rational, critical reflection is not alone 
capable of bringing about the kind of order sought by Nietzsche. However, I want to 
suggest that his alternative is a less rationally oriented openness to experimentation 
with novel values. 
There is an argument to be made that, in contrast to UB, Nietzsche wants us 
to do very little conscious work beyond that of combatting idealist values. Let us 
first recall that in UB IV, Nietzsche charges Goethe with failing to find his guiding 
idea and consequently of suffering a dissipation of his forces.207 This was in contrast 
to Wagner, who managed to consciously channel his powers in accordance with his 
“innere Gesetzlichkeit” or “Wille” (UB IV 2 1.435). If we turn to EH klug 9, 
however, we witness how much Nietzsche now seems to favour the Goethean model 
of experimentation: 
Man muss die ganze Oberfläche des Bewusstseins — Bewusstsein ist 
eine Oberfläche — rein erhalten von irgend einem der grossen 
Imperative. Vorsicht selbst vor jedem grossen Worte, jeder grossen 
Attitüde! Lauter Gefahren, dass der Instinkt zu früh “sich versteht” — 
— Inzwischen wächst und wächst die organisirende, die zur Herrschaft 
berufne “Idee” in der Tiefe, — sie beginnt zu befehlen, sie leitet 
langsam aus Nebenwegen und Abwegen zurück, sie bereitet einzelne 
Qualitäten und Tüchtigkeiten vor, die einmal als Mittel zum Ganzen 
sich unentbehrlich erweisen werden, — sie bildet der Reihe nach alle 
dienenden Vermögen aus, bevor sie irgend Etwas von der 
                                                      
206 For a more comprehensive overview of Nietzsche’s account of noble values, see Tongeren 
(1989), pp.151-72. 
207 UB IV 3 1.442: “Um das Ungemeine eines solchen Verhaltens zu ermessen, nehme man 
zum Beispiel das grosse Gegenbild Goethe’s, der, als Lernender und Wissender, wie ein viel 
verzweigtes Stromnetz erscheint, welches aber seine ganze Kraft nicht zu Meere trägt, 
sondern mindestens ebensoviel auf seinen Wegen und Krümmungen verliert und verstreut, 
als es am Ausgange mit sich führt.” 
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dominirenden Aufgabe, von “Ziel”, “Zweck”, “Sinn” verlauten lässt. 
— Nach dieser Seite hin betrachtet ist mein Leben einfach wundervoll. 
(6.294) 
Though it has been suggested that there is continuity between the ethics of the self 
presented in UB and EH, it should be plain just how mistaken such a conclusion 
is.208 Whereas in UB IV, Nietzsche affirmed the Schopenhauerian conception of a 
worthy life as one that traces a straight line, he now contests this, accenting the need 
for life to be a zigzag, or what Schopenhauer called a Fläche. To be sure, the 
formation of one’s impulses into a vibrant functional unity is still postulated as the 
underlying goal; however, this is no longer a question of becoming conscious of an 
essential aspect of oneself, and then organising one’s impulses around this in order 
to bring an end to “das Tastende, Schweifende, das Wuchern der Nebenschösslinge”. 
An openness to what may appear to us as digressions, diversions and distractions is 
an essential to the development of a guiding “Instinkt”, “Zweck” (i.e. a superordinate 
value) or ruling “Idee” (though Nietzsche tellingly places this last term in scare 
quotes in the above citation, consciously distancing himself from the Platonic 
metaphysical foundations of his earlier synthetic model). In JGB, this is formulated 
as a need for experimentation, which is to say the ability to explore the worth of new 
values. His ideal Versucher (JGB 42) (experimenters and tempters) are philosophers 
“welchen anderen umgekehrten Geschmack und Hang haben als die bisherigen” 
(JGB 2), who work without “die Sicherheit der Werthmaasse, die bewusste 
Handhabung einer Einheit von Methode” (JGB 210).209 Moreover, one’s ruling 
                                                      
208 See Gemes (2009): “The story of Wagner’s achievement of a higher unity born from some 
master drive is of course the story Nietzsche would repeat about himself in the dramatic 
section of Ecce Homo [EH klug 9] where Nietzsche elaborates the subtitle of that work, ‘How 
One Becomes What One Is’” (p.47). 
209 See also NL 9[93] 12.388, where Nietzsche calls for “ein Versuch mit Abenteuern und 
willkürlichen Gefahren.” While there is no set method, a prerequisite of Nietzsche’s strategy 
is the willingness and desire to break customary norms and engage in experimentation. And 
Nietzsche describes those who have foreshadowed his ideal Europeans of the future – like 
Goethe, Napoleon, Stendhal, Beethoven, Schopenhauer and Wagner – as those “mit 
unheimlichen Zugängen zu Allem, was verführt, lockt, zwingt, umwirft, geborene Feinde der 
Logik und der geraden Linien, begehrlich nach dem Fremden, dem Exotischen, dem 
Ungeheuren, dem Krummen, dem Sich-Widersprechenden” (JGB 256). 
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“‘Idee’” forms an order within oneself without the interference of our conscious, 
rational self. All we need to consciously do, according to Nietzsche, is refrain from 
trying to overmanage this process.210 Indeed, not actively pursuing self-knowledge 
is a necessary condition of becoming who one is; hence Nietzsche’s quotation of 
Goethe’s apothegm: “Wahrhaft hochachten kann man nur, wer sich nicht selbst 
sucht” (JGB 266).211   
This attitude, however, is not to be confused with an endorsement of an 
amoral state of laisser-aller. The first reason not to confound Nietzsche’s stance with 
amoralism, is that he aims to generate novel relatively fixed standards, to create new 
values (“Werthe schaffen”), to forge future ideals and a new “wozu” for humanity 
(JGB 211).212 In the second place, this experimentation requires a range of core 
virtues – for example, courage.213 Third, as already noted above, the philosopher 
cannot simply deny that they are “in ein strenges Garn und Hemd von Pflichten 
eingesponnen”; and insofar as they cannot escape the world of commitments and 
duties, Nietzsche’s ideal experimenters are still “Menschen der Pflicht” – they must 
rather learn to dance (“tanzen”) in their chains (“Ketten”).214 
But to get this process of experimentation off the ground, there must 
obviously be some initiating form of Umwerthung of Christian values, which do not 
readily permit such deviance. To what extent, though, do we need to denigrate 
idealist morality, and the behavioural impulse to behave as an ideal Christian (or 
                                                      
210 See FW 382, where Nietzsche paints his “Ideal eines Geistes, der naiv, das heisst 
ungewollt und aus überströmender Fülle und Mächtigkeit mit Allem spielt, was bisher heilig, 
gut, unberührbar, göttlich hiess; für den das Höchste, woran das Volk billigerweise sein 
Werthmaass hat, bereits so viel wie Gefahr, Verfall, Erniedrigung oder, mindestens, wie 
Erholung, Blindheit, zeitweiliges Selbstvergessen bedeuten würde”. 
211 See JGB 198, where Nietzsche valorises Goethe’s “kühne Fallen-lassen der Zügel”. Note 
that here Nietzsche only endorses this approach under the condition that one is so old that 
one can let one’s drives loose. 
212 Indeed, in AC, he explicitly rebukes anarchism, and hopes that experimentation will lead 
to a stable set of laws able to sustain an enduring society akin to the Imperium Romanum. 
See e.g. AC 57 and 58. 
213 See e.g. EH Bücher 3 6.303, where Nietzsche calls his perfect reader “ein Unthier von 
Muth”. 
214 Compare WS 140. 
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utilitarian or Kantian, etc.)? NL 10[117] 12.523 reveals that Nietzsche’s declaration 
of war against Christian values is in a sense limited: 
Ich habe dem bleichsüchtigen “Christen-Ideale” den Krieg erklärt 
(sammt dem, was ihm naheverwandt ist), nicht in der Absicht, es zu 
vernichten, sondern nur um seiner Tyrannei ein Ende zu setzen und 
einen Platz frei zu bekommen für neue Ideale, für robustere Ideale […]: 
unser Selbsterhaltungstrieb will, daß unsere Gegner bei Kräften 
bleiben, — will nur Herr über sie werden.215 
Nietzsche thus proclaims that he only wants to dominate Christian values and ideals 
(“Herr über sie werden”). Since, as we will remark in the following section, he wants 
to preserve and exploit the herd, and herd-morality is a condition of existence for the 
herd, it is unsurprising that he thinks that “[d]er Sinn der Heerde soll in der Heerde 
herrschen, — aber nicht über sie hinausgreifen” (NL 7[6] 12.280).216 But he also 
argues that higher individuals should ideally remain in conflict with herd-morality 
within themselves, since inner plurality and struggle is a necessary precondition of 
health: “[M]an bleibt nur jung unter der Voraussetzung, dass die Seele nicht sich 
streckt, nicht nach Frieden begehrt” (GD Moral 3 6.84). This is undoubtedly one of 
the reasons that he believes every higher culture to be defined by the struggle of 
slave and master morality, “sogar im selben Menschen, innerhalb Einer Seele” (JGB 
260). And to be sure, if we turn back to EH 9 klug, we can see what kind of struggle 
Nietzsche might mean in practice: 
                                                      
215 See also NL 10[2] 12.454, where Nietzsche describes this as his “Kampf gegen die 
Überherrschaft der Heerden-Instinkte”. 
216 On Nietzsche’s desire for the preservation of Christian morality within society, see also 
NL 7[6] 12.280: “Meine Philosophie ist auf Rangordnung gerichtet: nicht auf eine 
individualistische Moral. Der Sinn der Heerde soll in der Heerde herrschen, — aber nicht 
über sie hinausgreifen: die Führer der Heerde bedürfen einer grundverschiedenen Werthung 
ihrer eignen Handlungen, insgleichen die Unabhängigen, oder die ‘Raubthiere’ usw.” See 
also NL 35[9] 11.511f.: “Diese guten Europäer, die wir sind; was zeichnet uns vor dem 
M<enschen> der Vaterländer aus? Erstens: wir sind Atheisten und Immoralisten, aber wir 
unterstützen zunächst die Religionen und Moralen des Heerden-Instinktes: mit ihnen nämlich 
wird eine Art Mensch vorbereitet, die einmal in unsere Hände fallen muß, die nach unserer 
Hand begehren muß. Jenseits von Gut und Böse, aber wir verlangen die unbedingte 
Heilighaltung der Heerden-Moral.” See also Leiter (2015), p.119. 
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Nächstenliebe, Leben für Andere und Anderes kann die 
Schutzmassregel zur Erhaltung der härtesten Selbstigkeit sein. Dies ist 
der Ausnahmefall, in welchem ich, gegen meine Regel und 
Überzeugung, die Partei der “selbstlosen” Triebe nehme: sie arbeiten 
hier im Dienste der Selbstsucht, Selbstzucht. (EH klug 9 6.294) 
We see Nietzsche struggling to reinterpret (and appropriate) the Christian value of 
neighbourly love (“Nächstenliebe”) for his own higher purposes. In promoting 
“Sich-Vergessen, Sich-Missverstehn, Sich-Verkleinern, -Verengern, -
Vermittelmässigen”, altruistic practices can, Nietzsche avers, foster the development 
of a synthesis of one’s drives insofar as they prevent the species of pseudo-self-
knowledge that constricts this process (ibid.). Thus, he condones the drive to care 
for others at the temporary expense of one’s own wellbeing as a long-term strategy 
for achieving the egoistically oriented goal of self-cultivation. In this way, he places 
an interpretation on this drive for, and valuation of, altruism that robs it of its 
unconditional status and subordinates it the drive for individual health. Some 
Christian values can therefore obviously be retained within a healthy subjective 
organisation as long as their Herrschaft over healthy values is overturned. 
Yet, if Nietzsche’s endorsement of the instrumentalisation of values is 
occasioned by an affirmation of life as will to power, we would expect it to be 
married to an affirmation of an unmeasured species of axiological struggle. Surely 
not every aspect of Christian morality can be rendered compatible with the higher 
ideal of health? For example, Nietzsche’s ideal experimenter can explore any value 
except that of weakness (qua fundamental good) (or we might say, meekness) – he 
is someone “für den es nichts Verbotenes mehr giebt, es sei denn die Schwäche” 
(GD Streifzüge 49 6.151). But in other texts, he seems to suggest that no part of 
idealist morality is compatible with his vision of thriving life. For example, in NL 
7[6] 12.274: 
Meine Einsicht: alle die Kräfte und Triebe, vermöge deren es Leben 
und Wachsthum giebt, sind mit dem Banne der Moral belegt: Moral als 
Instinkt der Veneinung des Lebens. Man muß die Moral vernichten, um 
das Leben zu befreien. 
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This text implies that “Moral” (by which he means idealist morality) is an expression 
of an “Instinkt” that is fundamentally directed towards life-denial. To free life, then, 
(idealist) morality must be vernichtet, by which we can assume he means that the 
existing moral values associated with idealist morality must be subjected to radical 
critique – i.e. criticised without restriction – and the forms of behaviour associated 
with these values must correspondingly be subjected to unmeasured suppression.217 
A text such as this is wholly incompatible with the sublimational reading. Nietzsche 
is unequivocally stating that we should in some cases completely eradicate (i.e. 
exclude from our internal organisation) the “Instinkt der Verneinung des Lebens”. 
Indeed, Nietzsche consistently recommends that we engage in an active 
Vernichtung or Zerbrechung of our values. In AC, it becomes clear that Nietzsche 
has set his sights upon Christianity, declaring his “Todkrieg gegen der Laster,” 
where “der Laster ist das Chistenthum” (AC Gesetz 6.254). This is then prefigured 
in Z III, where Nietzsche repeatedly incites his readers to an apparently destructive 
struggle against the old Christian moral-order: “Zerbrecht, zerbrecht mir, oh meine 
Brüder, diese alten Tafeln der Frommen!” (Z III, Tafeln 15 4.257). However, what 
Nietzsche has in mind is not mere wanton negation; rather, he promotes unmeasured 
critique as a precondition of creating new, more vibrant moral orders. Hence, in GM 
he asserts that “[d]amit ein Heiligthum aufgerichtet werden kann, muss ein 
Heiligthum zerbrochen werden […]!” (GM II 24 5.335; my italics); and again in EH, 
that “im Jasagen ist Verneinen und Vernichten Bedingung” (EH Schicksal 4 6.368; 
my italics); or as he also declares in the context of his affirmation of radical value 
critique in Z III Tafeln: “Das Erdbeben macht neue Quellen offenbar” (Z III Tafeln 
25 4.265). As such, these statements are intimately tied to his Dionysian notion of 
                                                      
217 After calling for the destruction of morality in NL 7[6] 12. 273-83, he goes on to list a 
number of different ways he envisions this critique proceeding; for example, by showing 
how such morality is a “Werk des Irrthums”; how it is a “Werk der Unmoralität” insofar as 
it relies on the very egoistic drives that it condemns, and is therefore “mit sich in 
Widerspruch” (12.276); and how it is “dem Leben Schädlich”’ (ibid.). 
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creative-destruction.218 But in what does this Zerbrechung consist? And how is it a 
prerequisite of creativity in the specific context of moral values? 
One might begin by arguing that this Zerbrechung consists in merely 
negating the unconditionality of moral values. By negating their tyrannous claim to 
transcendence and universality one thereby opens up a creative space for the 
formation of novel values and Rangordnungen of values. After all: “[D]as 
Unbedingte kann nicht das Schaffende sein. Nur das Bedingte kann bedingen” (NL 
26[203] 11.203). On this interpretation, the drives, values and behaviours inscribed 
on those tablets might be retained so long as they lose their unconditional value and 
are thereby opened up to creative engagement – i.e. reorganisation within new 
hierarchies of values:  
Und wer ein Schöpfer sein muss im Guten und Bösen: wahrlich, der 
muss ein Vernichter erst sein und Werthe zerbrechen […]. 
Und mag doch Alles zerbrechen, was an unseren Wahrheiten 
zerbrechen — kann! Manches Haus giebt es noch zu bauen! (Z II Sebst-
Ueberwindung 4.149).219 
On this interpretation, creativity is enabled by breaking a certain modality to which 
our values lay claim.220 This might be achieved through Nietzsche’s naturalisation 
of values (as we saw above) or by disclosing the falsity, and even logical 
incoherence, of unconditional values – this is the “Wahrheit” of which Nietzsche 
speaks in the text cited above.221 But he also contests this universality by highlighting 
the detriment practical consequences furthered by such a belief – namely, insofar as 
                                                      
218 NL 13[13] 10.462: “Ihr Verdunkeler, ihr fragt, was aus euch wird, wenn ihr die Wahrheit 
sagt — aber die Wahrheit soll die Welt zerbrechen, damit die Welt gebaut werde! […] Ich 
liebe das Leben: ich verachte den Menschen. Aber um des Lebens willen will ich ihn 
vernichten” (my italics). 
219 See also NL 11[16] 10.381 
220 See Leiter (2015), p.60 for a review of Nietzsche’s attempt to undermine the universal 
claims of idealist morality. 
221 On the logical incoherence of the notion of an absolute value, see e.g. NL 34[28] 11.429: 
“Aberglaube: an das Seiende zu glauben, an das Unbedingte, an den reinen Geist, an die 
absolute Erkenntniß, an den absoluten Werth, an das Ding an sich! In diesen Ansätzen steckt 
überall eine contradictio.” 
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it blocks the possibility of creativity. Indeed, in 1883 he even claims that the inability 
to adapt our values to our power-augmenting needs (i.e. “um den Willen zur Macht 
zu befriedigen”) has fatal consequences: 
Gäbe es eine absolute Moral, so würde sie verlangen, daß unbedingt der 
Wahrheit gefolgt werde: folglich, daß ich und die Menschen an ihr zu 
Grunde gehen. — Dies mein Interesse an der Vernichtung der Moral. 
Um leben und höher werden zu können — um den Willen zur Macht 
zu befriedigen, müßte jedes absolute Gebot beseitigt werden. (NL 7[37] 
10.252) 
Nietzsche gives those wishing to avoid destructive conflict a very plain ultimatum: 
“[E]ntweder schafft eure Verehrungen ab oder — euch selbst!” (FW 346). While it 
may be tempting to read this as a measured abolition of values – one limited to their 
modal status – it is still difficult not to interpret this as a total rejection of the value 
of universality and the drive we have to make a priori axiological claims.  
But Nietzsche does not just endorse the active destruction of the values that 
constrict the process of ordering our drives; he also advocates a policy of 
quarantining oneself from such values. To be sure, one part of the spirit, says 
Nietzsche in JGB 230, is marked by measured, exploitative struggle – namely, “den 
Willen aus der Vielheit zur Einfachheit, einen zusammenschnürenden, bändigenden, 
herrschsüchtigen und wirklich herrschaftlichen Willen”. Yet this works in tandem 
with another, “entgegengesetzter Trieb des Geistes”, which is marked by an 
unmeasured struggle “zur willkürlichen Abschliessung, ein Zumachen seiner 
Fenster, ein inneres Neinsagen zu diesem oder jenem Dinge, ein Nicht-heran-
kommen-lassen, eine Art Vertheidigungs-Zustand gegen vieles Wissbare”. In the 
first place, he describes this ommisive activity as necessary in order to get a vision 
of human nature qua will to power. Thus, to get an insight into the “Grundtext homo 
natura”, one must stop one’s ears to the fantastical descriptions and valuations of the 
human that have hitherto been noisily imposed on his existence: 
[M]it unerschrocknen Oedipus-Augen und verklebten Odysseus-
Ohren, taub gegen die Lockweisen alter metaphysischer Vogelfänger, 
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welche ihm allzulange zugeflötet haben: “du bist mehr! du bist höher! 
du bist anderer Herkunft!” (JGB 230) 
But in the second place, Nietzsche further maintains in GM that insulation from 
those propagating altruistic values is necessary as a means to preventing one from 
becoming sick: “Und darum gute Luft! gute Luft! Und weg jedenfalls aus der Nähe 
von allen Irren- und Krankenhäusern der Cultur! Und darum gute Gesellschaft, unsre 
Gesellschaft! Oder Einsamkeit, wenn es sein muss!” (GM III 14 5.371).222 Again 
then, within Nietzsche’s later writings, the exclusion of harmful values and the 
impulses they promote is repeatedly posited as a precondition of self-cultivation.  
By now it should be quite irrefutable that Nietzsche’s ethics of self-
cultivation is one that can neither be glibly referred to as promoting an “agonistic” 
self, nor as a purely measured, sublimational form of struggle. Though Nietzsche 
does promote measured conflict with those drives and values that can be 
incorporated into a renewed, healthy self, this conflict should not be conceived as 
agonistic due to the emphasis on the fact that it is directed towards the 
instrumentalisation of that which has been overcome. On the other hand, I have 
argued that the sublimational reading, while acknowledging the exploitative thrust 
of Nietzsche’s conception of self-cultivation, over-generalises its claim that 
Nietzsche is opposed to the full negation of drives or impulses. Although he may 
equivocate on precisely what is to be eradicated and how this is to be achieved, there 
can be little doubt that he views the full suppression or eradication of certain 
impulses to be a prerequisite of healthy unity. Indeed, this is perfectly in keeping 
with his vision of the will to power as being fundamentally characterised by 
organisational conflict, which is at once a measured struggle to integrate the 
serviceable and an unmeasured struggle to exclude the injurious. However, contrary 
to his earlier Schopenhauerian model, we have seen that it is no longer knowledge 
                                                      
222 Thus, Nietzsche reiterates the warning of Goethe that the greatest danger for the 
Romantics was “[zu ersticken] am Wiederkäuen sittlicher und religiöser Absurditäten” (WA 
3 6.19). See also Appel (1999), p.66 for a number of other instances where Nietzsche seems 
to propound a prophylactic attitude toward herd-morals. 
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of our particular metaphysical essence that acts as the fixed point for individual 
organisation; rather, it is an appreciation of the world (and particularly the self) from 
a radically immanent viewpoint – that is, qua will to power. This should encourage 
us to embrace and even stimulate (rather than spurn or suppress) inner, subjective 
conflict as a condition of life. On Nietzsche’s account, this would enable us to avert 
both the risk of aboulia and the corollary danger of succumbing to idealist morality 
(as a pseudo-therapy for aboulia). But furthermore, Nietzsche gives us a yardstick 
by which we can organise our drives and values into a relatively stable functional 
hierarchy, thereby circumventing the risk of caprice and anarchy to which excessive 
tension gave rise.  
Nonetheless, Nietzsche’s conception of self-cultivation faces a serious 
obstacle. This can be traced back to his reframing the problem of disgregation as one 
of race, which implies that there are some aspects of the self that are so deeply 
embedded that they remain impervious to our best efforts at self-cultivation:  
Es ist aus der Seele eines Menschen nicht wegzuwischen, was seine 
Vorfahren am liebsten und beständigsten gethan haben […]. Es ist gar 
nicht möglich, dass ein Mensch nicht die Eigenschaften und Vorlieben 
seiner Eltern und Altvordern im Leibe habe: was auch der Augenschein 
dagegen sagen mag. Dies ist das Problem der Rasse. […] Und mit Hülfe 
der besten Erziehung und Bildung wird man eben nur erreichen, über 
eine solche Vererbung zu täuschen. (JGB 264) 
Taking a more moderate line than Nietzsche’s sublimational readers, though with a 
notable lack of textual evidence, Connolly has contended that it is only when a 
“disposition” becomes “an ineliminable aspect of our self” that we must “simply 
make the most of it, expressing, sublimating or concealing it, but not repressing, 
eliminating or denying it.”223 But Connolly’s solution is perhaps too quick, not only 
is Nietzsche critical of the policy of “Täuschung” (Connolly’s “concealment”), but 
he further implies that there are parts of one’s self that are wholly impervious to 
                                                      
223 Connolly (1988), p.163; see also (1991): “[O]ne may deploy techniques to conceal, 
sublimate, restrain, or revise others that do not synchronize with one's ideals and are 
unsusceptible to elimination” (p.180). 
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sublimational transformation: “im Grunde von uns, ganz ‘da unten’, giebt es freilich 
etwas Unbelehrbares, einen Granit von geistigem Fatum, von vorherbestimmter 
Entscheidung und Antwort auf vorherbestimmte ausgelesene Fragen” (JGB 231). To 
view this granite as a reprisal of his earlier essentialist conception of the self, 
however, would be a mistake; rather, he is merely referring to parts of the self that 
are too inveterate to undergo transformation or elimination – i.e. which exist beyond 
the reaches of our self-creative enterprises.224 However, the following section will 
demonstrate that he does not simply recommend that we abandon all attempts to 
eliminate harmful drives that happen to be impervious to transformation within our 
own lifetime. Indeed, I will now argue that he entreats us to eradicate or transform 
drives in others – namely, future individuals; and with this, we move decisively into 
the social dimension of his later philosophy. 
4.5. COLLECTIVE ORGANISATION  
The fact that the crisis of disgregation is now framed as a problem of race – i.e. as 
one stemming from deeply rooted impulses – means that in order to cure the 
pathology of the will afflicting modern Europeans, Nietzsche needs to formulate a 
longer-term programme of treatment. An ethics of self-cultivation will simply not 
suffice: “[D]ie Lebensdauer Eines [sic] Menschen [bedeutet] beinahe nichts […] in 
Hinsicht auf die Durchführung so langwieriger Aufgaben und Absichten” (NL 37[8] 
11.581-2). Cultivating the ideal human is a transgenerational project for Nietzsche, 
one that can only be pursued by means of a collective struggle to breed or cultivate 
this individual. The question that I want to answer in this section is therefore: What 
                                                      
224 Quoted in Richardson (2004), p.193 (fn.149). This difficulty is something that neither 
Nehamas (1985, ch.7) nor Kaufmann (1974) fully acknowledge in their optimistic models of 
Nietzschean self-creation. 
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kind of society does Nietzsche think can most effectively undertake this project? 
And more specifically, what forms of social struggle define this society?  
I will contend that the society best able to achieve this goal, according to 
Nietzsche, is one that embodies his general model of a healthy will to power 
organisation – though he is by no means univocal regarding how this model 
translates into a socio-political philosophy. In the critical literature, however, we 
uncover two starkly opposed accounts of how Nietzsche’s conception of the world 
as will to power translates into a theory of political governance. It will serve us well 
to briefly delineate these divergent interpretations. 
 First, we have Nietzsche’s agonistic readers, who read the will to power as 
implying an agonistic-democratic model of political organisation. As we have 
repeatedly seen, this is best represented by Connolly and Hatab, who argue that 
Nietzsche’s ontology of power implies a non-destructive and non-exclusionary 
mode of political contest. In Chapter 2, we saw that both cite NL 9[151] 12.424 
(“Der Wille zur Macht kann sich nur an Widerständen äußern”) in defence of this 
ontology. Hatab thus claims that “will to power expresses an agonistic force-field” 
in which each force is constituted through its relations. Hatab claims that this 
demands agonistic restraint at a social level, namely insofar as “my Other is always 
implicated in my nature; the annulment of my Other would be the annulment of 
myself.”225 To further buttress his agonistic vision of the healthy socio-political 
expression of the will to power, Hatab cites GD Moral 3 6.84f. (a text also used by 
Connolly). In this aphorism, Nietzsche explains how the Vergeistigung der 
Feindschaft 
darin [besteht], dass man tief den Werth begreift, den es hat, Feinde zu 
haben […]. Die Kirche wollte zu allen Zeiten die Vernichtung ihrer 
Feinde: wir, wir Immoralisten und Antichristen, sehen unsern Vortheil 
darin, dass die Kirche besteht… Auch im Politischen ist die Feindschaft 
jetzt geistiger geworden, — viel klüger, viel nachdenklicher, viel 
                                                      
225 Hatab (1995), p.68. See also p.8.  
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schonender. Fast jede Partei begreift ihr Selbsterhaltungs-Interesse 
darin, dass die Gegenpartei nicht von Kräften kommt […].226 
On the basis of this text, Hatab argues that Nietzsche’s ontology of difference 
translates into a political ethos of democratic respect, which “forbids exclusion, 
[and] demands inclusion”.227 Moreover, according to this,  
[…] not only would eliminating one’s Other violate this ideal, but so 
too would seeking or effecting complete control over one’s Other. […] 
Political domination can be unmasked as a flight from competition, a 
will to eliminate challenges, a fear of possible loss, and therefore as a 
weakness in a Nietzschean sense.228  
As a consequence of this, equality of opportunity is requisite for any strong state 
oriented toward perfectionism. Representative democracy, what Hatab calls a 
“contest of speeches”,229 then generates “temporary aristocracy” insofar as it 
meritocratically grants power to the winning contestants.230 Nonetheless, Hatab 
recognises that this is “not in keeping with Nietzsche’s version of aristocratism”, 
which he rightly recognises is of a more traditional mould.231  
Connolly, on the other hand, argues that Nietzsche formulates two ethical 
responses to his notion of life as will to power. One of these is that of aristocratic 
world-mastery, whereas the other “counsels us to come to terms with difference and 
to seek ways to enable difference to be.” As we saw in Chapter 2, this latter account 
can be described as an ethic of “letting be”.232 It was further discerned in Chapter 2 
that Connolly argues that ressentiment results from futilely striving to overcome the 
contingency, difference and resistance that are intrinsic to ourselves and society 
                                                      
226 See Hatab (1995), p.69. For Connolly’s appropriation of the passage, see William 
Connolly, Augustinian Imperative (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), pp.156-7. 
227 Hatab (1995), p.69. 
228 Ibid., p.122. 
229 Ibid., p.63. 
230 Ibid., p.123. 
231 Ibid., p.125. For Hatab’s exegesis of Nietzsche’s aristocratism, see pp.39ff. 
232 Connolly (1988), p.161. 
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(according to Nietzsche’s “ontology of resistance”).233 He maintains that 
“Nietzsche’s aristocratic solution […] recreates the very resentment it seeks to 
redress”.234 Connolly thus disavows Nietzsche’s aristocratic solution as inconsistent 
with Nietzsche’s own broader aims. Connolly therefore submits that it is only the 
ethic of “letting be” that we should take from Nietzsche insofar as it is more 
obviously congruent with his denigration of ressentiment. What is more, he 
maintains that a democratic politics is most consistent with this ethical outlook since 
it “provides the best way to incorporate the experience of contingency into public 
life”; moreover, he also maintains that rough equality of income would “relieve 
social causes of resentment.”  
Following a similar and equally imaginative line, Mark Warren admits that 
for Nietzsche the will to power translates into what he calls a “neoaristocratic 
conservativism”; yet Warren nevertheless argues that this “violates [Nietzsche’s] 
own critique of metaphysics” insofar as it is grounded in a crude species of 
naturalism.235 Warren conceives of the will to power as, above all, a human drive for 
“autonomy of the self”. Leading on from this, he asserts that at the level of the 
collective, the “will to power as an organised capacity for action is not inconsistent 
with social and political equality, simply because the universal motive identified by 
the concept of will to power is not domination but self-constitution.”236 Indeed, 
Warren echoes Cavell’s reading of the early Nietzsche in suggesting that if Nietzsche 
had judged societies in a manner more consistent with his philosophy of power, “he 
would have done so in terms of their capacities to enable the positive freedom of 
individuals”.237 Like both Hatab and Connolly then, Warren intimates that for 
Nietzsche, it is an agonistic society founded on the principle of equal opportunity 
                                                      
233 See ch.2, §2.3. 
234 Connolly (1988), p.160. 
235 Ibid., p.211, p.209.  
236 Mark Warren, Nietzsche and Political Thought (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991), p.141, 
p.232. 
237 Ibid., p.234. 
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that could most effectively “serve as a means to organizing individual power as 
agency”.238 
In each of these democratic readings, the conviction is that Nietzsche’s 
distinctive brand of aristocratism is disempowering according to the very logic of 
the will to power; indeed, they all comparably claim that some form of democratic 
political arrangement would be more congruent with this logic and better suited to 
Nietzschean perfectionism.239 In strong contrast to this chorus of interpretations, 
however, there are then the radical aristocratic readings of Nietzsche’s will to power. 
For example, Bruce Detwiler and Frederick Appel both invoke JGB 259 in order to 
defend their reading of Nietzsche’s aristocratism as being quite consistent with his 
notion of the will to power:  
Leben selbst ist wesentlich Aneignung, Verletzung, Überwältigung des 
Fremden und Schwächeren, Unterdrückung, Härte, Aufzwängung 
eigner Formen, Einverleibung und mindestens, mildestens, Ausbeutung 
[…]. Auch jener Körper, innerhalb dessen, wie vorher angenommen 
wurde, die Einzelnen sich als gleich behandeln — es geschieht in jeder 
gesunden Aristokratie —, muss selber, falls er ein lebendiger und nicht 
ein absterbender Körper ist, alles Das gegen andre Körper thun, wessen 
sich die Einzelnen in ihm gegen einander enthalten: er wird der 
leibhafte Wille zur Macht sein müssen, er wird wachsen, um sich 
greifen, an sich ziehn, Übergewicht gewinnen wollen, — nicht aus 
irgend einer Moralität oder Immoralität heraus, sondern weil er lebt, 
und weil Leben eben Wille zur Macht ist. […] Die “Ausbeutung” 
gehört nicht einer verderbten oder unvollkommnen und primitiven 
Gesellschaft an: sie gehört in’s Wesen des Lebendigen, als organische 
Grundfunktion, sie ist eine Folge des eigentlichen Willens zur Macht, 
der eben der Wille des Lebens ist. (My italics)240 
On the basis of this text, Detwiler convincingly argues against Warren that the will 
to power is not purely oriented towards self-overcoming, but is rather irreducibly 
oriented toward the domination of others. According to Detwiler, the will to power 
                                                      
238 Ibid., p.72. I am indebted to Detwiler’s (1990) succinct summary of Warren (pp.160-1). 
239 David Owen (2002), can also be said to occupy this vein of Nietzsche interpretation. 
240 See Detwiler (1990), pp.43-8 for his interpretation of the political ramifications of JGB 
259. 
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“finds its highest expression in the artistic will to give form, whether to the self or 
the state”.241 Thus, he explicitly rejects Warren’s reading, asserting that Nietzsche’s 
“discussion of the political ramifications of life as will to power do indeed flow from 
the same ontology as his thoughts on self-constitution”.242  
Appel draws attention to the way in which JGB 259 portrays pursuing power 
as an amoral activity (“er wird […] Übergewicht gewinnen wollen, — nicht aus 
irgend einer Moralität oder Immoralität heraus”). Appel also cites JGB 44 in arguing 
that Nietzsche esteems individuals who exercise an “unconditional will to power’, 
that revels in the ‘art of experiment and devilry of every kind’.”243 Indeed, from their 
exegeses of the will to power as an amorally exploitative process, both Appel and 
Detwiler take Nietzsche to unequivocally support the idea that the human pursuit of 
power should ideally proceed unencumbered by moral considerations.  On their 
readings, commanding individuals and social groups should rule with ruthless 
sangfroid, exploiting the masses without consideration for their well-being, since it 
is only through such instrumentalisation that the state can generate higher men, who 
represent the ultimate goal of humanity.244  
In support of their construal of ideal Nietzschean command, both cite NL 
1[56] 12.24, where Nietzsche champions figures such as Napoleon and Cesare 
Borgia as his exemplars. From men such as these, one gets a picture “von einem 
‘interesselosen’ Arbeiten an seinem Marmor, mag dabei von Menschen geopfert 
werden, was nur möglich.” This presents us with a conception of statecraft as a 
disinterested aesthetic activity, according to which the masses should be treated as 
no more than mere chips of marble; indeed, Appel and Dombowsky insist that this 
is the only way to create a society capable of producing great individuals according 
                                                      
241 Ibid., p.160. 
242 Ibid., p.161. 
243 Appel (1999), p.31 (my italics). 
244 See Detwiler (1990), pp.53f. See also Appel (1999), pp.147f.: “Nietzsche wishes to 
dissuade [his higher men] from feeling responsible in any way to ostensibly inferior human 
beings. Indeed, in his account the path to species improvement entails a wilful disregard of 
any accountability to the majority.” See also p.132. 
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to Nietzsche.245 Likewise, various other commentators have read Nietzsche as 
endorsing an undiluted form of amoralism, and even immoralism, in his celebration 
of the practice of slavery.246 Therefore, on the one side, according to his agonistic 
democrat readers, Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power is read as inconsistent with 
his aristocratism and more consonant with agonistic democracy. Conversely, his 
radical aristocratic interpreters identify a harmony between his callous conception 
of the world as will to power and his aristocratic political outlook. I want to look at 
how we might go about resolving this aporia.  
One possible response to this has been proffered by Herman Siemens. His 
reading states that Nietzsche’s conception of the world as will to power figures the 
goal of “Machtsteigerung” as fundamental to all life, and that the most pressing 
threat to this goal is that of “Gleichmachung”, that is, a negation of plurality and 
dynamism in favour of homogenous stasis.247 Moreover, Nietzsche explicitly indicts 
certain instantiations of democracy for nurturing just such homogeneity. However, 
on this reading, Nietzsche fundamentally equivocates regarding what he considers 
to be the ideal (i.e. most effective) mode of political organisation with respect to the 
task of fostering plurality and perfectionism. Predominantly drawing on the 
Nachlass, Siemens claims that Nietzsche commends a plethora of incompatible 
approaches. For example, Nietzsche prescribes i) that we should altogether refrain 
from trying to consciously bring about the ideal social conditions for the production 
of higher individuals (NL 26[117] 11.181); ii) that higher individuals should 
mercilessly instrumentalise the masses in some form of pyramidic Platonic society 
(NL 35[47] 11.533); and iii) that such higher individuals should in no way sully 
                                                      
245 See Detwiler (1990), p.53 and Appel (1999), pp.120-6. 
246 See e.g. Conway (1997): “According to Nietzsche, political lawgivers are bound in their 
deliberations by no moral considerations whatsoever – all of which have been cast adrift in 
the passage beyond good and evil” (p.4). Dombowsky (2004): “Nietzschean virtù is egoistic 
and immoralistic. […] The egoism which belongs to the nature of a noble soul carries with 
it the conviction that ‘other beings must be subordinate by nature and have to sacrifice 
themselves’ (BGE 265). In short, the perfectionism which accompanies Nietzschean ‘self-
fashioning’ cannot be separated from the perfectionism which uses ‘the great mass of people 
as . . . tools’ (WP 660 Nachlaß 1885–86 KSA 12 2[76])” (pp.140f.; see also pp.140ff.). 
247 Herman Siemens (2008), p.267 and p.235. 
 381 
themselves with the dirty task of ruling (NL 7[21] 10.244). The plurivocality of these 
theses, Siemens insists, “falsifies any attempt to ascribe a coherent, settled political 
vision to Nietzsche”.248 Siemens further argues that Nietzsche’s conception of 
instrumentalisation is highly underdetermined – sometimes it is pitilessly 
exploitative (e.g. NL 35[9] 11.512); but at other times, Nietzsche’s “exploitative” 
higher individuals are conceived as in actuality serving the masses – namely, insofar 
as they give meaning to the toilsome lives of the majority (e.g. NL 10[17] 12.463);249 
finally, one also finds a relation of total reciprocity, by which both higher individuals 
and the mediocre mutually condition the existence of their counterparts (e.g. NL 
10[59] 12.492).250 Indeed, Siemens uses these texts to corroborate his conviction that 
“Nietzsche’s efforts to think through the demands that issue from his critique of 
democracy in political terms remain fragmentary, contradictory and 
inconclusive.”251 
It is imperative that we acknowledge this lack of coherence in Nietzsche’s 
political thinking, and that we accordingly refrain from ascribing an overly concrete 
or “thick” political ideal to his thought. This said, however, I will now defend the 
idea that we can attribute a positive political vision to him, even if this may be “thin” 
in nature, and not always able to account for each and every politically oriented text 
in the later corpus. In addition, I will endeavour to demonstrate how this thin political 
ideal gels with his conception of the will to power as I have construed it above.  
As should by now be plain, the agonistic democrats (particularly Hatab and 
Connolly) misconceive of the will to power. Healthy will to power organisations can 
certainly destroy particular resistances; what they cannot do, if they are to remain 
healthy, is negate resistance tout court. Moreover, exclusionary struggle is a vital 
life process for any power organisation –relinquishing it would entail death on 
Nietzsche’s analysis. Nonetheless, the radical aristocrats misconceive of Nietzsche’s 
                                                      
248 See ibid., p.242. See pp.239-42. 
249 Ibid., pp.248-54. This recalls one of Nietzsche’s arguments in favour of serving elite 
genius in UB (see §3.3.5.). 
250 Ibid., pp.258-267. 
251 Ibid., p.232. 
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notion of command and exploitation, which should ideally preserve that which is 
commanded. More importantly, however, to the extent that within any healthy 
organisation commanding units must continuously obey those they command, power 
over an incorporated entity is never unconditional and command is never 
unidirectional. Indeed, insofar as they must heed the demands of those weaker than 
them, it would appear that Nietzsche’s ideal commanding forces do have certain 
moral obligations towards those whom they exploit (even if these are not dictated by 
a transcendent moral law). So, both the agonistic democrat and radical aristocratic 
readings respectively misconceive of the will to power as either an excessively 
measured or unmeasured ontology. My interpretation of Nietzsche’s political vision 
as broadly consistent with his conception of the will to power qua organisational 
struggle (i.e. a balance of measured and unmeasured struggle), is therefore offered 
as a positive corrective to these one-sided readings. 
4.5.1. ARISTOCRACY AND EXPLOITATION 
We should commence by collating some of the features that Nietzsche’s plurivocal 
depictions of healthy social order have in common. Many such shared characteristics 
are to be found in his idealising portrayal of historical aristocracies, such as those of 
ancient Greece, the Roman imperium, the Italian Renaissance and even ancient 
Hindu societies. Naturally, we should observe that Nietzsche stresses the 
impossibility of returning to these historical modes of social arrangement; indeed, 
he is certainly not to be considered an advocate of atavistic regression: “Wir 
‘conserviren’ Nichts, wir wollen auch in keine Vergangenheit zurück”, he declares 
(FW 377). Nonetheless, an overview of his idealising representation of these 
societies reveals a range of recurrent features that he strongly implies are essential 
to any thriving community. 
The first feature of the vital Nietzschean society is its prioritisation of the 
individual; indeed, for the later Nietzsche, social organisation should only ever be 
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directed towards the perfectionist goal of bearing ever more exceptional individuals 
– this is its principal Zweck: 
[D]ie Gesellschaft nicht um der Gesellschaft willen dasein dürfe, 
sondern nur als Unterbau und Gerüst, an dem sich eine ausgesuchte Art 
Wesen zu ihrer höheren Aufgabe und überhaupt zu einem höheren Sein 
emporzuheben vermag […]. (JGB 258)252 
Nietzsche maintains that engendering such higher individuals is the ultimate goal 
(and justification) of society.253 These higher creative types are what he sometimes 
refers to as “eine Art Übermensch” (AC 4), the antithesis of the “letzter Mensch”.254 
When Nietzsche says that he wants to advance the “Typus Mensch”, this should be 
interpreted not so much as a generalized concern with improving the conditions of 
every strata of humanity, but rather as a concern with elevating the highest products 
of society, since it is these that stand as the true representatives of humanity, or what 
he calls the “an sich mögliche höchste Mächtigkeit und Pracht des Typus Mensch” 
(GM Preface 6 5.253). As we saw in Chapter 1, these higher individuals are 
invariably culturally creative persons, akin to Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci and 
Napoleon. For Nietzsche, one of the ways in which a society discharges its 
accumulated capital is in the production of such “Übermensch[en]”, who represent 
the “Ausscheidung eines Luxus-Überschusses der Menschheit” (NL 10[17] 12.462). 
Indeed, the generation of the Übermensch is the highest form of agency through 
which a social organisation can express its power. We will return to the highly 
                                                      
252 See also NL 10[111] 12.520: “[M]an [soll] durchaus nicht verkennen, daß es sich trotzdem 
nur um das Zustandekommen des synthetischen Menschen handelt, daß die niedrigen 
Menschen, die ungeheure Mehrzahl bloß Vorspiele und Einübungen sind, aus deren 
Zusammenspiel hier und da der ganze Mensch entsteht, der Meilenstein-Mensch, welcher 
anzeigt, wie weit bisher die Menschheit vorwärts gekommen. Sie geht nicht in Einem Striche 
vorwärts; oft geht der schon erreichte Typus wieder verloren…” JGB 126: “Ein Volk ist der 
Umschweif der Natur, um zu sechs, sieben grossen Männern zu kommen. — Ja: und um 
dann um sie herum zu kommen.” 
253 See also NL 10[17] 12.462f. 
254 AC 4: “In einem andren Sinne giebt es ein fortwährendes Gelingen einzelner Fälle an den 
verschiedensten Stellen der Erde und aus den verschiedensten Culturen heraus, mit denen in 
der That sich ein höherer Typus darstellt: Etwas, das im Verhältniss zur Gesammt-
Menschheit eine Art Übermensch ist.” 
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underdetermined nature of Nietzsche’s conception of the Übermensch below, as well 
as to his justifications for exalting this frustratingly obscure figure; for now, 
supposing we accept this discharge of higher creative individuals as a goal, under 
what social conditions can this discharge be said to take place? 
What is evident from this preference for great individuals over the happiness 
of the greatest possible number is that Nietzsche’s healthy society is inherently 
inegalitarian. And in keeping with his notion of the will to power, he invariably 
views healthy (i.e. fecund) societies as aristocratically organised, which is to say 
stratified: 
Jede Erhöhung des Typus “Mensch” war bisher das Werk einer 
aristokratischen Gesellschaft — und so wird es immer wieder sein: als 
einer Gesellschaft, welche an eine lange Leiter der Rangordnung und 
Werthverschiedenheit von Mensch und Mensch glaubt und Sklaverei 
in irgend einem Sinne nöthig hat. (JGB 257; my italics)255 
Nietzsche defines an aristocratic social order quite minimally as a mode of 
organisation in which individual members form a Rangordnung both insofar as they 
are held to be of differing worth and insofar as individuals always obey the directives 
of those occupying higher rungs. Indeed, in AC 57, he implies that the necessity of 
such hierarchy is sanctioned by nature itself: “Die Ordnung der Kasten, das oberste, 
das dominirende Gesetz, ist nur die Sanktion einer Natur-Ordnung, Natur-
Gesetzlichkeit ersten Ranges” (6.242).  
One of the chief reasons Nietzsche supports an aristocratic social 
arrangement is on account of its association with the institution of slavery 
(Sklaverei). He describes slavery as “eine Bedingung jeder höheren Cultur, jeder 
Erhöhung der Cultur” (JGB 239), and in FW 377, he calls for “einer neuen Sklaverei: 
denn zu jeder Verstärkung und Erhöhung des Typus ‘Mensch’ gehört auch eine neue 
Art Versklavung hinzu”. Furthermore, he affirms slavery as a precondition of 
producing higher individuals: “[D]ie Sklaverei ist, wie es scheint, im gröberen und 
                                                      
255 See also NL 2[76] 12.96-7. 
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feineren Verstande das unentbehrliche Mittel auch der geistigen Zucht und 
Züchtung” (JGB 188). As we have seen from JGB 259, Nietzsche justifies 
exploitative social relations on the naturalistic grounds that “Leben selbst ist 
wesentlich […] Einverleibung und mindestens, mildestens, Ausbeutung” (JGB 259). 
A healthy society is defined by a constant struggle for Einverleibung, that is, the 
overpowering and subsequent exploitation of others. But why? And what forms can 
this exploitation take? 
One reason that slavery is necessary according to Nietzsche, is insofar as it 
functions as a sine qua non of cultivating self-tyranny. As he states in JGB 257, 
Ohne das Pathos der Distanz, wie es aus dem eingefleischten 
Unterschied der Stände, aus dem beständigen Ausblick und Herabblick 
der herrschenden Kaste auf Unterthänige und Werkzeuge […], könnte 
auch jenes andre geheimnissvollere Pathos gar nicht erwachsen, jenes 
Verlangen nach immer neuer Distanz-Erweiterung innerhalb der Seele 
selbst, die Herausbildung immer höherer, seltnerer, fernerer, 
weitgespannterer, umfänglicherer Zustände, kurz eben die Erhöhung 
des Typus “Mensch”, die fortgesetzte “Selbst-Überwindung des 
Menschen” […]. 
As commentators such as Keith Ansell-Pearson and David Owen have argued, in 
JGB, the external Pathos der Distanz (i.e. towards others) is only postulated as 
necessary insofar as it stands as a condition of possibility for the feeling of distance 
within oneself – that is, insofar as it functions as a means to self-exploitation.256 
However, despite this emphasis on slavery as a means to self-tyranny, Nietzsche 
nonetheless stresses the need for the institution on a variety of other grounds.  
On the one hand, he proffers a purely economic argument insofar as he 
conceives of the Übermensch as the product of a collective or communal “Luxus-
Überschuß”, as already mentioned above. As in the case of the genius in CV 3, we 
can assume that the reason for this is that Übermenschen must live off this surplus 
in order to concern themselves with higher pursuits (rather than the reproduction of 
                                                      
256 See Ansell-Pearson (1994), pp.204-5. See also Owen (2002), p.121. On the basis of this, 
Thomas Fossen has argued that Nietzsche “confines the activity of self-overcoming to the 
aristocratic elite, to the exclusion of others.” Thomas Fossen (2008), p.301. 
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their existence).257 Needless to say, this entails economic exploitation. In addition to 
this, however, Nietzsche also puts forward the argument that the aristocracy of 
higher individuals need to make use of the masses in order to realise their creative 
projects: 
Das Wesentliche an einer guten und gesunden Aristokratie ist aber, dass 
sie sich nicht als Funktion (sei es des Königthums, sei es des 
Gemeinwesens), sondern als dessen Sinn und höchste Rechtfertigung 
fühlt, — dass sie deshalb mit gutem Gewissen das Opfer einer Unzahl 
Menschen hinnimmt, welche um ihretwillen zu unvollständigen 
Menschen, zu Sklaven, zu Werkzeugen herabgedrückt und vermindert 
werden müssen. (JGB 258) 
Great individuals such as Caesar and Napoleon needed armies of conscripted men 
in order to undertake their pan-European exercises in state-building; moreover, they 
needed to be perfectly at ease with losses. Indeed, the Pathos der Distanz can be 
seen as a feeling of moral licence facilitating precisely this kind dispassionate 
instrumentalisation of subaltern individuals. However, Nietzsche also emphasises 
that even these higher individuals must sacrifice themselves (“[sich selber] opfern”) 
for the sake of further elevating humankind (as embodied in its highest exemplars, 
that is). In this sense, then, Nietzsche vacillates regarding the degree to which his 
higher individuals should feel themselves to be a function.258 Moreover, as in UB, 
we should not overlook the fact that the Übermenschen give something 
indispensable back to the masses, and that it is in the latter’s own interests (according 
to Nietzsche) to work to generate such individuals. If an economically productive 
and well-managed society lacks higher exemplars, Nietzsche stresses that 
[…] die Unkosten Aller summiren sich zu einem Gesammt-Verlust: der 
Mensch wird geringer: — so daß man nicht mehr weiß, wozu überhaupt 
                                                      
257 See also NL 2[13] 12.73. 
258 See GD Streifzüge 38 6.139, where Nietzsche insists upon the importance “[d]ass man 
die Distanz, die uns abtrennt, festhält. Dass man gegen Mühsal, Härte, Entbehrung, selbst 
gegen das Leben gleichgültiger wird. Dass man bereit ist, seiner Sache Menschen zu opfern, 
sich selber nicht abgerechnet.” See also NL 25[105] 11.38. 
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dieser ungeheure Prozeß gedient hat. Ein wozu? ein neues “Wozu!” — 
das ist es, was die Menschheit nöthig hat… (NL 10[17] 12.463) 
As Herman Siemens has underscored, Nietzsche therefore criticises the purely 
economic model of exploitation (i.e. increased exploitation equals increased output 
or value). For Nietzsche, humanity conceived as a perfectly operating machine has 
no higher purpose, and thus represents a net decrease in value (a “Gesammt 
Verlust”). Thus, the Übermensch bestows a purpose on this exploitative apparatus 
and thereby endows the toilsome lives of the masses with existential significance – 
he is “rechtfertigend[..]” (ibid.). In this way, then, the Übermensch can be 
understood as a means to an end that serves the very purposes of those whom they 
ostensibly exploit.259 
Nietzsche’s apology for exploitation should also not mislead us into 
thinking that the slavery he has in mind is simple chattel slavery; indeed, he often 
employs a far more expansive conception of Sklaverei, which merely involves the 
existence of “der Mensch als Werkzeug” (NL 25[238] 11.74).260 This encompasses 
various professions that we would not ordinarily consider exemplary of 
enslavement. For instance, he takes the scholar of philosophy, the monk, and the 
governmental official to epitomise slavery: “In Wahrheit giebt es immer Sklaverei 
— ob ihr es wollt oder nicht! Z.B. der preußische Beamte. Der Gelehrte. Der Mönch” 
(NL 25[225] 11.72).261 
                                                      
259 See Siemens (2008), pp.253-6. Compare §3.3.5. of this thesis. 
260 For an analysis of Nietzsche’s understanding of enslavement as merely treating the other 
as a means, see Fossen (2008) (esp. pp.307ff.). 
261 On the scholar of philosophy as slave,	see JGB 207: “Wenn man ihn [den objectiven 
Geist] so lange mit dem Philosophen verwechselt hat, mit dem cäsarischen Züchter und 
Gewaltmenschen der Cultur: so hat man ihm viel zu hohe Ehren gegeben und das 
Wesentlichste an ihm übersehen, — er ist ein Werkzeug, ein Stück Sklave, wenn gewiss auch 
die sublimste Art des Sklaven, an sich aber Nichts, — presque rien!” 
On this broader conception, it is hard to see how slavery could be wholly abolished. 
As David Owen (2002) has noted, the same criticism that Oscar Wilde implicitly invokes 
against Aristotle can likewise be directed against Nietzsche’s advocacy of slavery (pp.121f.). 
Wilde admits that the Greeks were “quite right” in saying that “civilisation requires slaves. 
[…] Unless there are slaves to do the ugly, horrible, uninteresting work, culture and 
contemplation become almost impossible […]”; however, post-industrialisation, Wilde 
points out that this function can now be fulfilled by machines. See Oscar Wilde, “The Soul 
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Consonant with Nietzsche’s account of the will to power, we should observe 
that the struggle of a healthy collective to establish exploitative relations is not 
merely internal to society (or the individual self). Rather, this impetus must also be 
directed externally, towards the instrumentalisation of others outside of the given 
social organisation: 
Es gehört zum Begriff des Lebendigen, daß es wachsen muß, — daß es 
seine Macht erweitert und folglich fremde Kräfte in sich hineinnehmen 
muß. […] Wenigstens dürfte ein Volk mit ebensoviel gutem Sinn sein 
Eroberungsbedürfniß, sein Machtgelüst, sei es mit Waffen, sei es durch 
Handel, Verkehr und Colonisation als Recht bezeichnen, — 
Wachsthums-Recht etwa. Eine Gesellschaft, die endgültig und ihrem 
Instinkt nach den Krieg und die Eroberung abweist, ist im Niedergang 
[…]. (NL 14[192] 13.378) 
Again, Nietzsche’s argument for the necessity of this struggle for growth and 
“Eroberung” is grounded in his understanding of societies as will to power 
organisations. We would do well to remark, however, that this conquest is not 
necessarily achieved by means of military force, but can equally be accomplished 
through the use of so-called soft power (i.e. through economic and cultural 
influence).262 Indeed, Nietzsche is well aware that although one can often effectively 
demonstrate one’s power over another by wielding one’s martial might, this is not a 
particularly efficient means of incorporating that other (insofar as it makes them 
hostile towards us).263  
                                                      
of Man under Socialism”, in The Collected Works of Oscar Wilde (Hertfordshire: 
Wordsworth, 2007), pp.1039-66 (p.1050). (For a similar argument, see also Ansell-Pearson 
[1994], p.214.) While this criticism holds for the texts in which Nietzsche indexes something 
akin to chattel slavery, it does not hold for the other texts in which Nietzsche uses the 
aforementioned expansive definition. Someone, after all, would surely have to service the 
machines which underpin Wilde’s utopian vision. Owen (2002) also argues that Nietzsche 
drops his pro-slavery position after JGB (p.122); however, given that we find support for this 
position in both FW 377, GD Streifzüge 38 6.139f. and GD Streifzüge 40 6.142f., this is an 
untenable position. See also NL 11[60] 13.30: “Wenn man ein Ziel will, muß man die Mittel 
wollen: wenn man Sklaven will, — und man braucht sie! — muß man sie nicht zu Herren 
erziehen”. 
262 Compare also GM II 11 5.310-3 and GD Alten 3 6.157. 
263 On this topic, see NL 16[26] 10.507f.: “Jedes Lebendige greift so weit um sich mit seiner 
Kraft, als es kann und unterwirft sich das Schwächere: so hat es seinen Genuß an sich. Die 
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Just as in Nietzsche’s model of the well-functioning power organisation, this 
exploitative command structure is supported by certain virtues; to be sure, Nietzsche 
makes the very general remark that we ought to conceive of “Moral nämlich als 
Lehre von den Herrschafts-Verhältnissen verstanden, unter denen das Phänomen 
‘Leben’ entsteht” (JGB 19). But how does this apply to the realm of the social in 
particular? As we have just witnessed, soft-power is integral to Nietzsche’s account 
of how slavery is maintained within a society – namely, through the use of morality 
and moral education: “Die Moralen und Religionen sind das Haupt-Mittel, mit dem 
man aus dem Menschen gestalten kann, was Einem beliebt” (NL 34[176] 11.478). 
For example, through the “Veredlung der Gehorchsamkeit” (JGB 61), morality 
conditions the lower rungs to obey, to be good instruments for the commanding 
classes (indeed, this is one of the main uses Nietzsche identifies in Christianity).264 
But compliance is also established through morality by a more direct route – namely, 
insofar as moral doctrine represents a means of codifying the behaviour of the 
masses through their conscience. In this manner, it functions “als ein Band, das 
Herrscher und Unterthanen gemeinsam bindet und die Gewissen der Letzteren, ihr 
Verborgenes und Innerlichstes, das sich gerne dem Gehorsam entziehen möchte, den 
Ersteren verräth und überantwortet” (JGB 61).  
Moral command of this sort has the further benefit of enabling the minority 
of “Geistigen” to maintain a healthy prophylactic distance from the infectious values 
of rabble.265 Indeed, the positively charged notion of “das Pathos der Distanz” also 
often signifies precisely this sense of seclusion.266 Crucially, Nietzsche’s affirmation 
                                                      
zunehmende ‘Vermenschlichung’ in dieser Tendenz besteht darin, daß immer feiner 
empfunden wird, wie schwer der Andere wirklich einzuverleiben ist: wie die grobe 
Schädigung zwar unsere Macht über ihn zeigt, zugleich aber seinen Willen uns noch mehr 
entfremdet — also ihn weniger unterwerfbar macht.” 
264 See NL 10[188] 12.568 and NL 35[9] 11.511. See also Appel (1999), p.134. 
265 In AC 57, Nietzsche also outlines how this can be achieved by the commanders by 
commanding vicariously, through executives (such as monarchs). 
266 See also GM III 14 5.371: “— das Höhere soll sich nicht zum Werkzeug des Niedrigeren 
herabwürdigen, das Pathos der Distanz soll in alle Ewigkeit auch die Aufgaben aus einander 
halten! Ihr Recht, dazusein, das Vorrecht der Glocke mit vollem Klange vor der misstönigen, 
zersprungenen, ist ja ein tausendfach grösseres: sie allein sind die Bürgen der Zukunft, sie 
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of this pathos presents a further problem for the agonistic democrat reading, which 
construes Nietzsche as radically endorsing inclusion. On Nietzsche’s account, 
Religion also functions in a manner akin to Plato’s “noble lie”, giving the lower 
ranks a “Genügsamkeit mit ihrer Lage und Art” (JGB 61).267 This is in stark contrast 
to the side of Christianity that Nietzsche disdains for trying to level man by teaching 
“Die ‘Gleichheit der Seelen vor Gott’” (AC 62) or socialist rabble-rousers, who “das 
Genügsamkeits-Gefühl des Arbeiters mit seinem kleinen Sein untergraben, — die 
ihn neidisch machen, die ihn Rache lehren” (AC 57).   
Such comments once again betray that Nietzsche’s struggle to incorporate 
Christianity and its derivatives does not aspire to remainderless sublimation. To be 
sure, he struggles to instrumentalise as much of them as possible for the higher aim 
of generating superior individuals; yet, there are always aspects of them that he 
appears to deem incompatible with this goal and which he accordingly spurns – 
indeed, in subjecting these aspects to radical critique, he apparently strives for their 
exclusion or Ausscheidung. To the extent that his critical engagement with 
Christianity and its derivatives combines measured and unmeasured struggle as a 
means to establishing a generative (social) synthesis, it can therefore be taken as a 
performative instantiation of his own notion of organisational struggle. 
One of the final grounds on which Nietzsche deems an aristocratic social 
organisation to be exigent is that it provides a basis for breeding (“Zucht und 
Züchtung”) in its creation of a stable moral order.268 It functions as a “Veranstaltung 
zum Zweck der Züchtung” (JGB 262), where breeding represents one of the most 
effective ways of increasing the net force of humanity. Indeed, opposing himself to 
the Christian notion of taming, he asserts the following: 
                                                      
allein sind verpflichtet für die Menschen-Zukunft.” For more on Nietzsche’s praise of a 
separation of the higher from the lower orders, see his discussion of “Schutzmaassregeln” in 
GD Verbesserer 3 6.100. 
267 To be sure, Nietzsche thinks that even Christianity and Buddhism teach the lowest 
individuals “[zu stellen] sich durch Frömmigkeit in eine höhere Schein-Ordnung der Dinge 
[…] und damit das Genügen an der wirklichen Ordnung, innerhalb deren sie hart genug 
leben, — und gerade diese Härte thut Noth! — bei sich festzuhalten” (JGB 61). 
268 See e.g. JGB 188 and 203. 
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Die Zähmung ist, wie ich sie verstehe, ein Mittel der ungeheuren Kraft-
Aufspeicherung der Menschheit, so daß die Geschlechter auf der Arbeit 
ihrer Vorfahren fortbauen können […].  (NL 15[65] 13.450) 
Owing to the entrenched nature of our drives, the project of generating higher 
individuals is, as demonstrated above, not achievable within the span of a single 
lifetime – it requires a transgenerational breeding programme. A programme of this 
sort in turn requires, according to Nietzsche, the stringent and tenacious authority 
that apparently only an aristocratic moral and legal order can provide.269 In Section 
4.2.2., we also saw that Nietzsche holds democracy to be characterised by a 
“Vielwollerei” (presumably on account of its short-term and coalition governments), 
from which we can surmise that it would be incapable of bringing such a long-term 
project to fruition. It should come as no surprise that 
[…] nichts scheint mir [Nietzsche] wesentlicher zu studiren, als die 
Gesetze der Züchtung, um nicht die größte Menge von Kraft wieder zu 
verlieren, durch unzweckmäßige Verbindungen und Lebensweisen. 
(NL 34[176] 11.480) 
Certainly, there has been quite some dispute over the precise nature of this 
transgenerational breeding programme. The debate concerns whether the laws of 
which Nietzsche speaks primarily ensure a biological-eugenic or a cultural-
                                                      
269 See JGB 262: “Nun sehe man einmal ein aristokratisches Gemeinwesen, etwa eine alte 
griechische Polis oder Venedig, als eine, sei es freiwillige, sei es unfreiwillige Veranstaltung 
zum Zweck der Züchtung an: es sind da Menschen bei einander und auf sich angewiesen, 
welche ihre Art durchsetzen wollen […] [.] [D]ie Art hat sich als Art nöthig, als Etwas, das 
sich gerade vermöge seiner Härte, Gleichförmigkeit, Einfachheit der Form überhaupt 
durchsetzen und dauerhaft machen kann […]. [J]ede aristokratische Moral ist unduldsam, in 
der Erziehung der Jugend, in der Verfügung über die Weiber, in den Ehesitten, im 
Verhältnisse von Alt und Jung, in den Strafgesetzen (welche allein die Abartenden in’s Auge 
fassen)”. Continuing this line of thought in AC 58, Nietzsche also commends durable and 
intransigent religious-legal orders, such as that of the Roman imperium, as a condition for 
the flourishing of life. Here he affirms the fact that “wir [lernten] eben eine religiöse 
Gesetzgebung kennen, deren Zweck war, die oberste Bedingung dafür, dass das Leben 
gedeiht, eine grosse Organisation der Gesellschaft zu ‘verewigen’”. On the necessity of legal 
order for the expansion of life, see Herman Siemens, “The Problem of Law and Life in 
Nietzsche's Thought”, The New Centennial Review, 10(3) (2010), 189-216. 
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educational form of cultivation.270 The terms Zucht and Züchtung seem to play on 
just this ambiguity – both, in different contexts, being capable of signifying either 
zoological breeding or cultural cultivation.271 Since, as we now know, Nietzsche 
does not make a clear-cut distinction between biologically and culturally ingrained 
behavioural impulses (i.e. drives), it is no wonder that we find an analogous duality 
to his breeding project. In the previous two citations, for example, it is evident that 
Nietzsche understands these laws as regulating both breeding partnerships 
(“Verbindungen”) and more culturally oriented means of cultivation (e.g. 
“Erziehung” and “Lebensweise”).272 We can therefore deduce from this that he 
believes we can, and indeed should, struggle against deeply embedded, harmful 
drives insofar as we are able to prevent their being passed on to future generations 
(pace Connolly). 
Hitherto, most of my reading may seem to have been in accord with that of 
the radical aristocrats, and against that of the agonistic democrats – that is, to the 
extent that I have argued that Nietzsche’s advocacy of exploitation both follows from 
his conception of the will to power and coherently underpins his perfectionist 
project. Nonetheless, against the radical aristocrats, we have observed that 
Nietzsche’s conception of slavery, and the means by which it is established, is 
radically underdetermined, to the point that it certainly does not amount to anything 
remotely like a coherently proto-fascist political agenda. Moreover, as we now 
continue to further interrogate the radical aristocratic reading of Nietzsche as a 
proponent of specifically amoral exploitation, we will find that this reading 
decisively diverges from his picture of the will to power as a form of reciprocity.  
                                                      
270 For a more biologically oriented account of Zucht and Züchtung, see Richardson (2004), 
esp. pp.190-200. For an account that is centred on cultural means of cultivation, see Ottmann 
(1987) (pp.358ff.) or Schank (2000). 
271 See Ottmann (1987), p.358; Schank (2000). See also entries for “Zucht” and “Züchtung” 
in DWB. See also Detwiler (1990), pp.111-3. 
272 On Nietzsche’s advocacy of using marriage laws as a means to selective breeding, see 
also NL 4[6] 12.179. See also JGB 61, where Nietzsche describes “glückliche Ehesitten” as 
a precondition of higher individuals. See also Richardson (2004), p.198. 
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According to Nietzsche, the lower castes are relentlessly struggling 
upwards, with an eye to occupying the social position of their commanders. Indeed, 
he appears to praise the fact that religious education can give the classes of the 
“Beherrschten” both the “Geistigkeit” and practice in self-overcoming required in 
order to rise up and eventually seize power (JGB 61).273 What is more, Nietzsche 
frequently valorises a form of social stratification marked by constant tension and 
struggle – a “beständigen Übung im Gehorchen und Befehlen, Nieder- und 
Fernhalten” (JGB 257; my italics).274 Just as in Roux’s vision of the body, the tension 
generated by the parts concurrently striving for dominance is vital to the continued 
strength of the whole. But what we also discovered in our exposition of healthy will 
to power organisations was that insofar as any commanding organisation depends 
upon its subordinates, it must also partly obey their demands and exercise certain 
Tugenden towards them – that is, their struggle to exploit must be measured. I do 
not wish to deny the presence of texts in which Nietzsche endorses amoralism, but 
merely to draw attention to the fact that he also presents exploitative rule in a way 
that better coheres with his account of the will to power. And to be sure, we find that 
this thought is affirmed in his later, socially oriented, writings:  
[Die Mittelmässigkeit] ist selbst die erste Nothwendigkeit dafür, dass 
es Ausnahmen geben darf: eine hohe Cultur ist durch sie bedingt. Wenn 
der Ausnahme-Mensch gerade die Mittelmässigen mit zarteren Fingern 
                                                      
273 JGB 61: “Inzwischen giebt die Religion auch einem Theile der Beherrschten Anleitung 
und Gelegenheit, sich auf einstmaliges Herrschen und Befehlen vorzubereiten, jenen 
langsam heraufkommenden Klassen und Ständen nämlich, in denen, durch glückliche 
Ehesitten, die Kraft und Lust des Willens, der Wille zur Selbstbeherrschung, immer im 
Steigen ist: — ihnen bietet die Religion Anstösse und Versuchungen genug, die Wege zur 
höheren Geistigkeit zu gehen, die Gefühle der grossen Selbstüberwindung, des Schweigens 
und der Einsamkeit zu erproben: — Asketismus und Puritanismus sind fast unentbehrliche 
Erziehungs- und Veredelungsmittel, wenn eine Rasse über ihre Herkunft aus dem Pöbel Herr 
werden will und sich zur einstmaligen Herrschaft emporarbeitet.” In this way, Nietzsche’s 
aristocratism is in no way at odds with his calls for self-overcoming – being oppressed does 
not necessarily prevent one from engaging in such activity (as Mark Warren [1991] has 
argued, for example). 
274 See Tongeren (1989), pp.152f. 
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handhabt, als sich und seines Gleichen, so ist dies nicht bloss 
Höflichkeit des Herzens, — es ist einfach seine Pflicht… (AC 57) 
This passage, which is usually suppressed by radical aristocratic readers, is 
revealing, even if Nietzsche does not expand upon it in great detail. Though we have 
to cast our eye back to the middle period, we find a text describing this dynamic 
quite lucidly, and showing that this idea is not a mere anomaly, but that it persists 
throughout the corpus: 
Vom Rechte des Schwächeren. — Wenn sich Jemand unter 
Bedingungen einem Mächtigeren unterwirft, zum Beispiel eine 
belagerte Stadt, so ist die Gegenbedingung die, dass man sich 
vernichten, die Stadt verbrennen und so dem Mächtigen eine grosse 
Einbusse machen kann. Desshalb entsteht hier eine Art Gleichstellung, 
auf Grund welcher Rechte festgesetzt werden können. Der Feind hat 
seinen Vortheil an der Erhaltung. — Insofern giebt es auch Rechte 
zwischen Sclaven und Herren, das heisst genau in dem Maasse, in 
welchem der Besitz des Sclaven seinem Herrn nützlich und wichtig ist. 
(WS 93)275 
If we read AC 57 in the context of WS 93, it becomes plain that Nietzsche is not 
proposing that superior individuals should grant their subordinates rights in 
accordance with some objective or transcendent law. Nor is it saying that 
subordinates can claim equal rights. Rather, it is simply stating that exploiters must 
grant the exploited certain moral obligations (i.e. rights) by virtue of their 
dependence on the latter and their need to prevent a suicidal rebellion (or, we might 
infer, simply their decay and death through neglect). There is unfortunately not space 
to fully develop this point. However, I would contend that these texts sufficiently 
demonstrate that Nietzsche’s model of healthy social exploitation is not adequately 
captured by the unidirectional, amoral interpretation of Nietzschean slavery put 
forward by the radical aristocrats. Rather, Nietzsche’s model is better described as 
being defined by a condition of moral reciprocity, which is grounded in the 
                                                      
275 See also M 112, and Paul Patton, “Nietzsche on Rights, Power and the Feeling of Power”, 
in Herman Siemens and Vasti Roodt (eds.), Nietzsche, Power and Politics: Rethinking 
Nietzsche's Legacy for Political Thought (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), pp.471-89. 
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interdependence of hierarchically organised powers; moreover, as I have 
maintained, it is this characterisation that is more properly consistent with his 
conception of the will to power. 
In proposing that we read Nietzsche’s notion of exploitative struggle as 
restrained, however, we should not overlook the unambiguously unmeasured species 
of struggle that is also intrinsic to his notion of healthy social order. For example, 
while Nietzsche promotes an expansionist foreign policy (see NL 14[192] 13.378, 
cited above), the incorporation of foreign cultures must be selective insofar as 
societies must exclude those cultures that they are not strong enough to incorporate 
and which may therefore cause them harm (recalling UB). Thus, Nietzsche approves 
of the German struggle to block Jewish immigration from the East on account of the 
relative strength of these Jews: “[…] also gebietet der Instinkt eines Volkes, dessen 
Art noch schwach und unbestimmt ist, so dass sie leicht verwischt, leicht durch eine 
stärkere Rasse ausgelöscht werden könnte” (JGB 251). 
Yet in some of his admittedly more extreme moments, we also bear witness 
to Nietzsche condoning the eradication of certain members of society. Like Spencer, 
he criticises Christianity for preserving degenerate parts of society: “[S]ie erhielten 
zu viel von dem, was zu Grunde gehn sollte” (JGB 62); indeed, against positivistic 
socialists, he does not view it as desirable to eradicate disease and self-destructive 
forms of vice from society – for Nietzsche, these are means of facilitating the demise 
of potentially detrimental elements of society: “Der Abfall, Verfall, Ausschuß ist 
nichts, was an sich zu verurtheilen wäre: er ist eine nothwendige Consequenz des 
Lebens, des Wachsthums an Leben” (NL 14[75]13.255). But this is not just a matter 
of passively allowing the degenerate to perish; indeed, Nietzsche often endorses a 
concerningly more active approach. Sometimes this involves pre-emptively 
preventing reproduction, but elsewhere his prescriptions have a more aggressively 
genocidal overtone; thus, he acclaims 
Jene neue Partei des Lebens, welche die grösste aller Aufgaben, die 
Höherzüchtung der Menschheit in die Hände nimmt, eingerechnet die 
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schonungslose Vernichtung alles Entartenden und Parasitischen […]. 
(EH GT 4 6.313)276 
Again, Nietzsche invokes a naturalistic argument in order to justify such policies:  
Das Leben selbst erkennt keine Solidarität, kein “gleiches Recht” 
zwischen gesunden und entartenden Theilen eines Organismus an: 
letztere muß man ausschneiden — oder das Ganze geht zu Grunde. — 
Mitleiden mit den décadents, gleiche Rechte auch für die Mißrathenen 
— das wäre die tiefste Unmoralität, das wäre die Widernatur selbst als 
Moral! (NL 23[1] 13.600; my italics) 
Those who are of no use whatsoever to the commanding parties have no claim to 
any rights from their superiors whatsoever (unlike those who can be exploited), not 
even to the right to life. Accordingly, Nietzsche condones a wholly unrestrained, 
amoral struggle. Notwithstanding the fact that Nietzsche grounds this negative 
eugenic project in his conception of the world as will to power, such genocidal social 
behaviour does not seem to be entailed by the logic of the will to power as I have 
construed it. Thus, we might retort that deportation or exile would be equally (if not 
more) consonant with the affirmation of Ausscheidung demanded by his account of 
the will to power. 
Although I have tried to argue against the radical aristocrats that Nietzsche’s 
later model of exploitation should be read as measured, the sheer quantity of texts 
applauding the struggle to secure the substantive inequality, exploitation, exclusion 
and even destruction of large swathes of society unequivocally vitiates any agonistic 
                                                      
276 See also NL 11[414] 13.192: “Die Schwachen und Mißrathenen sollen zu Grunde gehn: 
erster Satz der Gesellschaft. Und man soll ihnen dazu noch helfen.” On Nietzsche’s 
endorsement of preventing reproduction in certain cases, see e.g. NL 23[1] 13.599: “Die 
Gesellschaft, als Großmandatar des Lebens, hat jedes verfehlte Leben vor dem Leben selber 
zu verantworten, — sie hat es auch zu büßen: folglich soll sie es verhindern. Die Gesellschaft 
soll in zahlreichen Fällen der Zeugung vorbeugen: sie darf hierzu, ohne Rücksicht auf 
Herkunft, Rang und Geist, die härtesten Zwangs-Maaßregeln, Freiheits-Entziehungen, unter 
Umständen Castrationen in Bereitschaft halten. — Das Bibel-Verbot ‘du sollst nicht tödten!’ 
ist eine Naivetät im Vergleich zum Ernst des Lebens-Verbots an die décadents: ‘ihr sollt 
nicht zeugen!’” See also GD Streifzüge 39 6.141; NL 16[35] 13.495; Richardson (2004), 
p.198. 
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interpretation of his later socio-political philosophy.277 Indeed, the zweckmäßig 
organisation of society is figured as a function of these very processes. They 
represent the means by which society averts the extremes of excessive or insufficient 
internal tension. However, the question with which I would now like to close is: How 
does Nietzsche think we can move from our degenerate society to one that can 
legitimately be called healthy according to the criteria we have established 
throughout this subsection? 
4.5.2. INITIATING SOCIAL SYNTHESIS 
So far, we have outlined how Nietzsche believes a healthy society functions. But 
this does not tell us how the synthesis and revitalisation of our degenerately 
disgregated modern society can be initiated. As in his earlier philosophy, Nietzsche 
hopes to achieve this by uniting Europeans around a shared Aufgabe (what I called 
a “common purpose” in §3.3.5.): “Weiss Jemand ausser mir einen Weg aus dieser 
Sackgasse? Eine Aufgabe gross genug, die Völker wieder zu binden?” (EH WA 2 
6.360).278 As should by now be abundantly clear, the Aufgabe Nietzsche has in mind 
is the transgenerational task of breeding higher individuals: “Mein Gedanke: es 
fehlen die Ziele, und diese müssen Einzelne sein! (NL 7[6] 12.281); “[N]icht 
‘Menschheit’, sondern Übermensch ist das Ziel!” (NL 26[232] 11.210). But in order 
to attain this end, Nietzsche informs us, we need to begin by breeding an aristocracy, 
since it is only a tenacious social group of this sort who will be able to accomplish 
this long-term task (as was shown in the previous subsection). He thus hopes for “die 
Entstehung von internationalen Geschlechts-Verbänden […], welche sich die 
                                                      
277 See Detwiler (1990), p.108.  
278 As Nietzsche says in Z: “Noch hat die Menschheit kein Ziel” (Z I Ziele 4.76). 
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Aufgabe setzten, eine Herren-Rasse heraufzuzüchten, die zukünftigen ‘Herren der 
Erde’” (NL 2[57] 12.87).279  
In JGB 251, he calls “die Züchtung einer neuen über Europa regierenden 
Kaste” the “europäische Problem”, and it is indeed a problem. How does Nietzsche 
think we can go about this short-term task of cultivating a productive aristocracy? 
To be sure, in one note entitled “Die Starken der Zukunft”, he gives us some concrete 
ideas as to how we might set about propagating a future race of leaders: 
Die Mittel wären die, welche die Geschichte lehrt: die Isolation durch 
umgekehrte Erhaltungs-Interessen als die durchschnittlichen heute 
sind; die Einübung in umgekehrte Werthschätzungen; die Distanz als 
Pathos; das freie Gewissen im heute Unterschätztesten und 
Verbotensten. (NL 9[153] 12.425)280 
Recalling UB, there is again a need to ensure a certain isolation for some individuals 
in order to allow them a space for experimentation.281 Indeed, he accents the demand 
for “eine Rasse mit eigener Lebenssphäre […]; ein Treibhaus für sonderbare und 
ausgesuchte Pflanzen” (ibid.). Within such a sequestered space – a melting-pot in 
which the principles of the will to power (hierarchy, conflict, exploitation, etc.) are 
affirmed – higher individuals can forge not only new moralities of self-organisation, 
but also those capable of vibrantly synthesising the community. Thus, Nietzsche 
describes how the laws of Manu, honed to breed higher individuals, were preceded 
                                                      
279 See also NL 37[8] 11.582: “[V]or Allem [muß] erst eine neue Art angezüchtet werden 
[…], in der dem nämlichen Willen, dem nämlichen Instinkte Dauer durch viele Geschlechter 
verbürgt wird: eine neue Herren-Art und –Kaste”. 
280 See NL 37[8] 11.582, in which Nietzsche affirms the following: “Eine Umkehrung der 
Werthe für eine bestimmte starke Art von Menschen höchster Geistigkeit und Willenskraft 
vorzubereiten und zu diesem Zwecke bei ihnen eine Menge im Zaum gehaltener und 
verläumdeter Instinkte langsam und mit Vorsicht zu entfesseln”. NL 10[59] 12.491f., in 
which the importance of isolation is emphasised. NL 10[61] 12.493. See also Conway 
(1997), pp.30-2, and p.34. 
281 On the role of experimentation (and temptation) in Nietzsche’s political philosophy, see 
Conway (1997), pp.75-8. Conway claims that this experimentation is private in kind (such 
as is outlined in §4.4.2. of this chapter) and that this sets an example of health for others – 
thus, there is a kind of trickle-down effect from this private experimentation: “Born of excess, 
the philosopher’s ‘private’ experiments leak uncontrollably into the public sphere, where 
they are received as temptations and invitations” (p.77). 
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by a great period of experimentation. In this text, he thereby further encourages us 
moderns to create a similar experimental space able to act as a crucible for new social 
moralities.282 However, do we not need an aristocracy – or at least precisely the kind 
of stable government we are currently lacking – in order to institutionalise this 
space? In other words, do we not require an aristocracy in place to breed an 
aristocracy? Is Nietzsche suggesting we bootstrap ourselves out of the crisis of 
disgregation? I will now argue that he offers the concepts of the ewige Wiederker 
des Gleichen and the Wille zur Macht as means to overcoming this problem, which 
is to say, as means to kick-starting the process of organisational conflict.  
To be sure, Nietzsche conceived of his own philosophy as being able to set 
the cogs of convalescence into motion and even initiate the task of breeding 
(Züchten) a new race of leaders: 
Meine Philosophie bringt den siegreichen Gedanken, an welchem 
zuletzt jede andere Denkweise zu Grunde geht. Es ist der große 
züchtende Gedanke: die Rassen, welche ihn nicht ertragen, sind 
verurtheilt; die, welche ihn als größte Wohlthat empfinden, sind zur 
Herrschaft ausersehn. (NL 26[376] 11.250)283 
On the one hand, the “Gedanke” to which Nietzsche is referring is that of the ewige 
Wiederkehr des Gleichen – the idea that “Dieses Leben, wie du es jetzt lebst und 
gelebt hast, wirst du noch einmal und noch unzählige Male leben müssen” (FW 341). 
The thought represents a view of “das Dasein, so wie es ist, ohne Sinn und Ziel, aber 
unvermeidlich wiederkehrend, ohne ein Finale ins Nichts” (NL 5[71] 12.213). There 
is certainly textual evidence to suggest that Nietzsche envisaged the descriptive 
                                                      
282 See AC 57 6.241: “Ein solches Gesetzbuch wie das des Manu entsteht, wie jedes gute 
Gesetzbuch: es resümirt die Erfahrung, Klugheit und Experimental-Moral von langen 
Jahrhunderten, es schliesst ab, es schafft Nichts mehr.” We should also remark Nietzsche’s 
criticisms of the laws of Manu in the Nachlass, as pointed out by Thomas Brobjer. See e.g. 
NL 14[203] 13.385f.; NL 14[216] 13.392f.; NL 15[45] 13.439f. See Thomas H. Brobjer, 
“Nietzsche's Reading about Eastern Philosophy”, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 28 (2004), 3-
35 (pp.17-8). 
283 See also NL 25[227] 11.73, where Nietzsche dubs the eternal return “den großen 
züchtenden Gedanken”. 
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thought of the eternal return as having direct practical force, particularly insofar as 
he thought it capable of forming society into a functional hierarchy. This is perhaps 
most strikingly the case in 1883, where he asserts that the thought can function as an 
“auswählendes Princip, im Dienste der Kraft (und Barbarei!!)” (NL 24[7] 10.646). 
The thought, according to Nietzsche, has a double effect. In the first place, it is 
conceived as a profoundly pessimistic idea, so intolerable that it forces the 
degenerate to acts of self-destruction: 
Eine pessimistische Denkweise und Lehre ein ekstatischer Nihilismus 
kann unter Umständen gerade dem Philosophen unentbehrlich sein: als 
ein mächtiger Druck und Hammer, mit dem er entartende und 
absterbende Rassen zerbricht und aus dem Wege schafft, <um> für eine 
neue Ordnung des Lebens Bahn zu machen oder um dem, was entartet 
und absterben will, das Verlangen zum Ende einzugeben. (NL 35[82] 
11.547) 
On Nietzsche’s view, Christianity grants consolation by artificially imbuing 
existence with a transcendent purpose (Zweck), meaning (Sinn), and value (Werth) 
– namely, that of entering into heaven after the final judgement. Yet with the thought 
of the eternal return, “[w]ir leugnen Schluß-Ziele” (NL 5[71] 12.211).284 And 
indeed, in some notes, Nietzsche claims that we are forced into making this denial 
on account of our scientific integrity (we are “zwingt zu einem solchen Glauben” 
[ibid.]). Faced with the loss of the grand value endowed by the Christian worldview, 
the weak and sick experience the idea of the eternal return as a “Fluch” (ibid.). 
Consequently, these individuals are driven either to destroy themselves (“sich 
durchzustreichen” [NL 25[227] 11.73]) or each other in a “blindes Wüthen” against 
everything that is without meaning and purpose (“sinn- und ziellos”) (ibid.).285 
Hence, the thought induces the unmeasured process of Ausscheidung – i.e. the 
                                                      
284 For an argument against the idea that Nietzsche defended the eternal return on scientific 
grounds, see Maudmarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), pp.245ff. 
285 On this issue, see Deleuze (1983), pp.68ff. See also NL 2[100] 12.110: “Der Hammer: 
eine Lehre, welche durch Entfesselung des todsüchtigsten Pessimismus eine Auslese der 
Lebensfähigsten bewirkt”. 
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Reinigung of the sickest individuals (those who most chronically infect the strong) 
from society in such a way that does not require an aristocratic order to 
institutionalise this process.286 
Nonetheless, Nietzsche does not think that the crisis instigated by the eternal 
return only serves to cull out the weak, he also believes it to be capable of actively 
bringing the strong into relief: 
Der Werth einer solchen Crisis ist, daß sie reinigt, daß sie die 
verwandten Elemente zusammendrängt und sich an einander verderben 
macht, daß sie den Menschen entgegengesetzter Denkweisen 
gemeinsame Aufgaben zuweist — auch unter ihnen die schwächeren, 
unsichereren ans Licht bringend und so zu einer Rangordnung der 
Kräfte, im Gesichtspunkte der Gesundheit, den Anstoß giebt: 
Befehlende als Befehlende erkennend, Gehorchende als Gehorchende. 
Natürlich abseits von allen bestehenden Gesellschaftsordnungen. (NL 
5[71] 12.217) 
What this text evinces is that Nietzsche believes that the eternal return will bring a 
Rangordnung of individuals into being: those who are able to affirm the thought are 
marked out as higher individuals and commanders, irrespective of their position in 
any existing social orders (“bestehende[.] Gesellschaftsordnungen”). Indeed, the 
exceptional individual does not merely endure the thought of the eternal return, he 
also “züchtigt damit” (NL 10[47] 10.378). As Deleuze has emphasised, the thought 
goads us to undertake only the highest and most complete actions – after all, how 
could we will any other kind of action for all eternity?287  
Though he persistently calls the thought of the eternal return his “Hammer”, 
Nietzsche also declares that the thought of the world as will to power can just as 
effectively cull the degenerate members of society. Indeed, the principal note that 
Deleuze draws upon to highlight the self-destructive force of the thought of the 
eternal return (namely, NL 5[71] 12.211-7), is in actuality highlighting the effects of 
the thought of the world as will to power: 
                                                      
286 See also NL 27[23] 11.281, where Nietzsche describes the thought of the eternal return 
as enacting an Ausscheidung of “lebensfeindliche[.] Elemente” from society. 
287 See Deleuze (1983), pp.68-9. 
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Es giebt nichts am Leben, was Werth hat, außer dem Grade der Macht 
— gesetzt eben, daß Leben selbst der Wille zur Macht ist. Die Moral 
behütete die Schlechtweggekommenen vor Nihilismus, indem sie 
Jedem einen unendlichen Werth einen metaphysischen Werth beimaß 
[…]. Gesetzt, daß der Glaube an diese Moral zu Grunde geht, so 
würden die Schlechtweggekommenen ihren Trost nicht mehr haben — 
und zu Grunde gehen. […]  
 
Das zu-Grunde-Gehen präsentirt sich als ein — Sich-zu-Grunde-
richten, als ein instinktives Auslesen dessen, was zerstören muß. 
Symptome dieser Selbstzerstörung der Schlechtweggekommenen: die 
Selbstvivisektion, die Vergiftung, Berauschung, Romantik, vor allem 
die instinktive Nöthigung zu Handlungen, mit denen man die 
Mächtigen zu Todfeinden macht (— gleichsam sich seine Henker selbst 
züchtend) […].  
(NL 5[71] 12.215-6) 
It is the realisation that the world is will to power, and that the basis of values lies in 
the power-seeking activity of organisations immanent to that world, that leads to the 
self-destruction of the weak, chiefly by robbing them of metaphysical consolation, 
which subsequently drives them to suicide. It is therefore not the thought of the 
eternal return alone that functions as a socially purifying or exclusionary force. What 
is also of note, is that in the cited text, the thought of the world as will to power is 
also framed as a cultivating thought: in provoking the weak to actively threaten the 
powerful (“die Mächtigen zu Todfeinden”), it “züchtet” these higher individuals to 
destroy them – i.e. to become their hangmen (Henker). 
To return to the thought of the eternal return, however, how does Nietzsche 
think this idea gives the strong “gemeinsame Aufgabe”? What common tasks does 
it foist upon the masters? That is, how does it give them a unified will? In a 
preparatory Nachlass note for Z III, Nietzsche sketches an answer to this very 
question: 
“[I]ch gab euch den schwersten Gedanken: vielleicht geht die 
Menschheit daran zu Grunde, vielleicht erhebt sie sich, dadurch daß die 
überwundenen lebensfeindlichen Elemente ausscheiden.” “Nicht dem 
Leben zu zürnen, sondern euch!” — Bestimmung des höheren 
Menschen als des Schaffenden. Organisation der höheren Menschen, 
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Erziehung der zukünftigen Herrschenden als Thema von Zarathustra 3. 
Eure Übermacht muß ihrer selber froh werden im Herrschen und 
Gestalten. “Nicht nur der Mensch auch der Übermensch kehrt ewig 
wieder! (NL 27[23] 11.281)288 
Nietzsche claims that it is by creating new goals and values that we can counteract 
the despair occasioned by the admission that we live in a world devoid of 
transcendent value. The thought thereby compels us to rediscover the joy of 
commanding, creating new goals (“Herrschen und Gestaltung”), and revaluing our 
values.289 It becomes exigent that we rediscover the freedom and pleasure of 
overcoming resistances and forming novel, stronger power organisations.290 With 
respect to our current inquiry, however, it is vital to observe that the creative act that 
most effectively augments one’s power, and which therefore brings the greatest 
degree of joy according to Nietzsche, is the creation of the Übermensch:   
Um den Gedanken der Wiederkunft zu ertragen: 
ist nöthig Freiheit von der Moral, […] 
größte Erhöhung des Kraft-Bewußtseins des Menschen, als dessen, der 
den Übermenschen schafft. (NL 26[283] 11.225) 
Moreover, one of the most painful thoughts accompanying that of the eternal return 
is the realisation that “[e]wig kehrt er wieder, der Mensch, dess du müde bist, der 
kleine Mensch” (Z III Genesende 2 4.274). The only way to counteract this abysmal 
thought, then, is to work towards the Übermensch and thereby grant oneself the 
uplifting faith that “auch der Übermensch kehrt ewig wieder!” (NL 27[23] 
11.281).291  
The highest human (“der höchste Mensch”) is, on Nietzsche’s analysis, the 
person “der die Werthe bestimmt und den Willen von Jahrtausenden lenkt, dadurch 
                                                      
288 See Keith Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p.192. 
289 See NL 26[284] 11.225: “Mittel ihn [der Gedanke der ewige Wiederkunft] zu ertragen / 
die Umwerthung aller Werthe […].” 
290 As Clark (1990), has expressed it: “Finding intrinsic value in life itself, that is, valuing 
the process of living as an end, becomes the only alternative to despair” (p.272). 
291 See Clark (1990), p.261; see also p.271. 
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daß er die höchsten Naturen lenkt” (NL 25[355] 11.106). Of course, there is no 
greater and more enduring project than that of breeding the future aristocracy and, 
with that, the Übermensch. If we follow through Nietzsche’s logic, and we want to 
maximally discharge our power and endow our life with significance, the greatest 
creative project in which we can engage is that of fashioning higher individuals.292 
Indeed, he conceives of the highest human as the fullest embodiment of thriving 
nature or will to power, discharging relatively tremendous amounts of force: “Der 
höchste Mensch als Abbild der Natur zu concipiren: ungeheurer Überfluß, 
ungeheure Vernunft im Einzelnen, als Ganzes sich verschwendend, gleichgültig 
dagegen” (NL 25[140] 11.51).293 As Heidegger expresses it, the Übermensch is “als 
höchste Subjeckt der vollendeten Subjektivität das reine Machten des Willens zur 
Macht”.294 I would submit that it is this realisation – i.e. that the greatest work 
towards which we can strive is that of the Übermensch – that justifies the individual 
and collective struggle to establish a future oriented breeding programme. Since this 
involves a social and transgenerational breeding project, the only way to achieve this 
goal is by accepting it as a “gemeinsame Aufgabe”, by cooperating with one’s 
equals, obeying the directives of one’s superiors, and commanding inferior 
individuals in such a way as to serve the attainment of this higher end. 
We should observe, however, that both the concept of the higher man and 
that of the Übermensch are radically underdetermined. Indeed, the affirmation of the 
                                                      
292 This contradicts Phillipa Foot, who has argued that Nietzsche justifies the pursuit of the 
overman by appealing to an implicit aesthetic preference that we have for higher men. Thus, 
she states that “[Nietzsche] is appealing to our tendency to admire certain individuals whom 
we see as powerful and splendid […]. [There is] a similarity between the way we attribute 
value (aesthetic value) to art objects and the value that Nietzsche attributes to a certain kind 
of man, both resting on a set of common reactions”. See Philippa Foot, “Nietzsche: The 
Revaluation of Values,” in Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical 
Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), pp.156-68 (p.163). This said, there is some 
evidence for Foot’s claim, for example, where Nietzsche points out that whether one prefers 
to cultivate the herd individual at the expense of the exceptional individual “ist im Grunde 
eine Frage des Geschmacks und der Aesthetik” (NL 11[325] 13.138). Quoted in Leiter 
(2015), p.117. 
293 Müller-Lauter (1999), pp.87ff. 
294 Heidegger (1961), vol.2, p.304, quoted in Müller-Lauter (1999), p.80. 
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Übermensch seems to very minimally signify the growth or overcoming of humanity 
itself. As Heidegger has observed, “das Wesen des Über-menschen [besteht] im 
Hinausgehen ‘über’ den bisherigen Menschen”.295 Comparably, Bataille also 
remarks the openness that defines Nietzsche’s various descriptions of higher 
individuality: “Il [Nietzsche] ne limitait rien, se bornait à décrire aussi librement 
qu’il pouvait un champ de possibilités”.296 The affirmation of this thin conception of 
the Übermensch as a social goal is tantamount to an affirmation of the will to power 
as a flourishing dynamism lacking an essential telos dictating the direction of 
growth.297 The task of breeding higher humans is therefore a processual task, not a 
teleological one, indeed, it could never be attained in any final manner.298  
Note that the logic of the will to power gives us a completely independent 
prudential reason for engaging in this collective, transgenerational project – we do 
not necessarily have to assent to the thought of the eternal return in order to view 
this task as a worthwhile undertaking. This is convenient since one of the issues with 
the thought of the eternal return is that, for the majority of us, it is not 
psychologically compelling. Ivan Soll has competently pointed out that if there is no 
psychological continuity between my repeated selves, there is no real reason why 
this repetition should present me with any cause to worry.299 Indeed, the eternal 
                                                      
295	Martin Heidegger, Was heisst denken? (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1997), p.26.	
296 Bataille (1937), p.186. 
297 Werner Stegmaier has similarly argued that the teaching of the Übermensch is an Anti-
Lehrer intended to undermine any single concept of Mensch that threatens to become reified: 
“Als Anti-Lehre verstanden ist der Gedanke des Übermenschen die Überwindung des 
Begriffs des Menschen überhaupt.” See Werner Stegmaier, “Anti-Lehren: Szene und Lehre 
in Nietzsches Also sprach Zarathustra”, in Volker Gerhardt (ed.), Friedrich Nietzsche: Also 
Sprach Zarathustra (Klassiker Auslegung Bd. 14) (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), pp.209-
11. 
298 For a contrary interpretation of the Übermensch – that is, as an oft attained and therefore 
attainable ideal, see Conway (1997), p.23. To be sure, NL 10[17] 11.462-3 does seem to 
suggest that Übermenschen are merely the higher humans produced by a given society. 
299 Ivan Soll, “Reflections on Recurrence: A Re-examination of Nietzsche's Doctrine, die 
ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen", in Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Nietzsche: A Collection of 
Critical Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), pp.322-42 (pp.339-40). Clark (1990) 
rejects this criticism, arguing that it is based on a misreading of the idea, which she argues 
should rather be imagined “in an uncritical or preanalytical manner, suspending all doubts 
concerning its truth or conceivability” (p.270). Nonetheless, this requires our actively 
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return may strike us as a damp squib. Hence, I have endeavoured to bring into relief 
how Nietzsche thinks the notion of the world as will to power, which is far more 
compelling, can independently fulfil the key organising functions of the eternal 
return.  
When Nietzsche talks of the need for “einer Lehre, welche die Menschen 
aussiebt… welche die Schwachen zu Entschlüssen treibt und ebenso die Starken”, 
he could equally be referring to the teaching of the will to power or that of the eternal 
return (NL 11[149] 13.71). Of course, to the extent that both represent radically 
immanent worldviews that eschew any transcendent realm of meaning, the 
acknowledgement of the world as will to power and the thought of the eternal return 
go hand in hand. The world that should be affirmed by he who passes the test of the 
eternal return is the world as will to power, and therefore just as Nietzsche wants us 
to affirm the eternal return, he presses for us to affirm the world as will to power. 300 
The affirmation of the world as will to power forces us to make a decision as to the 
future of humanity (insofar as it foregrounds our current weakness), it robs the weak 
of consolation (insofar as it undermines eschatology), it gives us a metric by which 
to revalue our values, and it presents us with a vision of flourishing life as conflict, 
creative activity and overcoming in such a way as to impel us to engage in the 
struggle to organise ourselves, our fellowman and our descendants.301  
                                                      
engaging with the thought in a charitable manner, and so on this reading, it completely loses 
its compelling (zwingend) status. Clark’s version of the eternal return is not likely to drive 
someone to suicide, since they can so easily turn away from it, or criticise its validity; nor 
would it be so hard to bear that we need to create higher goals in the face of it. Thus, on 
Clark’s reading, the eternal return is emptied of its cultivating, disciplining force.  
300 See NL 38[12] 12.610: “Diese Welt: ein Ungeheuer von Kraft, ohne Anfang, ohne Ende, 
eine feste, eherne Größe von Kraft, […] sich selber bejahend noch in dieser Gleichheit seiner 
Bahnen und Jahre, sich selber segnend als das, was ewig wiederkommen muß, als ein 
Werden, das kein Sattwerden, keinen Überdruß, keine Müdigkeit kennt —: diese meine 
dionysische Welt des Ewig-sich-selber-Schaffens, des Ewig-sich-selber-Zerstörens, diese 
Geheimniß-Welt der doppelten Wollüste […]. Diese Welt ist der Wille zur Macht — und 
nichts außerdem! Und auch ihr selber seid dieser Wille zur Macht — und nichts außerdem!” 
See also JGB 56.  
301 See NL 34[247] 11.504, where after giving an account of the world as will to power 
(against mechanistic theories of the existence), he states that “— die verschiedenen 
philosophischen Systeme sind als Erziehungsmethoden des Geistes zu betrachten: sie haben 
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Casting our minds back to Chapter 3, we should be able to remember that 
Nietzsche’s early philosophy had a distinctly Platonic-Schopenhauerian structure, 
where it was insight into two metaphysically transcendent facts that acted as the 
fulcrum for his synthetic project. In the later writings, however, we can now see that 
a profound shift has taken place – namely, to the extent that it is now a purely 
immanent view of reality that acts as the basis of his synthetic remedy to 
disgregation. Discerning this, Ottmann has stated the following with reference to 
Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return: 
[W]as bei Platon Zucht und Bildung im Blick auf die Idee, letztlich die 
Idee des Guten und die an sich seiende Welt ist, wird bei Nietzsche zu 
einem anderen Hinblick, zum Blick auf die Physis dieser zeitlichen 
Welt des Werdens und Vergehens, die für Platon nur der Schatten eines 
Schattens war.302 
But whereas Ottmann suggests that it is acknowledgement of the notion of the 
“ewige Wiederkehr” that serves as Nietzsche’s ordering principle, I have tried to 
bring to light how an affirmation of life as will to power is equally intrinsic to his 
later socially synthetic project. Indeed, Nietzsche’s later social conception of 
organisational conflict does not just embody his vision of the world as will to power, 
but can also be instigated by that very vision. What we can further conclude from 
this is that, contrary to the agonistic-democrat reading, Nietzsche cogently presents 
his will to power thesis as a means to both justifying and actively establishing social 
relations that are inherently inegalitarian, exploitative and exclusionary. In light of 
this, it is simply unfeasible to extricate Nietzsche’s ontology of resistance (properly 
understood) from undemocratically instrumentalising modes of governance. 
                                                      
immer eine besondere Kraft des Geistes am besten ausgebildet; mit ihrer einseitigen 
Forderung, die Dinge gerade so und nicht anders zu sehen.” See also NL 40[50] 11.653. NL 
5[70] 12.211: “Der Wille zur Macht und seine Metamorphosen. / (was der bisherige Wille 
zur Moral war: eine Schule). 
302 Ottmann (1987), p.360: “Das Zuchtmittel ‘Idee’ wird ersetzt durch den Gedanken der 
‘ewigen Wiederkehr’. Er wird das ‘Schwergewicht’, das abhält vom Anodos zu den Ideen 
und von der Flucht in die Hinterwelt, Erziehung zur Lebens- und Diesseitsbejahung wird.” 
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4.6. CONCLUSION 
My thesis in this chapter has been that the principal form of conflict prescribed by 
the later Nietzsche is one that combines measured and unmeasured struggle. As in 
UB, I have called this species of conflict organisational struggle and have explicated 
how Nietzsche conceives of it as a remedy to the problem of disgregation at both an 
individual and collective level. The first obstacle that faced this thesis, however, was 
that Nietzsche’s earlier model of how functional organisation arises out of 
organisational conflict was preconditioned by the existence of, and our 
epistemological access to, certain metaphysical entities. These entities were the 
Platonic-Schopenhauerian Ideas – in particular, the Idea of our character and the 
Idea of the exemplary human being (towards whom nature incompetently strives). 
However, it was shown that Nietzsche thoroughly discredited these metaphysical 
presuppositions in the middle and later phases of his thought. We concluded that if 
disgregation was seen to persist as a problem for the later Nietzsche (which it was), 
and he wanted to prescribe organisational conflict as a remedy for this, he needed to 
give an account of how such conflict could engender functional coherence without 
recourse to his earlier metaphysical presuppositions. Through a reconstruction of his 
notion of the will to power, I expounded how he drew on Roux (among other natural 
scientists) to formulate a purely immanent model of how zweckmäßige organisations 
arise. The core of his argument was that existence is solely composed of actively 
(even consciously) organising forces, which relentlessly strive to overpower and 
incorporate those of weaker relative power. The zweckmäßig appearance of the parts 
is therefore purely the result of the way in which these parts have been contingently 
shaped in their reciprocal struggle with the superordinate organisation. The part–
whole relation is therefore always the contingent result of a two-way struggle, and 
never wholly determined from above – for example, by a substantial essence or idea. 
As in the previous chapter, this was found to be inseparable from the repulsion, 
excretion or eradication of organisations that could not be exploited.  
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Turning to the normative aspect of his philosophy, I then examined 
Nietzsche’s application of this new model to the problem of individual and collective 
disgregation. At each of these levels, we were confronted by a novel problem. First, 
at the individual level, the dominant interpretation (i.e. the sublimational reading) 
suggested that Nietzsche endorses the exploitation but not the full negation of our 
impulses. I refuted this claim by indexing how Nietzsche’s account of self-
organisation is congruent with his general theory of the will to power in that it posits 
unmeasured exclusion as indissociable from the measured process of exploitative 
incorporation. What Nietzsche is vehemently opposed to is the attempted destruction 
of drives that are necessary for life, as well as precipitously and indiscriminately 
striving to destroy drives without having first sought ways in which to exploit them. 
However, we then encountered another practical obstacle, signalled by Nietzsche 
himself – namely, that our drives are largely beyond our ken. I responded to this by 
suggesting that the struggle for subjective unity must therefore be fought at the level 
of our values since it is via these that we have the greatest practical access to our 
drives.  
At the collective level, we then ran into a different obstacle, namely that 
neither of the two existing veins of interpretation agreed as to the socio-political 
ramifications of Nietzsche’s ontology of power. Whereas the radical aristocrats 
argued that the will to power accords with Nietzsche’s aristocratism, the agonistic-
democrats claimed that there is a mismatch between the two. The latter then 
contended that the political model most faithful to Nietzsche’s vision of the world 
as will to power is a form of democracy. Deepening the radical aristocratic reading, 
I argued against the agonistic-democrats that the emphasis on the struggle for 
exploitation, hierarchy and exclusion that we find in Nietzsche’s socio-political 
thought are coherently grounded in his notion of the will to power. Nonetheless, the 
radical aristocratic reading of Nietzsche was found to have its limits. Primarily 
insofar as its interpretation of Nietzsche as propounding amoral exploitation was 
found to clash with his conception of will to power organisations as governed by 
reciprocal morality. On the other hand, a mutual and morally attuned struggle for 
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social exploitation gelled well with his conception of the will to power. Both the 
agonistic-democrats and the radical aristocrats therefore misrepresent Nietzsche’s 
politics by failing to remark the fact that healthy organisation emerges from a 
balance of measured and unmeasured struggle. Both tendentiously focus on one side 
of this dichotomy at the expense of the other. 
Nietzsche’s incitements to unmeasured (exclusionary) struggle cannot be 
dismissed as unrepresentative moments of excess that are out of tune with the tenor 
of his wider philosophy. Indeed, unmeasured struggle permeates every level of 
Nietzsche’s description of the activity of healthy will to power organisations, and to 
neglect or deny this is, by Nietzsche’s very own standard, to be guilty of a disavowal 
of life that is equally as harmful as that of rejecting conflict or hierarchy. We should 
not mistake Nietzsche’s criticisms of particular forms of unmeasured conflict for a 
general repudiation of eliminatory struggle. Indeed, Nietzsche draws the distinction 
between commendable and lamentable forms of destructive conflict very clearly in 
FW 370: 
Das Verlangen nach Zerstörung, Wechsel, Werden kann der Ausdruck 
der übervollen, zukunftsschwangeren Kraft sein (mein terminus ist 
dafür, wie man weiss, das Wort “dionysisch”), aber es kann auch der 
Hass des Missrathenen, Entbehrenden, Schlechtweggekommenen sein, 
der zerstört, zerstören muss, weil ihn das Bestehende, ja alles Bestehn, 
alles Sein selbst empört und aufreizt. 
In harmony with such comments, I have tried to distinguish healthy destructive 
activity (which is a necessary condition of growth) from that which we can consider 
pathological. The unmeasured conflict necessitated by Nietzsche’s later philosophy 
is of a primarily behavioural or ideological kind – i.e., it is directed towards the 
complete suppression of certain forms of behaviour through an inversion of the 
values that promote those forms of behaviour. At a social level, however, he was 
seen to advocate the exclusion of certain members of society in a way that is 
admittedly hard to render palatable. This said, it was found to be in no way necessary 
for Nietzsche that this exclusionary process express itself in exterminatory eugenics: 
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it could take the form of selective immigration, positive eugenics or the simple 
neglect of degenerate parts of society. Though these may strike our ears as 
distasteful, they do not make Nietzsche a proto-Nazi. What further flies in the face 
of proto-fascistic readings is that at the level of the collective, the aggressive, 
exploitative aspect of organisational struggle does not necessarily translate into a 
militaristic politics; on the contrary, it can equally be fulfilled through soft-power 
and economic domination.  
Finally, the broader trend that I have tried to foreground in this chapter is 
the shift Nietzsche makes away from what might be considered a broadly Platonic 
metaphysical approach to organisation towards an immanent, ontological one. 
Where Nietzsche’s early synthetic project relied on the existence of, and our 
epistemological access to, certain a priori metaphysical truths, his later work is 
grounded in our insight into a purely immanent, a posteriori, or hypothetical 
conception of reality qua will to power. If we accept Nietzsche’s conception of life 
as will to power, and we wish to thrive, then it becomes necessary that we engage in 
the organisational struggle to overcome ourselves as individuals and communities. 
Nonetheless, beyond the general aim of embodying the key features of a healthy will 
to power organisation, the Zweck towards which we should direct ourselves is not 







Throughout the preceding chapters, I have defended the thesis that Nietzsche’s 
philosophy should be read as valorising both measured and unmeasured conflict. 
This position is one that I have developed in opposition to hard and soft readings of 
Nietzsche, which tendentiously portrayed him as a proponent of either measured or 
unmeasured conflict. I have first substantiated this claim by showing, in Chapters 1 
and 2, how he valorises both Vernichtungskampf (unmeasured) and Wettkampf 
(measured) throughout his writings. On the other hand, in Chapters 3 and 4, I have 
shown how he promotes a struggle for organisation, which consists in the dual 
process of a measured struggle for the Einverleibung of that which is useful, and an 
unmeasured struggle for the exclusion of that which is not.  
Due to the imbalance inherent to virtually all readings dealing with Nietzsche’s 
thoughts on conflict, I primarily concerned myself with the exegetical task of 
reconstructing his position as faithfully as possible whilst also endeavouring to 
coherently account for both the measured and unmeasured trends in his writings. By 
way of conclusion, I will now enumerate the coherent set of claims that I have 
attributed to Nietzsche’s mature philosophy of conflict, I will then raise some 
potential objections to these claims, and close by collating some of the most 
detrimental philosophical errors against which my reading of Nietzsche warns us. 
1. NIETZSCHE’S COHERENT SET OF CLAIMS 
While we have found myriad discrepancies in Nietzsche’s writings (particularly with 
respect to his thoughts on war and violence), we have also uncovered an underlying 
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coherence to his descriptions of, and prescriptions regarding, the various forms of 
Kampf – particularly as we move into the mature phase of his thought.  It is 
worthwhile briefly tallying this systematic set of philosophical claims:  
 
1. Everything and everyone struggles for power augmentation – primarily by 
means of incorporating or organising that which is serviceable into an 
exploitative hierarchy; 
2. This general impetus can express itself concretely in a range of different 
ways;  
3. The most effective mode of exploitative struggle is attentive to the demands 
of the subordinate power, and measures its struggle to exploit accordingly; 
4. At a social level, one such way exploitative relations can be established is 
through struggles to the death (i.e. war and violent conflict), which can act 
as a means to either enslaving the individuals or exploiting the resources that 
were previously protected by the eradicated party (the spoils of war). 
However, this is not the most effective means of establishing exploitative 
relations;  
5. Though violence may be an ineradicable Urfaktum of life, and the genetic 
source of culture, it is within our human capacities to employ alternative 
means of establishing the exploitative relations we need to live, and as far 
as possible, we should do so; 
6. While it may not be necessary for us to engage in violently unmeasured 
conflict, life is nonetheless conditioned by unmeasured struggle insofar as 
the organisation upon which any living unity rests is preconditioned by the 
active exclusion of that which is, or has become, harmful; 
7. Notwithstanding, where two powers realise they are too equally matched to 
establish exploitative relations, they can, and should, engage in agonistically 
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measured conflict in order to strengthen themselves in the struggle to exploit 
parties outside of the agonistic contest. 
As this list makes evident, claims (2)–(7) all cohere with the logic of the will to 
power (1). It further demonstrates that affirming the world as will to power does not 
entail affirming either measured or unmeasured conflict, but a synthesis of both 
under the higher goal of organisation. In suppressing one or the other of these two 
dynamics, the hard and the soft readers can, by Nietzsche’s own standards, be 
charged with dubiously constructing a life-denying philosophy out of Nietzsche’s 
writings. I have tried to initiate an aspect change whereby these two sides, rather 
than being understood as mutually exclusive, are seen as two ways of looking at 
single impetus toward organisation. Hopefully, this makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, for readers to return to identifying only one of these two aspects. 
In trying to vindicate my attribution of these interlocking claims to 
Nietzsche, I have often not had space to critically assess them in their own right. For 
example, we might ask whether the agonistic appropriation of Nietzsche’s thought, 
while not representative thereof, is perhaps a better normative philosophy given the 
challenges faced by contemporary society; indeed, is it, as Nietzsche argues and the 
agonists deny, truly impossible to cultivate agonal relations between unequals – that 
is, is it unrealistic to call on people to raise weaker individuals up to their level 
instead of subjugating them? Might people not want to have their present inferiors 
as equal competitors in the future, for example? Should we not sometimes decline 
the opportunity to exploit those who are weaker and could be exploited?  
In Chapter 4, I endeavoured to underscore that we should not take 
Nietzsche’s affirmation of Einverleibung and exclusion to entail an affirmation of 
selective immigration, chattel slavery, wars of enslavement, eugenics or even ethnic 
cleansing. Indeed, he forces us to search for new ways in which Einverleibung and 
Ausscheidung can be realised. Yet a criticism we might formulate in response to this 
is that there seems to be so much flexibility in how we might imagine these processes 
being fulfilled, that their affirmation makes little ethical demand upon us. For 
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example, we saw that Nietzsche indicates that anyone in gainful employment might 
be considered an exploited slave. Moreover, while I have also tried to give as cogent 
an account as possible as to why Nietzsche identifies a parallelism between the 
organism and society, I have not fully explored the many critiques of organic models 
of society that emerged in the twentieth-century, particularly in response to structural 
functionalism. Since there is not the space for a full treatment of all the possible 
objections and replies, I leave these comments as an indication that my attempting 
to comprehensively reconstruct Nietzsche’s position should not be equated with my 
unquestioningly concurring with this position.  
2. PHILOSOPHICAL OBSERVATIONS 
According to Nietzsche, one of the ways in which humans most definitely differ 
from lower organisms is insofar as they possess consciousness (“Bewußtsein” or 
“Geist”), which far from being evidence of their superiority, he views as proof of the 
“Unvollkommenheit des Organismus, als ein Versuchen, Tasten, Fehlgreifen, als 
eine Mühsal” (AC 14). Indeed, seeing “through a glass darkly”, so to speak, it would 
appear that we are condemned to misjudge the state of affairs that characterises both 
ourselves and the outside world. But throughout this thesis, we have identified 
various ways in which we are prone to fallacious descriptions of the world that 
specifically impact upon how we practically manage conflict in our lives. Moreover, 
these errors are usually both harmful and preventable. With respect to ourselves, one 
of the most obvious examples is our tendency to over-estimate our power relative to 
others (a foible specific to organic organisations, according to Nietzsche1), which as 
we saw in Chapter 2, can lead us into violent, self-detrimental struggles in a manner 
reminiscent of Rousseau’s critical analysis of amour-propre.  
                                                      
1 See e.g. NL 35[59] 11.537: “Der Übergang aus der Welt des Anorganischen in die des 
Organischen ist der aus festen Wahrnehmungen der Kraftwerthe und Machtverhältnisse in 
die der unsicheren, unbestimmten.” 
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However, our analysis of Nietzsche, and the critical literature dealing with 
his thought, has also uncovered a range of subtle ways that our arbitrarily favouring 
one possible conceptual description of conflict over others can lead us to take 
particularly bad ethical stances towards certain modes of opposition. The 
identification of these pitfalls is, I believe, one of the principal philosophical 
contributions of both Nietzsche’s thoughts on conflict, and our study of these 
thoughts. It is accordingly worthwhile enumerating some of these. First, in Chapter 
1, we discerned that the description of physically destructive conflict in terms of the 
cathartic release of essentially destructive energy sabotaged the project of 
qualitatively transforming this mode of conflict. While I focussed on the way in 
which this blocked the agonistic project, this goes equally for any attempts that might 
be made to modulate physically destructive conflict into measured exploitative 
conflict, or into modes of exclusionary struggle that are not physically destructive. 
Thus, as suggested, we might opt to incarcerate or exile (i.e. ostracise), rather than 
physically eradicate, problematic members or groups of society; or we might even 
choose completely non-physical modes of negation – for example, rather than 
eradicating troublesome individuals and social groups, we might focus on merely 
eradicating the values and drives that make those individuals or social groups 
problematic (as a truly “reformatory” prison system aims to do). The idea that 
physically destructive impulses grow unstoppably stronger until they inevitably 
erupt is a dangerous assumption, one that Nietzsche inherited from Schopenhauer 
and Burckhardt, though eventually outgrew and abandoned.  
In Chapter 2, with respect to the secondary literature, I brought into relief 
how the tendency to equate the agon with destructive conflict neutralised the agonal 
dimension of Nietzsche’s transformative project before it had even begun. Namely, 
since it failed to conceptually distinguish the form of conflict Nietzsche wants to be 
subjected to transformation from the form of conflict that he hopes will result from 
this transformation. Second, holding productive agonal relations to be founded on 
the counterbalancing of powers alone was seen to lead commentators to neglect the 
foundational importance of cultivating self-limitation. Finally, the description of the 
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agon as based solely in a subjective shift of attitude (towards respect) was seen to 
blind us to the fact that establishing certain social institutions is a precondition of 
agonal relations.  
In Chapters 3 and 4, we then witnessed how the error of thinking that 
organisational struggle is enabled by identifying a metaphysical telos within 
ourselves or nature only serves to frustrate the process of organisation. The goals 
towards which both humanity and the human individual strive must be forged by 
humans themselves, and in such a way that they remain provisional and malleable. 
Prematurely fixed conceptions of one’s ideal self or one’s ideal society can, on 
Nietzsche’s account, lead us to exclude digressional inclinations and avenues of 
development that may prove highly advantageous to our evolution. 
In Chapter 4, I then clarified how, according to Nietzsche, our picture of the 
natural world, and of our values, has a serious impact on our normative orientation 
towards conflict. To see the natural world as governed by pure mechanism and 
universal natural law was criticised by Nietzsche as unfounded, whilst also serving 
to vindicate universal moral law. Indeed, we have a tendency to misconceive of our 
values as being of transcendent origin, and thus we completely overlook the fact that 
many of these values are the vestiges of a prudential rear-guard ethical policy created 
by weak power organisations. These two related errors (viz. concerning the structure 
of nature and the origin of our values), lead us, in the first place, to neglect the 
struggle to organise our values. This is because the apparent transcendent origin of 
our values makes them seem beyond our practical reach. But in addition to this, since 
these entrenched values are herd-values, which are explicitly opposed to social 
conflict, the errors buttressing these values further blind us to the necessity of 
cultivating healthy social struggle.  
In the closing chapter, we then saw how Nietzsche exposes our 
predisposition to misidentify that which presents us with difficulty as that which is 
useless and to be excluded – how “[man] verwechselt das Unbrauchbare und das 
Schwerzuerwerbende” (NL 11[134] 9.492). We are thus often led, in our hasty 
reactivity, to strive for the full negation of that which could be of positive value for 
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us. But the inability to correctly identify that which is serviceable does not only 
occasion the unnecessary destruction of the potentially useful; for Nietzsche, this 
error also leads us to excessively consume that which cannot be used, which we saw 
was an underlying cause of the anarchy associated with the historical sense. 
Nietzsche thus alerts us to the need to carefully screen phenomena according to their 
employability in order to establish the most prudential conflictual relations with 
them. 
Finally, we then located two more such errors in Chapter 4 by reading 
Nietzsche against his one-sided commentators. First, describing exploitation as 
intrinsically unmeasured led these commentators to ignore the possibility and task 
of finding “softer”, more symbiotic forms of exploitation (which, incidentally, can 
be found in Nietzsche’s writings themselves). Contrariwise, viewing measured 
modes of contest as divorceable from unmeasured, exclusionary ones, caused 
agonistic commentators to overlook the fact that exclusion may be ineradicable and, 
consequently, that it is vital that we actively search for forms of exclusion that are 
as “soft” as possible.  
This wide range of cognitive biases to which we are prone when it comes to 
thinking about conflict are therefore not comparable to the life-preserving errors of 
which Nietzsche often speaks (e.g. the “Unwahrheit als Lebensbedingung” he refers 
to in JGB 4). They are intellectual predispositions that lead us into modes of conflict 
that are harmful either for ourselves or the social whole, or that cause us to shirk 
modes of conflict that are beneficial. Though we can often impute these errors to 
Nietzsche himself, in his strongest and most coherent moments he shows us that we 
make these at our peril.  
If we wish to optimise our conflictual relations with ourselves, others, and 
the world in general, then it is exigent that we carefully scrutinise our understanding 
of the nature and value of conflict. Such an enterprise can help us harness our 
impulses and become more effective individuals, or it can prompt us to work on 
establishing the agonal institutions we need to stimulate cultural flourishing, or 
again, it can teach us the worth of acting virtuously towards those who may be 
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subordinate to us. Indeed, I have endeavoured to illuminate the multifarious ways in 
which refining our understanding of struggle enables us to cultivate modes of contest 
that can be profoundly beneficial to our lives, not just as individuals or specific social 
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NIETZSCHE’S PHILOSOPHY OF CONFLICT 





Since as far back antiquity, philosophers have been inquiring into the nature 
of conflict. Their persistent interest has produced a rich variety of theoretical 
perspectives on the topic. Within this multiplicity, however, we can identify 
a number of recurrent ideas. Among these, perhaps the most prominent is the 
belief that conflict represents an undesirable part of life, one that stands 
opposed to the ideals of harmony, co-operation and consensus. Those who 
deprecate struggle in this way can then be split into two groups. On the one 
hand, there are those for whom conflict and its irksome effects are a 
contingent part of human life. As such, they allege that struggle can therefore 
be eradicated, or at least minimised, and they duly give us an account of how 
we might go about achieving this. Plato is undoubtedly the standard bearer of 
this philosophical position. In the Republic, he provides his readers with a 
detailed blueprint describing how we can substitute discord with harmony, 
both at the level of the self and that of society. Following in Plato’s wake, we 
then find a slew of philosophers similarly denigrating conflict and professing 
to give us the means to its eradication. For instance, Kant sketches how we 
might go about establishing a social condition of “perpetual peace”, and, 
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continuing this line of inquiry, Rawls tries to elaborate on the political means 
by which such a condition might be concretely achieved. Correspondingly, 
thinkers such as Spinoza and Descartes have tried to show how we can 
minimise the painful and often paralysing inner struggle of our passions 
through the proper exercise of our rational faculties. Nonetheless, among 
those who criticise conflict, there exists another group of philosophers who 
don’t share Plato’s optimism. Thinkers such as Schopenhauer and the later 
Freud, for example, pessimistically conceive of both social and psychological 
conflict as an incurable human affliction. In spite of our best efforts, they tell 
us, we are condemned to destructive war and painful psychological struggle. 
 In opposition to this widespread tendency to demonise conflict, there 
then stands a group of thinkers who affirm conflict as a potentially beneficial 
force. The bellwether of this faction was undoubtedly Heraclitus, who 
famously praised war as “the father of all things”. This group can also be split 
in two depending on whether they think of war and more violent forms of 
political oppression as contingent or necessary. First, then, there are those 
who think of war as an ineluctable part of human life yet nonetheless affirm 
it as socially rejuvenating force. They claim that belligerence brings healthy 
hierarchical order to society. Many have situated Heraclitus in this corner of 
the debate, though others, such as the historian Jacob Burckhardt, also 
unambiguously propound this view. In the other corner, there are then those 
who view war and struggles for political oppression to be quite contingent 
and, simultaneously, undesirable. Yet unlike Plato and his descendants, this 
group does not favour harmony; rather, they valorise more moderate forms 
of struggle that they hold to be socially beneficial, such as democratic dispute, 
for example. They then petition for the transformation of the more harmful 
forms of discord into these productive modes of political contestation. In 
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more recent times, agonistic democratic theorists such as Bonnie Honig, 
Jean-François Lyotard and Chantal Mouffe have all defended some variant 
of this idea. William Connolly, another agonistic democrat, has analogously 
claimed that we need to cultivate more moderate forms of conflict within 
ourselves, at a psychological level. Connolly hopes that this approach will 
replace harmfully repressive struggles that futilely aim at inner harmony.  
 What this brief survey reveals is that the principal fault lines in the 
debate form over two questions: Is conflict beneficial or harmful? And what 
is the modal status of conflict? That is, is it an indelible, or contingent, part 
of human existence?  
One thinker whom the agonistic democrats often invoke in support of 
their position is the nineteenth-Century German thinker Friedrich Nietzsche. 
As they point out, he affirmed conflict in the context of both society and the 
self. Yet within Nietzsche studies itself, commentators remain deeply divided 
regarding his attitude towards conflict, and it is far from certain that he would 
have concurred with the agonistic democrats’ answers to the two fundamental 
questions just mentioned. One cluster of commentators proposes what is often 
called the soft reading, and their antagonists defend the so-called hard 
reading. The soft Nietzsche is read as overwhelmingly advocating measured, 
agonal struggle. This species of conflict is exemplified by the non-violent 
artistic, athletic and political contests (or agons) that pervaded ancient Greek 
culture. Proponents of this reading then often conjecture that this type of 
struggle is epitomised by modern democratic contention. By contrast, the 
hard readers claim that Nietzsche almost exclusively esteemed and incited 
unmeasured struggle as a means to cultural renaissance. Many have 
accordingly held the hard Nietzsche to be at least partly responsible for the 
atrocities committed by the Nazis in the 1930s and 40s. The hard readers 
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further divide into two subgroups depending of the specific type of 
unmeasured struggle they think Nietzsche incited. First there are those who 
allege that Nietzsche prescribed war as a remedy for modernity’s ills – I call 
these his militaristic readers. Alongside this group, there are those who read 
him as promoting a murderous aristocratic struggle of an elite minority to 
enslave and exploit the masses. This is what I refer to as the radical 
aristocratic interpretation. 
Frustratingly, both sides are able to cite texts from Nietzsche’s corpus that 
seem to corroborate their tendentious readings. What is more, both sides tend to read 
the texts that ostensibly support their opponents as further evidence of their own 
reading. In this way, Nietzsche’s soft readers often aver that when he invokes the 
vocabulary of war, he is in actuality using this language metaphorically – namely, 
to refer to the measured spiritual struggle for self-overcoming and the ideological 
struggle for cultural renewal. Conversely, the hard readers often interpret 
Nietzsche’s praise of the Hellenic agon as an embracing endorsement of the ancient 
Greeks’ love of conflict – that is, including their proclivity for war. 
 Rather than elucidating Nietzsche’s philosophy of conflict, an 
overview of the critical literature therefore renders it many ways more 
opaque. The principal objective of this thesis is therefore to address this 
impasse. Some may be inclined to view this alleged contradiction in 
Nietzsche’s thought as evidence of his being a shoddy thinker, and as further 
reason not to take him seriously as a philosopher. As I contend, however, 
such a prejudgment would be misguided. A sustained close reading of 
Nietzsche’s writings reveals a mature philosophy of conflict that is both 
systematic and coherent. In order to demonstrate this coherence, we of course 
need to address the aforementioned antagonism in the critical literature. We 
need to navigate a path between the readings of Nietzsche as an exclusive 
proponent of measured conflict and those that construe him as an exclusive 
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proponent of unmeasured struggle. Does Nietzsche exclusively recommend 
measured or unmeasured conflict? Or are both of the exclusive readings in 
need of correction? 
 With a view to resolving this aporia, this thesis attempts a critical 
analysis of Nietzsche’s views regarding the nature and value of conflict. I 
perform a systematic study of his vocabulary of conflict spanning the entire 
breadth of his corpus. A cursory survey of his writings reveals that Nietzsche 
thematised his thoughts on conflict under four main clusters of terms. First, 
we find a cluster of German words that ostensibly refers to murderously 
violent conflict: Vernichtungskampf (struggle-to-the-death), Krieg (war), 
Mörder (murder), and Zweikampf (duel) (among others). We can then discern 
another cluster that is closely related to the forms of non-violent contest 
prolific among the ancient Greeks: Wettkampf (contest), Agon (agon), 
Wettspiel and Wettbewerb (competition), and Wettstreit (contention) (among 
others). Thirdly, he uses a separate vocabulary of conflict (Kampf) to describe 
struggles directed at the organisation of complex systems – that is, struggles 
aimed at the Einverleibung (incorporation), Assimilation (assimilation) and 
Herrschaft (domination) of certain entities. This form of struggle is then 
married to another which is directed towards the Unterdrückung (repression), 
Zurückstoßen (repulsion), Ausscheidung (excretion) and even Zerstörung 
(destruction) of certain entities. In the respective chapters, I dissect each of these 
different aspects of Nietzsche’s vocabulary of conflict and determine whether 
there is any underlying coherence in his usage.  
On the basis of this groundwork, I contend that both the soft and hard 
readings are one sided and in need of modification. Indeed, the thesis that this 
dissertation defends is that Nietzsche promotes both measured and 
unmeasured struggle in a manner that is entirely coherent. I also argue that 
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commentators have neglected the most significant form of conflict in 
Nietzsche’s thought. This form is characterised by a combination of measured 
and unmeasured conflict, and Nietzsche thinks of it as necessary for any form 
of life – individual or social – to exist and extend itself. We might conceive 
of this species of struggle as analogous to the biological processes of nutrition 
and digestion. Through these, an organism simultaneously engages in a 
measured struggle to incorporate useful material from its environment and in 
an unmeasured manner to exclude material that presents itself as redundant 
or harmful. This dualistic struggle is what I term organisational conflict on 
account of the fact that both incorporation and exclusion form part of a single 
overarching impetus to achieve healthy organisation. 
My analysis illuminates a number of specific shortcomings of the soft 
and hard readings. We see that the soft reading, which presents Nietzsche as 
wholly bent on the transformation of destructive into culturally productive 
conflict, misses the fact that there are phases where Nietzsche conceives of 
violent struggle as ineradicable and culturally beneficial. We also find that 
Nietzsche is highly critical of political agonism, thereby casting doubt on the 
soft, agonistic democrat appropriations of his thought. Our study of 
organisational conflict also reveals that Nietzsche valorises a form of struggle 
that promotes inequality and exclusion in a way that is quite at odds with the 
soft reading, which is marked by a democratic ethos of egalitarianism and 
inclusivity. Nonetheless, we see that the hard militaristic reading also has its 
shortcomings insofar as it wilfully overlooks the non-violent nature of 
Nietzsche’s celebration of the agon. We also witness how the radical 
aristocratic reading misinterprets Nietzsche’s advocacy of exploitation as an 
endorsement of murderously immoral enslavement. In fact, Nietzsche 
considers exploitation of this sort to be highly imprudent and unhealthy. The 
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ideal exploitative relation is rather one in which the commander cares for the 
commanded insofar as the former has a vested interest in the preservation and 
strength of the latter. 
My hope is that this study will have repercussions for those who 
precipitously reject Nietzsche for glorifying violence, just as it does for those 
who unjustly appropriate his thought in the name of a democratic political 
agenda. In addition to this, by reconstructing and critically assessing 
Nietzsche’s thoughts concerning struggle, my aim is also to throw light on 
some of the broader philosophical questions concerning the nature and value 
of conflict.  
In Chapter 1, I examine Nietzsche’s thoughts regarding struggles of 
eradication (Vernichtungskämpfe) and, more specifically, war. I refute the 
exclusively agonistic reading by demonstrating that, throughout his writings, 
Nietzsche gives numerous arguments as to why we ought to value mortal 
forms of combat. I further contend that many of these arguments, particularly 
in his early writings, are underpinned by a description of destructive conflict 
that is seriously problematic for his agonistic readers, all of whom take 
Nietzsche to be pursuing the transformation of destructive into constructive, 
agonistic conflict without remainders. Though there are certainly texts in 
which he recommends transformation, I call attention to passages where he 
also conceives of violently destructive struggle as untransformable. On this 
logic, war is portrayed as ineluctable because humans possess an irresistible 
drive for specifically murderous strife. My solution to this apparent 
contradiction is to suggest that this problematical conception of destructive 
conflict is for the most part confined to his early writings. As he moves away 
from Schopenhauer, from whom he inherits this idea, and towards the natural 
sciences in the 1880s, he reconceives of destructive conflict as the contingent 
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expression of a general impulse to overpower others – one that is not 
necessarily murderous and can therefore be given an outlet in non-violent 
modes of conflict.  
In Chapter 2, I analyse the mode of conflict that Nietzsche often 
opposes to destructive struggle – namely, agonal contest. I refute the hard, 
exclusively unmeasured readings and argue that Nietzsche consistently 
advocates measured agonal relations. In order to determine what this 
affirmation of agonal contest involves, however, we first need to resolve three 
interpretive disputes. First, it is unclear whether Nietzsche understands 
agonal contest as a specifically non-violent form of conflict or whether it 
includes murderous forms of struggle such as war. We establish, however, 
that he unequivocally conceives of agonal conflict as non-destructive. We 
further discover that he views agon as a non-exploitative kind of struggle. 
Agonal contestants fight for fame and personal glory, not instrumental 
command of their opponents. Second, commentators dispute the means 
Nietzsche proposes for concretely instituting agonal measure in society. How 
can one stop people from pursuing victory by unmeasured means? For 
example, how can one prevent political adversaries from resorting to violence 
in the struggle for power? Some allege that Nietzsche’s agonism is founded 
on the cultivation of self-restraint, while others theorise that measure results 
from balancing equal opponents against one another (we might think of the 
separation of political powers in the US as exemplary of this). My analysis, 
however, reveals that both self-restraint and equality are in fact fundamental 
sources of agonal measure. I additionally underline the much-neglected 
importance of religious, educational and legal institutions in Nietzsche’s 
account. On his view, these serve to instil an ethos of self-moderation. Third, 
there is disagreement as to whether Nietzsche promotes the agon in an 
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inclusive, non-class specific manner or whether his endorsement is confined 
to an elite minority of aristocratic equals. I contend that, according to 
Nietzsche, agonal contest can (and should) take place between any 
individuals of approximately equal ability, irrespective of their class. 
Nonetheless, he also distinguishes a higher form of agon that is fought over 
eternal fame, and which is strongly associated with the aristocratic classes.  
Having established that Nietzsche only promotes agonally measured 
conflict under rarely occurring conditions of equality, I then show in Chapters 
3 and 4 how he advocates a quite unique form of measured conflict under 
conditions of inequality. This third type of conflict is what I have already 
described as the exploitative struggle for organisation. Organisational 
struggle is measured insofar as it strives for the preservation of that which 
has been overpowered (albeit in a position of servitude); however, we find 
that it is conceptually distinct from agonally measured conflict to the extent 
that a) it is directed at exploitation; b) it occurs under conditions of inequality; 
and c) it is conditioned by unmeasured exclusionary struggle (recall the 
analogy we drew with nutrition and digestion, which necessitate excretion). 
We further observe how organisational conflict figures far more 
prominently than either murderous or agonal conflict in Nietzsche’s search 
for a panacea to the ills plaguing modernity. Nietzsche diagnoses both 
modern individuals and societies as lacking the harmony that enables a 
flourishing life. The plurality of forces which constitute these forms of life 
are at present pulling in contrary directions and mutually frustrating one 
another. This condition leaves both the modern individual and society 
paralysed and impotent. We observe that Nietzsche by far and away favours 
the formation of instrumental hierarchies as an antidote to this affliction and 
claims that these are established by means of organisational struggle. 
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Psychologically speaking, this means struggling to reign in certain drives (i.e. 
impulses or desires) so that they obediently serve one’s higher goals. 
However, contrary to existing readings of Nietzsche, which take him to be 
staunchly opposed to psychological repression, I foreground how he urges his 
readers to eradicate intractable impulses. Socially speaking, organisational 
struggle manifests itself as a push to exploit weaker individuals. Yet, contrary 
to Nietzsche’s radical aristocratic readers who understand this exploitation as 
a murderous form of chattel slavery, Nietzsche’s conception of healthy 
exploitation is inherently measured. Either the exploiter wishes to preserve 
the exploited and therefore attends to their wellbeing, or the subordinate party 
voluntarily serves their superiors on account of the benefits this grants them. 
At the same time though, Nietzsche also emphasises the need for a society to 
exclude individuals that are inimical to its vitality. I conclude, however, that 
this should by no means be equated with an affirmation of genocide (as some 
have surmised) since we can easily imagine it being realised by less abhorrent 
means such as, for example, the creation of a truly reformatory penal system.  
Although I highlight the similarity between the early and the later 
Nietzsche’s proposed remedies to disintegration, I also emphasise a major 
point of divergence. In Chapter 3, we see that Nietzsche’s early notion of 
organisational struggle is founded on two key metaphysical presuppositions. 
Yet, in Chapter 4, we find that these are wholly absent from his later theory 
of organisation. The early Nietzsche buys into Schopenhauer’s conviction 
that the organisation of any entity is grounded in the unity of its essence. Prior 
to the late 1870s, Nietzsche maintains that we need to identify the true 
unchanging essence of our self (i.e. our character) in order to organise 
ourselves. Once we know our true calling in life, which is dictated by our 
essential character, we have a criterion against which we can determine 
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whether behavioural impulses are potentially beneficial or harmful. 
Otherwise put, we can deduce whether we should cultivate or eradicate an 
impulse. For the early Nietzsche, ascertaining and acknowledging the 
essential purpose of society – namely, to create geniuses – serves a similar 
function. It gives us the criterion by which we can distinguish the values and 
social structures that we should promote from those that we ought to abolish. 
As of the late 1870s, though, Nietzsche goes on to reject the very essences 
that ground his early theory of organisation. According to the later Nietzsche, 
there are no human essences – the self is just a contingent plurality of drives 
– nor can we speak of society as having any essential purpose.  
The question we therefore have to ask in Chapter 4 is: how does the 
later Nietzsche reconceptualise organisational struggle without the 
metaphysical fundaments of his earlier philosophy? I reconstruct how he uses 
his readings in the natural sciences to develop a non-metaphysical account of 
organisation. This involves a detailed exegesis of his theory of the world as 
will to power (Wille zur Macht), according to which existence is framed as a 
constellation of forces vying to augment their power. According to this 
theory, organisation results from certain forces within the self or society 
taking control and unifying the subordinate forces into a functioning unit. As 
we see at the end of Chapter 4, for the later Nietzsche, it is insight into the 
nature of the world as will to power – rather than some kind of metaphysical 
essence – that sets the cogs of organisation into motion. 
By way of conclusion, I summarise how Nietzsche’s mature thoughts 
on conflict form a coherent whole. We find that Nietzsche prescribes the 
various species of measured and unmeasured conflict under quite compatible 
sets of conditions. With this it becomes evident that the antagonism between 
the soft (measured) and hard (unmeasured) readings presents us with a false 
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dichotomy. After enumerating some of the most harmful defects associated 
with our conventional conception of conflict, I close by gesturing towards 
how we might, in light of our findings, reformulate the concept in order to 
facilitate individual and collective flourishing.
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NIETZSCHE’S FILOSOPHIE VAN CONFLICT 
EN DE LOGICA VAN ORGANISATORISCHE 
STRIJD  
 
Al sinds de Oudheid hebben filosofen de aard van conflicten onderzocht. Hun 
voortdurende interesse heeft een rijke variëteit aan theoretische perspectieven op het 
onderwerp opgeleverd. In deze veelvoud kunnen we echter een aantal terugkerende 
ideeën identificeren. Meest prominent daaronder is wel de overtuiging dat conflict 
een onwenselijk deel van het leven is, een deel dat tegenover de idealen van 
harmonie, samenwerking en consensus staat. Degenen die strijd op deze wijze 
negatief waarderen kunnen in twee groepen worden verdeeld. Aan de ene kant zijn 
er degenen voor wie conflict en zijn hinderlijke effecten een contingent deel van het 
menselijk leven zijn. Zodoende beweren zij dat strijd daarom kan worden uitgeroeid, 
of tenminste geminimaliseerd, en zij bieden ons dan ook een verhaal over hoe we 
dat zouden kunnen bereiken. Plato is ongetwijfeld het boegbeeld van deze 
filosofische positie. In de Staat geeft hij zijn lezers een gedetailleerde blauwdruk die 
beschrijft hoe we onenigheid kunnen vervangen door harmonie, zowel op het niveau 
van het zelf als op het niveau van de samenleving. In het spoor van Plato vinden we 
een reeks filosofen die net zo afgeven op conflict en beweren ons de middelen in 
handen te geven om een einde aan alle conflict te maken. Kant, bijvoorbeeld, schetst 
hoe we een sociale toestand van ´eeuwige vrede´ tot stand zouden kunnen brengen, 
en Rawls, die deze lijn van onderzoek voortzet, probeert de politieke instrumenten 
uit te werken met behulp waarvan zo’n toestand daadwerkelijk bereikt kan worden. 
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In dezelfde lijn hebben denkers als Spinoza en Descartes geprobeerd om te laten zien 
hoe we de pijnlijke en vaak verlammende innerlijke strijd van onze passies kunnen 
minimaliseren door een juiste werking van onze rationele vermogens. Toch is er 
onder de critici van conflict een andere groep van filosofen die Plato’s optimisme 
niet deelt. Denkers als Schopenhauer en de late Freud, bijvoorbeeld, zien zowel 
sociaal als psychologisch conflict pessimistisch als een ongeneeslijke menselijke 
aandoening. Ondanks onze beste inspanningen, zeggen zij ons, zijn we veroordeeld 
tot destructieve oorlog en pijnlijke psychologische strijd. 
Tegenover deze wijdverbreide tendens om conflict te demoniseren staat een 
groep denkers die conflict positief waarderen als een mogelijk gunstige kracht. Aan 
de oorsprong hiervan staat ongetwijfeld Heraclitus die zoals bekend oorlog prees als 
‘de vader van alles’. Deze groep kan ook worden verdeeld in twee partijen 
afhankelijk van of ze oorlog en meer gewelddadige vormen van politieke 
onderdrukking beschouwen als contingent of noodzakelijk. Ten eerste zijn er dan 
degenen die oorlog beschouwen als een onontkoombaar deel van het menselijk leven 
maar het desondanks positief waarderen als een sociaal vernieuwende kracht. Ze 
stellen dat oorlogszucht een samenleving een gezonde hiërarchische ordening 
bezorgt. Velen hebben Heraclitus aan deze kant van het debat geplaatst, hoewel ook 
anderen, zoals de historicus Jacob Burckhardt, deze visie onomwonden verdedigen. 
Aan de andere kant staan dan degenen die oorlog en strijd om politieke 
onderdrukking als contingent beschouwen en, tegelijkertijd, onwenselijk. Maar 
anders dan Plato en zijn navolgers geeft deze groep niet de voorkeur aan harmonie; 
ze hechten eerder waarde aan meer gematigde vormen van strijd die ze als sociaal 
gunstig beschouwen, zoals bijvoorbeeld het democratisch debat. Ze vragen dan ook 
om de transformatie van de meer schadelijke vormen van onenigheid in deze 
produktieve vormen van politieke twist. Meer recent hebben agonistische 
democratische theoretici zoals Bonnie Honig, Jean-François Lyotard en Chantal 
Mouffe een variant van dit idee verdedigd. William Connolly, een andere 
agonistische democraat, heeft op analoge wijze gesteld dat we meer gematigde 
vormen van conflict in onszelf moeten cultiveren, op psychologisch niveau. 
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Connolly hoopt dat deze benadering de schadelijke onderdrukkende strijd die 
vergeefs streeft naar innerlijke harmonie zal vervangen. 
Dit beknopte overzicht laat zien dat de belangrijke scheidslijnen in het debat 
zich vormen langs twee vragen: Is conflict gunstig of schadelijk? Wat is de modale 
status van conflict, dat wil zeggen, is het een onuitwisbaar, of een contingent deel 
van het menselijk bestaan? 
Een denker die de agonistische democraten vaak aanhalen om hun positie te 
ondersteunen is de 19e eeuwse Duitse denker Friedrich Nietzsche. Ze wijzen erop 
dat hij conflict zowel in de context van de samenleving als van het zelf positief heeft 
gewaardeerd. Maar binnen het domein van de Nietzsche studies blijven 
commentatoren sterk verdeeld over zijn houding ten aanzien van conflict, en het is 
maar helemaal de vraag of hij het eens zou zijn geweest met de antwoorden die de 
agonistische democraten geven op de twee zojuist genoemde fundamentele vragen. 
Eén cluster commentatoren stelt de zogenaamde zachte lezing voor, en hun 
antagonisten verdedigen de zogenaamde harde lezing. De zachte Nietzsche wordt 
gelezen als iemand die in hoge mate gematigde, agonale strijd voorstaat. 
Voorbeelden van dit soort conflict zijn de niet-gewelddadige artistieke, atletische en 
politieke wedstrijden (of agons) die een belangrijk deel uitmaakten van de antieke 
Griekse cultuur. Voorstanders van deze lezing veronderstellen vaak dat dit soort 
strijd zijn hoogtepunt vindt in moderne democratisch debat. De harde lezing 
daarentegen stelt dat Nietzsche vrijwel uitsluitend ongematigde strijd beschouwde 
als een middel tot culturele renaissance. Daarom hebben velen de harde Nietzsche 
verantwoordelijk gehouden voor de wreedheden die de Nazi’s begingen in de 
dertiger en veertiger jaren van de vorige eeuw. De voorstanders van de harde lezing 
vallen op hun beurt uiteen in twee subgroepen afhankelijk van het specifieke type 
ongematigde strijd waartoe Nietzsche volgens hen aanzette. Ten eerste zijn er 
diegenen die beweren dat Nietzsche oorlog voorschreef als een remedie voor de 
kwalen van de moderniteit – ik noem die zijn militaristische lezers. Naast deze groep 
zijn er degenen die hem lezen alsof hij een moorddadige aristocratische strijd 
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bevorderde van een elitaire minderheid die de massa tot slaaf wil maken en uitbuiten. 
Dat noem ik de radicaal aristocratische interpretatie. 
Het is frustrerend dat beide kampen teksten uit Nietzsche’s corpus kunnen 
aanhalen die hun tendentieuze lezing lijken te bevestigen. Sterker nog, beide kampen 
zien de teksten die op het eerste gezicht hun tegenstanders lijken te steunen als verder 
bewijs voor hun eigen lezing. In deze zin beweren Nietzsche’s zachte lezers vaak 
dat wanneer hij het vocabulaire van de oorlog gebruikt, hij deze taal eigenlijk 
metaforisch gebruikt – namelijk, om te verwijzen naar de gematigde spirituele strijd 
om het zelf te overwinnen, en naar de ideologische strijd om culturele vernieuwing. 
Omgekeerd interpreteren de harde lezers Nietzsche’s lofprijzing van de Griekse 
agon als een alomvattend ondersteunen van de oude Griekse liefde voor conflict – 
dat wil zeggen, inclusief hun geneigdheid tot oorlog. 
In plaats van Nietzsche’s filosofie van conflict te verhelderen, maakt een 
overzicht van de kritische literatuur deze filosofie in menig opzicht duisterder. Het 
belangrijkste doel van dit proefschrift is dan ook om de confrontatie met deze 
impasse aan te gaan. Sommigen zullen geneigd zijn om deze zogenaamde 
contradictie in Nietzsche’s denken te zien als bewijs voor het feit dat hij een 
rommelige denker is, en als een extra reden om hem niet serieus te nemen als 
filosoof. Ik betoog echter dat zo’n vooroordeel misplaatst zou zijn. Een volgehouden 
close reading van Nietzsche’s geschriften onthult een uitgewerkte filosofie van 
conflict die èn systematisch is èn coherent. Om deze coherentie aan te tonen moeten 
we natuurlijk de confrontatie aangaan met het bovengenoemde antagonisme in de 
kritische literatuur. We moeten navigeren tussen de lezingen van Nietzsche als een 
verdediger van louter en alleen het gematigde conflict, en de lezingen die hem 
neerzetten als een verdediger van uitsluitend ongematigd conflict. Raadt Nietzsche 
louter en alleen gematigd of ongematigd conflict aan? Of zijn beide exclusieve 
lezingen aan herziening toe? 
Om deze aporia op te lossen probeert dit proefschrift een kritische analyse te geven 
van Nietzsche’s visie op de aard en waarde van conflict. Ik voer een systematische 
studie uit van zijn vocabulaire van conflict die zijn gehele oeuvre omvat. Een snel 
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overzicht van zijn geschriften toont dat Nietzsche zijn gedachten over conflict naar 
voren bracht in vier clusters van termen. Ten eerste vinden we een cluster Duitse 
woorden die duidelijk verwijzen naar moorddadig gewelddadig conflict: onder 
andere Vernichtungskampf (strijd tot de dood), Krieg (oorlog), Mörder (moord), en 
Zweikampf (duel). We kunnen daarnaast een ander cluster onderscheiden dat nauw 
gerelateerd is aan de vormen van niet-gewelddadige wedijver algemeen verspreid 
onder de oude Grieken: onder andere Wettkampf (wedstrijd), Agon (agon), Wettspiel 
en Wettbewerb (competitie), en Wettstreit (wedijver). Ten derde gebruikt hij een 
apart vocabulaire van conflict (Kampf) om strijd te beschrijven die gericht is op de 
organisatie van complexe systemen – dat wil zeggen, strijd gericht op de 
Einverleibung (incorporatie), Assimilation (assimilatie) en Herrschaft (dominantie) 
van bepaalde entiteiten. Deze vorm van strijd wordt dan gekoppeld aan een andere 
die gericht is op de Unterdrückung (onderdrukking), Zurückstoẞ en (terugdringen), 
Ausscheidung (excretie) en zelfs Zerstörung (vernietiging) van bepaalde entiteiten. 
In de respectievelijke hoofdstukken ontleed ik elk van deze aspecten van Nietzsche’s 
vocabulaire van conflict en bepaal ik of er een onderliggende coherentie is in zijn 
gebruik ervan. 
Op basis van dit voorbereidende werk beweer ik dat zowel de zachte als de 
harde lezingen eenzijdig zijn en aanpassing behoeven. De stelling die dit proefschrift 
verdedigt is: Nietzsche bevordert zowel gematigde als ongematigde strijd op een 
volstrekt coherente wijze. Ik betoog ook dat commentatoren de meest significante 
vorm van conflict in Nietzsche’s denken hebben veronachtzaamd. Deze vorm wordt 
gekenmerkt door een combinatie van gematigd en ongematigd conflict, en Nietzsche 
beschouwt dit als noodzakelijk voor iedere vorm van leven – individueel en sociaal 
– om te bestaan en zich uit te breiden. We zouden dit type strijd kunnen zien als 
analoog aan de biologische processen van voeding en spijsvertering. Hierdoor gaat 
een organisme tegelijkertijd een gematigde strijd aan om nuttig materiaal uit zijn 
omgeving te incorporeren en een ongematigde strijd om materiaal dat overbodig of 
schadelijk blijkt af te scheiden. Deze dubbele strijd is wat ik organisatorisch conflict 
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noem omdat zowel incorporatie als afscheiding deel uitmaken van één 
overkoepelende drang om een gezonde organisatie te bereiken.  
Mijn analyse verheldert een aantal specifieke tekortkomingen van de zachte 
en harde lezingen. We zien dat de zachte lezing, die Nietzsche neerzet als geheel 
gewijd aan de transformatie van destructief in cultureel produktief conflict, 
voorbijgaat aan het feit dat er fases zijn waarin Nietzsche gewelddadige strijd ziet 
als onuitroeibaar en cultureel gunstig. We vinden ook dat Nietzsche zeer kritisch is 
op politiek agonisme, waarbij hij twijfel zaait over de zachte, agonistisch 
democratische toeëigening van zijn denken. Onze studie van organisatorisch conflict 
onthult bovendien dat Nietzsche een vorm van strijd positief waardeert die 
ongelijkheid en uitsluiting bevordert op een manier die volledig in strijd is met de 
zachte lezing, die wordt gekenmerkt door een democratisch ethos van 
gelijkheidsdenken en inclusiviteit. Desalniettemin zien we dat de harde 
militaristische lezing ook zijn tekortkomingen heeft voor zover deze bewust de niet-
gewelddadige aard van Nietzsche’s verering van de agon negeert. We zijn er ook 
getuige van hoe de radicaal aristocratische lezing Nietzsche’s verdediging van 
uitbuiting verkeerd interpreteert als steun voor moorddadige immorele slavernij. 
Eigenlijk beschouwt Nietzsche dit soort uitbuiting als hoogst onverstandig en 
ongezond. De ideale relatie van uitbuiting is er eerder één waarin de bevelhebber 
zorgt voor zijn ondergeschikten omdat hij belang heeft bij hun behoud en kracht. 
Het is mijn hoop dat deze studie gevolgen zal hebben voor diegenen die Nietzsche 
overhaast verwerpen omdat hij geweld zou verheerlijken, en ook voor diegenen die 
zich ten onrechte zijn denken toe eigenen uit naam van een democratische politieke 
agenda. Bovendien is mijn doel om, door de reconstructie en kritische evaluatie van 
Nietzsche’s denken over strijd, licht te werpen op een aantal bredere filosofische 
vragen ten aanzien van de aard en waarde van conflict. 
In hoofstuk 1 onderzoek ik Nietzsche’s denken omtrent vernietigingsstrijd 
(Vernichtungskämpfe), en meer in het bijzonder oorlog. Ik weerleg de louter 
agonistische lezing door aan te tonen dat Nietzsche in zijn werk talrijke argumenten 
geeft hoe we dodelijke vormen van strijd moeten waarderen. Ik stel verder dat veel 
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van deze argumenten, vooral in zijn vroege werken, worden ondersteund door een 
beschrijving van destructief conflict die uitermate problematisch is voor zijn 
agonistische lezers, die Nietzsche allemaal zien als iemand die de volledige 
transformatie van destructief in constructief agonistisch conflict nastreeft. Hoewel 
er inderdaad teksten zijn waarin hij transformatie aanbeveelt, vraag ik aandacht voor 
passages waar hij gewelddadige destructieve strijd beschouwt als niet te 
transformeren. In deze lijn van argumentatie wordt oorlog gezien als onvermijdelijk 
omdat mensen een onweerstaanbare drang hebben voor met name moorddadig 
conflict. Mijn oplossing voor deze ogenschijnlijke tegenstelling is de suggestie dat 
deze problematische conceptie van destructief conflict voor het grootste deel beperkt 
is tot zijn vroege werken. Zodra hij afstand neemt van Schopenhauer van wie hij dit 
idee overneemt, en in de jaren 1880 in de richting van de natuurwetenschappen 
beweegt, gaat hij destructief conflict beschouwen als de contingente expressie van 
een algemene impuls anderen de overmeesteren – een impuls die niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs moorddadig is en daarom ook een uitlaatklep kan krijgen in niet-
gewelddadige vormen van conflict. 
In hoofdstuk 2 analyseer ik de vorm van conflict die Nietzsche vaak tegenover 
destructieve strijd zet – namelijk agonale wedijver. Ik weerleg de harde, louter 
ongematigde lezingen en betoog dat Nietzsche op consistente wijze gematigde 
agonale relaties voorstaat. Om te bepalen wat dit omarmen van agonale wedijver 
behelst, moeten we echter eerst drie discussies over interpretatie oplossen. Ten eerste 
is het onduidelijk of Nietzsche agonale wedijver ziet als een specifiek niet-
gewelddadige vorm van conflict of dat het moorddadige vormen van strijd zoals 
oorlog omvat. Wij stellen echter vast dat hij agonaal conflict zonder meer als niet-
destructief ziet. We ontdekken verder dat hij agon ziet als een niet-uitbuitende soort 
strijd. Agonale strijders vechten om roem en persoonlijke glorie die geen middel is 
om hun tegenstanders te overheersen. 
Ten tweede betwisten commentatoren de middelen die Nietzsche voorstelt 
om agonale maatvoering concreet de institutionaliseren in de samenleving. Hoe kan 
men mensen ervan weerhouden om de overwinning na te streven met onbegrensde 
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middelen? Hoe kan men bijvoorbeeld politieke tegenstanders ervan weerhouden om 
hun toevlucht te nemen tot geweld in de strijd om de macht? Sommigen beweren dat 
Nietzsche’s agonisme berust op het cultiveren van zelf-beheersing, anderen 
bedenken dat maatvoering het resultaat is van een balans tussen gelijkwaardige 
tegenstanders (we kunnen hierbij denken aan de scheiding van politieke machten in 
de Verenigde Staten). Mijn analyse laat echter zien dat zowel zelfbeheersing als 
gelijkheid feitelijk fundamentele bronnen van agonale matiging zijn. Ik benadruk 
verder het vaak veronachtzaamde belang van religieuze, educatieve en juridische 
instituties in Nietzsche’s betoog. Volgens deze opvatting dienen zij om een ethos 
van zelf-moderatie aan te brengen.  
Ten derde is er onenigheid over de vraag of Nietzsche de agon voorstaat op 
een inclusieve, niet klasse-specifieke wijze, of dat zijn steun beperkt is tot een 
elitaire minderheid van aristocratische gelijken. Ik stel dat, volgens Nietzsche, 
agonale wedijver kan (en moet) plaatsvinden tussen individuen van min of meer 
gelijke vermogens, ongeacht hun klasse. Desalniettemin onderscheidt hij ook een 
hogere vorm van agon die gestreden wordt omwille van eeuwige roem, en die sterk 
geassocieerd wordt met de aristocratische klassen. 
Na te hebben vastgesteld dat Nietzsche agonaal gematigd conflict alleen 
voorstaat onder zeldzame condities van gelijkheid, laat ik in de hoofdstukken 3 en 4 
zien hoe hij een vrij unieke vorm van gematigd conflict voorstaat onder condities 
van ongelijkheid. Dit derde type conflict is wat ik al heb beschreven als de strijd in 
de vorm van uitbuiting ten dienste van organisatie. Organisatorische strijd is 
gematigd in zoverre als het streeft naar het behoud van dat wat overmeesterd wordt 
(zij het in een positie van dienstbaarheid); we vinden echter dat het conceptueel is 
onderscheiden van agonaal gematigd conflict in de zin dat het a) gericht is op 
exploitatie; b) plaatsvindt onder condities van ongelijkheid; en c) geconditioneerd 
wordt door ongematigde strijd gericht op afscheiding (denk aan de eerder genoemde 
analogie met voeding en spijsvertering die afscheiding noodzakelijk maakt). 
We constateren verder dat organisatorisch conflict veel prominenter 
optreedt dan hetzij moorddadig hetzij agonaal conflict in Nietzsche’s zoektocht voor 
 453 
een geneesmiddel voor de kwalen die de moderniteit plagen. Nietzsche stelt de 
diagnose dat moderne individuen en samenlevingen de harmonie missen die een 
bloeiend leven mogelijk maakt. De veelheid van krachten die deze vormen van leven 
constitueren trekken in tegenstelde richtingen en frustreren elkaar. Deze toestand 
laat zowel het moderne individu als de moderne samenleving verlamd en impotent 
achter. We zien dat Nietzsche verreweg de voorkeur geeft aan het vormen van 
instrumentele hiërarchieën als middel tegen deze kwaal, en dat hij beweert dat deze 
hiërarchieën door middel van organisatorische strijd tot stand worden gebracht. In 
psychologische termen betekent dit strijden om bepaalde driften (d.w.z. impulsen of 
verlangens) in te perken zodat ze gehoorzaam onze hogere doelen dienen. In 
tegenstelling echter tot sommige lezingen van Nietzsche, die hem zien als krachtig 
tegenstander van psychologische onderdrukking, stel ik voorop hoe hij zijn lezers 
aanspoort om onbeheersbare impulsen uit te roeien. In sociale termen toont 
organisatorische strijd zich als een drang om zwakkere individuen uit te buiten. Maar 
in tegenstelling tot Nietzsche’s radicaal aristocratische lezers die deze uitbuiting zien 
als een moorddadige vorm van slavernij, is Nietzsche’s opvatting van gezonde 
exploitatie inherent gematigd. Ofwel de uitbuiter wil de uitgebuite partij behouden 
en zorgt daarom voor hun welbevinden, of de ondergeschikte partij dient de 
superieuren vrijwillig vanwege de gunsten die dit haar verleent. Tegelijkertijd 
benadrukt Nietzsche ook de noodzaak dat een samenleving individuen buitensluit 
die haar vitaliteit bedreigen. I concludeer echter dat dit geenszins gelijkgesteld moet 
worden met een acceptatie van genocide (zoals sommigen hebben beweerd) omdat 
we ons gemakkelijk kunnen voorstellen dat dit met minder afschuwelijke middelen 
gerealiseerd kan worden, zoals bijvoorbeeld het in het leven roepen van een 
strafsysteem dat werkelijk gericht is op resocialisatie. 
Hoewel ik de aandacht richt op de overeenstemming tussen remedies voor 
desintegratie die de vroege resp. de late Nietzsche voorstellen, benadruk ik tevens 
een punt van verschil. In hoofdstuk 3 zien we dat Nietzsche’s vroege notie van 
organisatorische strijd berust op twee cruciale metafysische aannames. Maar in 
hoofdstuk 4 vinden we dat deze volledig afwezig zijn van zijn latere theorie van 
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organisatie. De vroege Nietzsche werkt met Schopenhauer’s overtuiging dat de 
organisatie van elk wezen gefundeerd is in de eenheid van zijn essentie. Vóór de late 
jaren 1870, houdt Nietzsche vol dat we de ware onveranderlijke essentie van ons 
zelf (d.w.z. ons karakter) moeten identificeren om onszelf te organiseren. Zodra we 
weten wat onze ware roeping in het leven is, die wordt gedicteerd door ons essentiële 
karakter, hebben we een criterium waarmee we kunnen bepalen of gedragsimpulsen 
potentieel bevorderlijk of schadelijk zijn. Met andere woorden, we kunnen afleiden 
of we een impuls moeten cultiveren of uitroeien. Voor de vroege Nietzsche heeft het 
vaststellen en erkennen van het essentiële doel van de samenleving – namelijk het 
creëren van exemplaren van de genius – een overeenkomstige functie. Het geeft ons 
een criterium waarmee we de waarden en sociale structuren die we zouden moeten 
bevorderen kunnen onderscheiden van degenen die we zouden moeten afschaffen. 
Na de late jaren 1870, echter, gaat Nietzsche ertoe over om diezelfde essenties die 
zijn vroege theorie van organisatie funderen te verwerpen. Volgens de latere 
Nietzsche zijn er geen menselijke essenties – het zelf is slechts een contingente 
pluraliteit van driften – en kunnen we evenmin spreken van het essentiële doel van 
een samenleving. 
De vraag die we daarom in hoofdstuk 4 moeten stellen is: hoe 
conceptualiseert de latere Nietzsche organisatorische strijd zonder de metafysische 
fundamenten van zijn eerdere filosofie? Ik reconstrueer hoe hij zijn studies van de 
natuurwetenschappen benut om een niet-metafysisch betoog over organisatie te 
ontwikkelen. Dit behelst een gedetailleerde exegese van zijn theorie van wereld als 
wil tot macht (Wille zur Macht), die bestaan voorstelt als een constellatie van 
krachten die streven naar het vermeerderen van hun macht. Volgens deze theorie is 
organisatie het resultaat van bepaalde krachten in het zelf of in de samenleving die 
de controle aan zich trekken en de ondergeschikte krachten samenbrengen in een 
functionerende eenheid. Zoals we zien aan het einde van hoofdstuk 4 is het voor de 
latere Nietzsche het inzicht in de aard van de wereld als wil tot macht – in plaats van 
een of andere metafysische essentie – dat de raderen van de organisatie in beweging 
zet. 
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Als conclusie vat ik samen hoe Nietzsche’s uiteindelijke gedachten over 
conflict een coherent geheel vormen. We vinden dat Nietzsche de verschillende 
soorten van gematigd en ongematigd conflict voorschrijft onder vrijwel compatibele 
voorwaarden. Daarmee wordt duidelijk dat het antagonisme tussen de zachte 
(gematigde) en harde (ongematigde) lezingen ons een valse tweedeling presenteert. 
Na een aantal van de meest schadelijke defecten te hebben opgesomd die ons 
conventionele concept van conflict met zich meebrengt, sluit ik af met een suggestie 
hoe we, op grond van onze resultaten, het concept van conflict kunnen herformuleren 
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